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Adhikaraṇa—Sampadyāvirbhūtādhikaraṇa[850]—of the fourth *pāda* of the fourth *Adhyāya*.

The effect of *dahara*, etc., *upāsana* is to attain a *śarīra* which is actually that of the form of Sadāśiva (*Śarīra sākshāt Sadāśivarūpō bhavati*). How? *Śabdāt*, *i.e.*, by the utterance, *Aham Brahmāsmi* (IV. 1. 1). He realizes thus his real *svarūpa*; as water joins with water and fire unites with fire, in the same way, the *jīva* joins with *Śivasvarūpa* (*Śivasvarūpēṇa svarūpaikya kathanāt*, IV. 1. 2). Thus the *jīva* attains to *Śivalōka* through the *Prabhākaramaṇḍala* and joins the *Śivatattva region*. If it is doubted whether the *jīva* entering the *Śivalōka* (*Śivalōka prāptirēva*) was one with the body of Paraśiva Brahman himself, the next *Sūtra* answers the doubt—*Ātmā prakaraṇāt*. In this *Sūtra*, the term *ātma* means Paramātma and is used in the sense of *jyōti* (light regarded as the Supreme Spirit). It does not mean the region of the Sun (*āditya maṇḍala*). Why? Because it is a topic by itself (*prakaraṇāt*). *Sruti* texts like *Ya ātmā apahatapāpmā vijarō vimrutyurviśōkō vijighatsō pipāsassatyakāmassatyasankalpaḥ*,[851] *iti*, etc., declare that *ātmā* treats of the topic of *Prajāpati Brahman* and this is purely one which speaks of Paramātman, as explained in the *Sūtra*, *Uttarāśchēdāvirbhūta svarūpastu iti*. If the *jīva* which has neither beginning nor end (*anādi*) is not at this stage freed from all worldly bondage, then how else could it attain such a condition? *Sruti* texts like *Gnā gnau dvāu ajāvīśānīśau*,[852] etc., declare that the *jīva* and *Īśvara* are eternally little-knowing and all-knowing respectively, characteristics which are opposite in character and always co-existing. But as the effect of concentrated meditation (*Brahmavidyā mahimnā*), the *jīva* becomes quite free from the *mala-traya* bondage and in that liberated condition becomes a pure *jīva* and joins that *Paranjyōti* form in his next state, just as a river joins the ocean and is transferred

[850] The *Adhikaraṇa* which deals with that which is brought about, accomplished, effectuated or manifested.

[851] *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 1.

[852] *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 9.

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into the ocean, as declared in hundreds of *Sruti* texts like *Yathā nadyassyandamānāssamudrē astam gachchanti nāmarūpē vihāya, Tathā vidvān nāmarūpādvimuktaḥ parātparam purushamupaiti divyam*,[853] *Brahma vēda Brahmaiva bhavati, Tattvamasi*,[854] *Aham Brahmāsmi*,[855] *Brahmavidāpnōti param, Gnātvā Śivam śāntamatyantamēti*,[856] *iti*, etc., which enunciate the truth that the *jīva* and the *Brahman* are clearly explained to be of a *bhēda* and *abhēda* character. Thus ends the *Sampadyāvirbhūtādhikaraṇam*.

The Attainment of Mukti.

What is 'mukti'? How is it attained? Is there any continuance of 'bhēda' after attaining mukti? These are questions which are again and again referred to by Srīpati. Commenting on IV. 3. 9, *Sāmīpyāttu tadvyapadēśaḥ* (*Parabrahma sāmīpya is mukti*), he gives an outline of his views. After remarking that the *śabda 'tu'* here clears the doubt, he states that *Sruti* texts like *Yō dēvānām prabhavaśchōdbhavaścha viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ*,[857] *Hiraṇyagarbham janayāmāsa pūrvam sanōbudhyā śubhayā samyunaktu*, etc., declare that the *jīva* came into origin through Parabrahma Śiva by the agency of *Hiraṇyagarbha* and that in meditating on him alone lies his union with him. Then again the *Sruti* texts, *Tamīśānam varadam dēvamīḍyam*[858] *nichāyyainām śāntimatyantamēti, Yō dēvānām prathamaśchōdbhavaścha viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ, Hiraṇyagarbham paśyata jāyamānam sanō budhyā śubhayā samyunaktu*, etc., declare that the *jīva* through constant meditation gets within sight of *Hiraṇyagarbha*[859] through whom he is brought to the presence of Parabrahman and within sight of him. He,

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[853] *Mund. Upa.*, II. 1.

[854] *Ibid.*, III. 1. 3.

[855] *Brihad. Upa.*, 1. 4. 10.

[856] *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 14.

[857] *Mahōpa.*, X. 19.

[858] *Ibid.*

[859] *Cf.* Ānandatīrtha. *Hiraṇyagarbhaḥ, khaprōktaḥ īśaḥ Sankara ēvacha srishṭyādinā vartayati* ॥ *Skānda.* In the beginning, Parabrahman assumes the *vyakta* (*sat*) form in *Hiraṇyagarbha* and begins the work of creation, etc.

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the *mumukshu* (*i.e.*, the released soul), then has no other to meditate upon except Parabrahman and enjoy the bliss of his sight (*svasamīpa Hiraṇyagarbhēkshitrutvam śubha smriti hētutvamcha vyavasthāpanāchcha*). *Sruti* texts like *Yō vēda nihitam guhāyām paramē vyōman, Sō'śnutē sarvān kāmān saha Brahmaṇā vipaśchita,*[860] etc., declare that the *upāsaka* of Parabrahman by nearness to Parabrahman and enjoying the bliss of his sight will have been entirely granted every wish (*sarva kāma*) of his. This is the established fact. *Sruti* texts like *Tatpurushō mānavassa ēnān Brahmagamayati,*[861] etc. (That being—hitherto a mere man—hastens towards the determinate knowledge that he is gone away to Brahman) declare that the *mumukshu* is one who has speedily gone near to Śiva (*Śiva ēva avagamyati*). *Sruti* texts like *Śiva ēkōdhyēyaḥ śivankaraḥ sarvamanyat parityajya,*[862] etc., state that *mumukshus* should not meditate upon any one other than Śiva Parabrahman. In order to remove this objection—for meditation on *Hiraṇyagarbha* is mentioned above in another text—the next *Sūtra* mentions the alternative proof: *Kāryātyayē tadadhyakshēna sahātaḥ paramabhidhānāt.* There are the *Sruti* texts which we have heard: *Gatāḥ kalāḥ panchadaśā pratishṭhā dēvāścha sarvē pratidēvatāsu; Karmāṇi vignānamayaścha ātmā parē'vyayē sarva ēkībhavanti.*[863] These declare that all *dēvas* in whom are invested the fifteenth part of Paramātman's power return to him at the time of *mōksha*. Thus all *karmas* performed having resulted in abiding knowledge, all *ātmas* become associated with the Imperishable Supreme. In the *Sūtra*, the word *kāryātyayē* means when the *mumukshus* reach their final stage of bodily existence, when they are to cast off their carnal sheaths, when the work to be done through their sensory organs has absolutely ended. The word *ataḥ* signifies "therefore". Then the word *paramabhidhānāt*

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[860] *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.
[861] *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 15. 6.
[862] *Śveta. Upa.*, IV. 14.
[863] *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 7.

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means that they are therefore termed to be installed along with others already in association with Parabrahman (*tad-adhishṭhāna Brahmādi dēvatābhissaha*[864] *paramabhidhānāt*). This is what is meant when it is said that by the expression *paramātmanēkībhavatva*, *i.e.*, becoming associated with the Paramātman. Why *mumukshus* should meditate only on *Hiraṇyagarbha* is a topic which is pleasant not to discuss. Therefore the *Sruti* texts: *Ēsha dēvapathō Brahmapatha ētēna pratipādyamānā imam mānavamāvartantē*;[865] *Tayōrdhvamāyannamrutatvamēti*;[866] etc., declare that this is the chief way for the *dēvas* to reach the path to Brahman (*Brahmapatha*) by reaching which this *mānava* (being) has not to go back for further rotation (of births and deaths) and getting into this path, he rises up higher and higher until he reaches the deathless stage (*amrutatva*). The *Srutis* here do not mention *Hiraṇyagarbhapatha* but since the *mumukshu* has no further rotation, he is declared to have reached the stage known as *Chitkailāsa*.

As from *Smriti* texts like *Ābrahma bhuvanāllōkāḥ punarāvrittinō'rjuna*,[867] etc., we hear that the Brahma and other worlds are non-eternal, the world even before it came to be created and after its dissolution, existed only in the womb of Śiva as propounded in the texts *Yadā tamastan na divā na rātrir nasan nachāsachchiva ēva kēvalaḥ*;[868] *Tadaksharam tatsavituvarēṇyam pragnācha tasmāt praśrutā purāṇi*, etc. *Sruti* texts like *Ritam satyam param Brahma purusham krishṇa pingalam*,[869] etc., clearly state that *Brahmadharma* is declared to be existing at all the three times—past, present and future—without interruption and that *ritatva* and *satyatva* are the characteristic *dharmas* of

[864] Note that the words used directly suggest that *Brahma* and other gods are there already and *mumukshus* are only installed in their group on their obtaining their release—when their sensory organs cease to work and carnal bodies are cast off.

[865] *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 15. 6.

[866] *Ibid.*, VIII. 6. 6.

[867] *Bhagavad-Gītā*, VIII. 16.

[868] *Taitt. Upa.*, VI. 10.

[869] *Mahōpa.*, X. 20.

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no one else but Parabrahman whom the *mumukshus* should meditate upon and none else.

Smritēścha (IV. 3. 11) (*On account of the smriti*). The *Smriti* texts, *Śivāmśabhūtajīvānām Śivōpāsanamuchyatē*; *Śivasyānugrahādēva krimi kīṭakavat sadā*; *Śivātmakatvam samprāpya na punarjanma labhyatē*, etc., clearly declare that to those who meditate on Śiva alone, there is no more return as they will have attained *Śivātmakatva*.[870] To *mumukshus*, no other *upāsana* is prescribed.

In this connection an alternative practice also is explained in the next *Sūtra*: *Param Jaiminir mukhyatvāt* (IV. 3. 12) (*The highest Jaimini opines; on account of primariness of meaning*). The *Sruti* texts, *Ritam satyam param Brahma purusham krishṇa pingalam*;[871] *Brahmādhipatir Brahmaṇōdhipatir Brahmā Śivō mē astu Sadāśivōm*,[872] etc., declare that the Śiva form of Parabrahman is the highest form for meditation—the symbolic form of *praṇava*. Jaimini thinks that all those who meditate on this Śiva form of Parabrahman are taken to *Śivalōka* led by *ātivāhikas* (angels of Kailāsa). Why? Because that is the chief place intended for them, according to the *Sruti* text *Brahmavidāpnōti param*,[873] etc. For the word "*Brahman*" always *denotes in its most important sense* "*Parabrahman*" only (*Brahma śabdasya parasminnēvāt Brahmaṇi mukhyatvāt*).[874] At other times, the word *Brahma* denotes *Chaturmukha*, *Hiraṇyagarbha*, etc., according to the sense in which the terms are used in the beginning and the end with reference to *shaḍvidha linga tātparya* without contradiction (*Chaturmukha Hiraṇyagarbha pakshē upakramōpasamhārādi shaḍvidha linga tātparyē virōdhāchcha*). Therefore in *Sruti* texts like *Tatpurushō mānavassaēnān*[875]

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[870] Assuming Śiva's own form.

[871] *Mahopa.*, X. 20.

[872] *Mahōpa.*, X. 21.

[873] *Brihad. Upa.*, IV. 6.

[874] This should be compared with Ānandatīrtha's words: "*Brahma śabdasya Vishṇvāvēva*" (The word Brahma in its highest sense implies only Vishṇu). He quotes the *Sruti* text: *Tadēva Brahma paramam kavīnām. Mahōpa.*, I; See *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāshya*, I. 1. 1.

[875] *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 15. 6.

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Brahma gamayati, etc., the word *Brahma* should be interpreted in terms of Śiva (*Śivaparatvam*). This is the conclusion.

Further argument as to this is adduced in the next *Sūtra*: *Darśanāchcha* (IV. 3. 13) (*And because Scripture declares it*). *Yēsha samprasādō'smāchcharīrāt samutthāya paramjyōtirupasampadya svēna rūpēṇābhinishpadyatē*;[876] *Yathā nadyassyandamānāssamudrē astam gachchanti nāmarūpē vihāya* | *Tathā vidvān nāmarūpāt vimuktaḥ Parātparam purushamupaiti divyam*;[877] these and other *Sruti* texts declare that *jīva* and *Brahman* are as the attainable and the attained (*prāpyaprāpakatvēna*)[878] without contradiction in a manner which exhibits *bhēda* as well as *abhēda*. To attribute to the *jīva* for ever the state of Brahman (*Brahmatvam sadā*) or to postulate eternal difference (*sadā bhinnatvam*) between the *jīva* and the Brahman cannot ever be accepted (*Jīvasyaiva Brahmatvam sadā jīva bhinnatvamcha nāngīkartavyam*).

The further argument for this is adduced in the next *Sūtra*: *Na cha kāryē pratyabhisandhiḥ* (IV. 3. 14) [*And the objective is not towards union* (*with Hiraṇyagarbha*)]. *Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ*;[879] *Hiraṇyagarbham janayāmāsa pūrvam*;[880] these and other *Sruti* texts declare that there is no promise that the *jīva* would attain the *Hiraṇyagarbha* form. Hence the word *pratyabhisandhiḥ*—there is no declaratory statement that the *jīva* will attain the *Hiraṇyagarbha* form. There is no declaration, that through the agency of the dissolution of the *jīva* form, he will attain to *Hiraṇyagarbha* form in *mōksha*. *Tamēvam viditvā atimrutyumēti*; *Nānyaḥpanthā vidyatē ayanāya*;[881] *Gnātvā Śivam śāntam atyantamēti*;[882] these and other *Sruti* texts declare that it is

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[876] *Chch. Upa.*, VII. 3. 4.
[877] *Mund. Upa.*, II. 1.
[878] *Prāpaka*=Procuring, conveying, leading to attainment. *Prāpya*='To be reached; attainable.
[879] *Mahōpa.*, X. 19.
[880] *Ibid.*, XI. 19.
[881] *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 12.
[882] *Atharvaśiras.*

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only after fully knowing Śiva through his *gnāna* that the *jīva* can attain *Śivatādātmya* and *sāyujya* (intimate union with Brahman) and *mukti*. Those who meditate upon *Chaturmukha* Brahma will, according to *Srutis*, *Smritis* and *Purāṇas*, attain a form of *mukti* wherefrom no further return is declared (to be possible). *Sruti* texts like *Aśva iva rōmāṇi vidhūya pāpam chandra iva rāhōrmukhāt pramuchya dhūtvā śarīramakrutam krutātmā Brahmalōkam abhisambhavāmi*,[883] point out that wherever *Brahmalōka* is referred to in the *Srutis*, it is to be understood as applicable to *Śivalōka*. In this manner, agreeably to the maxim, *bahavōpyēka yatnita*, though many may be the trials put forward, yet the objective aimed at is the same; while conforming to the theories (of philosophy) advanced by different Āchāryas, our own system of philosophy has been made to shine.[884]

Apratīkālambanānnayatīti Bādarāyaṇa ubhayathā cha dōshāttatkratuścha (IV. 3. 15) (*Those not depending on symbols he leads thus, says Bādarāyaṇa; there being a defect in both cases; and he whose thought is that*). *Apratīkālambanam* means those who act contrary to *pratīkālambana*. (Those who do not seek the support of Brahman through meditating on images (*pratīkas*) are called *Apratīkālambanas*.) Such of them—*i.e.*, *Apratīkālambanas*—are led by the group of *Ātivāhikas*—*i.e.*, divine carriers of *muktas*—to the presence of Brahman through the *Archirādi mārga*. Thus opines Bādarāyaṇa. This *Sūtra* declares thus: Meditation (*upāsanam*) carries every one to *mukti*; but this does not apply uniformly in the same way generally to all (*muktas*). *Sruti* texts like *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma*; *Tajjalānīti śānta upāsīta*;[885] *Aitadātmyamidam sarvam tatsatyam sa ātmā tattvamasi śvētakētō*;[886] *Tattvamēva*

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[883] *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 11. 1.

[884] Śrīpati says that he has interpreted the systems of other Āchāryas—*bhēda* and *abhēda*—in conformity with their views but has at the same time made them illustrate the truth of his own system of philosophy.

[885] *Chch. Upa.*, III. 14. [886] *Ibid.*, VI. 1. 8.

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tvamēva tat; *Tvam Brahmāsi*; *Aham Brahmāsmi*;[887] etc., declare that this universe consisting of *chētana* and *achētana* beings is the result of *Brahmakārya* and is pervaded by Brahma (*Brahmātmakatva*) and this can be realized through meditation whereby the meditator realizes *Brahmatattva* (*dhyānēna Brahmatattva prāptyavagamāt*). The *Sūtra* has the expression *ubhayathācha dōsha tatkratuścha*. If this expression is explained in accordance with *Dvaita Sruti* texts like *Dvā suparṇau*,[888] etc., and made to declare in *upāsana* that the *jīva* and the *Brahman* are different, then many *Advaita* texts like *Tattvamasi*,[889] etc., are tainted with the sin of compromise. If, on the other hand, the *Advaita Sruti* texts are treated as more important, then many hundreds of *Dvaita Sruti* texts would be tainted with the sin of compromise. And therefore it is that we have to accept the theory of *bhēda* and *abhēda* between *jīva* and *Brahman* on the analogy of the *bhramara* and the *kīta* and numerous other examples of a similar kind. *Yēsha samprasādō'smāchcharīrāt samutthāya paramjyōtirupasampadya svēnarūpēṇābhinishpadyatē*;[890] *Yathā nadyassyandamānāssamudrē astam gachchanti nāmarūpē vihāya*,[891] etc. *Sruti* texts declare that one should not stick to a one-sided view and a view which has been repudiated. The *Sūtra* uses the expression *tat kratuścha*. This is the realization he has toiled for and obtained at last. As the *Sruti* texts *Tam yathā yathōpāsata*,[892] etc., declare that the fruit of one's action will be in accordance with his meditation and trials. Therefore whatever one does in this world, he will reap the fruit of the same in the next, quite in accordance with his action. To the meditators, the meditated (object) will be at hand. Throughout

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[887] *Brihad. Upa.*, I. 4. 10.
[888] *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 1.
[889] *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 1. 8.
[890] *Ibid.*, VIII. 12. 14.
[891] *Mund. Upa.*, II. 1.
[892] *Kaṭha Upa.*, IV. 10.

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the *Vēdānta* in its entirety, it is declared that *bhēdābhēda* should be accepted as inevitable (*durvārya*).

Verily it is seen in *Sruti* texts like *Nārāyaṇa param Brahma tattvam Nārāyaṇaḥ paraḥ*,[893] etc., that meditation is undertaken in connection with Vishṇu and many other gods. But in the *Dahara*, *Śāṇḍilya*, *Upakōsala*, *Vaiśvānara* and other *vidyas*, it is clearly explained that that particular form of God which entirely releases beings from the bondage of *Māyā* should be meditated upon. And if it is asked which is that particular form, it is explained in the next *Sūtra*: *Viśēshancha darśayati* (IV. 3. 16) (*And Scripture declares the difference*). Here the indeclinable particle *cha* indicates certainty in the meaning (*niśchayārthaḥ*). In the midst of *jīvas* possessing the *paśu* form of Brahma, Vishṇu, etc., Śiva Parabrahman is Paśupati. The term *viśēshancha* signifies that this is generally borne testimony to in the *Rig* and other *Vēdas* and in the *Vēdānta*. *Darśayati* means *shines forth*; *i.e.*, that this fact is brought to light. Thus it is testified to in the following texts of the *Rigvēda*:— *Antarichchanti tam janē*; *Rudram parō manīshayā gribhnanti jihvayāsanam*; *Ayam mē hastō bhagavān ayam mē bhagavattaraḥ*; *Ayam mē viśvabhēshajō ayam śivābhimarshaṇaḥ*, etc., and in the following texts of the *Yajurvēda*: *Yātē Rudraḥ Śivātanūḥ aghorā pāpakāśinī*; *Tayānastanuvā śantamayā giriśantābhichākaśīhi*; *Triyambakam yajāmahē*, etc., and it is also seen thus testified to elsewhere.

Moreover, in the *Taittirīya* in the text, *Daharam vipāpam*, while prescribing for the *mumukshus* the meditation upon Parabrahman within their hearts (*daharapuṇḍarīka*), it is said in the text, *Yō vēdādau svaraḥ prōktō vedāntēcha pratishṭhitaḥ*; *Tasya prakritilīnasya yaḥ parassa mahēśvaraḥ*,[894] etc., in which the meditation on Mahēśvara is prescribed. And also texts like *Na karmaṇā na prajayā dhanēna*,[895] etc., declare that

[893] *Mahōpa.*, XI. 4.
[894] *Ibid.*, X. 24.
[895] *Kaivalya Upa.*, 2.

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all those who have freed themselves from worldly bondages and family ties and have accordingly become *viraktas*, should in the midst of other *dēvas* ardently aspire for meditation on Śiva.

The *Sruti* text beginning with the words *Sahasra śīrsham dēvam*,[896] etc., eulogizes God Nārāyaṇa at length and the hymn beginning with *Padmakōśa pratīkāśam* and ending with *Tasyāśśikhāyām madhyē Paramātmā vyavasthitaḥ*,[897] etc., declares that Nārāyaṇa in his three forms should be meditated upon in one's own heart. Then, further on, *Sruti* texts like *Ādityōvā ēsha ētanmaṇḍalam tapati*,[898] etc., declare that Śiva pervades everything including the *Ādityamaṇḍala* and the *Sruti* text beginning with *Nidhanapatayē namaḥ*[899] and ending with *Pāṇimantram pavitram*, declares that Śiva Parabrahman pervades every part of the universe in his two symbolic forms of *Mūrta* and *Amūrta*, which cause the creation of the *jagat* in its manifested condition. The *Sruti* then prescribes that according to the five texts beginning with *Sadyōjātādi*, etc., and ending with *Namō hiraṇyabāhavē* eulogizing Śiva in all his glowing forms, including Umā Śakti, that these (*Mūrta* and *Amūrta*) forms should be meditated upon by all those who seek for *mukti*. And the *Sruti* text, *Ritam satyam param Brahma*,[900] etc., declares that the forms of Krishṇapingala Virūpāksha and Viśvarūpa are to be meditated upon. In the *Kaivalya*, the text beginning with *Hritpuṇḍarīkam virajam viśuddham*, etc., and ending with *Tadādi madhyānta vihīnamēkam vibhum chidānandamarūpamadbhutam; Umāsahāyam paramēśvaram prabhum trilōchanam nīlakaṇṭham praśāntam*, and other similar texts declare clearly that only the Parabrahman form of Śiva, who is the presiding supreme deity at heart, should be meditated upon in his *Mūrta* and *Amūrta* forms. The *Smriti*

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[896] *Mahōpa.*, XI. 1.
[897] *Ibid.*
[898] *Chch. Upa.*, III. 19.
[899] *Mahōpa.*, XIV. 1.
[900] *Ibid.*, X. 21.

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texts, *Sarvabhūtasthamātmānam sarvabhūtānichātmani । Sampaśyan Brahma paramam yāti nānyēna hētunā*[901] etc., clearly declare that *Śivōpāsana* only is capable of granting *mukti*. In *Śivasankalpōpanishad* and *Bōdhāyana Sūtra*, the texts *Parātparatarō Brahmā tatparāt paratō Hariḥ । Yatparātparatō Īśastanmē manaśśivasankalpamastu*, etc., clearly prove that Mahēśvara is the greatest of all deities (*Mahēśvarasya sarvādhikatva nirdēśāt*).

As regards the *Sruti* text *Tadvishṇōḥ paramampadam sadā paśyanti sūrayaḥ*,[902] etc., the *Śivapada* which is termed Kailāsa is beyond *Vishṇupada* and this the holy sages with their eyes of knowledge (*gnāna drishṭi*) reach. For it is said in the *Skānda* : *Tadvishṇōḥ paramam divyam padam kailāsa samgnikam । Śivakāruṇya lēśēna sadā paśyanti sūrayaḥ*, etc. And also in the *Māṇḍūkya*, it is said :— *Prapanchōpaśamam śāntam Śivamadvaitam chaturtham manyantē sa ātmā sa vignēya*, etc. Also in the *Śvētāśvatara*, it is seen :—*Ēka ēva Rudrō nadvitīyāya tasthē । Yō dēvānām prathamaśchōdbhavaścha, Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ । Hiraṇyagarbham janayāmāsa pūrvam*, etc. ; *Māyāntu prakritim vindyāt māyinantu mahēśvaram । Tasyāvayava bhūtōththam vyāptam sarvamidam jagat*[903] । *Ksharam pradhānam amrutāksharam Haraḥ ksharātmanā viśatē dēva ēkaḥ*[904] । *Tasyābhidhyānāt yōjanāt tattva bhāvādbhūyaśchāntē viśvamāyā nivruttiḥ । Tamīśvarāṇām paramam mahēśvaram tam dēvatānām paramamcha daivatam । Patim patīnām paramam purastāt vidāma dēvam bhuvanēśa mīḍyam*[905] । *Na tasyakāryam karaṇamcha vidyatē na tatsamaśchābhyadhikancha driśyatē । Parāsya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyatē svābhāvikī gnāna bala kriyācha*[906] । *Na tasya kaśchit patirasti lōkē nachēśitānaiva cha tasya lingam । iti*, etc. Also it is said in the *Atharvaśiras* :—*Dēvā ha vai svargam lōka-*

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[901] *Bhagavad-Gītā*, VI. 29.
[902] *Taitt. Upa.*, IV. 2. 9.
[903] *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 10.
[904] *Ibid.*, I. 10.
[905] *Kaivalya Upa.*
[906] *Śvēta Upa.*, VI. 8.

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magaman । Tē dēvā Rudramapruchchan । Kō bhavāniti । Sō'bravīt । Ahamēkaḥ prathamamāsam vartāmicha bhavishyāmicha । Nānyaḥ kaśchinmattō vyatiriktaḥ । iti.

In the *Atharvaṇa śikhā* also the same view is propounded in the text beginning with *Dhyāyitēśānam pradhyāyitavyam । Sarvamidam Brahma Vishṇu Rudrēndrāstē samprasūyantē* and ending with *Śiva ēkō dhyēyaḥ śivamkaraḥ sarvamanyat parityajya*, etc. These and hundreds of other texts thus clearly declare that Śiva alone is to be meditated upon for obtaining *mōksha*. Though *Sruti* texts like *Vācham Brahmētyupāsīta । Prāṇam Brahmētyupāsīta । Manō Brahmētyupāsīta*[907] । *Nārāyaṇa parō dhyātā dhyānam Nārāyaṇaḥ paraḥ*,[908] etc., declare that through word, thought and deed, Nārāyaṇa should be meditated upon with purity of mind and body, yet, those learned in the *Vēda* declare as the established truth that in order to obtain the form of Śiva Parabrahman in the end, through the *sushumnā nāḍi*, these are the stages through which they (the meditators) have to pass. It is to obtain this glorified knowledge, by which the form of Śiva Parabrahman may be realized, that *Ātivāhikas*—those holy servants of Śiva—lead the meditator so that he may obtain the final Kailāsa, passing beyond all Indra and Upēndra *lōkas*, there to enjoy eternal bliss.

The attainment of *Svasvarūpa* and *Śivatva* (*Śivatva prāpti*) being defined as *mukti* (IV. 4. 22), it does appear that Srīpati directly answers the question whether there is *bhēda* after attaining *mukti*. Whether *Śivōpāsana* prevails in *mukti* is not thus explicitly stated though he quotes the *Atharvaśiraḥ* text *Śiva ēkō dhyēyaḥ śivamkaraḥ sarvamanyat parityajya*, etc., and remarks that none other than Śiva should be meditated upon (*upāsana*). It would seem that when *svasvarūpa* is obtained, the *upāsana* would still continue even in *mukti*. *Mukhyatva* (*i.e.*, *Parabrahmatva*) would remain in Śiva while *muktitva* would have come to the *upāsaka*. The term *Bhagavat*, he adds, is not applicable to anybody else except *mukhya*, *i.e.*, Paraśiva

[907] *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 5. [908] *Mahōpa.*, XI. 24.

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(*Bhagavat śabdō nētarasya mukhyaḥ । Tadvadupadishṭam laukika prayōgāt śrautavidhēr balīyastvāt* ॥). Quoting in support the *Śatarudrīya* text *Namastē astu Bhagavan Viśvēśvarāya Mahādēvāya । iti*, he would seem to hold that the *mukta* says: *Salutation to Bhagavān Mahādēva, the Lord of the Universe.* According to the view of Srīpati, the *Sruti* holds strongly that the term *Bhagavat* applies only to *Mukhya* and to none else. Paraśiva Brahman would thus appear to be supreme even in *mukti* and the *mukta*, though in Śiva's own form, can only bow down to him and offer worship to him, even in *mukti.* The fact that Srīpati seeks *Sruti* support for this view (*Srautavidhēr balīyastvāt*) would seem to indicate that he strongly holds to this view.[909]

Sripati's Position Defined.

This brief review plainly shows that Srīpati holds a middle position between *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* and hence his suggestion that we should not push the argument for either *Bhēda* or *Abhēda* to its logical limits. He remarks that some matters are best left out uninquired into—*avichārita ramaṇīyam.* Similarly as between those who claim supremacy for Vishṇu and those who desire to establish the supremacy of Śiva, he, despite the fact that he is a strong upholder of the supremacy of Śiva, identifying him as he does with Parabrahman, states that topics of this kind are best left untouched—*avichārita ramaṇīyam.* A few examples ought to suffice to illustrate this middle point of view adopted by Srīpati:—

(1) II. 3. 42. *Apicha smaryatē.*

In commenting on this *Sūtra*, Srīpati states that *jīvas* are of *Śivāmśa* (*Jīvānām śivāmśatvamēva abhidhīyatē*). He protests against the view of others that the words "Hariḥ

[909] This is strictly in conformity with the view of Ānandatīrtha who quotes *Kāmānni kāmarūpyanusancharan ēshatsāmagāyānnāstē*, a text quoted by Srīpati in his commentary on IV. 4. 22. The term *Bhagavat* means "glorious", "illustrious", etc., an epithet applied to gods, demi-gods and respectable deities. Here it has to be taken to mean Paraśiva Brahman.

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Om!" indicate the splendour of Vishṇu and that the *Vēdas* establish the supremacy of Vishṇu. He holds that these are matters which are best left uninquired into (*avichārita ramaṇīyam*).

(2) II. 3. 41. *Mantravarṇāt.*

In commenting on this *Sūtra*, Srīpati states that the argument about *ātmaikya* and the suggestion that *ātma* indicates *Brahman* and not *jīva*, are matters best left uninquired into. If inquired into, they are bound to end in affirming *bhēda*. Knowledge will show that though they are all one, to our eyes they (Brahman and *jīva*) look as different from each other. *Srutis* also declare superabundantly that Brahma and *jīva* are *different*. That the *jīvas* are *many* and *eternal* is vouched for by numerous texts. *Ātmaikyatva*, which is the view propounded by the Advaitins, is accordingly *avichārita ramaṇīyam*. He quotes *Sruti* texts like *Nityō nityānām chētanaśchētanānām, ēkō bahūnām, yō vidadhāti kāmān, iti,*[910] etc., in support of his view. Srīpati suggests that the *Advaita* argument would fail here if pushed to the full length.

(3) II. 3. 40. *Amśō nānāvyapadēśādanyathāchāpi dāśakitavāditvamadhīyata ēkē.*

In commenting on this *Sūtra*, Srīpati strongly urges that *bhēdābhēda* is the only acceptable theory—*tadēva ramaṇīyam*. Elaborating, he says that we should understand that the *jīva* is an *amśa* of the Brahman. Proofs that manifestly demonstrate *bhēda* being too strong for rejection, to urge anything contrary to it, cannot avail. That Parabrahman is the author of creation, that he alone is the controller, that he alone invests all with *gnāna*, that all the rest are separated from him, that he alone wears, as it were, the rest and protects every one and destroys all, and obtaining *upāsana* from all, gives them what is owing to them as the fruits of their action, and grants *mōksha* to those who desire it, and the rest of the *purushārthas* (*dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*) as the Supreme Lord—if all this is granted, *jīva* and *Brahman* cannot but be different from each other (*Jīva*

[910] *Kaṭha Upa.*, V. 13.

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Brahmaṇōr bhēdaḥ). The rest, being not visible to the eye, we cannot argue or explain it in any other way—*i.e.*, by way of the *Advaita* argument. While therefore *jagatsrishṭi*, etc., are being proved from authorities by Bhēdavādins, to undertake the rôle of arguing for *mithyā* is not possible. Also, for undertaking to prove that *ātma svarūpa Brahman* is *akhaṇḍaika rasa chinmātra svarūpa*, there are no authorities available. Further, Parabrahman brings into existence many kinds of creations out of his mind, and establishing them with the aid of *ākāśa* and the *panchabhūtas*, entering them as if he were a *jīva*, and becoming famous with many different names and forms, granting to *jīvas* the experience of bliss and sorrow as they deserve and himself staying in them, untouched, and being the authority for granting to *jīvas* all that they may deserve, separating them from the bonds of family life and granting them *mōksha*—when all this is said of Parabrahman in the *Śāstras*, if we are to reject them all as illusion, as required by the Advaitavādins, then that would be the cry of a mad man (*unmatta pralāpitatvāpātāt*). So it is impossible to argue out successfully that the *jīva* is only Brahman under the control of *upādhi*.

(4) II. 3. 50. *Pravēśa bhēdāditichēnnāntarbhāvāt.*

In the course of his comment on this *Sūtra*, Srīpati says that the argument that Brahman is only *jīva* under the control of *upādhi* (*Brahmaṇō upādhivāsēna jīva iti vādaḥ avichārita ramaṇīyaḥ*), is one best left out without argumentation. Several *Sruti* texts like *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē*।[911] *Gnā gnau dvāu ajāvīśānīśau* । *iti*[912] etc., are decidedly opposed to such a view. Also, in *Sūtras* like *Utpattirasambhavāt iti*, etc., Bhagavān Bādarāyaṇa has at length conclusively proved that *jīvas* are eternal and are not created afresh. And therefore, in spite of repeated and harassing opposition, the two sets of *Sruti* texts—*bhēda* and *abhēda*—cannot be brought into harmony. Therefore in consideration of the arguments that the *jīva* is immortal and is always to enjoy the fruits of his actions (*bhōktatva*) and that he should work out his life

[911] *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1. [912] *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 9.

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for attaining *gnāna* and that *Īśvara* should be his inner being and his controller (*antaryāmi* and *niyāmaka*) and no enjoyer of any part of the fruit of his actions, it is decided that the *jīva* is not *Īśvara* (*Jīvakrita karmasiddhēshṭānishṭa phala bhōktrutvam nēśvarasyēti nirṇīyatē*).

(5) II. 4. 18. *Vaiśēshyāttu tadvādaśastadvādaḥ.*

Commenting on this *Sūtra*, Srīpati says that it is not possible to accept the *Advaita* theory that postulates the identity of the *jīva* with Īśvara. The statement of the Advaitins that during creation Īśvara entered the *viśva-srishṭi* in the form of *jīva* is also not reasonable. Because this theory is obviously contradicted by numerous *Sruti* and *Smriti* texts. Invented statements like the one that an elephant is a horse and that the *jīva* is Īśvara are impossible of proof. It happens that *bimba* and *pratibimba* are found in the identical place; but they are different from each other. *Sruti* texts like *Yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē*,[913] etc., prove clearly that the *jīva śarīra* in its *chētana* and *achētana* form, during creation and destruction, is within the control of and subordinate to Parabrahman and that it has no independent power whatever. In the *Sruti* text, *Pradhāna kshētragnapatir guṇēśaḥ samsāra mōkshasthiti bandha-hētuḥ*,[914] it is declared that Paramēśvara is the overlord (*kartru*) above all the *jīvas*, having in his control grace and punishment (*tirōdhānānugraha*).

And thus it is concluded that Paraśiva Brahman grants to all those *bhaktas* in their final release all happiness and *Śivatva*, according to the *Bhramara kītanyāya* in the *nirā-bhāra* form (*Nirābhāratayā*) having freed the *jīvas* from all worldly bondage, the result of previous births. This is the gist of the whole of the *Vēdānta* as understood from the *Dvaitādvaita siddhānta* point of view.

(6) II. 1. 14. *Tadananyatvamārambhaṇa śabdādibhyaḥ.*

Cause and effect are closely connected; effect indicates cause. In this lies *ananyatva*, *i.e.*, without another; not relating to another; having no other resource left. There

[913] *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1. [914] *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 16.

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can be no effect without a cause for it being found. To know that there is nothing beyond cause and effect, is to know *ananyatva*. The Kaṇāda doctrine that there is something beyond cause and effect is not maintainable. *Rajju* and *sarpa* are not connected with each other as cause and effect. *Kārya* and *kāraṇa* are not likewise *ananya*. Similarly *jīva* and *Brahman*, from the effect of *upādhi*, are described as different from each other. But as there is nothing beyond Brahman which can be described as real, it would be attributing *upādhi* to Paraśiva. But cause and effect (*kārya* and *kāraṇa*) cannot be described as being one and the same. If we are to presume *Avidyā* in Brahman, then darkness and light will have been spoken of as being existent in the same place which is contradictory. Then we will be compelled to attribute *agnatva* to Brahman himself. This is opposed to the *Śāstras*. If we accept that *chaitanya* is without a second (*advitīya*), this also will be opposed to the *Śāstras*. Following the *Sruti* text, *Yathōrṇanābhiḥ srijyatē grihyatēcha*,[915] just as the spider which is the cause, weaves the delicate web which is the effect and thus shows the effect, Paramēśvara, as the cause (*kāraṇarūpa*), creates the *chidachidātmaka srishṭi* and in *Praḷaya* he again drags the whole of it into himself. In this way, Paramēśvara, by his creation, care and dissolution of *chidachidātmaka prapancha*, demonstrates the doctrine of *kārya kāraṇa ananyatva*.

Later Critics of Bhedabheda.

It has been remarked above that the system of Srīpati has been styled by him as *Bhēdābhēdātmaka Viśēshādvaita*.[916] The criticism of *Bhēdābhēda*, as propounded

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[915] The *Yathōrṇanānābhis srijyatē grihyatēcha* is usually a text cited in support of the *Bhēda* view. *Munda. Upa.*, I. 1. 7.

[916] The terms *Viśēsha* and *Viśishṭa* may be fully distinguished here. *Viśishṭa* in *Viśishṭādvaita* means *advaita* with a distinction; or a kind of *advaita* that is distinguished (in a particular manner); a particular, special or distinctive kind of *advaita*. An *advaita* characterized by a distinction. It may also mean a superior kind of *advaita* as *viśishṭa* means *superior* or *best of all* or *excellent*. As applied to

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by Vāchaspati Miśra in his *Bhāmati*, has been briefly referred to above.[917] As Vāchaspati Miśra lived about the 9th century A.D., he may be said to represent the *Advaita* view of his time on this doctrine. Other *Advaita* and *Viśishṭādvaita* criticism of it will be considered below. As the doctrine has also been examined by the Dvaitins as well and as Srīpati criticizes certain aspects of both *dvaita* and *advaita*, it seems necessary to set out briefly here the *dvaita* viewpoint taken in regard to this particular doctrine and then advert to other criticism.

Rāmānuja's doctrine, it might be taken to signify the particular or peculiar distinction that Rāmānuja makes as distinguished from Sankara, that Brahman and Prakriti are *identical* and *real entities*. As *viśishṭa* in Sanskrit is a name of Vishṇu, it might, in addition, be taken to stress Rāmānuja's particular regard to this deity, whom he holds in his *Bhāshya* as the one God, as the highest Self or Brahman, as the Creator, as the promulgator of the Pāncharātra and as pervading the whole world (I. 1. 13 ; I. 1. 21 ; I. 4. 4 ; II. 1. 15 ; II. 1. 23 ; II. 1. 24 ; II. 2. 35 ; II. 2. 3).

Viśēsha in *Viśēshādvaita* means species, kind or variety ; an *advaita* of a special kind or variety ; in other words, a sort or species of *advaita* which is different from Sankara's or Rāmānuja's. As *viśēsha* also means *individuality* or *particularity*, the term *viśēshādvaita* may be translated as an *advaita* doctrine which has an individuality of its own. Not only does Srīpati assert the reality of *Brahman* and *Prakriti* but also that the Brahman is possessed of *viśēsha*, *i.e.*, attributes. Srīpati calls his system *Bhēdābhēdātmaka viśēshādvaita*. In this sense, the word *viśēsha* may be taken to distinctly limit or qualify the sense of the word (*advaita*) following it. In other words, we would have to describe it as an *advaita* with a qualification, while Rāmānuja's *Viśishṭādvaita* would be rightly called an *advaita* characterized by a distinction. *Srīpati's* name for his system *Bhēdābhēdātmaka viśēshādvaita* would thus mean a variety of *advaita* which embodies in itself the *bhēda* and *abhēda* views. *Viśēsha* as used here appears to signify nothing more than "peculiar", "special", "distinctive", "discriminating" or "variety". *Viśēsha* is used to indicate "variety," when it is used at the end of a compound, *i.e.*, *Bhūta viśēshaḥ*,—*Uttararāmacharita*, 4 ; *Parimala viśēshān*,—*Panchatantra*, 1 ; *Kadalī viśēshāḥ*,—*Kumārasambhava*, I. 36. Srīkantha describes his system as *Śaiva Viśishṭādvaita*.

[917] See *supra*. Also the *Bhāmati Chatussūtri* by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri and C. Kunhan Raja, page 175 ; Introduction, p. XIX.

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The *Bhēdābhēda* doctrine has been dealt with at some length by Ānandatīrtha in his *Tatvōdyōta*.[918] The relevant passage may be quoted here:—*Sarva vailakshaṇyangīkārāt durghaṭamapi Brahmapramāṇāt angīkriyata ēva jagatō bhinnam abhinnam uta bhinnābhinnam iti vikalpaḥ tatrāpi yujyatē । Bhinnam chēt bhēdādi viśishṭāt śuddham bhinnam abhinnam vētyādi anavasta । Abhinnam chēt mithyārūpēṇa jagatā brahmāpi mithyaiva syāt । Bhinnābhinnam chēt dōsha-dvayamapi ubhaya vilakshaṇam chēt anirvachanīyatvam Brahmaṇa ēva patitam । Yad ēvamapi na anirvachanīyatvam Brahmaṇaḥ tarhi jagatōpi nasyāt । Viśvam satyam ityādi śrutērvachanam atrāpi yuktam । Nasattan nāsaduchchatē ॥* While you accept that Brahman is one having contradictory characteristics, though such a conclusion is impossible to arrive at, the existence of Brahman is accepted through evidence. If this be so, these doubts arise:—Is Brahman separate (*bhinna*) from the world (*jagat*), or is he one with it (*abhinna*), or is he both separate and non-separate (*bhinnā-bhinna*)? If *jagat* is held to be different (*bhinna*) from Brahman, then he must be held to be absolutely different and no occasion for a doubt can arise as to whether he is divided, undivided and both divided and undivided. If *jagat* is held to be undivided from Brahman, then if *jagat* is said to be *mithyā* (unreal), then Brahman also becomes unreal. If it is said that the *jagat* is both divided and undivided from Brahman, then there arises a double discrepancy (*dōsha dvayam*). And both the discrepancies then become so inexplicable that Brahman himself cannot be explained. If Brahman becomes so difficult of explanation, then *jagat* itself is reduced to nothingness (*nasyāt*).[919] But the *Sruti* texts declare *Viśvam satyam*, etc.[920] (*i.e.*, The

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[918] See T. R. Krishnachar's (Kumbakonam) Edition, p. 241, lines 1—2.

[919] That is, *jagat* is not merely *mithyā*, but something worse, it is not at all existent.

[920] The full text of *Rig-Vēda*, II. 24. 12, runs as follows:—*Viśvam satyam maghavānayuvōridāpaśchana praminanti vratam vām । Praghānvasya mahatō mahāni satyā'satyasya karaṇāni vōcham ॥*

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jagat exists) and *Nasattan nāsaduchchatē*, etc. (The world is true and eternal).

In the *Karmanirṇaya*[921] Ānandatīrtha touches on this question once again. Discussing the *nirviśēsha* theory, he asks whether the *vailakshaṇya* of Brahman exists in being *Bhēda*, *Abhēda* or *Bhēdābhēda*—in difference, in non-difference or in both difference and non-difference. As regards *Bhēda*, it has never been accepted by you (the *Advaitin*); but *vyāvahārika* is accepted in the light of *anirvāhatva* (*i.e.*, inexplicability). Therefore there is really no such thing as *vyāvahārika*; for if all *vyavahāra* is dispensed with, there is no proof (of anything existing thereafter). In *vyavahāra*, the unreal (*mithyā*) and the real (*tathya*), when put to common test, will prove indistinguishable like vapour (from the air) and vapour from the tears (*dhūmabāshpayōrdhūmatvavat*). Therefore *Abhēda* cannot be accepted. Consequently there remains only *Bhēdābhēda*. This too cannot be accepted. In *Abhēda*, Brahman is inexplicable (*anirvāchya*)—*Brahmaṇōstatśabdayōḥ paryāyatva*. You want to make Brahman and *tatśabda* synonymous with each other. This synonymity cannot be accepted because you have discarded *viśēshaṇa* and argue *nirviśēshatva*. While you don't accept *viśēshatva*, you still discuss Brahman, assuming *tatśabda* as synonymous with him, which is an attribute. This contradicts your own statement and thus cannot be accepted. You also say that a Brahmagnāni should not use any other term as synonymous with Brahman, if he wishes to attain *Brahmatva* but still you employ the term *tat*, which is an attributive term and not Brahman. Thus your argument ends in contradiction. And therefore you have not proved your doctrine—*mithyā viśēshya chāsiddhirukta*. Therefore, the argument for *Bhēdābhēda* which relies on the mutual dependence or support (*anyōnyāśraya*), on unsettledness (*anavasta*) and on a fraudulent device (*chakrakam vā*) becomes contradictory

[921] A work on the *Rigvēda Brāhmaṇa*, 1 to 5 khaṇḍas—more properly called *Karma nirṇaya mūlabhūta Rigvēda bhāvaḥ*. (See Krishnachar's Edition, p. 247.)

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and has to be rejected even on your own footing. Nor can Brahman be explained to be anything else which can appeal to knowledge. Therefore, the suggestion of *bhēdābhēda* becomes contradictory. So, that form of *bhēdābhēda* consisting of *vilakshaṇa* (contradictory) characteristics becomes destroyed (*i.e.*, refuted).

In his *Vishṇutattva-Nirṇaya*[922] also, Ānandatīrtha discusses the doctrine of *Bhēdābhēda*. He says:—*Abhinnaścha mabhēdaścha yathā bhēdavivarjitam vyavahāryampruthaktvam syāt yēvamēva guṇōharēḥ । Abhēda bhinnayōrbhēdō yadivā bhēdabhinnayōḥ । Anavasthiti rēvasya naviśēshaṇatāmatiḥ mūlasambandhamagnātvā tasmādēkam anamtata vyavahāryam viśēshēṇa dustaraḥ balatōharēḥ । Viśēshōpi svarūpam sa svanirvāhakatasyacha । iti Brahmatarkē* The *Brahma Tarka* says:—The expression *Abhēda* denotes undividedness (*abhinnatvam*), as if it were impossible of being divided (*i.e.*, incapable of being divided). And the expression *vyavahāra* denotes absolute difference. So the characteristics of Hari (*i.e.*, Brahman) are absolutely different from those of others. If *Abhēda* should mean difference among the divided things (*bhinnayōrbhēdaḥ*), or if *Abhēda* is understood to mean difference existing between two different things, then, in either case, there arises unsettlement. And there can be no correct understanding arrived at (in either case). Without understanding correctly the relationship of the original (*i.e.*, Brahman), if we begin to argue, then the argument ends in false reasoning in understanding about Hari (*i.e.*, Brahman). Because all attributes use the natural forms of Brahman. And all attributes are possessed of Hari (*i.e.*, Brahman). The *Sruti* texts *Ēkamēvādvitīyām tannēhanānāsti kinchana*;[923] *Mrityōssamrityumāpnōti ya iha nānēvapaśyati*;[924] *Yathōdakam durgē vrishṭam parvatēshu vidhāvati । ēvam dharmān*

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[922] T. R. Krishnamachar's Edition, page 274.

[923] *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 2. 1.

[924] *Brihad. Upa.*, IV. 4. 19. (In the text *iha* has been interpreted by Ānandatīrtha thus: *ihēti Paramēśvara rupēshu avayavēshu dharmēshucha kinchana nānā nāstītyantaḥ ॥*)

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pruthakpaśyan tānēvānuvidhāvati;[925] etc., declare that there is only one Being and no others and that great Being is capable of becoming the God of Death, just as a big fall of showers on the tops of the mountain makes the water roll in torrents and fully reach the sea, all characteristics denote that great Being to whom alone those attributes apply. Therefore that great Being is the possessor of all the infinite *guṇas* (qualities) and to him alone they apply in the main. And those who thus understand Vishṇu in the fulness of his character will free themselves from the bondage of *samsāra* and enjoy everlasting *ānanda* in his presence (*tatsamīpē samōdate*). To *muktas*, *Vishṇu* is an object of shelter (*āśrayabhūta*); and under him all those *muktas* serve and *Īśvara* is the Overlord of all. This is the declaration of *Parama Sruti*. The *Sruti* texts *Amrutasyaisha sētuḥ*, *Sō'śnutē sarvān kāmān saha Brahmaṇā vipaschita*,[926] etc., clearly state that the Lord Vishṇu is the great bridge for the *muktas* to pass over free from bondage to the everlasting enjoyment of *ānanda* and he that thus passes over the bridge enjoys eternal happiness as the result of realizing of what all he desired to enjoy by the side of Brahman (*Sarvān kāmān saha Brahmaṇā*). The *Pādma Purāṇa* states that all the *Srutis* exult in glorifying the innumerable and infinite qualities of the great Overlord (Vishṇu) and therefore Nārāyaṇa is the only faultless and all-bliss. This is the final conclusion.

In his commentary on the *Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad* also, Ānandatīrtha refers to the *Bhēdābhēda* doctrine.[927] In order to declare that there is no *bhēdābhēda*, the word *iha* is used in *Sruti* texts *Ēkamēvādvitīyam tannēha nānāsti kinchana*;[928] *Mrityōssamrityumāpnōti ya iha nānēva paśyati*[929]. In the forms as well as characteristics of Paramēśvara, there is no distinction or difference; nor is there anything that can be considered higher or equal to him. This means that there is nothing equal to or higher than

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[925] *Kaṭha Upa.*, IV. 14. [926] *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.
[927] T. R. Krishnamachar's Edition, *Brihad. Upa.*, pp. 492–493.
[928] *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 2. 1. [929] *Bṛihad. Upa.*, IV. 4. 19.

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Īśvara, or one who can be said to excel him in any respect. And therefore Parabrahman is the highest of all (beings). And the *bhēdābhēda* view is thus refuted because the term *bhēdābhēda* itself is of contradictory import (*viruddhōbhaya samyōga iva śabdaḥ*). (It is just like a clubbing together of two contradictory thoughts in a single expression.) And the *Sruti* does not imply such a contradiction, because the illustration given in it explains that there is no *bhēdābhēda*. The illustration in the *Sruti* text is:—*Yathōdakam durgē vrishṭam parvatēshu vidhāvati* । *Ēvam dharmān pruthak paśyan tān ēvānuvidhāvati* ॥ etc. As the rain which falls on the top of a mountain naturally flows down as a stream to find its own destination, similarly all different characteristics found in various things go to Him, the great Overlord. This clearly shows that He is quite different from other things. Hence there cannot be any *bhēdābhēda*, for he is quite out and out different from all others. *Bhēdēna darśanādvāpi bhēdābhēdēna darśanāt* । *Vishṇōr guṇānām rūpāṇām tadamgānām mukhādinām* । *Tathā darśana kālāttu kshipramēva tamō vrajēt*, etc., as declared in the *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa*. The *Srutis* and the *Śāstras* generally denote distinctly *bhēda* only and not *bhēdābhēda*. The characteristics of Vishṇu as well as his various features, although equal in Himself, yet are absolutely different from those other beings in the world. The *Sruti* texts *Jyushṭam yadā paśyatyanyamīśam asya mahimānamiti vītaśōkaḥ* । *Dvāsuparṇau sayujau sakhāyau* । *Yō vēda nihitam guhāyām paramē vyōman* । *Sō'snute sarvān kāmān saha Brahmaṇā vipaśchita iti*[930] । *Ētamānandamayam ātmānam upasankramya ya imān lōkān kāmānnī kāmarūpyanusancharan*[931] and the text beginning with *Athātānandāsya mīmāmsā bhavati* and ending with *Manushyādi brahmāntānām muktānām ānandē śataguṇa viśēshaśchōchyatē satē* । *Muktānāmcha ayam viśēshaḥ* । *Śrōtriyasyacha akāmahatasyēti viśēshaṇāt* । *Nahi Brahmādīnām anadhigataḥ śrutyarthaḥ kēshamchidasti* । *Na cha Brahmaṇa ēva kēchana kāmahatāḥ kēchana akāmahatāḥ ityatra pramāṇamasti* । *Tasmāt śrōtriya iti*

[930] *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1. [931] *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 8.

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prāpta śruti phalatvān muktyuchchyatē । *Akāmahatatvancha mukhyam muktasyaiva* ॥ clearly declare that a *mukta*, by virtue of his realization, has finally attained what he desired—*mukti* or *Brahmapada*. The *Sruti* texts nowhere accord sanction that a realized person (*mukta*) will have anything more to aspire for. The expression *Athātānandasya mīmāmsā bhavati*[932] declares that beginning from the state of "man" to the state of "Brahman" all enjoy *ānanda* from one to hundred parts according to their merits as *muktas*. This itself is the chief characteristic of *muktas*. The attributes *śrōtriyasyacha* and *akāmahatasyacha* also do not in any way allow the *muktas* a position any whit higher than (*adhigataḥ*) the *Brahman* stage. Therefore the expression *śrōtriya* (one who obtained the result declared in the *Srutis*) clearly means that the *mukta* has realized what he ought to obtain as the result,—*i.e.*, the highest state, the state of a *mukta Brahman*. He has no desire beyond *mukti*. Hence *akāmahataḥ*. Therefore *śrōtriyas* are declared to be those who have obtained fully their desires.[933] These are therefore declared in the *Bhārata* as *āptakāmaḥ*, *i.e.*, those who have realized their desires, *i.e.*, those who have nothing else to desire, *mukti* being the final stage and there being nothing beyond it. When *Bhēda* has once been proved all round, we cannot revert to a discussion of *Abhēda* or of *Bhēdābhēda*, as both of these are proved to be non-existent. For it has been proved that there is no such thing as *bhēdābhēda* in Vishṇu considered as Parabrahman.

If *Bhēdābhēda* cannot be maintained, then either *Bhēda* or *Abhēda* will have to go. Srīpati's position is that either extreme is impossible in view of the two different types of texts we have to deal with in the *Srutis*. As against *Advaita*, he thinks that neither an attributeless Brahman nor an illusory world can be successfully maintained. As against *Dvaita*, Srīpati's contention is that stressing only

[932] *Chch. Upa.*, III. 13. 7.

[933] *Cf.* Ānandatīrtha in *Brihad. Upa.*, III. 4. 14 :—*Prāpta Sruti phalatvāttu śrōtriyāḥ prāptā mōkshiṇaḥ* ॥ (See Krishnachar's Edn., p. 493).

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one set of *Sruti* texts defining the *Dvaita* viewpoint as against the weight of the other set expounding the *Advaita* position, would be tantamount to rejecting the authority of the latter. Srīpati's cardinal point is that *Bhēdavādins* fail to recognize the *Abhēda Sūtras*. They differ, in his opinion, from Bauddhas only to a small extent: while Bauddhas reject all *Srutis*; *Bhēdavādins* reject only a part of them. The difference is thus one of quantity and no more.[934] But *Bhēdins* may urge—as they have—that there may be what seem like contradictions between *Sruti* texts. It will not do to say that there are such contradictions. It is your duty not to treat them as contradictory, for have you exhausted all the *Srutis* to say conclusively that they *are* contradictions? It is difficult to prove such a contradiction. It only shows that you are not able to harmonise all the *Sruti* texts into a consistent whole. A *Sruti* text says:—*Guṇā śrutāḥ saviruddhāścha dēvē santayaśśrutā api naivātra śankā । Chintyā chintyāścha tathaiva doshāḥ śrutāścha nagnaivihi tathā pratītāḥ* (*Sauparṇa Sruti*). The qualities described in the *Srutis* are, though appearing apparently contradictory, really not so; because God is faultless, and nothing could be doubted of Him which is of contradictory import. In view of the fact that His nature could not be fully understood, the alleged contradictions cannot either be proved or harmonised by us within our limited range (of knowledge). And thus they go for mere observations without any proof. God *is* faultless; nor are the *Srutis* contradictory in this regard. So runs the *Sauparṇa Sruti*, quoted by Ānandatīrtha in his commentary on the *Sūtra*, *Sarvadharmōpapattēścha* (II. 1. 38).[935]

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[934] A similar criticism is offered by Ānandatīrtha in regard to the lack of difference between those who hold the Bauddha and the Śūnyavāda doctrines. (See Ānandatīrtha's *Aṇuvyākhyāna*, II. 1. 29–33.)

[935] Ānandatīrtha's *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāshya*, II. 1. 38. The Jaina doctrine is rejected by the Sūtrakāra, according to Ānandatīrtha, because on account of the impossibility of contradictory attributes

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Another point urged by Srīpati against *Dvaitavādins* is their extreme insistence on the difference between *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* (*ghaṭapaṭayōr atyanta bhēdavādinaḥ*). As to this point it may be pointed out that some *Bhēdavādins* have anticipated this point and answered it at some length. Among these, Jayatīrtha stands easily first. Commenting on the *Sūtra*, *Asaditi chēnna pratishēdha mātratvāt* (II. 1. 8), Jayatīrtha in his *Nyāya Sudhā* sets out the truth underlying the criticism that *Bhēdavādins* attach undue importance to the *ghaṭapaṭa vāda*. In its ultimate analysis, this criticism reduces itself to a denial of *kartrutva* to Brahman. What is behind and beyond *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*? There is the *kartru*, whose existence cannot be denied. If his existence is denied, then not only the *bhēda* between *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* is denied, but also the existence of the creator of this distinction, *i.e.*, the *kartru*. If *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* are not in existence, there is no *kartrutva* behind them.

If there is no *kartrutva*, then there is no topic to start with. Then, there will be, in consequence, no discussion. If we have to accept the existence of *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, then we have to accept the existence of *kartrutva*. Without *kartrutva*, *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* could not have come into existence. In the *Sūtra*, the term *pratishēdha mātra* declares *kartrutva* to Īśvara, because his *kartrutva* is beyond denial. The lordship of Īśvara is of an all-pervasive nature and it is his special characteristic and there it is beyond the control of another. Much less is it capable of interruption (or prohibition). The indeclinable term *mātra* (in this *Sūtra*) indicates his pervasive character in its entirety. The words *pratishēdha mātra* accordingly imply that injunctions cannot predominate over him (*pratishēdha mātra śabdō vidhēraprādhānyam lakshayati*). Therefore *kārya* and *kāraṇa* would have become inoperative without a *kartru*, for example *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*.

being represented as being in one and the same thing. (See *Ibid.*, II. 2. 32–34.) The same reasoning would apply to the co-existence of *Bhēdābhēda*. (See also Ānandatīrtha's *Aṇuvyākhyāna*, II. 2. 29–34.)

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Ghaṭa and *paṭa* depend purely for their coming into existence in their particular forms upon a *kartru*. Obviously *ghaṭa* could not have had any existence as such before it was made, though the material out of which it was made was in existence. If there is no *kartru*, in spite of the materials available in the forms of *kārya* and *kāraṇa*, nothing could be brought into definite form. The *kartru* being undeniable (*anishēdhatayā para pratīkshēpēṇa pratīyatē*) he avails himself of the *kārya* and *kāraṇa* and brings into manifestation (*srishṭi*) as the potter having under his control the material earth and the wheel brings into existence several forms of *ghaṭa*. Thus it is proved that the *kartru* uncontradictingly possesses in himself by his inherent powers both the powers of (*Dēvasyēsha svabhāvōyam*) *kārya* and *kāraṇa*. Just as if we deny the existence of the potter, we cannot predicate the making of the pot, in the same way, if we deny the *kartru*, we are reduced to denying the utility of the truth of the illustrative example, *viz*., the existence of the *ghaṭa*, for we should in such circumstances have not realized its existence, but only ended in arriving at its non-existence. If we attempt to predicate that there is such a thing as a non-existent *ghaṭa*, the very idea itself cannot be supported in any form, because its very existence is a nullity (*abhāvāt*). If we want to prove nullity (*abhāva*) through an illustration, the question of *bhāva* and its character must first be illustrated and understood. What is *bhāva* and what is *abhāva* and what are their respective characteristics? It is possible to describe *bhāva svarūpa* from example, but it is not possible to do so in the case of *abhāva svarūpa*. Where we deny *bhāva svarūpa*, there we have to infer the existence of *abhāva svarūpa*. That is why the word *mātra* is used in this *Sūtra*. It comes to this: By merely denying the *bhāva rūpa* which can be attained, we will be imagining a non-existent state. This is not what is intended by the *Sūtra*. It does not attempt to describe anything beyond *bhāva dharma*. It is because it seeks to establish the *bhāva svarūpa* that the illustrative example

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of *ghaṭa* has been sought (by *Dvaitavādins*). Therefore it is that the *bhāva* and *abhāva* of *ghaṭa svarūpa* cannot be dispensed with by their mere denial so long as *kartrutva* remains in the *kulāla*, whose *dharma* is clearly to be understood. The non-mention of *kulāla* cannot remove him from existence. How then can his existence be established? It is said that the term *mātra* in this *Sūtra* indicates the absolute independence of the potter in regard to his discretion as to the forms the pots should take (*mātru śabdōhi sākalyē vartatē*). Nobody can hinder his independence (in this regard). The thought of denial of *kartrutva* was only adduced by the upholders of the opposite doctrine (*parēṇaiyōktatvāt*). The phrase *pratishēdha mātra* interferes with the independence of the *kartru* against this injunction. Thus, if it is stated that he partook of only food, it is understood that he left other things alone and partook of food only. Therefore, the mind of the partaker of food is signified—his *kartrutva* is signified in regard to the kind of food he has chosen to take, *i.e.*, that he has taken only food and not anything else. This peculiar turn of mind indicates only a mind which predicates one that is thinking of a *bhāva svarūpa* and not *abhāva svarūpa*. Therefore, the use of the phrase *pratishēdha mātra* indicates that the mind is fixed on *bhāva svarūpa* and not on *abhāva svarūpa*. The topic to be proved is of two kinds: *svatantram* and *paratantram* (independent and dependent). *Paratantra* is further divided into *bhāva* and *abhāva*. *Bhāva* is in turn sub-divided into *chētana* and *achētana*. While *abhāva* does not come under the headings of *chētana* and *achētana*, what is the utility of considering *abhāva* as belonging to one of these two categories? However, we cannot even assume, for example, that there is in existence some one, a very intelligent man, but who never had actually his existence. What then is the use of saying, in such a case, that such a person (an intelligent person) never actually existed and that such a person has never been found? A discussion which leaves away the actual connected argument and premises a point of no consequence whatever,

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is impertinence (*atiprasangāt*). Of course, the *Sruti* text *Tan manō kurutē* does not concede this impertinence. Otherwise, the correct conclusion cannot be arrived at. If the term *pratishēdha mātra* had a meaning contradictory to the *Srutis*, then, the *Srutis* cannot be harmonised. The term *asat* in the *Sūtra* only shows *Brahman* and denotes solely *bhēda*, difference. And this meaning the opponent has to contradict because Brahman becomes a term of plurality. There cannot be many Brahmans independent of each other. Therefore Brahman is defined here by the term *asat*. Truly, the phrase *pratishēdha mātra* used in the *Sūtra* is intended only to indicate the insistence to be laid on the right use of one's intellect for interpreting in a feasible manner the *Srutis* in an harmonious way, avoiding thereby all contradictions. Many commentators, while accepting the unusual matter contained in this *Sūtra*, and conceding the *dharma* of *bhāva*, have doubted the existence of *abhāva* but left it however in a state of doubt. We cannot fit in *bhāva* with *abhāva dharma* and *abhāva* with *bhāva dharma*. Because there is demonstrably no proof available to fit in the characteristics of *bhāva* and *abhāva* with the characteristics of their *abhāva* and *bhāva dharmas*; because they are decidedly of an opposite nature. Between two white cloths, a comparison may be easily effected, but not between two unconnected things like *mēru* and *mandira* (*i.e.*, a mountain and a house). Moreover, there is no connection whatever between *bhāva* and *abhāva* and it is never possible to effect a comparison between the two because of their contradictory character. A reasonable comparison between two things is possible only when both possess the identical qualities and not otherwise. Take, for instance, a buffalo and a horse. They cannot be compared, because of the inimical and opposite characters they are naturally endowed with. Such is the nature of *bhāva* and *abhāva*. Their very natures make them the opposite of each other and exclude the one from the other. A *ghaṭa* can never assume by itself that form (*i.e.*, the form of a *ghaṭa*). The *dharma* of one particular

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thing cannot be made by itself, so that *dharma* and *dharmi* cannot be one and the same, unless the *dharmi* is acted upon by the *dharma*. It, therefore, comes to this: *dharma* is the property of a particular thing, which can be clearly seen in the *dharmi* as its property. That which is made known by its peculiar qualities, *i.e.*, its distinguishing property, that is called its *dharmi* (the possessor of a *dharma* is *dharmi*). *Dharmi* is the possessor of the *dharma*, *i.e.*, the characteristic property. It is not possible to describe these two—*dharma* and *dharmi*—in any other mode. *Bhāva* and *abhāva*, therefore, cannot be established by any other means beyond their actual essential properties. Otherwise, the discussion regarding *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* will be evidently out of the way if the characteristics not existing in one are assumed to be as if they were existent. This leads to a result undesirable. How can it be said that *bhāva* and *abhāva* do not possess the *dharmi bhāva*? Why not *abhāva* be considered to be absence of *dharma* of the *bhāva*? Two dissimilar objects which are possessed of different properties compared with two white cloths possessing the same comparable characters are instances for comparison between *bhāva* and *abhāva*. As an illustration, two white cloths may be compared in regard to their respective characteristics for obtaining a knowledge of them. Similarly, as an illustration of *abhāva*, may be mentioned *mēru* and *mandira*, the characteristics of which are dissimilar. The characteristics found in *mēru* are not found in *mandira*. In this way, *abhāvarūpa* is illustrated. In the same manner, the characteristics of *ghaṭa* being absent in *paṭa*, any comparison between the two (objects) cannot hold good, for in the *ghaṭa* is involved the earth for its original property, while that is not found in the *paṭa*. In this way, all objects of a contradictory character—which are different from each other—are stated to be possessed of opposing properties. Hence the idea of *bhāvābhāva* being considered as *abhāvābhāva* and associated with such *dharma* is repudiated. As to things which last eternally and those which are liable to eventual destruction, even though they do possess certain

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contradictory properties, their qualities have still to be considered in describing them. The same cannot be said of two similar things like *śukla paṭa*—two white pieces of cloth. Because the two white cloths are similar to each other in their qualities. The same should hold good in the case of all objects of comparison. The opponent has always agreed that two dissimilar things do not agree in their properties. And it is not possible to discover any points of similarity in two things of dissimilar nature. If, in this manner, we proceed to compare two dissimilar objects, which from their very nature are patently different from each other and begin to describe the qualities of each for purposes of comparison, we will only end our argument in incoherent talk.

If we still insist on so comparing existing things with things non-existing (*i.e.*, *bhāvābhāva*) with their respective opposing properties (*abhāvābhava*), then it results in the inconsistency that the properties and the things possessed of the properties (*dharmādharmi*) cannot be differentiated. Then, there can be no restriction of thought in understanding things existing with their properties and things non-existing and their properties (*bhāvatvēna abhāvasya cha abhāvasya bhāvatvēna*) so that things existing may be described as non-existing—as argued in the *Nyāya Mīmāmsa* under the heads of *Prāgabhāva*, *Pradhvamsābhāva* and *Atyantābhāva*. And then finally a comparison will prevail in knowing which things existed and which non-existed. Such must not be the way employed for knowing the correct properties of things to arrive at a correct conclusion. The whole world will not consider such conclusions as deserving of any value. Therefore, the terms *bhāva* and *rūpa* are terms indicating properties of particular things. And hence we have to understand things existent and things non-existent as we come into contact with such of them according to the context in which they are referred to. This is the proper way of interpreting. Should a reader be taught to lay down a rule for himself as to how to understand the usage (of *bhāva* and *abhāva*) in the context in which they are referred to? The latter part of the question suggests the answer for the

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former. (He must discover the proof and draw the inferences.) However, certain things—either existent or non-existent—such as *ghaṭa*, etc., really never existed before. In order to illustrate how a thing which never existed before could be brought into existence, *i.e.*, to give an instance of *prāgabhāva*—reference may be made to the utility of things such as the earth, which when made into a rounded ball-like thing, can be converted into a *ghaṭa* of any form that one likes. This shows how a thing (*padārtha*) could be used and what its properties are. Out of the material earth, a form has been brought into existence which did not exist before. The inference is that a form not existent before (*prāgabhāva*) has come into existence. According to the *abhēda* theory, the *dharma-dharmi bhāva* is not considered as an attribute of quality (*viśēsha śaktyā samgachchata iti*). This may be right for that theory. But as regards the second (*abhāva*) it is, as in the case of the first, unyielding and the properties of *abhāva* are likewise neglected. Whoever accepts the fact that *ghaṭa* can be made from a rounded ball of earth, admits also the existence of *bhāva*; whoever admits that a thing existent is liable to destruction, he should be held to admit both *prāgabhāva* and *pradhvamsābhāva*. Whence *ghaṭa* is brought into its form, it cannot be compared with a non-existing thing like *paṭa*. Nor can it be interpreted in terms of the non-existing thing *paṭa*. Accordingly the states of *prāgabhava* and *pradhvamsābhāva* may be described as subjects for comparison to convince one of how a non-existent thing came into existence and also how it can undergo destruction. This is the only way to arrive at the right conclusion by interpreting the terms used in a particular context. In order to indicate that many things could in this way be compared in order to arrive at the correct conclusion, the plural indeclinable *hi* is used by the Āchārya (Ānandatīrtha) in the text (*Prathamēhi*, II. 20. 14, in his *Aṇuvyākhyāna*). The topic and the matter relating to the topic are related in the same way as the supporter and the supported. In order to illustrate this view, the Āchārya uses the locative case. In all such

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illustrations, one has to bear in mind the chief topic and how the matters relating to it should be viewed and compared, so that the primary and secondary thoughts may not be mixed up (*gauṇa mukhyatva vivakshābhāvasya sthitatvāt iti*). Thus it has been clearly proved how *bhāva* and *abhāva* are so intermixed in discussion by argumentators, thus proving the contradictory conclusion they arrive at, which bears testimony in itself to be against the teaching of *Sruti* texts. Now, the Sūtrakāra, having proved that there is no contradiction between *Sruti* texts, explains how the term *Asat* should be understood in the correct manner, so that such explanation might be in harmony with all *Sruti* texts and at the same time disallow all other methods of argumentation that might be in contradiction with it, and proceeds to lay down the next *Sūtra*: *Api tau tadvat prasangādasamanjasam* (II. 1. 9). If we discussed the term *asat* in this manner, contradictory to the *Sruti* texts, then our discussion will end in disagreement with them (*asamanjasam*). And thus this expression *asamanjasam* would lead us to assume that the *Viśva* (universe) has come into existence without a maker (*kartru*). How is this? If we are to accept the theory that *Jagatkartrutva* should be assigned to *abhāva*, then we would have to say that there exists nothing else than *abhāva*. Then Īśvara and all others would have had to come into existence out of *abhāva*. But it is not so. For if Īśvara is ignored and denied to be the maker of the *jagat*, then we will have none else to hold responsible for creation, etc. And therefore obviously this is not the meaning of the *Sruti* text and therefore it should not be said that in *Praḷaya* nothing existed including Īśvara and all other minute forms of embryonic matter capable of bringing about creation again. It is therefore to prove clearly, by way of illustration, that there were at *Praḷaya* all forms of matter in their undestroyable condition that *ghaṭa* was chosen to exemplify how non-existent things can be brought into creation by the maker—the *kartru*—by means of different kinds of matter existing in embryo. The Sūtrakāra thus formulated the last *Sūtra*, only to declare that everything—*i.e.*, all matter—

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was existent in its embryonic form at *Praḷaya* (*asat*) and not that nothing was existent at *Praḷaya*. To accept the latter proposition would be wrong. Because, the illustration of the *ghaṭa* has been brought in only to drive home this point. The all-pervasive character of Paramātman is amply proved by evidences, which are not liable to destruction. These evidences are clear proofs to illustrate the minute embryonic existence of everything during *Praḷaya* under the all-pervasive control of Paramēśvara. Where are these proofs available and what *Srutis* establish this position? The Bhāshyakāra (in his *Aṇuvyākhyāna*) establishes it in connection with the expression *Sarva nāśēshvapi iti*, etc., occurring in II. 1. 15.[936] There the word *Sarva* not only includes those existing at present but also all those that have been existing for all time. In order to remove the apparent inconsistency involved in this statement, he points out that from the given premises the conclusion follows that the Paramātman's all-pervasiveness is at the root (of the position) (*Purushasya vyāpti mūlam anumānamuchchyatē*). The illustration itself amply proves the statement without contradiction. Therefore it follows clearly as an inference that in *Praḷaya*, Paramēśvara and everything else (favouring *srishṭi*) did actually exist (*sat bhāva*) in an embryonic form. If it is suggested by the opponent that the *jagat* originated from *abhāva kartrutva*, even that is destroyed by his own argument. Because if the *Praḷaya* was such as to leave no vestige of a Purusha, if *abhāva Viśva kartrutva* is to occur, even the very occasion for such a *kalpana* (assumption) disappears. Because such an assumption evidently has to fall back for its support on the *kartrutva* of the Purusha, which was *ex hypothesi*, destroyed at the *Praḷaya*. Verily in this world, if the *kulāla* did not exist before the *ghaṭa* came into existence, no one could have had the idea of its maker (*Nahi lōkē*

[936] See *Aṇuvyākhyāna*, II. 1. 15, where the full text of the passage occurs: *Sarvanāśēshvapi sadā śishṭatvāt yasya kasyāṇuḥ | Nāśōyam vimatōpi syānnāśatvāt kartru śēshavān ॥ Dharmā'dharmāśrayatvēna svīkāryōpi nirālayē ॥ Anāditvāt iti ॥*

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prāgutpattēḥ kulālābhāvayōḥ satōrabhāvō ghaṭasya kartā drishṭaḥ). They would have necessarily asked who is this *kulāla*? Naturally one who had not seen the maker, would at once reply, "He is the maker of a pot" and thus free himself of the confusion. Again, when in the struggle that ensued between Sunda and Upasunda,[937] when countless numbers fell down, there still remained one who was the chief cause of their struggle. Thus, there has been never an instance where everything went to destruction along with the *kartru* as it is opposed to the principle of *kartrutva* for a *kartru* cannot destroy himself (*Natu nāśa kartuḥ Purushasya aviśishṭatā*). Nor while destroying what existed till then, can one prevent from coming into existence what is going to come into existence in the future. Since he cannot foresee what is going to come into existence in the future, much less is it within his power to prevent it from coming into existence. It really comes to this: leaving the *kartrutva* quite free for what is to come into existence in the future in due course, he must say that only what has been existent—in the present—has been destroyed. If not, the premises assumed will be overruled and contradicted. It cannot be granted for a moment that destruction is possible for all three periods of time—past, present and future—for no one has any control over what is going to befall at the next moment. Nor can it be proved. But if it is to be assumed that the destruction of what is going to happen is also possible, then it has to be described as an anomaly[938] (*tatra vyabhichārasyāt*).

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[937] See the *Mahābhārata* for the story of Sunda and Upasunda. These were two brothers, the sons of Nikumbha. They secured a boon from the Creator that they would not die until they should kill themselves. On the strength of this boon, they grew very oppressive and Indra had at last to send down a lovely nymph named Tilōttama, and while quarrelling for her, they killed each other—leaving Tilōttama alone.

[938] *Vyabhichāraḥ* is going away from; deviation; or leaving the right course. Hence an irregularity, anomaly or exception to a rule. In Logic, a fallacious *hētu*, the presence of the *hētu* without the *sādhya*.

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Praḷaya[939] is the complete destruction of everything that has, during the course of ages, been brought into existence. Thus, *Praḷaya* is the destruction of *existing* things. There is, however, no reason to co-relate *Īśvara abhāvatva* with *Praḷaya*. Therefore, there is no reason to predicate that *Praḷaya* indicates such a destruction as to include the destruction of Īśvara, etc. It is thus clear that to assume that nothing existed at the time of *Praḷaya* and that everything had been destroyed is a clear contradiction. Both the Sūtrakāra and the Bhāshyakāra accordingly left this point for inference on the part of their disciples without dwelling at length on it. However, this was hinted at by the Sūtrakāra in the first words of the *Sūtra* beginning with *Api tau*, etc. The Bhāshyakāra asks : What is the profit to be derived from a proof which establishes such a *Praḷaya* (as evidences the destruction of everything including the *kartru*) ? Therefore *laya* evidently means the destruction of everything else existing except *jīva* and *Īśvara* which are indestructible. And this is the ordinary inference to be drawn. Now, we have to prove whether in *Praḷaya*, the *jīva* and *Īśvara* did actually exist. To meet this point, the following inferential proofs are available :—At destruction, the *dharma* (matter) and *dharmi* (properties of matter) were never interfered with. In order to drive home this fact, the term *api* in the *Sūtra* is used. The dual term *tau* indicates that *jīvātma* and *Īśvara* did exist. During *Praḷaya*, *dharma* and *dharmi* (matter and its properties) did continue. *Dharma* also includes the opposite *adharma*.

[939] *Praḷaya* : *Pra* + *laya* : a condition in which the exhausted state is allowed to lie in an inactive condition, only to be rejuvenated and allowed to gain power and start and grow again afresh, as if quite new. In other words, *Praḷaya* is a dormant condition of inactive existence. In the compound word *Praḷaya*, *laya* means *lurking* or *hiding*. How modern science is approaching this ancient doctrine of *Praḷaya* is thus expressed by a scientific writer in closing a series of papers in "The New World Picture" :—"The idea of the eternal dissolution of matter into waves and the materialization of waves back into matter, has now some experimental foundation."

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Dharma and *adharma*, which are always associated with the *jīvātma*, can never undergo destruction. Therefore, even in *Praḷaya*, though the form of *nara*[940] (human form) underwent change, *dharma* or *adharma* still remained with the *bhāva*. But if it is objected that this is only an arbitrary proof intended to gain ground for alleging that *Īśvara* and his *kartrutva* existed even during *Praḷaya*, the reply is that the word *āśraya* used in the *Sruti* text (*Praḷaya kālāvartī dharmaḥ sāśrayaḥ*) clearly proves that *Praḷaya* also sought the asylum of Īśvara. It sought refuge in Īśvara saying, "Now, I have done my portion of the *dharma* as per your will" (*Dharmatvāt idānīmtana dharmavat*). Even *dharma* is represented as having subjected itself to the *kartrutva* of Īśvara in its work of destruction. Evidently the seeking of this kind of refuge which results in subjecting *Praḷaya dharma* itself to the *kartrutva* of Īśvara makes it nothing more than perform the function of a *jīva*. The fact is that in Īśvara alone the *kāraṇa chētanatva* exists. It is not possible to eradicate this *kartrutva* from Īśvara, who is the sole repository of all causes. It is not within the physical power of any one force beyond Īśvara to remove from Īśvara his *kartrutva* and *kāraṇatva* and place it in another (*Nachātīndriyayōḥ dharmādharmayōḥ adhishṭhātritvam īśvarādanyasya upapadyatē*). Therefore it should be imperatively agreed to that in *Praḷaya* the controlling power over *dharmā-dharmi* and the *jīvātma* does exist along with Paramapurusha.

Verily, if it is to be agreed that *bhāva* only existed in *Praḷaya*, then it is not necessary for us to admit that *dharmā-dharmi* existed separately seeking asylum in Īśvara. This point must be made clear—whether *bhāva* is separate from *dharmā-dharmi* or included in it. Do you mean to say that the characteristics of *dharmā-dharmi* exist in the cause or in the effect or in both during *Praḷaya*? Or, if it is granted that *Sat* signifies *akāraṇatva*,

[940] *Nara* means *dōsha sahita jīvātma*, *i.e.*, the *jīva* taken with his taint.

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then the reply is that we have to accept for granted that nothing existed. The contradiction thus arises that those things that existed from eternity did exist in *Praḷaya*. In certain places, it is also said that everything existed during creation. However, nothing came into existence during creation which never existed before or during *Praḷaya*. If it were otherwise, *kārya* which existed from beginningless eternity would have gone without a *kāraṇa*. Because from *Asat*, there can be no cause for action. (That is, from non-existence, there can be no existence.) All causes leading to creation will have to be considered as having ceased to exist. Let it be so. If it is agreed that from a certain cause not foreseen, *srishṭi* came into existence in the beginning, then *Praḷaya* also should be agreed to have come into existence from some unforeseen cause. It, therefore, naturally follows that there was in existence something unforeseen from beginningless time. This, therefore, has to be assumed. Such a thing did exist in *Praḷaya*. Even the present existing thing came out of that unforeseen cause which was existing from beginningless time, wherefrom our present premises came into discussion. As we agree to this, the other also will have to be agreed to in the same way. It cannot be asked whether there existed no cause in the beginning of time. In the same way, *Praḷaya* shows plainly that there was enough cause for it, *Praḷaya* being the proof for it. How? In *Praḷaya* itself, sufficient illustration of what previously existed from beginningless time, the cause of which could not be ascertained, is fully proved. Else, there would not have been sufficient cause for *Praḷaya*. *Praḷaya* did not destroy beginningless time. If not, how could effect come into play without any cause? Therefore, we have rightly to infer that cause and effect did exist in the interval of time between the beginning of creation and its end (*i.e.*, *Praḷaya*); just because there existed things unforeseen in *Praḷaya*, therefore we have to infer that cause for it did exist in *Praḷaya*.

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To understand even *ādikāla*, we have to infer the unforeseen causes which existed before in beginningless time and thereby seek to establish the causes which brought about *mahadādi kāraṇa*.[941] This must be clearly said. In *ādikāla*, nothing could be foreseen. Later on, out of the unforeseen causes that existed previously, things came into existence, and helped to give rise to *ādyam*. That which previously did not exist later came into existence. This is the general saying. This removes the doubt. If so, we ask that which did not exist previously, how did it come into existence later? However that may be, it is not questioned how that which was not in existence even before the time of *Praḷaya* came into existence later. We explain usually that which was not in existence previously came into existence later. This explanation is objectionable because how could it be possible that what never existed before should have subsequently come into existence? That could not possibly be. If there was nothing that could as efficient cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*) give rise to the existence of everything, though not seen by us, creation would not have been possible in the beginning of time. We never said for a moment that what we never saw did never exist. Then, how is it possible to say that whatever came into existence in the beginning of time (*Ādikāla*) such as *mahadādi*, came out of nothing as its cause? If creation came into existence in the beginning, we cannot say, however, it came out of nothing as such an assumption would be a clear contradiction, because all unforeseen things cannot come within our observation, even if we desired. Then, why should we not assume that *mahadādi* came into existence during creation out of some unforeseen causes which are not known to us? As the unforeseen causes cannot be closely examined by us, even

[941] *Mahat* is the second of the twenty-five elements or *tattvas* recognized by the Sānkhyas. In Sānkhya philosophy, *Mahat* stands for the great principle, the intellect (distinguished from *Manas*), the second of the twenty-five elements above referred to,

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if we desired, as it is beyond our reach, we have simply to grant the existence of the unforeseen causes, in order to bring into existence the *mahadādi srishṭi*. Then, let it be granted that from unforeseen causes only things came into existence. We cannot, however, deny that there was nothing unseen before, for it is not possible to prove such a statement. In order to gain a correct understanding we have to lean upon a particular conclusion, which is indisputable in order to establish what we seek to prove. If you cannot grant that there existed what was beyond your perception, then there would be no cause whatever for anything to come into existence. In that case, where is any *Praḷaya* at all and where, the proof for it? *Praḷaya* also, in such a case, would be rendered *apramāṇika* and would be impossible of belief. Because you did not see it with your own eyes. Even so, Īśvara and others, whether they existed or not in *Praḷaya*, cannot be perceived by you and even a statement about *Praḷaya* would not stand as proved. And so the opponent will have his statement disproved. This is what we have to understand. Necessarily in *Praḷaya*, we have to assume that certain things should have existed which were capable of bringing into existence creation in the beginning of time. It is thus : The creation of the Universe is a series of creations in one continuous flow (*Viśvasantānōyam driśya santāna śūnyaiḥ santānābhirārabdhaḥ santānatvāt āraṇīya santānavat*) which cannot be understood by those who are devoid of a continuous flow of perception, and it cannot be realized by them how this series of creations came into existence ever since the beginning of time; just as the trees in the forest (*āraṇīya santānavat*)[942] form a continuous flow (one succeeding the other), so is the universe which forms a continuous flow of creations, one following the other. Therefore, even the present creation of *Brahmāṇḍa* came out from the

[942] It may also be explained in another manner, *Araṇi* being interpreted as "relating to *Araṇi*". *Araṇi* is a piece of wood of the Śami tree used for kindling the sacred fire by attrition; the fire-producing wooden stick (*Araṇiḥ agniyōniḥ*).

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embryonic state that existed in *Praḷaya*, out of which it came into existence in its present form. Even though it existed for ever, it is said to have existed from the beginning. In other words, that which is like a small light has become a big glowing torch. In the same way, all these series of generations cannot be rooted out, because they still remain in their embryonic state just as a small light keeps constantly burning. It is never possible to eradicate these little *paramāṇu* wholesale at any time, because they are capable of coming to life again. If it is assumed that they were so *eradicated*, then, we have to assume again that they resumed their existence by the air beginning to blow. Even the series of terrestrial globes (*bhūgōḷa*) cannot be thought of as having been rooted out at any time, because of their endless series in existence like particles of glowing fire. This phenomenon (*kriya*) is at all times under the control of the Supreme *Kartru*. If so, then, it must be agreed to that all *dharma* and *adharma* and all causes are brought to effect by the Supreme *Kartru*, just as the happiness or sorrow that attend on the body of Dēvadatta are born of Dēvadatta's own peculiar characteristics and his own personal endeavours. What all peculiar things Dēvadatta does, owe their origin to his peculiar personal characteristics, born of the smell of his previous birth (*Sragādivadityādi anumānēna vichitra kāryānyathānupapatyā*). According to the *Sruti* text *Jyōtishṭōmēna svargakāmō yajēta*,[943] *Yō Brāhmaṇāyavā gurēt tam satāmēva yatayēt, iti*,[944] it has to be understood that Dēvadatta, by reason of his own peculiar qualities, offers the *Jyōtishṭōma* and other sacrifices and attains *svarga*, etc. This is the right way to understand. Now, if you think that it is not so—that it is not by his labour that Dēvadatta attains *svarga* and that he is ignorant of the future, then, you will have to answer whether it was possible for Dēvadatta to earn his happiness or sorrow by his own special qualities or as the fruit of the series of actions inherited by him (*Dēvadatta śarīrādēr Dēvadatta viśēsha guṇa*

[943] *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 12.
[944] *Ibid.*, VII. 24. 1.

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janyatvam kim sākshāt sādhyamuta paramparayāvā). It is not, however, the first; because you have not agreed to accept that *dharma* and *adharma* which existed previously were the ones which impelled Dēvadatta. And it is also not true that the bodily happiness or otherwise of Dēvadatta was not the result of Dēvadatta's own labour, just as it was seen in Yagnadatta's instance. It evidently proves itself that the results came only out of the labour in previous births as the result of the worship offered to deities then. It cannot be said that Īśvara is responsible for any part of the fruits of the actions born of the peculiar characteristics of Dēvadatta. From what is now happening before us we are helped to think of what might have been their cause. Even the beginning of creation is evidently the result of causes unforeseen and antecedent to it and yet we are led to think that what did not exist has suddenly come into existence. If that is the idea we maintain, there will be neither an end to the means to be adopted for sacrificial functions such as *Jyōtishṭōma*, etc., performed in order to win *svarga* nor an attainment of the objects to be achieved by their performance. Having adopted an uncertain procedure probably an unintended end will be reached; for generally if the deity that is to be invoked in a particular sacrifice is unknown, the result is that *svarga* and the rest (of the salvation) sought for will remain unattained. Therefore to attain a correct result, he (the sacrificer) should find out all advantageous means by which the attainment of *svarga*, etc., might be enabled to be accomplished. If so, then, even to obtain a knowledge of *Praḷaya*, we have to seek such correct sources of information as will help us to secure its correct meaning without any of the existing facts being contradicted. It is thus: we cannot say that time was not existing even before *Praḷaya* and that the expression "in the beginning" does not suggest that time was not in existence previously. It is not right to premise that before Brahman came into existence there was absolutely nothing like *Brahmaṇatva* and even if we did so assume, we will have drawn an

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inference which is liable to doubt. Therefore, it is not enough to take into account only the time at which *Praḷaya* occurs, because we will not then have taken into consideration all the factors then prevailing (*i.e.*, at the time of *Praḷaya*). If we do not so take into consideration all the then existing factors at *Praḷaya*, then we cannot be expected to arrive at a correct conclusion.

In this way, if you say that it would be an error if we assumed that there was before *Praḷaya* a Brahman who had neither a beginning nor an end, the reply is it is not so. Because, in all Vēdāntic argument, we have to draw an inference. Thus, (to understand the position), in the example *Parvatō agnimān ityādau*, to determine the question whether there is fire (*agni*) on the mountain or not, we lean on smoke (*dhūma*) and are thus led to draw the inference that there is fire on the mountain. This is the only correct manner of determining the truth; else our inference would be thrown away. If it is said that there are other ways of determining the existence of fire on the mountain, then, if that be so, how can contradiction find place in the argument? If the correct method of reasoning correlating the different limbs of the argument is employed, having regard to the particularity of time, the very face of the contradiction will cease to exist. Putting aside the point whether an entity like Brahman (*Brahmaṇa vyaktē*) came into existence anew (*ādyatva*), whether it did exist without beginning (*anādyatva*), to prove merely, for the time being, the existence of Hiraṇyagarbha and then to say that Hiraṇyagarbha disappeared in *Praḷaya* cannot help the opponent to succeed. By first assuming the existence of Brahman, do you also assume that *viśva* existed with all Brahmāṇḍa or that it only came into existence as the result of a new creation? Not the first; because it does not answer your purpose. Evidently, it is the second; because you have agreed that at *Praḷaya*, everything including Brahmāṇḍa went into destruction.

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If Brahmāṇḍa did not exist at first, there can be no *Praḷaya* which could come off at the end. If you say that things came into existence in the same way that flies come into existence in the fruit of *audumbara* and fire from the internal part of the *audumbara*,[945] then there would be no cause that would give rise to further results and it would be just like the sprouting of a cotton plant from a pot in which no cotton seed had been planted. Then Time, Fire, Rudra, etc.—none of these—should have existed. As for the second alternative, there would be no cause for *Praḷaya* at all. And the happening of *Praḷaya* itself would be impossible of proof. Then, we will have nothing whatever to assume, and no kind of existence whatever, such as fire, wind, and the series of things, gradually ending with darkness and neither tree, mountain nor other object left to us, and no *Praḷaya* whatever—thus landing us in a vacuum of nothingness (*avayavaśūnya samayāsiddhēḥ*). If you assume any one of these—of this series of fire, wind and the series gradually ending with darkness—you will have assumed either all of them to be existing or none at all.

Fifthly, if the terrestrial globe is assumed to be in existence always in a successive series (*santāna śabdēnnōchantē*), will we be making an unwarranted stretch in our assumption? In the first place, there is a way for establishing the truth. But then the minute embryonic particles forming the *ingredients*, as it were, for the scattering of the seeds and bringing into existence the next creation, will have to be assumed to have existed without destruction. Secondly, if not, there is nothing else left to lean upon. Seeing these contradictory fallacies, we have to ignore all arguments. Therefore, in order to save this position, the granting of such an assumption would prove ineffectual, inasmuch as the cause which made such an assumption possible would be subject to destruction and nothing could possibly come into existence anew. Thirdly, it would end in a false conclusion (*apasiddhānta*).

[945] *Araṇi*, churning wood used in the production of sacrificial fire. See footnote on page 613.

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Gradually, there would be an eradication of all argument. Fourthly, it is just like assuming the existence of the threads of a cloth when the whole cloth has been destroyed, which is an evident wrong deviation (from the truth). If the minute particles (*paramāṇu*) from which the existence of the world was assumed to have come into existence and developed by multiplication, even such an assumption would be rendered false and go without proof.

To assume only one of them would be a wrong deviation (*vyabhichāraḥ*). A cause for a beginning means assuming the existence of a cause for a series of all things existing—fire, wind and the rest of the series ending with *Praḷaya*. If we assume that one particle came into existence and then multiplied itself into two, and then into three and thus in a series of multiples, creation came into existence, there will be an occasion for a serious objection. Therefore we have to discard even the second inference as well. Brahmāṇḍa did exist originally and did not come into existence anew (at *Praḷaya*). If we agreed to assume its existence, the source from which it was brought into existence would be subject to destruction in *Praḷaya*. We should construct our arguments in such a way as to establish *Praḷaya* from proofs obtained from the *Āgamas*. In order to arrive at such a conclusion, the chief thing required is to put together proofs (from the *Śāstras*) which do not contradict each other. If we did so, one would not be enabled to say that some of the proofs adduced are unimportant or uncommon. If important links are thus sought to be omitted on the plea that they are unimportant or uncommon, then, there will occur a renunciation of the support sought from the *Āgamas*. This being so, how can it be said that you seek your support from the *Āgamas* only? Thus, it is clear that every link of proof afforded by the *Āgamas* should be accepted and closely followed. In this manner, it having been established with the aid of proofs drawn from the *Āgamas* that *jīva* and Īśvara

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did exist in *Praḷaya*, it follows as equally established that the properties of all things in their embryonic form did exist in *Praḷaya* (*dharmādi satvamapi sādhitam*). Else, there will be a clear contradiction if we concluded that in *Praḷaya* there was only *abhāva* in the form of *asat*. Having thus far maintained one side of the argument, and a cause being established, the fact that Prakriti and the rest existed is also established (*Ēvamādi kāryam pakshīkritya sōpādānatva sādhanē prakrityādi siddhirapi drashṭavyēti*). In the very first *Sūtra*, in order to remove this contradiction of *abhāva kartrutva* and to repudiate it, the *anumāna* has been clearly placed (for correct inference being drawn according to the *Āgamas*). The *Sutra* (propounded by Bādarāyaṇa) *Drishṭāntābhāvāt*[946] clearly lays down the principle that the creation of the universe was not the result of *abhāva kartrutva*, for Īśvara, the *Kartā*, did exist in *Praḷaya*. *Praḷaya* is the result of the will of the *Kartā*. Out of his free will, *Praḷaya* took shape, just as we assume that a piece of cloth or some such thing (*paṭādau*) had a maker. In all places wherever ellipses are to be filled in, the filling in should be done in such a way as to remove contradiction. If we assume that *abhāva* existed in *Praḷaya* and then proceed by admitting *mahadādi* came into existence, this very assumption would be a clear contradiction of the actual existence of matter in embryonic form, which will have to be doubted. In order to completely expel such a doubt, the expression *sarvatra* is used . . . . By the word *kartā* we have to understand that he is a *Buddhimān*, *i.e.*, the knower of all things. If you assume otherwise, one who begins to argue, leaning on *abhāva kartrutva*, will surely fall into contradiction and fail to arrive at a sound conclusion (*Abhāvakartrutvavādinām pratisiddha sādhanatāprasangāt*). There will be no use arguing with such a person. Where is the objection (to the above statement)? There is no

[946] The reference is to I. 1. 1. The discussion referred to in it is one relating to Brahman and not *abhāva*. The *Sūtras* propound a *jignāsa* about *Brahman* and not about *abhāva*. The word Brahman includes *Brahmasvarūpa* (*Kartā*), *Āgamas*, *Vēdas*, etc.

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ground whatever to infer *kartrutva* in *abhāva*. The *Sūtra Drishṭāntābhāvat*[947] clearly meets the opponent's doubt. And this again is amply proved in the *Sūtra*, *Svapaksha dōshāchcha*.[948] In fact, this *Sūtra* becomes the commentary for the previous *Sūtra*. This lays down the procedural order to be followed. We should never be at variance with the truth of the statement in the *Śāstras* which says *kāryatvāt ghaṭavat*, *i.e.*, *chētana kartrutva* exists always as is seen in *ghaṭa*. The destruction of *chētana* should be understood in the same way as a *ghaṭa* should be when it is destroyed. We should not doubt the fact that without *chētana kartrutva*, it is possible to create as is seen in the bringing into existence of a *paṭa* (*paṭōtpattivat*). If we agreed to the proposition that the *ghaṭa* is destroyed, it should not be assumed that we have agreed to the (other) proposition that the maker of the *ghaṭa* is (also) destroyed. There is no reason whatever to think of the destruction of *chētana kartrutva* in our argument. It is our duty now to discuss and prove whether the *chētana kartrutva* existed quite intact or not in *Praḷaya*. It is generally seen that even though all the plants die out in the dry season, soon after a time we notice sprouts coming up, thereby proving that there were the seeds that had not been perceived. From this phenomenon, we cannot assume and premise that at the destruction of the threads of the cloth the cloth could come into existence again (of their own accord). When the world comes to perish at the occurrence of *Praḷaya*, it cannot be assumed that the Great Maker as well as his *kartrutva* have also perished. He had still his *kartrutva* existing in himself. We cannot say for a moment that the Maker and his *kartrutva* originated afresh. Such an assumption would be wrong. In order to refute such

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[947] II. 1. 9. The text of the *Sūtra* is :—*Natu drishṭāntābhāvāt* (Not so ; as there are parallel instances).

[948] II. 1. 10. This *Sūtra* may be thus rendered : "And on account of the objections to his view". It immediately follows *Natu drishṭāntābhāvāt*, and is referred to below as explanatory of the latter.

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an idea, and to establish that even in *Praḷaya* the Maker and his *kartrutva* did exist and there was no annihilation of the Maker and his *kartrutva*, the expression *asat* (*a+sat*)[949] in the *Sūtras*, *Asaditichēnna pratishēdha mātratvāt* (II. 1. 7) and nine other *Sūtras* in the *Asadadhikāraṇam* has been used. It is very easily inferred that such a state of annihilation could not have been possible. It is for this reason that the next *Sūtra Drishṭāntābhāvāt* was enunciated by the Sūtrakāra, to drive home the fact that *kartrutva* did exist in *Praḷaya*. Nor could it be a fact. If annihilation had been agreed to by the Sūtrakāra, it would not have been possible for him to prove the *kartrutva* of Īśvara (*Īśvarasya jagatkartrutvam*) from the annihilated stage and it would also go against his own utterance (*ukta viruddham*). The *Sūtra Śāstrayōnitvāt* (I. 1. 3) also strongly refutes the existence of such an annihilated state and argues strongly against such an idea. Inferential premises must be supported by correct proofs so as to lead to the existence of the Maker and his *kartrutva*. The existence of the Maker at all times was never for a moment doubted by the Sūtrakāra nor has he doubted the existence of his *kartrutva* at all times. What is the purpose of our going in quest of the proofs provided by the *Āgamas* by inferential premises? It is only to establish the existence of Īśvara—and his *kartrutva* at all times—that we seek for aid in the *Āgamas*. If it were not so, there would be no necessity to begin such a discussion, if the proofs in the Vēda would not establish the existence of Īśvara and his *kartrutva* at all times. Such a *jignāsa* would be fruitless and it were well it had not been begun (at all). Then, what should we do? The only answer is that *Āgamas* alone should help to clear our doubt and on the clear proofs afforded by them we have to lean and agree to. If we, after discussion, understand correctly the meaning of the *Sruti* text *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē iti*,[950] etc., and agree to its conclusion, then there would be no further cause for us to doubt

[949] The word *Asat* denotes the great *Avyakta* as Brahman.

[950] *Taitt. Upa.*, III, 1.

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the existence of Īśvara and his *kartrutva* at all times and there would be no cause for any contradiction to arise. Thus, from correct inferential premises, we have proved beyond all doubt that the creation of *viśva* never came out of *abhāva kartrutva*. Having assumed the doubtful argument that the *viśva* was created from *abhāva kartrutva*, we have arrived at the correct proof that the creation of *viśva* is only possible with Īśvara *kartrutva* and his existence at all times (*Īśvara kartrukatvam samarthitam*). From the same conclusion is met the opponent's argument and the objection against it in the next *Sūtra*, *Tarkāpratiṣṭhānādapi anyathānumēyamiti chēdēvamapyanirmōksha prasangaḥ* (II. 1. 12).

Because discussion of one kind has not proved profitable, if another indefinite kind of inference is had recourse to, away from the provision of the *Āgamas*, the argument will be driven away from the one position that would lead to salvation (*anirmōksha prasangaḥ*). This is the explanation for the objection. The *Sūtra* states that when a start (in discussion) is made on the basis of a certain inference, in keeping with the *Āgamas*, if one happens to arrive at a difficulty (in the *pūrvapaksha*), he should not at once jump into several other kinds of inferences, exceeding the provisions of the *Āgama*, for fear the *pūrvapaksha* discussion will not lead us into a correct *siddhānta*, and thus fail in helping to attain at our object. Generally, the *pūrvapaksha* starts on account of certain doubts that could not be cleared from the proofs (*pramāṇa*) put forward by us; we have to arrive at the *siddhānta* by closely examining such proofs which could be harmonised and which could help us to arrive at a correct conclusion. Inferences themselves cannot be final proofs. Why? Because, if one inference fails, we should not think we can at once start off with another inference. What is an inference and what are its limits? We should not premise things that are unnecessary, untrue or ungranted by the *Āgamas*, for we cannot get acceptable proofs from the *Āgamas* for them nor can we agree to them. Nowhere is it found justified that when an argument that has been

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started, on certain premises, is found to be inconvenient, that we should issue forth with another mode of argument, contrary to the original one (*na tarkōnumānāt bhidyata, iti*). You should not say that the new method of argument is more profitable and that it is possible to gain proof for it. Why? Because logic did not establish the original argument (*tarkāpratishṭhānāt*). And so, we have had to seek some (other) kind of solution. Nobody has prevented us from seeking out the solution at hand. It is said that through discussion and inferences, you have to prove and arrive at the conclusion, removing the doubt. Therefore this mode of endeavouring to subsist in different receptacles of argument (*vyadhikaraṇa*) by changing from inference to inference, one contrary to the other, is not seen in the *Āgama*. Just because the first method of argument proved a failure, that we should start off a contrary one is not permissible. It is to remind one of this provision that the Sūtrakāra sets down this *Sūtra*. Discussion (*tarka*), according to the *Āgama*, should never change from one mode of argument to another. Or, if one inference does not help to put forth a correct argument to establish the truth, the most suitable thing to do is to find out proofs which will best harmonise with the *Āgama*. (That is, the inference should not question the *Āgama*, which has for its sheet-anchor the pervasion of the Brahman; an argument that controverts *Paramēśvara vyāpti* ends as *apratishṭhita tarka*.).[951] How could an argument become untrustworthy (*apramāṇa*)? By its inability to arrive at a correct conclusion and by its being obliged to draw inferences to the contrary. This is how it should be understood—the *apratishṭha* character of the argument. It is to clear up this doubt that the Sūtrakāra has laid down this *Sūtra*, so that no one may fall into this blunder and invariably to find out such proofs which would satisfy the Āgamic standpoint. Therefore, the searching of proofs for an argument means the comprehension of the *Āgama* (standpoint). Therefore, the latter part of the *Sūtra*

[951] Unstable logic or reasoning; hence unprofitable, useless,

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(*anyathānumēyamitichēt*, etc.) lays down clearly that such a constant change of arguments from one to another leads to fruitless discussion and ends in the putting off of the attainment of *mōksha*. *Āgama* is fixed as the only means of obtaining correct *pramāṇa*. In order to lay full stress on accepting Āgamic proofs as the sole truth, the commentator (Ānandatīrtha) uses the expression *akshajāgama mūlāsya* in the later half of the verse (in his *Aṇuvyākhyāna*),[952] thereby meaning that just as the axle of a wheel is to the wheel itself as a pivot, so the *Āgama* is the chief pivot on which all arguments by the aid of *tarka*, should be made tc turn by the drawing of inferences. If *Āgama* is thus accepted, there will be encountered no contradiction and the truth will be established. The chief point in view is that all inferences to be drawn should be authoritative and agreeable to the *Āgama*.[953] What the Sūtrakāra means is this :—Whatever was drawn as inference with the given data, must be proved by the Āgamic proofs, so as to harmonise the argument with *paksha linga vyāptimatva*. In this lies the skill of the argumentator as to how he searches into the *Śāstras* to establish the irrefutable truth of the inference. If not, his *tarka*, being away from the Āgamic proofs, can never establish the truth (of the inference). Therefore, it is only through the Āgamic *pramāṇa* that we can establish the truth of the inference.

What is the purpose of our making an inference? It is only to seek the truth by the help of Āgamic proofs. First, in order to find it out, we start by making an inference from the given data. With the help of it, how can we arrive at a correct result, if we do not closely follow the *Āgama* and select proofs that will help to harmonise with the inference? No fawn (*hariṇaśāvā*) ever tries to go against its will into the gaping mouths of a wolf, if it wants to get

[952] See *Aṇuvyākhyāna* (T. R. Krishnachar's Edition, page 177): *Āgamānugrahābhāvē natarkasyāt pratishṭhitaḥ | Akshajāgama mūlākyhāsyādēvāsya pratishṭhitaḥ* ||

[953] All discussion is subject to the cardinal doctrine *Paksha linga vyāpti*.

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away from it. The very fact that it cannot thus save itself is evidence enough for the opposite view. Secondly, even if we assume the contrary as a fact and proceed to argue, saying that the first inference was a wrong one, then what follows? In such a case, both the inferences will be rendered wholly groundless. Thus arise a series of contradictions between one set of proofs and another and the doubts relating to the proofs themselves become obstructed, the one to the other, and go uncleared. It is not infrequently so. Therefore the first aim of the argumentator should be to determine the meaning of the *Āgama*, in order to obtain a path with its aid. The second point one has to keep in view is whether a statement is in accordance with Āgamic proof or if not, how could such a proof be available in the *Āgama* and how is it to be made available. This should be the aim of the argumentator. At all times, he will necessarily find the proof fully supported by the *Āgama*, because *Āgama* stands for the *Sāstra* just as the axle-wheel stands to the wheel itself. The established truth will be such a one that it could withstand any kind of refutation and the opponent will be successfully beaten down. There cannot be two opposing proofs for arriving at one established truth, for that would result in inconsistency. If every kind of inference can help us to arrive at a final conclusion, whether with or without the aid of the *Āgama*, then every one will think that all the inferences thus drawn are unfounded. In order to save us from this position, the Sūtrakāra has definitely laid down in the *Sūtra* that this is the only way to draw an inference. Else the arguments by which such contradictory conclusions are reached will result in the failure to realize *mōksha* (*Ēvam anirmōksha prasangaḥ*). And this is clearly pointed out in the *Sūtra*. Therefore, we should understand that all inferences drawn should be authoritative and subject to proof from the *Āgama*. The inference drawn should be such a one that no opponent could oppose it from the Āgamic standpoint and it should be free from flaws, judged from the position taken by the *Āgama*.

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If one step of the proof fails to harmonise with the *Āgama*, then the whole of the proof will, from the point of view of *Āgama*, fail to be authoritative. Also, it will be subject to Āgamic refutation. If one correct method is not properly followed throughout, then the inference drawn will not only have failed to establish the truth but also it will have repulsed itself. Some commentators have coupled this *Sūtra* with *Sūtras* like *Navilakshaṇatvāt* (II. 1. 4), etc., and have thus tried to establish that the world is a material cause for Brahman for purposes of creation. If this is conceded, *Prakrityadhikaraṇa* becomes superrogatory. For which reason, they split the *Sūtra* into two parts and treat the first part *Tarkāpratishṭhānāt* as describing the conclusion (*siddhāntatayā varṇayanti*). The commentator (Ānandatīrtha) opposes this view. Because the questions arise (1) whether the argument has failed and further argument is impossible of being adduced; or (2) whether the argument cannot find sufficient Āgamic proof to support it; or (3) whether it indicates the inadequacy of search into the *Āgama* for the requisite proof. The answer to the first question is hidden in the question itself. This is in fact so (*i.e.*, implicit in it). Because one who attaches himself to Sānkhya philosophy does not admit that he has failed in his argument, even though he fails to secure Āgamic support and does not mind it. In his own opinion, he does not desire to retrace his steps to obtain a connection for fear his opinion may prove redundant. In his opinion, he thinks that the *Sūtra Śāstrayōnitvāt* (I. 1. 3) is explained clearly by the subsequent *Sūtras*, *Īkshitērnāśabdam* (I. 1. 5), etc. and *Ānumānikamapyēkēshāmiti* (I. 4. 1), etc. The second standpoint is also objected to on the ground that *Āgama* being like an axle-pole (*akshaja*) for all its proofs, in order to get at it, we have to search how far the *kartrutva* of Parabrahman is proved and select such proofs in support of the inference drawn. There must not be the slightest room for the opponent to refute. This the Sūtrakāra points out and indicates how to draw the inference and how to select Āgamic proofs free from flaws. When the Sūtrakāra

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has himself thus shown the method of selecting the Āgamic proofs according to the *Brahma Mīmāmsa Sāstra*, how can one say that the Sūtrakāra has not himself established the truth by the method of discussion (*tarka*) employed by him and how can it be open to objection? Of course one set of commentators do blame another set of commentators. Notwithstanding their objections, an argument correctly put forward, and directly in search of the truth according to the *Āgama*, cannot be said to have gone off unestablished from the right path. Such an argument cannot be easily discarded. Accordingly, the *Sūtra* briefly means: no *tarka* can be easily discarded which supports an inference established by Āgamic proofs intended to postulate the all-pervasive *kartrutva* of Parabrahman (*Vyāptyādimatvēna prāmāṇyāprāmāṇya karaṇa*).

Proceeding, he comments on the next *Sūtra*, *Ētēna śishṭā parigrahā api vyākhyātāḥ* (II. 1. 12). In order to prove conclusively that the truth underlying *Sruti* texts should be admitted in their entirety, *Sruti* texts do not as between themselves contradict each other. They cannot each of them be refuted with the aid of others. But all of them should be interpreted harmoniously as a whole for arriving at the truth. *Tarka* should be so used that a harmonious interpretation is arrived at and that in a manner not inimical to the *Āgama*. This is the gist of the *Sūtra*, *Ētēna śishṭāparigrahā api vyākhyātāḥ* (II. 1. 12). From the above (*Sūtra*), the remaining (*Sruti* texts) which had proved unacceptable to certain wise commentators, have also been commented upon (here). In this *Sūtra* (II. 1. 12), the Sūtrakāra says that he has taken into consideration what has been left out by wise commentators and has commented without reserve on the true import of all *Sruti* texts, including those which have proved unacceptable to them. Some commentators comment like this: By the expression *Ētēna* in the *Sūtra* they refer back to the *Sūtras*, *Navilakshaṇatvāt* (II. 1. 4), etc., which are not to the point. Thus, they accept to a certain extent the meaning of the Upanishadic

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texts, so far as it helps to put forth their argument and leave away the rest, for fear of meeting with contradiction. They also have been considered as useful to the argument and commented upon in this *Sūtra*, as it is adduced to be important by such writers as Manu, Vyāsa and other commentators. These latter eminent men have taken the *Sruti* texts as a whole in supporting the *anvādi kāraṇa vāda* by the Vaiśēshikas. That has here been contradicted. Let us first consider their doubts and their reasoning. The seeking of a solution for this is by means of application by analogy (*atidēśa*).[954] There are, it is said, two sets of argumentators—the Sānkhyas who hold to the doctrine *Nirīśvaratva* and the Vaiśēshikas who hold to the *Sēśvaratva*. It is fitting that both these contrarieties should be considered. Some hold a view opposed to the granting of *jagatkāraṇatva* to Brahman. But the Sānkhyas refuse to concede the very existence of a Brahman. The one question that has led to differences of opinion among Vedāntins as between themselves is the granting of *jagatkāraṇatva* to Brahman. Even the views of those opposing the granting of *jagatkāraṇatva* to Brahman have been taken into consideration. Vaiśēshikas, though they grant the existence of Brahman and concede that the *jagat* is the *nimitta kāraṇa*, do not agree to the *jagat* being *upādāna kāraṇa*. There is thus a little difference of opinion here. Hence the use of the word *śishṭa*—a part of the *Sruti* remaining unaccepted by the Vaiśēshikas. Satkāryavādins, who accept the *Srutis* in their totality, need not be considered here, as they do not fall under the category of *śishṭa parigrahas*. If they are also to be included in this connection, the argument will become too elaborate and become rambling (*viparivartasyāt*). In such a case, we would have to consider the performance of sacrifices and the pain

[954] *Atidēśa* is of five kinds : *Śāstrātidēśa*, *Kāryātidēśa*, *Nimittātidēśa*, *Vyapadēśātidēśa* and *Rūpātidēśa*. *Atidēśa* is usually expressed by words showing likeness or resemblances, such as *iva*, *vat*, *sadruśa*, etc.

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inflicted on animals thereat. This is held over only to save a lengthy argument in which the *Vēda* could be shown to support the position that no pain is inflicted on the animals offered as sacrifices. Multiplying arguments on this scale is not our purpose. Principles and rules are numerous. How can this *Sūtra* be limited in its application? The *Sūtra* aims only at disowning the attitude of the two sets of argumentators to a certain extent, by agreeing to the principle half way, as convenient to them, and disagreeing from the remainder. With a view to reject the wrong comment and impress on the mind the correct interpretation, this *Sūtra* has been enunciated. Chief among those who have departed from the correct interpretation, in our opinion, are those who have assigned *kartrutva* to *abhāva* and to *jagat* the *kartrutva* of *jīva* and the rest. The latter point is also in the remaining part of their argument. By using the expression *api vyākhyāta*, it is indicated that all such arguments as these, which have been left out of account by them, though they are part of the *Vēda*, have been considered by the Sūtrakāra. Though rejected by them, they are still part of the *Vēda* and so have had to be considered, as they cannot disappear from the *Vēda* because they have been rejected by one set of commentators. The *Vēda* admits *jīva*, *pradhāna*, *satkāla* and *svabhāva* and the arguments which support them, and these we have acknowledged according to this *Sūtra*. The expression *śishṭa* in the *Sūtra* also includes the argument about *Brahma-kāraṇa-vāda*.

This, some argumentators have not acknowledged. In leaving aside this part of the argument, they still hold on to the *abhāva kartruvāda*. This, again, is explained by means of application by analogy (*atidēśa*) and proved. The word *śishṭa* has, therefore, been used in the *Sūtra*. In order to set out clearly the doubts of those commentators which made them disagree to that portion of the *tattva*, the expression *śishṭa* has been used in the *Sūtra*, thus helping to prove by referring to the contrary views held by them. It is not to help their disagreement but to

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clearly explain the real meaning of the Vēdic expression and to establish the *bhāva kartruvāda*. Some of the commentators referred to support the argument *jīva pradhāna vāda* and try to establish *asat kartrukatva*. It is not right. It has been clearly proved in the foregoing *Sūtra* and rejected. It is unnecessary to refer to it here to avoid repetition. The *Sruti* texts *Tan manō kurutē*, etc., are strong proofs that *manas* (mind) is only one of the seats in bringing about an action into existence and therefore *manas* cannot be called as *asat* or *abhāva*. We must understand it in the manner we have explained in the previous *Sūtra*, *Asaditichēnna pratishēdha mātratvāt*. From the expression *pratishēdhamātra* used in the *Sūtra*, it is to be clearly understood that *asat* cannot be the agent nor can *kartrutva* be ascribed to it.[955-56] In order to instruct clearly that *asat* which ends in *śūnyāt* cannot possess any agency, the expressions *pratishēdhamātra*, etc., were used in the *Sūtra*. Also, the *Sruti* texts *Akasmādidam āvirāsīt iti*, etc.[957] [This (universe) came into being accidentally] declare that without mind (*manōvinā*), *asat* would be merely *śūnya* and nothing could have come into existence. So that it comes to mean this: in the foregoing argument, it was proved that *abhāva* could not have been the cause for the universe coming into existence; now, it is proved that *śūnya* is not capable of bringing anything into existence. *Abhāva* is thus synonymous with *śūnya*. What was said before is that nothing could come into existence without *kartrutva*—and now it is affirmed that a *kartru* is of the utmost necessity. *Asat* has no *kartrutva* assigned to it (*i.e.*, to create the world, etc.). The statement that *asat* has no *kartrutva* assigned to it is not one made by the commentator. This has been said above. Yet there is no *punarukti dōsha* here. Because it is made by the commentator with the object of anticipating the objection of the opponent and

[955-56] The word *Asat* should be understood as *avyakta* as in the words of the *Sruti* text: *Aśabda asparśa arūpa avyaya agandha* (*Kaṭha Upa.*, III. 15).

[957] *Rig-Vēda*, I. 1. 1.

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answering it in advance and for laying bare the proofs that could be adduced from the *Āgamas*. It is only to prove these aspects of the matter, *viz.*, *asat* (*abhāva*) *kartruvāda* ; *bhāvasya kartrutvam* and *kartrutvam vinā na kāryasya utpattiḥ*, that the discussion of the matter has been brought up and the doubts cleared.

Therefore never think of *abhāva* as possessing *kartrutva* —*abhāva kartrutva* ; nor of creation of the universe by *jīva*. Of course, *Sruti* texts like, *Jīvāt bhavanti bhūtāni*,[958] *Pradhānādidam utpannam*,[959] *Akasmādidam āvirāsīt iti*, etc.,[960] support only *bhāva kartrutva* and not *abhāva kartrutva*, just as for example, *ghaṭa dadhi*, *kaṇṭaka taikshṇya*, etc. These examples are illustrative of the truth of the *Sruti* texts. *Jīvas* and others cannot counteract the innate qualities of things—the piercing quality of the thorn, etc., or the agency required for placing the curds in a *ghaṭa*. If we say that *jīvas* and others can counteract the innate qualities of things, our words will prove untrue. The above-quoted examples are intended to illustrate the characteristics of *asatva* and *achētanatva*. Do you then say that *asat kāraṇatva* cannot be attributed to *asat* or is it that you attribute to *asat akartrutva* also ? It is not the first ; because the examples above quoted contradict it (such a position). Nor is it the second ; because we do not attribute *kartrutva* to *abhāva*. The expression *kartrutva* should everywhere be understood as carrying with it the sense of (*i.e.*, as implying) *kāraṇatva* also. From this it should not, however, be understood that Īśvara, by reason of his possessing *kāraṇatva*, would create *jīvas* afresh at creation, because they have existed at all times. By a fresh creation of *viśva*, there is no contradiction of the previous conclusion (*i.e.*, that *Praḷaya* does not mean complete annihilation of *kārya* and *kāraṇa*, but it is only development into *srishṭi* of what existed in the embryonic form at *Praḷaya*). The *jīvas* themselves do not know what all have been existing which

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[958] *Rig-Vēda*, IX. 96. 5.
[959] *Bhāgavata*, VI. 9. 11.
[960] *Rig-Vēda*, I. 1. 1.

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causes them to come into existence as helps at creation. This aspect of the matter has already beeen agreed to (by us). The *jīvas* cannot avail themselves of opportunities of knowing all those materials that cause the bringing about of their creation, as they are unable to know them. The *kartru* himself knows the causes of *srishṭi* as evidenced by the *Āgamas*. The *Srutis* refute uncontradictingly the *pradhāna-kāraṇa-vāda* and subsequently establish *Sēśvara Sānkhya* doctrine. And therefore there is no contradiction meant here. Whatever it may be, the right of prohibition is not in *Pradhāna* and the rest of them, because they are *achētana*. If we still hold and argue that they have such a power, then it results in uncertainty (*anēkāntika vāda*).[961] And further it ends in *yukti virōdha*, *i.e.*, becomes opposed in reasoning to the *pūrva-paksha*; and this has been pointed out briefly in the words *pratishēdhamātāratvāt* and *drishṭāntābhāvāt*. Further, from the *Sūtras*, *Svapaksha dōshāchcha* and *drishṭāntābhāvāt*, the argument becomes unsupported by authority (*aprāmāṇikatva*), and therefore your doubts are cleared from your own words. It makes no difference to us—your raising this point. It is the same as before, *i.e.*, as if you had not put it forward (*Aviśēśhitassamānaḥ*). And this is how we have proved by analogy (*atidēśa*). (*Kāraṇatva* to Brahman has not been assigned groundlessly.) Further, verily if you ask again how it could be contradictory if we argued that the *jīva* possesses the *kartrutva* and how it could be *yukti viruddha*, our reply is that the very fact that there was causation for every thing, leaves no room for anything to be made afresh by the *jīva*, for it is said *akrutam iti*, nothing is made newly that did not exist previously. And

[961] Uncertainty; being not to the point. *Anēkāntika* is the name given to one of the five main divisions of *hētvābhāsa* (fallacies) otherwise called *savyabhichāra*. It is of three kinds:—(i) *Sādhāraṇa*, where the *hētu* is found both in the *sapaksha* and *vipaksha*, the argument, therefore, being too general; (ii) *Asādhāraṇa*, where the *hētu* is in the *paksha* alone, the argument being not general enough; (iii) *Anupasamhāri*, which embraces every known thing in the *paksha*, the argument being non-conclusive.

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therefore the *panchami* (*vibhakti*) is used to denote that nothing was created afresh (*achētanādakrutamcha drishṭvā*). The *ēva śabda* denotes that there could be no doubt whatever (*asandigdha*) as to the existence of the *jīva* at the time of *Praḷaya*. If any doubt had been entertained, the *panchami* would not have been used. The *jīvas* also were never made (*akrutatva*) but they existed. They existed with the *mahat* (the great principle), etc. Hence it is that *panchami* has been used. The *mahat* includes all *jīvas*; therefore it is that *mahat's* function is the causing of creation. *Mahadādi* also have to be actually taken to be like *jīvas*. But *mahadādi* are not *achētana*. It would be wrong to suppose that *pradhāna* is capable of action—because it is only an *achētana vastu*. In the same way it is wrong to suppose that *asat* is capable of action—though it is a *vastu*, it is only like a pot, an *achētana vastu*. However, it has already been agreed to that *srishṭi* comes into being only for the sake of *jīvas* and *pradhāna* also is brought into creation as *upādāna kāraṇa* in order to help the *jīvas*. In order to denote that these *jīvas* are devoid of independence, and are always subject to Parabrahman, this *Sūtra* has been enunciated. Therefore, the argument is not unwarranted. Verily if it is said that *jīvas* also were made by Īśvara just as any other *vastu*, we have to say "It is not so," for it is not right to apply such an argument in the case of Īśvara. Because *Sruti* texts like *Sa idam sarvamasrujata iti*,[962] etc., clearly declare that Īśvara being above all did create *mahat*, etc., under his supreme control. But to interpret *Sruti* texts like these in any other manner without understanding them correctly, would land us in an unwarranted stretch of the argument, would affect the inferential premise as to *kartrutva* and *kāraṇatva* of Brahman, and would render us unauthoritative. Thus, this matter has, in the light of your objections, been discussed without varying the meaning of the *Sruti* texts and displaying any bias, and brought to a conclusion. *Sruti* texts like *Jīvāt bhavanti bhūtāni iti*,[963] etc.,

[962] *Chch. Upa.*, VII. 1. 26.

[963] *Rig-Vēda*, IX. 96. 5.

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vāchyaḥ). To suggest that in *mukti* the *jīva* is possessed of *avidyā* but free from *antaḥkaraṇa*, is contrary to the previously quoted *Sruti* texts, because these plainly enunciate that even in *mukti*, *jīva* and Brahman are different. Accordingly as it is against the *pramāṇas*, it is fit to abandon this standpoint (that the *bhēda* postulated is of the primary kind). If it is alleged to be the second (or secondary kind), it also deserves to be rejected, because the *jīva* being *achētana*, *Abhēda* indicates only the *mukta's* distinctive feature of similarity with Brahman (*sādruśyam iti upalakshaṇam*)[972] as compared with those who have not attained that state. It is clear from this that the superiority of Brahman stands out of itself unaffected (*Tat pradhānakatvādyapīti drashṭavyam*). If *Abhēda* is agreed to, how is it possible, then, to accept the opposite of it (*viz.*, *Bhēda*)? Accordingly it is meet to repudiate it. If it is said that *Abhēda* prevails only in cases of certain people who attain to *mukti* from *samsāra*, even this is opposed utterly to reason. Moreover, the acceptance of the theory that *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* prevail as between *jīva* and Brahman, would also be opposed to *Sruti* texts. Because *Bhēdābhēda* means *Bhēdēnasahitō bhēda*, *i.e.*, *Abhēda* that exists along with *Bhēda* (*Bhēdēnasahitō Bhēdō Bhēdābhēdaḥ.*) Nowhere could such a relationship (*Bhēdābhēda*) be said to exist. Without such a joint existence (of *Bhēdābhēda*), it is improper to enumerate the second (*Abhēda*) with the first (*i.e.*, *Bhēda*) (*na upasankhyātavya*). While there is no such real collective existence (of (*Bhēda* and *Abhēda*), there can be no such thing in existence as *Bhēdābhēda* (*samudāyamrutē nakēchit bhēdābhēdō nāsti*). Therefore, there being no existence without its natural

[972] *Upalakshaṇam :* A mark, characteristic or distinctive feature. Implying something that has not been actually expressed ; implication of something in addition or any similar object where only one is mentioned. The idea seems to be that *Abhēda* indicates only a partial or one-sided similarity and in that respect is only a distinctive mark of a *jīva* in *mukti*. Hence the word *sādruśya* is used to indicate " likeness," " resemblance," or " similarity ".

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characteristics, there can be no such thing as *Abhēda* (*svaguṇādīn vinā abhēdō nāsti*). Accordingly, the characteristics of *jīva* and Brahman are natural to each of the two and cannot be harmonised (*Ētēna jīva Brahmaṇō bhēdābhēdau dvāvapi svābhāvikau*). *Bhēda* is not a thing that has been fettered by the *upādhi* termed *avidyā* and the like (*natu bhēdō'vidyādyupādhi nibandhanaḥ*). And therefore even in *mōksha*, *Bhēda* prevails, and we reject *Abhēda* in *mukti*, as propounded by the *Yādava Prakāśa*, because it is clearly contrary to *Bhēda vachanas* (found in the *Srutis*) (*Atō muktāvapi Bhēdasadbhāvāt nāsmākam muktabhēda vachana virōdha iti vadan yādava prakāśōpi nirastaḥ*).[973] The expressions *kvachit* and *kēnachit*[974] occur here and there (in arguments of this nature) but they are opposed to a large number of *Sruti* texts (*viśēsha Sruti virōdhāt*). While there is nothing like *Bhēdābhēda* existing between *jīva* and Brahman, how then could the *Bhēdābhēda Sruti* texts been brought out by way of illustration to explain the *Sūtra*? The answer is that Bādarāyaṇa has explained the *Sruti* texts (referred to) from his own point of view in this *Sūtra*. *Sruti* texts declare only *Bhēda* and describe the distinctive features of *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* that are generally found in *jīva* and Brahman (*Upalakshaṇamētat Bhēda śrutayaścha ityapi drashṭavyam*). Because each of these belongs to his own (respective) *amśa*. This is how the *Sūtra* has

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[973] *Yādava Prakāśa* :—The work of Yādava Prakāśa is referred to by Rāmānuja in his *Srī Bhāshya*. He is taken as typical of those who propound the view that "the general cause, *i.e.*, Brahman, is pure Being in which all distinctions and changes such as being an enjoying subject, and so on, have vanished, while however it is endowed with all possible potentialities." See *Srī Bhāshya*, commentary on II. 1. 15 (*Tadananyatvam ārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ*). This theory is severely criticised by Rāmānuja as opposed to all Scripture, *Smriti*, *Itihāsa*, *Purāṇa* and Reasoning (*Ibid.*). Tradition says that Yādava Prakāśa was the teacher of Rāmānuja.

[974] *Kvachit* :—Met with occasionally ; rare ; unusual.

Kēnachit :—By some persons, in the indefinite sense indicating the unimportance of the person or persons referred to.

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to be understood. The statement that the *jīva* is a part (*i.e.*, an *amśa*) of Paramātman, is a solemn declaration (*pratignājāta arthaḥ*). The words *nānāvyapadēśāt* in the *Sūtra* show that the *jīvas* are relatively different from each other just like son, brother, etc. The words *anyathāchāpi* denote that though they (son, brother, etc.) are different from each other, yet their relationships exist in this manner (as sons, brothers, etc). In the same way *Sruti* texts also indicate *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* between *jīva* and Brahman. These *Sruti* texts also broadly declare that the *jīva* is only an *amśa* of Brahman and nothing more. If perchance *jīva* is utterly different (*bhinna*) from Brahman, just as what *ghaṭa* is to *paṭa*, *i.e.*, extremely different, then all the *Abhēda Sruti* texts would have been obstructed. Similarly, if perchance *jīva* is utterly *abhinna* from Brahman, then, all the *Bhēda Sruti* texts would be invalidated. We should not, because there are *Sruti* texts supporting both *Bhēda* and *Abhēda*, endeavour to club them, the two sets of *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* (*Sruti* texts), into one harmonious whole (*Yadi jīvō Brahmaṇō ghaṭa iva paṭādatyantabhinnassyāttadā bhēda śrutayaḥ uparuddhyēran । Yadivā Brahmābhinnaḥ syāttarhi bhēda śrutayō bādhayēran । Nacha bhēdābhēdāśrayaṇēna śrutidvaya sāmanjasyam vāchyam*). It is nowhere exemplified that if this is not done, the *Sruti* texts would be contradicted (*Na kēnachidityudāhruta śruti virōdhāt*). From the mere fact that there are *Bhēda* and *Abhēda Sruti* texts, we cannot combine what are opposite *Sruti* texts and say as a demonstrated conclusion that *jīva* is an *amśa* of Brahman (*Atō bhēdābhēda śrutyanyadhānupapattyā jīvō Brahmaṇōmśa angīkārya ītyēva sūtrārtha iti*). It is neither right that we should use the expression *Bhēdābhēda* as one expression by itself nor as conveying this meaning (*i.e.*, as conveying a consistent meaning of the *Sruti* texts). For it is said, *Yatō bhēdēnatasyāyamabhēdēnacha gīyate । Ataśchāmśatva muddishṭam bhēdābhēdau na mukhyata iti* ॥[975] Those *Sruti* texts

[975] The authority is not quoted.

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which declare for *Bhēda* cannot be held to declare for *Abhēda*. As those *Srutis* have declared *amśatva* to be their primary object, the idea of *Bhēdābhēda* is not the important matter (*i.e.*, *amśatva* and not *Bhēdābhēda* is the important point). When we admit that we have correctly understood the *Paramātma amśatva*, then we should not agree also to the *Bhēdābhēda* theory. Because the characteristics of *amśatva* cannot be properly determined. To this, the reply is that we have already admitted that there is no difference as between the Matsya and other *avatāras* as all the *amśas* are admitted to be one without difference (*Matsyādishu paramēśvara amśēshu abhēdasya angīkritatvāt*). But as regards the *jīvas*, the expression *Paramēśvara amśa* is used simply in order to show that there is *such a similarity* as between them (as there is between the different *avatāras* of Vishṇu). This similarity as between the *jīvas* shows their constant subordination to Parabrahman in their existence. By this, it is declared that the characteristics of virility (*pumstva*) etc., possessed by Parabrahman in his *amśatva*, are denied to the *jīva*.

Thus what seems to be suggested in regard to the *jīva* in the very name of the *Adhikaraṇa* is rejected. It is not possible to interpret the *amśatva* (of the *jīva*) even by any hidden mode (*prakārāntarēṇa*). The expression *cha* in the *Sūtra* (*Amśō nānāvyapadēśat*) warrants the restriction of the meaning of the term *amśa* in this way that the *jīva* is subordinate to Brahman (*Tadadhīnasattādimatvam chētyarthaḥ*). Really, the term *amśa* has been used in the *Sūtra* to denote that there is absolutely no difference between the *avatāras*, *Matsya* and the rest. Nevertheless, the term *amśa* when used in connection with *jīva* is merely intended to denote a proportionate similarity in its characteristics when compared with the entire *amśatva* as seen in the different *avatāras* of Parabrahman. And therefore the term *amśa*, when applied to the *jīva*, has only a secondary significance (*Tathāpi mukhyāmśa sādruśyam tatsattaiva sattāvatva lakshaṇam ēva jīvasya amśatvam gauṇōyam amśaśabda iti*). The term *amśa*

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is possessed of several meanings, among which the most primary one is seen in the *Matsya* and other *avatāras* (of Vishṇu), in which each *avatāra* consists of the *svarūpāmśa* in its entirety. But when the term *amśa* is used in respect of the *jīva*, it is not so. For, the *amśatva* of the *jīva* is possessed of varying characteristics. Hence it bears a secondary significance, as declared by the *Āgamas* (*āgama vākyam paṭhati*). The *Āgamas* declare clearly that the *jīva* bears only a small amount of similarity (*kinchit sādruśya mātram*) to Brahman. The expression "*amśatviti*" used by the Āchārya (Ānandatīrtha) should be construed as covering both these two aspects of its significance, *viz.*, the first *lakshaṇa* indicating the capacity to create, etc., the *svarūpa* indicating *pūrṇānandikam* (entire bliss) and the *sthiṭi* indicating the measure of his all-pervading omnipresence (*sarvagatatvādiparimāṇam*). These are the chief characteristics of the first aspect of *amśatva*. These are to be understood as indicating the never-changing *svarūpāmśa* of Brahman. As regards the *jīvāmśa*, it is otherwise. This also, the *Sūtra* illustrates from the examples of *dāsakitavāditvam*. This explains further the import of the subsequent *Sūtra*, *Prakāśādivattu naivamparaḥ*. The *jīvas* in their *amśatva* can never bear the same likeness (*sāmya*) to Paramēśvara in the same manner as the *avatāras*, etc., do in their different manifestations. Because *Matsya* and other *avatāras* bear the likeness of *śvarūpāmśa* while the *jīvas* bear a divided likeness (*vibhinnāmśā eva*). In order to break down the misconception of similarity as between the two, the subsequent *Sūtra*, *Prakāśādivattu naivamparaḥ* (II. 3. 47) was propounded by the Sūtrakāra to illustrate his position. These illustrations sufficiently show that it would not be meet to take the word in one and the same significance.[976] In order to remove the doubt whether it should be understood as applicable both to *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* in their respective applications (*ubhayatra bhēdābhēda sadbhāvādityāśankā*

[976] *I.e.*, The word has a double significance and must be understood in one way when applied to Brahman and in another when applied to *jīva*.

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nirāsāyabhāshyam), this interpretation has been offered. In fact, the existence of self-conceit in *jīvas* is pointed to in the term *amśa* in its significance. In order to bring out the force of pride (egotism) existing in *jīvas*, the term *amśa* is further explained in the subsequent *Sūtras* by clear illustrations and this makes the position very explicit. Commenting on the *Sūtra*, *Prakāśādivattu naivamparaḥ* (II. 3. 46), the Ācharya (Ānandatīrtha) says that the sun is within his own disc, his own measurer and his own sharer. The rays of light that proudly proceed from the sun and the sun in the *Sūryamaṇḍala* are both the same (*amśa* and *amśi* are both the same). In this way (*i.e.*, this idea of oneness) we have to carry everywhere. The word *atha* (used by Ānandatīrtha) is used in a collective sense. Because the sun overspreading the seven oceans with his lordly rays (his *amśa*) and himself (*amśi*) are one. The *prithvi* which extends to an area measuring *panchāśatkōṭi* is, as *amśa*, the same as the mountain Mēru, its *amśi* (*Amśībhūtā dharādēvi mēruvādērabhimāninī dēvatāpi amśarūpa ēka ēva*). Mēru and the Himavat are termed males in the *Purāṇas* because they are famed for their hardness. Some *Sruti* texts declare that the earth is very hard; this is only to represent that, in certain places, the earth is also hard. Here, the characteristic of the earth (*svarūpāmśa*) is explained in its variety only. In the same way, Bhagavān Vishṇu (Parabrahman), who is *amśi*, is one and the same in his many different *avatāras* and absolutely without difference in his *amśa*. This is how we have to understand. Parabrahman is immutable (*avyaya*), and always full of good qualities (*sadāpūrṇaguṇaḥ*), both in *amśa* and in *amśi*. This is the idea that is propounded in the succeeding *Sūtras* for demonstrating the *abhēda* point of view as between the *svarūpāmśa* of Parabrahman and *avatārāmśas*. The different *amśas* (*vibhinnāmśa*) of the *jīva* are next expounded by way of illustration. Next to Parabrahman are the *dēvatas* who have fallen away (*sadā apabhrashṭa nāmaka dēvatāmśa*), who are also of the *amśarūpa*, such as Sūrya, Varuṇa, Prithvi, etc., who are quite different from each

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other and are in their inverted order from Parabrahman. In this *Sūtra*, Bādarāyaṇa has established that the *jīvas* in their *amśas* are thus severally different from each other in the inverted order when compared with Paramēśvara's *svarūpāmśas* which are absolutely one and the same.

With great skill, in the next *Sūtra*, *Anugnāparihārau dēhasambandhājjyōtirādivat*, this difference between Paramēśvara—as *amśa* and *amśi*—is demonstrated. In this *Sūtra* and in those succeeding it, the commentator further illustrates how the *jīva* is of *vibhinnāmśa* on account of the egotistic feeling (*abhimāna*) in him. And on this *abhimāna* of the *jīva*, the commentator proceeds to say that the *jīva* is always embodied in a body, which even divine beings, though they may possess the capacity to be invisible (to us), cannot avoid. Hence the *cha śabda*—which occurs in the *Asantatēśchāvyatikaraḥ* (II. 3. 49)—is intended to denote the collective sense. Sūrya and the rest are subordinate in *srishṭi* and *sthiti* to Parabrahman (*prasādāyatta*), that is both for coming into *srishṭi* (*pratibandha*) and for absolution (*nivrittitvāt*). By the word *anugrāhya*, we have to understand that they possess bodies which have been polluted by the taint of *abhimānadōsha* (attachment). Suffice it to say that *jīvas* as *amśas* are different from Paramēśvara (*Paramēśvarādbhēdam*); that the *bhēda* is of varying kinds and that it is never one like the *svarūpāmśa* of Parabrahman as manifested in his many *avatāras*. The very word *anugrāhya* denotes "subject to grace". This in itself plainly denotes that *jīvāmśa* is different from *svarūpāmśa*. *Sruti* texts like *Nēshyatē*, *naivatē*, *jāyantē iti*, etc., strongly support this view of subordination (of *jīvāmśa*). The *Sūtra*, *Asantatēschāvyatikaraḥ* (II. 3. 49) strongly supports this view in that the *jīvāmśas* are held to be absolutely different from *Paramēśvarāmśa* (*tat jīvāmśānām paramēśvarādbhēdamēva sādhayatpratīyatē*) and not identical with *Matsya* and other *avatārāmśas* (*Na tu matsyādīnām abhēdam*). *Matsya* and other *avatārāmśas* are in the possession of the attributes of perfect *ānanda* and other good qualities. The *Sūtra*,

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Anugnāparihārau, etc., (II. 3. 47) indicates, on the other hand, that the *jīvāmśa* is subordinate to *Parabrahmāmśa*. It must never be understood that *jīvāmśa* is equivalent to the *svarūpāmśa* of the *Matsya* and other *avatāras*. Thus, it has been established by proofs that *jīvāmśa* is absolutely different from *Īśvarāmśa*. And thus it is established by many proofs that the *jīva* is different from Īśvara (*ēvam amśasyāpi jīvasya Īśvarādbhēdaḥ pramāṇaiḥ samarthitaḥ*). Yet, if any one still tries to prove that *jīvāmśa śabda* is intended to be identical with *Parabrahmāmśa* and tries to find out proofs for it, he will fall into confusion of the kind noted above. And in his attempt to establish a contradiction, he will arrive at a result which is expounded in the next *Sūtra*, *Ābhāsa ēva cha* (II. 3. 50). According to this *Sūtra*, the *jīvas* bear a semblance to the *Parabrahmāmśa*. This is the import of the *Sruti* text, *Tathaitasmin Purushottamē ētat jīvajātam ātatam ētadēvāsya tadamśatvam iti*, etc. (That is, though born as an *amśa* of Paramātma, Paramātma is complete, in his *amśatva*, whereas he—the *jīva*—is different from Paramātma and calls himself an *amśa*.) This text by itself does not establish the *Parabrahma amśatva* of the *jīva*. Because there is this text contrary to it (in the *mantra* of the *Rig-Vēda*) : *Pādō'sya viśvā bhūtāni tripādasyā amritam divi iti*.[977] (In a small fourth part of Parabrahman is the whole universe ; the remaining three parts are unseen in the world of immortality).[978] The *dyu śabda* (*ākāśa*) covers up the entire worlds *Anantāsana*, *Śvētadvīpa* and *Vaikuṇṭha* which are implied by the term *pāda*. This word *pāda* also means *amśa*. Merely because the *jīva* is referred to as *amśa*, it is not permissible to claim identity with *amśatva* or *pādatva* of Parabrahman. And therefore we cannot invent a place for the *jīva* which is identical with Parabrahman. Next, the term *natviti* is used by the Āchārya. How can the *jīva* as *amśa* claim identity with Parabrahman, while Parabrahman's every *amśa* is entire in itself as described in the *Sruti* text, *Pumpādavat purushasya amritapādatrayam ?*

[977] *Rig. Taitt. Araṇyaka*, III. 12. [978] *Ibid.*

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If it is asked (*kutah*) how can every *amśa* of Parabrahman be entire in itself, the answer is *Nārāyaṇam prādurbhāva-rūpam* (*jīvāmsēbhyaḥ param vilakshaṇam*)—the *avatāra rūpas* of Nārāyaṇa, etc., are manifested forms among Parabrahman's infinite and unimaginable forms. The *amśa* of *jīva* when compared with Parabrahman is quite separate and quite the reverse in its character. Hence different. The *Sruti* says *Jagādā*, etc.—that Parabrahman in his *svarūpa* has *ādhidaivādi svarūpa* (*ādhidaiva*, *ādhyātma* and *ādhibhautika*) which is determined in every part of it (*pāda*) and *srishṭi* begins in the *amśa* itself. In order to explain the *ādhidaivādi svarūpa* etc., this section was begun so as to enable one to understand this state of difference existing between the *amśa* of Parabrahman and the *amśa* of the *jīva*; and to give a firm impression of it, the Āchārya summarises and states it in the further sloka, *Akshaya iti*—Parabrahman in his *svarūpa* is *akshaya*, *i.e.*, he has no *śarīra* which he is to assume and to lose, while the *jīva* in his *amśa* necessarily assumes one and casts it off. Therefore it is that in *Praḷaya* also He undergoes no change (because he has no *śarīra*). This is at length described in the *Sūtras*, *Asambhavastu śatōnupapattēḥ* and *Na'tmā srutēr nityatvāchchatābhyaḥ*.[979] The Āchārya says *Lakshmyāvāsa iti*. Parabrahman always exists with Lakshmi and Lakshmi is ever at His will. Even in *Praḷaya*, Parabrahman, while in His entire *svarūpa*, keeps Lakshmi also in Her entire *svarūpāmśa*. This is at length explained in the *Viyadadhikaraṇa* (II. 3. 1)—that Lakshmi with the will of Parabrahman starts the creation by bringing into manifestation Brahma and others with their *abhimāna*[980] ending ultimately in their respective bodily forms only during *srishṭi* (*utpatti*) and none during *mukti*. In thus treating of the order of creation and destruction, *srishṭi* and *praḷaya*, it is intended to show the relative importance of *jīvas* in their respective *amśas* (*tāratamya*). This is treated of at length in the *Adhikaraṇa*,

[979] II. 3. 9 and II. 3. 17.

[980] *Pride* (in a good sense); *i.e.*, *śarīra* in which it ultimately ends.

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Viparyayēṇa tu kramōta sampadyatē, etc.[981] The gist of *Viyadadhikaraṇa* is further elaborated in the *Sūtras* following it, wherein it is said that Prakriti appears as Lakshmi. Then Sankarshaṇa assumes the form of Prāṇa. Then, again, Prakriti assumes the form of Saraswati and Bhārati. These two latter are also the original forms of Prakriti. Thus with the united *kartrutva* of Prakriti and Purusha, Brahma is made to manifest himself in *mahattattvarūpa*. Then he develops into *ahamkāratattva*; then, again, appears as Indra, Skanda and other *tattvābhimānis* (*i.e.*, primary agencies of creation). In order to reject the misconception that they are superior to the *amśa* of Parabrahman, these symbolic names indicate their grades in subordination to Parabrahman. This is explained in the *Sūtras*, *Tathāprāṇāḥ* etc.[982] Thus *srishṭi* and *praḷaya* are the order in which Parabrahman manifests his *kartrutva*. And the *Sūtras*, *Tējōtastathāhyāha* and *Tadabhidhyānādēvatu tallingātsaḥ* (II. 3. 15 and 16), indicate that the spirit (*tējas*) of each belongs to himself. The *Panchami* (*vibhakti*) used clearly shows the meaning of the *Sūtra*, *Parāt tu tat śrutēḥ*. (Both in *srishṭi* and *praḷaya* all *jīvas* are, in the order of gradation, subordinate to Parabrahman.)[983] The liberation from *janma* and *laya* is what is called *mōksha*. Liberated from both these—*janma* and *laya*—to be eternal (*nitya*), is *mukti*. In *mukti* also, though there is no *janma* again, the fact of affectionately praising the Parabrahman, is in itself being subordinate to Parabrahman. This is established at length in the *Sūtra*, *Tadadhīnatvāt arthavat*.[984] Thus, this subject of gradation of Brahman and other *jīvas* in their *amśas* has been discussed and determined throughout this *pāda* (*i.e.*, II. 3.) It will thus be seen that the criticism of the *Dvaita* view that undue stress is laid on *Bhēda* by the upholders of that theory has been met, in anticipation, as it were, by Jayatīrtha. It will also be conceded that the position of Srīpati in regard to *Abhēda* in the *mōksha* stage is widely different from that of the *Advaita*

[981] II. 3. 14.
[982] II. 4. 1.
[983] II. 3. 38.
[984] I. 4. 3.

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school of thought. That is the very reason why he designates his system as *Viśēshādvaita* and not merely *Advaita*. His conception of *Advaita* may perhaps be described as *Advaita* with a difference and embodying the *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* views combined in a harmonious manner.

It is interesting to note in this connection that Jayatīrtha in his *Nyāya Sudhā*[985] (I. 1. 1.) lays down the principles of *Brahma Tarka* which should guide discussions relating to the Brahman and the value to be attached to opposing *Sruti* texts. His argument is that *Sruti* texts are, broadly speaking, of two kinds : *Sāvakāśa*, those which leave room for discussion ; and *Niravakāśa*, those which leave no room for discussion. He thus enunciates these two principles :—

(1) *Atō nanu adhikabala virōdhē na hīnabala pramāṇam bhavati.* Where there is a stronger opposing argument, there the weaker proof cannot prevail.

(2) *Sāvakāśa niravakāśayōḥ niravakāśam balavat.* Between the *sāvakāśa* and the *niravakāśa* arguments, only the *niravakāśa* argument will prevail.

(3) *Sāvakāśācha advaita śrutiḥ.* The *Advaita Sruti* texts quoted in support of *Brahmaikya* belong to the *sāvakāśa* order as they leave much room for discussion and contradiction.

(4) *Bhēda śrutistu ṇiravakāśaḥ.* The *Bhēda Sruti* texts, *i.e.*, those that declare the *Bhēda* doctrine, belong to the *niravakāśa* group.

(5) *Atō niravākāśatayā balavatyā bhēdaśrutyā sāvakāśatayā durbalāyāḥ advaitaśrutēḥ bādhō yukta iti.* Therefore it is but right that those *Niravakāśa Sruti* texts which hold, without giving room for discussion, the *Bhēda* doctrine prevail over those *Sāvakāśa Advaita Sruti* texts, which are weak in their argument and leave scope for discussion. They are weak and rightly sublated.

These principles, as will be seen, differ from those formulated by the *Advaita* school of thought. Rāmānuja in setting out the *Mahāpūrvapaksha* argument, which

[985] T. R. Krishnachar's Edition, p. 66.

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is said to embody the Advaitic view,[986] thus summarizes them: There being a conflict between the two sets of passages (those which describe Brahman as possessed of qualities and those which describe Brahman as devoid of qualities), we (*i.e.*, the upholders of the Advaitic view) —according to the *Mīmāmsā* principle referred to above[987] —decide that the texts referring to Brahman as devoid of qualities are of greater force, because they are later in order than those which speak of Brahman as having qualities."[988]

Commenting in his *Aṇuvyākhyāna*[989] on II. 3. 29 *Tadguṇa sāratvāt tadvyapadēśaḥ prāgnavat*, Ānandatīrtha definitely rejects *Bhēdābhēda*. He says:—

Sādruśyāchcha pradhānatvāt svātantryādapi chābhidām ।
Āhurīśēna jīvasya na svarūpābhidām kvachit ॥
Sthānaikyamaikamatyancha muktasya tu viśishyatē ।
Sādruśyancha viśēshēṇa jaḍānām dvayamēva tu ॥
Bhavēt sādruśyamatyalpam tritīyam paramātmanā ।
Īśarūpakriyāṇām cha guṇānāmapi sarvaśaḥ ॥
Tathaivāvayavānām tat svarūpaikyam tu mukhyataḥ ॥
Yathōdakam durgē vrishṭam parvatēshu vidhāvati ।
Ēvam dharmān pruthak paśyan tānēvānuvidhāvati ॥
Iti śrutēr nōbhayancha bhēdābhēdākhyamishyatē ॥
Ēkamēvādvitīyam tannēha nānāsti kinchana ।
Mrityōssa mrityumāpnōti ya iha nānēvapaśyati ॥
Iti śrutāvivētyasmāt bhēdābhēda nirākritiḥ ।
Ivōbhayē cha sādruśyam iti vākśabdanirṇayē ॥

In the text *Brahmavidbrahmaiva bhavati*, *sādruśya* and *svātantrya* are promised by Īśvara to the *jīva*. Never

[986] It has been suggested that this *Mahāpūrvapaksha* view enunciated by Rāmānuja represents the Advaitic view developed by Vimuktātman in his work *Ishṭa-Siddhi*, which has been set down to the middle of the 11th century A.D.—See M. Hiriyanna, *Ishṭa-Siddhi*, Introd. xi—xiii.

[987] *Mīmāmsa Sūtras* of *Jaimini*, VI. 5. 54, where *Kachchavimōchana* in the *Jyōtishṭhōma* sacrifice is explained.

[988] *Srī Bhāshya*, I. 1. 1. See Thibaut's *Vēdānta-Sūtras with Rāmānuja's Commentary*, pp. 25–27.

[989] T. R. Krishnachar's Edition, p. 193.

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was Īśvara's undifferenced *svarūpa* granted to the *jīva*. *Sthānaikya* is all that has been provided for the *mukta*. This *sādruśya* (between *Īśa* and *jīva*) differs as much as the *sādruśya* of the *muktas* does from that of the *jaḍas* (such as pearls, rubies, etc.). The *sādruśya* of the *jīva* is of the third order and utterly small. In quality it differs from Īśvara in its *lordship* (*Īśatva*), form (*rūpa*) and in action (*kriyā*). In every other quality the *jīva* is in the third order.[990] Similarly in bodily form, it differs. In fact, nothing beyond *svarūpaikya*[990a] is promised to the *mukta*. Just as the showers pouring on the summit of a mountain flow towards the sloping ground, thereby finally reaching the ocean, similarly all *dharmas* find their own avenues and flow till they reach their final end. Thus the *Sruti* does not accord sanction to the double system known as *Bhēdābhēda* position. And the *Sruti* text *Ēkamēva*, etc., declares that Parabrahman is only one and in Him there are no divisions and he who contemplates on Him in the idea that he differs from himself (in his forms) will meet with the death of deaths. Thus, by the help of the *Sruti* texts themselves, the theory of *Bhēdābhēda* is rejected. The indeclinable adverb *iva* in the *Sruti* text denotes mere *sādruśya* (likeness) between the two as declared in the *Śabdanirṇaya*.

The same idea is suggested but not developed by Ānandatīrtha in his *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāshya* in the commentary on the same *Sūtra* (II. 3. 29). Only because the *jīva* possesses for his essence qualities similar to those of Brahman, he is spoken of, says Ānandatīrtha, as in the case of the all-wise Brahman. As the essence of the *jīva* consists of only wisdom, bliss and other Brahman-like qualities, the statement is made that the *jīva* is one like Brahman; as in the *Sruti* text *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma tajjalāniti śānta upāsīta*,[991] etc., Brahman is spoken of as

[990] *Trividhā jīvasanghāstu Dēva Mānusha Dānavāḥ* |
Tatra dēvā mukti yōgyā mānushēshu uttamāstathā ||
Tattvasankhyāna, T. R. Krishnachar's Edn., p. 237.

[990a] *Sva* + *rūpa* + *aikya*. *Aikya* means only similarity, *i.e.*, what the *jīva* deserves. *Ēkē mukhyānya kēvalāḥ*. (*Nighanṭu*).

[991] *Chch. Upa.*, III. 14. 1.

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identical with all the world, on account of Brahman possessing all the qualities which are predicated of the whole world. But he quotes the following from the *Bhavishyat-purāṇa* to indicate the limit of the likeness between the *jīva* and Brahman: "The souls are separate; the perfect Lord is separate; still owing to the similarity of intelligent nature, they are spoken of as Brahman in different Scriptural disquisitions."[992]

In commenting on II. 2. 33 (*Naikasminnasambhavāt*), though he does not refer to the *Bhēdābhēda* theory, Ānandatīrtha states that the Sūtrakāra rejects the Jaina theory because of the impossibility of the existence of contradictory attributes being in one and the same thing at the same time. He suggests that the *Saptabhangi nyāya*, according to which seven different moods are said to be in the same thing at the same time, is not maintainable as they are contradictory of each other, and so cannot be admitted to be in the same thing. These seven moods are: "Somehow it is; somehow it is not; somehow it is and is not; somehow it is indescribable; somehow it is and is indescribable; somehow it is not and is indescribable; somehow it is and is not and is indescribable." "It might be being; it might be non-being; it might be being as well as non-being; it might be different from what is being as well as non-being, etc." These contradictory attributes cannot be admitted to be existent in one and the same thing from their very nature, *i.e.*, such an admission would be, he says, against all reason and proof, while the authorities to prove it are wholly absent. Rāmānuja urges, while commenting on this very *Sūtra*, as will be shown below, that what applies by way of objection to the *Bhēdābhēda* theory, applies to this Jaina doctrine of *Saptabhangi nyāya* also. Rāmānuja and Ānandatīrtha treat both the theories as a species of paralogism which cannot be maintained as contradictory attributes cannot be held to co-exist in the same thing at the same time.

[992] Ānandatīrtha, *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāshya*, II. 3. 29.

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Ānandatīrtha, in interpreting *Sūtras* I. 4. 24 to 29 (from *Prakritiścha pratignā drishṭāntānuparōdhāt* to *Ētēna sarvē vyākhyātāh vyākhyātāḥ*), states that Brahman is also called *Prakriti*, agreeably to the argument and illustrative instances. He quotes the text "This verily is the Person whom all the names declare; just as all the rivers going to the sea, flow towards and enter it, so do all names enter and declare the Perfect Being." *Prakriti* is Brahman only because of his divine will being called *Prakriti*. Ānandatīrtha quotes the *Sruti* text "Let him know the Lord's Will to be *Prakriti* and the Supreme Lord to be the master of the Will."[993] According to this text, *Prakriti* is only the Will of the Lord. The *Sruti* text is quoted: "He is Will; He is the guiding thought; He is wisdom; He is bliss." This is so, because he is both *Prakriti* and *Purusha*. In support, is quoted the text of the Paingins' *Sruti* which directly describes the Brahman as both *Prakriti* and *Purusha*: "He is woman; He is man; He is *Prakriti*; He is the *Purusha*; He is Brahman; He is the support; He is the light; Who is the Lord Hari, the cause of all; Himself without a beginning or end, but the end of all; the highest of the high; the original present in all." *Prakriti* is Brahman only for the reason He moulds forms out of *Prakriti* (*i.e.*, *Prakriti* the material cause), in which He also exhibits Himself in various ways and makes everything. That Brahman is *Prakriti* is seen from the etymology of the word *Prakriti*: "he works eminently". Brahman enters into *Prakriti*, the material cause, shapes it differently and in the different shapes He dwells as a ruling principle for which purpose He assumes numerous forms. The *Bhāllavēya Sruti* is quoted to this effect: "Now indeed the Lord enters with *Prakriti*, makes himself many; hence He is *Prakriti*, hence He is *Prakriti*, they say." Next the *Nāradīya Purāṇa* is cited: "The Supreme Lord Gōvinda, though He undergoes no change,

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[993] *Rig-Vēda*, IV. 10.

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only having entered into *Prakriti* the changeable, is spoken of as *Prakriti.*" The suggestive remark is added: "No other interpretation is to be put upon it, for that would be against the authority of Scripture." In conformity with this view, that Brahman while He enters *Prakriti* and makes Himself, Himself undergoes no change, is further strengthened in the *Aṇuvyākhyāna*, in the comments on the corresponding *Sūtras* (I. 4. 24 to 29). This exposition is taken up by Jayatīrtha and expanded at length into an argument which shows how these *Sūtras* are an exposition of Bādarāyaṇa's views against the *Bhēdābhēda* theory.

Ānandatīrtha in his *Aṇuvyākhyāna*,[994] commenting on I. 4. 24 (*Prakritiścha pratignā drishṭāntānuparōdhāt*) says:—*Na cha prakriti śabdēna Brahmōpādānamuchchyatē । Avikārassadā śuddhō nitya ātmā sadā Hariḥ । Sadaika rūpa vignāna bala ānanda rūpakaḥ । Nirvikārō'ksharaḥ śuddhō nirātankō'jarō'maraḥ । Aviśvō viśvakartā'jō yaḥ paraḥ sō'bhidhīyatē ॥ Nirvikāramanaupamyam sadaikarasa makshayam । Brahmēti Paramātmēti yamvidur vaidikā janāḥ ॥ Iti Śruti purāṇōktyā na vikāri janārdanaḥ । Parādhīna viśēshāptiranivartyōnyathā bhavaḥ ॥ Kshīrādivad vikārassyāt naiva sa syāt harēḥ kvachit ॥ Apādānatvamēvāsya yadyupādānatēshyatē ॥*

The use of the *Prakriti* does not mean that Brahman is liable to undergo *vikāra.* The *Sruti* declares *Avikāraḥ sadā śuddhaḥ*, *i.e.*, that Brahman is *Avikāra* and ever *suddha*, *nitya* (eternal) and is called *Ātma* and ever removes one's sin. Brahman always has *ēka rūpa* and is always all-knowing, all-potent and all bliss. Such a one, who never undergoes any change (*nirvikāra*), is called *aksharaḥ*, *śuddhaḥ*, *nirātankaḥ*, *ajaraḥ*, *amaraḥ*, *aviśvaḥ*, *viśvakartā* and *ajaḥ.* He alone is declared as *paraḥ i.e.*, Mahēśvara. Such a one who undergoes no *vikāra* cannot bear comparison as there is none other to compare with him. Therefore he is termed Brahman and Paramātman by great sages who are well versed in the *Vēda.*

[994] T. R. Krishnachar's Edition, p. 172.

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Similarly do the *Srutis* and *Purāṇas* declare Janārdana to be *nirvikārin*. But here and there, it is seen as if Brahman is subjected to others' control (*parādhīna*). This is either a seeming misconception or a misjudgment. Curd is a state of *vikāra* from milk, but the change of curd into milk is unheard of. Parabrahman never undergoes such a state of *vikāra*, which disables him from going to his original state. Mere mention that he is the *kāraṇa* (*apādāna*) and also the *kartru* (*upādāna*) does not make him lose the state of *nirvikāratva*.

This has been accepted by all—that Parabrahman is like a father (*pitru*) and is also creator of the *viśva*. But it is also agreed that he was not born out of the *viśva*. Just as the spider throws out the thread of its web, without itself showing any *vikāra* in the act, Parabrahman, out of his entire *kāraṇatva* and agency, creates *viśva* as a result of action (*kāryarūpatayā*). Furthermore, he is the great cause, being the *viśva kartru*, he creates out of his mere will as declared by the *Sruti* text *Ichchāmātrāt Prabhōḥ srishṭiḥ avikārasya sarvadā । Svabhāvō'yamanantasya rajōyēnābhavaj jagat*. So declares the *Bhāllavēya Sruti* which says that out of His (Parabrahman's) mere Will, *viśva srishṭi* came into existence. Commenting on this passage, Jayatīrtha says :—

Nēti । Yasya kshīrasya vikāro yaddadhi tasmāt kshīrādanyathā tasya dadhnah kēnāpi kvāpi na driśyata ityarthaḥ । Ēvamanyathā darśanasya siddhāvikāra vikāri bhāvādvyāvrittiḥ ॥ Tataḥ kim ityata āha ॥

Sarvagnāt iti ॥ Hi śabdo yasmādityarthē tasmānnatayō vikāri vikāra bhāva iti śēshaḥ ॥ Ayamatra prayōgaḥ । Jagat brahma vikāro na bhavati । Tatō anyatvē nōpalabhyamānatvāt । Yō yatō anyatvēnōpalabhyatē sa na tadvikārō yathāghaṭaḥ paṭasya । Yaścha yadvikarō nāsau tatō 'nyatvēnōpalabhyatē । Yathā dadhikshīrāditi । Yadvā jagad brahmaṇi nānyōnya vikāra vikāriṇi । Anyōnyamanyatvēnōpalabhyamānatvāt । Ghaṭapaṭavaditi prayōgaḥ । Nachāyamasiddhō hētuḥ । Yassarvagna iti brahmaṇaḥ sarvagnatva śravaṇāt । Gnāna kāryasya sarvathāpyanupalambhēna jagatō

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gnānābhāvānumānāt । Viruddha dharmādhikaraṇayōśchān-yōnya manyatvōpalambha niyamāt iti bhāvēnōktam । Sarvagnāditi । Nanu vikāra vikāriṇōr bhēdābhēdābhyupaga-māt kathamayam hēturitichēnna । Bhēdēnaiva upalambhasya hētutvāt । Tarhi drishṭāntassādhana vikalaḥ । Sarvatra mayā Bhēdābhēdābhyām sankaraśyābhyupagamāt । Tat kim tvadabhyupagama mātrēṇa ghaṭa paṭayōrabhēda utō-palambhāt । Nādyah । Madabhyupagamēna śuddha bhēdasyaiva grāhyatvāt । Nadvitīyaḥ । Asiddhēḥ । Abhēdānupalambhōvā hētutvēna vivakshitaḥ । Nanvayam asiddhō hētuḥ । Jagad-brahmaṇā abhinnam satvādbrahmavadityanumānēnā bhēdō-palambhāditi chēnna । Kharvam svarṇēnābhinnam satvāt svarṇavadityābhāsa samāna yōga kshēmatvādityāha । Abhēda iti । Yadi jagadbrahmaṇōḥ sādhyēta tarhīti śēshāḥ । Kharva-mayaḥ kharparamvā । Nanvidam ishṭamēva । Kharvasvarṇa-yōrabhēdasya mayāngīkritatvāt itichēnna । Abhēda śabdēna bhēdābhāvasya vivakshitatvāt । Atra pramāṇa virōdha iti chēt । Jagat brahmanō'atyantam bhidyatē । tatsvarūpānugati-śūnyatvāditi tvadanumānasyāpi pramāṇa virōdha iti samam samādhānam । Atyanta bhēdō mama na kvāpītyaprasiddha viśēshaṇatēti chēnna । Mōkshābhāva prasangāt । Tathāhi । Gnānēna nivritta karmaṇācha mōkshōbhyupēyatē । Tachcha gnānam agnānamapi bhavati । Nivrittam karma pravritta-mapi bhavatīti katham mōkshasādhanam syāt । Gnānatvādinā tadbhāvē agnānādērapi tadbhāvasyāt । Gnānādikam gnānā-di svarūpēṇa atyantā bhinnam agnānādi svarūpēṇa tu bhinnābhinnamatō na kārya sankara iti chēt । Tathāpi agnānādyabhēdēna svakāryasya kartavyatvāt । Ēvam mōkshōpi samsārā bhinna ityamōkshasyāt । Mōkshātma (tā)-nā sadbhāvēna mōkshatvē samsārōpi tathā syāt । Yadi chāyamabhēdō'nupalabhyamānō arthakriyāsu nōpayujyatē । Tadā vyasanitayaivābhyupagantavyaḥ syāditi । Brahma svarūpānugati śūnyatvāt na tat pariṇāmōyam prapancha ityuktam । Tatra kim sarvasvarūpānugati śūnyatā abhiprē-tā । Utākinchit anugama śūnyatā ॥ Nādyah । Sarvānugamā bhāvēpi ghaṭādinām mridādi vikāratva darśanāt । Na dvitīyaḥ । Satvānugamēna vikāra vikāri bhavōpapattē-rityata āha । Abhēda iti । Abhēdō vikāri vikāra bhāvaḥ ।

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Nanu na suvarṇasatvam kharvēnugatam । Tat kathamayam prasangaḥ । Tat kim brahma satvamēva viyadādīnām । Adhyētichēnna । Pramāṇā bhāvāt । Prāṇāvai satyam, tēshāmēsha satyam ityādi Sruteḥ prāṇa satyatvasya brahmādhīnatārthatvōpapattēḥ । Brahmaṇa ēva sāmānya sattā viyadādāvanugatēti chēt tarhi katham na svarṇasattā kharvē nugatā । Atha manyasē kāraṇamēva kāryātmanā bhavatīti pariṇāmavādinām matam । Tataścha kāraṇam yatsvabhāvā vyabhichāritadanugamaḥ kāryē'vaśyābhyupagantavyaḥ । Anyathā kāraṇamēva kāryātmanā bhavatīti riktam vachassyāt । Avyabhicharita svabhāvānugamē kāraṇasyaivānanugama prāptēḥ । Nacha sanmātra svabhāvam suvarṇam । Ēna kharvam tadvikārassyāt । Kintu tadavyabhichāri suvarṇatvādyanugamē satīti । Ēvam tarhi jagadapi katham brahma pariṇāmassyāt । Nahi sanmātra svabhāvam brahma । Kintu vignānamānandam brahmētyādi śrutyā vignānādīnāmapi tadavyabhichāri svabhāvatvāvagamāt । Nacha vignānādyanugamaḥ prapanchē'stīti samam । Nanu kshīrāvyabhichāri svabhāva mādhuryānugati vidhuram dadhi, tadvikāro drishṭamiti chēnna । Satkāryavāda bhanga prasangāt । Kshīrakāryam dadhīti niśchayēna mādhuryam kshīrasvabhāva iti kalpyatē । Mādhuryasya kshīra svabhāvatā niśchayē vā । Kshīravināśē tatkāraṇasya dadhyupādānatvam kalpayata iti na dōshaḥ ।

Apichāgamairanumānaiścha brahmaṇō nirvikāratvē siddēḥ satyaprachyuta (svarūpa) svabhāvasyaiva brahmaṇō jagadupādānatvam yōmanyatē tam pratyētau prasanga viparyayāvuktāviti kō virōdhaḥ । Ētēna pradhānasya jagadupādānatvē pyayam samāno dōsha iti nirastam ।

Atha matam । Dvirūpam brahmāpyupagamyatē । Anantānanda chidātmakam sadātmakamchēti । Tatrādyēna rūpēṇa nimittam । Dvitīyēnōpādānam । Atō na kaśchiduktō dōshaḥ । Tathāhi । Yattāvaduktam nirvikāratvam tachchichakti vishayatvā chchrutyādēradūshaṇam । Nimittakāraṇēna chichchaktikēna prakriti pradhānādyabhidhānam sachchaktikam brahma pariṇamatītyangīkarē na yukti virōdhōpi । Sadātmakasya jagadupādānatvāchchaitanyā dyananugamōpi na dōshaḥ । Sadanugamasya vidyamānatvāt । Anyatva darśanamcha

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navirudhyatē । Yatō yasmādanyatva mupalabhyatē sarvagnāt । Tannimittamēva nōpādānam । Yachchōpādānam sadrūpam na tasmād bhēdē nōpalabhyata ityāśankyāhā । Bhāgēnēti । Yadi brahmaṇaḥ sadbhāgēna pariṇāmaḥ chidbhāgēna nirvikāratvamangīkriyatē । Tadā vaktavyam । Tayōrbhāgayōrabhēdō bhēdābhēdau vā । Na tāvadabhēdaḥ । Dvayōrapi pariṇāmitvādi prāptyābhāgadvaya kalpanā vaiyyarthyāt । Nāpi bhēdābhēdau abhēdēna sankara prasangāt । Bhēdābhēda kāryam niruṇaddhitichēt । Kim tarhyaprayōjakēnābhēdēna । Tasmād bhāgayōratyanta bhēdēvāngīkaraṇīyaḥ । Tataḥ kimityata āha । Yō bhāga iti । Parasparamatyanta bhinnē dvē vastuni । Tatraikam nirvikāram jagannimittamēva । Aparantu pariṇāmi jagadupādāna mēvētyangīkārēṇēśvarasya kēvala nimittatva vādinā masmākam kaśchidvivādaḥ । Nirvikārasya jagannimittasyāsmābhirīśvaratvēna pariṇāminō jagadupādānasya pradhānatvēna svīkritatvāt । Vivādābhāvāchcha prakritiśchētyādi sūtrāṇām anārambhā yēvēti । Atra yō bhāga iti parābhyupagamēnōktam । Svamatēna tu yadvastviti gnātavyam । Nahi bhāginam vinā bhāgassambhavati । Nāpi vikāryavikāriṇōḥ kaśchit bhāgī vidyatē । Nanvasti vivāda vishayaḥ । Nimittōpādāna bhēdavādinā nimittasyaiva brahmatvamabhyupagamyatē । Mayātu sadānantānanda chitām samudāyasyēti tadarthamadhikaraṇārambha iti chēt । Kimidam brahmatvam । (Kim) Brahma nāmavatvam uta jagatkāraṇatvādi lakshaṇārthavatvam । Ādyam dūshayati । Bhinnānām iti । Tadbhavēdityabhyupagamamāha । Tataśchāyamarthaḥ । Yaddyarthēna vivādō'sti tadā nārambhaṇīyamēvādhikaraṇam । Śabdamātrē parēṇa vivādā kāraṇāt । Kārṇēpyaśabda śāstratvāditi । Dvitīyēpi vivēktavyam । Kim parasparam bhinnā ssatchidānandādyaḥ pratyēkam brahmaṇi । Uta tē na brahmaṇi । Kintu tatsamudāya ēvēti । Nādyaḥ ēkamēvādvitīyam ityādi śrutivirōdhāt । Dvitīyēpi tatsamudāyōnāma kim tadupādānakam dravyāntaram sankhyā vā samyōgō vā । Sarvatrāpi dōshamāha । Brahmēti । Tadēti manasi sthitānām pakshāṇām vikalpitānām vāngīkārē । Kvachit pakshē hi śabdēnānupapattēḥ prasiddhatāmāha । Atra hi brahmōpādānasya vā tadguṇinō vā jagadupādānatvam prāptamiti viśvasya brahmōpādānakatā nasyāt । Nahyupādānaguṇigatāḥ śaktayaḥ

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kāryadravyē guṇēvā sambhavanti । Tadupādānatvādērasambhavāt । Athavā brahmaṇaḥ kāryatvāt guṇatvāchcha na viśvōpādānatvam sambhavatīti vyākhyēyam । Atra brahmōpādānātētyupalakshaṇam । Brahma nimittakatā cha na yuktētyapi drashṭavyam ॥

Jayatīrtha's position may be briefly set down. The milk is seen to undergo a change resulting in curd; but the curd does not admit of undergoing the process of reversion to its former condition of milk. Such is not the change that Brahman is expected to undergo in the creation of the world (*Srishṭi*). Out of his mere will, *Srishṭi* becomes manifest, himself undergoing no change whatever. The changes seen in *Srishṭi* are only changes in *Pradhāna* by the power of his (Brahman's) will. The term *hi* clearly indicates that Brahman undergoes no change whatever during this transformation of *Pradhāna* in *Sriṭshi*. Accordingly *jagat* cannot become a transformed condition of Brahman. Brahman is quite independent from what is manifested out of his will. For the very reason that *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* being made out of earth and cotton materials are subject to the agency of the potter and the weaver, similarly *jagat* is the manifested result of the will of Parabrahman without absolutely any change in himself. For, no such change is ever observed in Parabrahman; what all is otherwise seen in the manifested *jagat* itself is as the curd transformed from milk. Nor can it be said that *jagat* is capable of showing any *vikāra* in Brahman during the series of changes it undergoes. In order to illustrate this truth the examples of *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* have been brought in. These two illustrations were not brought in for any other ineffectual purpose. Brahman is declared *Sarvagna* and in all his manifestations the greatest output of knowledge is exhibited by him and his master workmanship leaves nothing to be questioned. In every particle of work in *Srishṭi*, no contradiction could ever be pointed out either in character or in the result, for the very reason that he is *Sarvagna*. Nor can it be doubted that during the transformation of *Pradhāna* carried out at his will no

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contradictory aspect of *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* can be pointed to throughout his manifestation. In every particle of transformation, he proves himself quite out of touch with the *Pradhāna* and its varied changes. Else, the illustrations would prove against his *Sarvagnatva*. If it is asked that in certain places *Bhēda* is indicated and in certain others *Abhēda* is perceived, and the question raised why should not *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* be conjointly considered, the answer is that the illustrations above quoted, *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, do not allow of such a fused consideration. These illustrations show fully that the agents—the potter and the weaver—are absolutely different from the things made by them. In no way can they be proved to be a part of the changes that *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* have undergone. Similarly, *jagat* in its manifested form is absolutely free from Brahman at whose will it became manifest. And it cannot be said that Brahman himself underwent any change at all by reason of his manifestation. A gold bangle is in a form assumed by gold different from gold itself; though gold is made to appear in the form of a bangle, yet, the gold is there, the change of form is also there and the agency through whom the change was made is also clearly seen. In this illustration, the gold and the bangle are one and the same, while the agent that brought the gold into this different form is absolutely different and underwent no change whatever. The illustration amply proves that in the very same way *jagat* and *Brahman* are absolutely different from each other as gold and the maker of change in its form. It also proves beyond all doubt that gold in its *svarūpa* underwent no change whatever in transforming itself into a bangle. If it is asked "where lies this *atyanta bhēda*, and that it is not quite clear on account of its mere attributive character," then the reply is there is no *Mōksha*, because of the very same reason, *Mōksha* being subject to His Grace. It is therefore said that *Mōksha* is the result of *nivritti karma* (action done without desire). And this can be attained both from *gnāna* and ignorance, for sometimes *nivritti karma* assumes the form of *pravritti*

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karma. In such a case, how can *Mōksha* be expected? If *gnāna* and *agnāna* cannot be distinguished, the result also cannot be distinguished. Thus what one thinks that he is doing out of his wisdom, he may be actually doing as the result of his ignorance. Unless one distinguishes that *gnāna* is absolutely different (*atyanta bhinna*) from *agnāna*, he will have no room to commingle *gnāna* and *agnāna* in the form of *Bhinnatva* and *Abhinnatva*. Therefore every one, in order to obtain *Mōksha*, should work out of mere wisdom. Therefore it is held that *Mōksha* is absolutely different from and free from the bondage of *Samsāra*. Unless one holds such a decisive opinion, he cannot free himself from the bondage of *Samsāra*. Nor will his actions be productive of any good result to make him realize *Mōksha*. Thus his actions will all be reduced to a sorrowful end. It must not be thought that *Brahmasvarūpa* is realized from the mere assertion of the non-existence of *jagat*. Because if it is held that there existed nothing and everything but Brahman was *śūnya*, then there is nothing to assume whereby *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* could have been put forth as examples out of *Pradhāna*, which was subject to *vikāra*. It was proved that Brahman himself would not undergo *vikāra*, because he is always *avikāra*. Then, what is *Abhēda?* It is *vikārivikāra bhāva*. Evidently it should signify something which undergoes change because it is liable to change —a natural state subject to change. It cannot be said that gold is such a thing. Then, what is the proof? Can it be said that Brahman, in his *sat*, is identical with *Ākāśa* and the rest of them? If it is so affirmed, it should be said that it is not so; for there is no proof that it is so. For the *Sruti* texts, *Praṇā vai satyam tēshāmēsha satyam iti*, etc., prove that *Prāṇā* is real; and that this *Prāṇā* is subordinate to Brahman and that Brahman alone is generally ruling over all and not merely as gold in relation to gold bangle. Those who maintain the *Pariṇāma vāda* hold that cause ends in the result, *Kāraṇamēva kāryātmanā bhavati iti*. Thereafter, the cause which is the root always exhibits itself

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necessarily through the result. *Kāraṇa* is thus reduced to mere void (*riktam vachassyāt*).

In instances where the truth is unopposed, the causes leading to the truth alike are unopposed and open to no contradiction. For example, gold is not only naturally of a pure quality but also all articles made of it, of different sorts, are also of the same pure quality. And there is no reason to dispute its quality. When that is so, how can *jagat* be said to be a thing transformed out of Brahman (through *vikāra*)? Similarly Brahman cannot be said to be of the same *svabhāva* as gold illustrated above. But as the *Sruti* declares *Vignānam ānandam Brahma iti*, etc., Brahman is all-knowledge and bliss in form and cannot to any extent separate himself on account of his *sat* nature from knowledge and bliss. Else the *satsvabhāva* of Brahman would be put into opposition to the *Srutis*. It is certain that curd is an altered state from that of milk; for this is the only state into which milk can naturally and ultimately turn into. Of course sweetness is naturally one of the qualities of milk and at one time this quality is liable to destruction, at which stage it results in exhibiting itself as curd. And we cannot say that this kind of conversion is a fault. Moreover, all *āgamas* and *anumānas* assure and assert that Brahman is absolutely *nirvikāra*. If one says that creation (*srishṭi*) by Brahman is but his natural tendency, there is nothing to contradict such a statement; no one can dispute it. And in so far as *Pradhāna* is considered a mere subordinate cause, subject to Brahman's will in the matter of *srishṭi*, it is equally open to no contradiction. Accordingly the opponent's objection is discarded. The fact is Brahman has two forms; one is *anantānanda chidātmaka* form and the other *sadātmaka* form. Out of the first, all causes are stored (*apādāna*); from the second (form), all causes play upon the *upādāna kāraṇa* in bringing into manifestation *Pradhāna*. And there is absolutely no contradiction in this statement. What was said previously, *viz.*, Brahman undergoes no *vikāra*, is again reaffirmed that it is so, because of

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his faultless *chitśakti* and this does not contradict the *Srutis*. The question arises whether from the *satśakti* form of Brahman comes the *nimittakāraṇa* (*apādāna kāraṇa*), thereby ending in the name of *Prakriti-Pradhāna* (*upādāna kāraṇa*). If this view is accepted, would there be any contradiction with the *Srutis*, in employing such an argument? There would be no contradiction. For Brahman being *sadātma*, the manifestation of *jagat* is his mere nature and hence there is no contradiction. His *sadātmaka* form is above all charge of *vikāra*. His manifestation of *Pradhāna* does not in any way affect him during the transformation of *Pradhāna* into *jagat*. And therefore it has been declared that Parabrahman, who is *Sarvagna*, is beyond all *vikāra*. By his mere will, the cause comes into play. If it is doubted whether *sadrūpa* consists of his *upādāna* and whether it is completely different from the *jagat*, the reply is *Bhāgēnēti*, *i.e.*, it is by mere difference. If Brahman through his *sat* ultimately puts the *chit* into manifestation through his *nirvikāratva*, then, he is called *avyakta*. If it is asked whether the two parts, the manifested and the unmanifested, are *Bhēda* or *Abhēda* or *Bhēdābhēda*, the reply is it is not *Abhēda*, because both the parts have the will of Parabrahman in their *pariṇāma* and therefore it cannot be said to consist of *Bhēdābhēda* for *Abhēda* in this combination simply expresses no commingling. Thus *Bhēdābhēda* becomes confused and contradicted. Then, in such a state, *Abhēda* becomes a mere rhetorical expression. Therefore the two parts being absolutely different from each other, we have to accept only *Bhēda* as true. Then, what is the result? When the two parts are utterly different from each other, of which one, the Brahman, is *nirvikāra*, *jagat* becomes only a *nimitta kāraṇa*. And subject to his will, *jagat* undergoes various *vikāras* at the mere will of Parabrahman. And this proves that we have no dispute whatever. So, it is declared that Parabrahman being absolutely *nirvikāra*, *jagat* is subject only to his natural will in all his lordship (over it) and undergoes changes under

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the name of *Pradhāna*. In order to remove this dispute, the *Sutra*, *Prakritēścha pratignādrishṭāntānuparōdhāt* was laid down by the Sūtrakāra. Else there would have been no necessity for this *Sūtra*. It has been stated above that the two parts (forms of Brahman) are absolutely different from each other. In your view, it is not granted that Brahman has two different forms. Without a thing to be divided, there can be no division. Unless there is a thing ready to be divided, there can be no division. Nor can there be *vikāra* unless there is a thing ready to undergo *vikāra*. Let this be the matter for discussion. The Bhēdavādin says that the *nimitta kāraṇa* of Parabrahman is purely a source of cause and nothing more in Brahman. We therefore say that the *sadānanda* form of Brahman always rules over the *chitsamudāya*. In order to prove this, the *adhikaraṇa* is begun. If so, then, what is this Brahmatva in Parabrahman? Is this Brahmatva in Brahman merely a name or is it something in him for manifesting the *jagat* in its varied form? The first view is contradicted because of its divided character. This means that where we do not agree and where we always differ, there we should not begin the *adhikaraṇa*. For the agreement merely ends in argument. Only when one is ready to stand to the literal meaning of the expressions an argument should be advanced. If it is asked whether in Parabrahman *sat*, *chit*, *ānanda*, etc., are different from each other or one in combination, the reply is "It is not the first". For, the *Sruti* text *Ēkamēvādvitīyam* is contradicted. As regards the other view, the combination consists of both the *nirvikāra* and *vikāra* forms under the name of *upādāna kāraṇa* and other combinations. There is fault attaching to all these views. For Brahman, when it is once determined in mind and accepted, there can be no cause for disagreement. The expression *hi* proves without a doubt the declared meaning of the *upādāna kāraṇa* of Parabrahman, which is his natural characteristic in bringing *Pradhāna* into *Srishṭi* in its varied aspects. Else Brahman's lordship over *upādāna kāraṇa* would not have existed. Brahman's lordship

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is amply shown in *Srishṭi* in various transformations by his mere will in which lies his *Brahmatva*. Else, it (*Brahmatva*) would not have existed in him. It cannot be said that Para-brahman's *upādāna kāraṇa* and the various manifestations of *Pradhāna* in bringing the universe into existence, cannot be said to be interdependent on each other. Hence in Brahman's chief *nimitta kāraṇatva* lies his *Brahmatva*. Hence also he is the overlord of all manifested *vikāra* forms of *jagat* under his will and control. This is no mere subtle argument but proved from an examination of all *Srutis* and *āgamas*.

Ramanuja's Criticism of Bhedabheda.

We have referred above to Jayatīrtha's criticism of Yādavaprakāśa's view. Not much different is the criticism of Rāmānuja from the *Viśishṭādvaita* standpoint. Commenting on *Sūtra* II. 1. 15, *Tadananyatva mārambhaṇa śabdādibhyaḥ*, he offers a strikingly strong criticism of Yādavaprakāśa's conception of *Sat*. "Others again (*Yādavaprakāśa*)," he says, "hold that the general cause, *i.e.*, Brahman, is pure Being in which all distinctions and changes such as being an enjoying subject, and so on, have vanished, while however it is endowed with all possible potentialities. During a *praḷaya* this causal substance abides self-luminous, with all the distinctions of consciousness of pleasure and pain gone to rest, comparable to the soul of a man held by dreamless sleep, different however in nature from mere non-sentient matter. During the period of a creation, on the other hand, just as the substance called clay assumes the forms of jars, platters, and so on, or as the water of the sea turns itself into foam, waves, bubbles, and so on, the universal causal substance abides in the form of a triad of constituent parts, *viz.*, enjoying subjects, object of enjoyment, and a ruler. The attributes of being a ruler, or an object of enjoyment, or an enjoying subject, and the perfections and imperfections depending on those attributes, are therefore distributed in the same way as the attributes of being a jar or pitcher or platter; and the different effects of these attributes are distributed among different parts of the substance, clay. The objects

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of enjoyment, subjects of enjoyment, and the ruler are one, on the other hand, in so far as 'that which is' constitutes their substance; just as jars, platters and pitchers are one in so far as their substance is constituted by clay. It is thus one substance only, *viz.*, 'that which is', that appears in different conditions, and it is in this sense that the world is non-different from Brahman." Demurring to the reasoning adopted, Rāmānuja says—"But this theory is really in conflict with all Scripture, *Smriti*, *Itihāsa*, *Purāṇa* and Reasoning. For Scripture, *Smriti*, *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa* alike teach that there is one supreme cause, *viz.*, Brahman—a being that is the Lord of all Lords, all-knowing, all-powerful, instantaneously realizing all its purposes, free of all blemish, not limited either by place or time, enjoying supreme unsurpassable bliss. Nor can it be held that above the Lord there is 'pure Being' of which the Lord is a part only. For 'This which is "being" only was in the beginning one only, without a second; it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth';[995] 'Verily, in the beginning this was Brahman, one only. Being one it was not strong enough. It created the most excellent Kshattra, *viz.*, those Kshattras among the Dēvas —Indra, Varuṇa, Sōma, Rudra, Parjanya, Yama, Mrityu, Īśāna';[996] 'In the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing whatsoever else blinking. He thought, shall I send forth worlds';[997] 'There was in truth Nārāyaṇa only, not Brahma, not Īśāna, nor heaven and earth, nor the nakshatras, nor the waters, nor Agni, nor Sōma, nor Sūrya. Being alone he felt no delight. Of him merged in meditation' etc.[998] —these and other texts prove that the highest cause is the Lord of all Lords, Nārāyaṇa. For as the terms 'Being,' 'Brahman,' 'Self,' which are met with in sections treating of the same topic, are in one of those parallel sections particularised by the term 'Nārāyaṇa', it follows that they all mean Nārāyaṇa. That the Lord only is the universal cause is shown by the

[995] *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 3.
[996] *Brihad. Upa.*, I. 4. 11.
[997] *Ait. Ar.*, II. 4. 1. 1, 2.
[998] *Mahōpa.*, I. 1.

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following text also, 'He the highest great lord of lords, the highest deity of deities—he is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord'.[999] Similarly the *Manu Smriti*, 'Then the divine Self-existent (Brahma)—desirous to produce from his own body beings of many kind—first with a thought created the waters and placed his seed in them'.[1000] *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇas* also declare the Supreme Person only to be the universal cause, 'Nārāyaṇa, of whom the world is the body, of infinite nature, eternal, when desirous to create and sent forth from a thousandth part of himself the souls in two divisions.' 'From Vishṇu the world originated and in him it abides.'

Nor is it possible to hold that the Lord is pure 'Being' only, for such 'Being' is admitted to be an element of the Lord; and moreover all 'Being' has difference. Nor can it be maintained that the Lord's connection with all his auspicious qualities—knowledge, bliss, and so on—is occasional (adventitious) merely; it rather is essential and hence eternal. Nor may you avail yourself of certain texts —*viz.*, 'His high power (*Śakti*) is revealed as manifold, as essential, and (so) his knowledge, strength and action';[1001] 'He who is all-knowing, all-cognising'[1002], and others—to the end of proving that what is essential is only the Lord's connection with the *potentialities* (*Śakti*) of knowledge, bliss, and so on. For in the *Śvētāśvatara* text the word 'essential' independently qualifies 'knowledge, strength and action' no less than '*Śakti*'; and your explanation would necessitate so-called implication (*lakshaṇā*). Nor again can it be said that in words such as *sarvagna* (all-knowing), the formative suffix expresses potentiality only, as it admittedly does in other words such as *pākaka* (cook); for grammar does not teach that all these (*krit*) affixes in general express potentiality or capability only. It rather teaches[1003] that a few *krit*-affixes only have this

[999] *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 7. 9.
[1000] *Mahōpa.*, I. 6—8.
[1001] *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 8.
[1002] *Mund. Upa.*, I. 1. 9.
[1003] *Cf. Pāṇini*, III. 2. 54.

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limited meaning; and in the case of *pākaka* and similar words we must assume capability to be denoted, because there is no other explanation open to us. If, moreover, the Lord were held to be only a part of the *Sat*, as the whole, would be superior to the Lord just as the ocean is superior to a wave, and this would be in conflict with ever so many scriptural texts which make statements about the Lord, *cp. e.g.* 'Him the highest great lord of lords'; 'There is none seen like to him or superior'.[1004] If, moreover, mere Being is held to be the Self of all and the general whole, and the Lord only a particular part of it, this would imply the stultification of all those texts which declare the Lord to be the general Self and the whole of which all beings are parts of, and to have their being in, pitchers (which themselves are only special things made of clay). Against this you perhaps will plead that as Being in general is fully present in all its parts, and hence also in that part which is the Lord, all other things may be viewed as having their Self in, and being parts of, him. But from your principles we might with equal right draw the inference that as Being in general is fully present in the jar, the Lord is a part of the jar and has his Self in that! From enunciations such as 'the jar is,' 'the cloth is,' it appears that Being is an attribute of things, and cannot therefore be a substance and a cause. By the 'being' of a thing we understand the attribute of its being suitable for some definite practical effect; while its 'non-being' means its suitability for an effect of an opposite nature. Should it on the other hand be held that substances only have being, the (unacceptable) consequence would be that actions, and so on, are non-existent. And if (to avoid this consequence) it were said that the being of actions, and so on, depends on their connection with substances, it would be difficult to show (what yet should be shown) that 'being' is everywhere of one and the same nature. Moreover, if everything were non-different in so far as 'being', there would be a universal consciousness of the nature of everything,

[1004] *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 7. 8.

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and from this there would follow a general confusion of all good and evil (*i.e.*, every one would have conscious experience of everything). This point we have explained before. For all these reasons non-difference can only have the meaning set forth by us.

Nor is Rāmānuja satisfied with the view of Bhāskara. "'Those again who (like Bhāskara),'" he remarks, "hold the effect also to be real — the difference of the soul and Brahman being due to limiting conditions, while their non-difference is essential; and the difference as well as the non-difference of Brahman and matter being essential—enter into conflict with all those texts which declare that the soul and Brahman are distinct in so far as the soul is under the power of *karman* while Brahman is free from all evil, etc., and all those texts which teach that non-sentient matter undergoes changes while Brahman does not. For as, according to them, nothing exists but Brahman and the limiting adjuncts, Brahman—as being indivisible—must be undivided while entering into connection with the *upādhis*, and hence itself undergoes a change into inferior forms. And if they say that it is only the power (*śakti*), not Brahman itself, which undergoes a change: this also is of no avail since Brahman and its power are non-different."[1005]

In another place, in establishing the Great Siddhānta, Rāmānuja more directly attacks the *Bhēdābhēda* view and shows how it is, in his opinion, untenable. Commenting on I. 1. 1, he enlarges at some length on the point that perception never has for its object that which is devoid of all difference. He says:—"The same arguments tend to refute the view that there is difference and absence of difference at the same time (the so-called *Bhēdābhēda* view). Take the judgment 'This is such and such'; how can we realize here the non-difference of 'being this' and 'being such and such'? 'The such and such' denotes a peculiar

[1005] See Rāmānuja's *Srī Bhāshya*, II. 1. 15. George Thibaut's translation in the *S.B.E.*, Vol. XLVIII, *The Vedānta Sūtras with Rāmānuja's Commentary*, Part III, page 459.

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make characterised, *e.g.*, by a dewlap, the 'this' denotes the thing distinguished by that peculiar make; the non-difference of these two is thus contradicted by immediate consciousness. At the outset the thing perceived is perceived as separate from all other things, and this separation is founded on the fact that the thing is distinguished by a special constitution, let us say the generic characteristics of a cow, expressed by the term 'such and such'. In general, wherever we cognize the relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished thereby, the two clearly present themselves to our mind as absolutely different. Some things—*e.g.*, staffs and bracelets—appear sometimes as having a separate, independent existence of their own; at other times they present themselves as distinguishing attributes of other things or beings (*i.e.*, of the persons carrying staffs or wearing bracelets), other entities—*e.g.*, the generic character of cows—have a being only in so far as they constitute the form of substances, and thus always present themselves as distinguishing attributes of those substances. In both cases there is the same relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished thereby, and these two are apprehended as absolutely different. The difference between the two classes of entities is only that staffs, bracelets and similar things are capable of being apprehended in separation from other things, while the generic characteristics of a species are absolutely incapable thereof. The assertion, therefore, that the difference of things is refuted by immediate consciousness, is based on the plain denial of a certain form of consciousness, the one namely—admitted by every one—which is expressed in the judgment 'This thing is such and such.' This same point is clearly expounded by the Sūtrakāra in II. 2. 33 (*Ēvanchātmākārtsnyam*); also in II. 2. 34 (*Na cha paryāyādapyavirōdhō vikārādibhyaḥ*)."[1006]

Then, again, in commenting on I. 1. 1, Rāmānuja propounds how *Bhēdābhēda* involves, like *Bhēda* and *Abhēda*, the reflection of all those texts which teach that Brahman

[1006] *Ibid.*, 42–43.

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is the universal Self. "It appears," he says, " that those as well who hold the theory of the absolute unity of one non-differenced substance, as those who teach the doctrine of *Bhēdābhēda* (co-existing difference and non-difference), and those who teach the absolute difference of several substances, give up all those scriptural texts which teach that Brahman is the universal Self. With regard to the first mentioned doctrine, we ask, 'if there is only one substance; to what can the doctrine of universal identity refer?' The reply will perhaps be 'to that very same substance'. But we reply, this point is settled already by the texts defining the nature of Brahman (*The True, Knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman,—Taitt. Upa.* II. 1), and there is nothing left to be determined by the passages declaring the identity of everything with Brahman. But those texts serve to dispel the idea of fictitious difference! This, we reply, cannot, as has been shown above, be effected by texts stating universal identity in the way of co-ordination; and statements of co-ordination, moreover, introduce into Brahman a doubleness of aspect, and thus contradict the theory of absolute oneness. The *Bhēdābhēda* view implies that owing to Brahman's connection with limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) all the imperfections resulting therefrom—and which avowedly belong to the individual soul—would manifest themselves in Brahman itself; and as this contradicts the doctrine that the Self of all is constituted by a Brahman free from all imperfection and composing within itself all auspicious qualities, the texts conveying that doctrine would have to be discarded. If, on the other hand, the theory be held in that form that *bhēdābhēda* belongs to Brahman by its own nature (not only owing to an *upādhi*), the view that Brahman by its essential nature appears as individual soul, implies that imperfections no less than perfections are essential to Brahman, and this is in conflict with the texts teaching that everything is identical with Brahman free from all imperfections. For those finally who maintain absolute difference, the doctrine of Brahman being the Self of all has no meaning whatsoever—for things absolutely different can in no way

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be one—and this implies the abandonment of all Vēdānta texts together." Rāmānuja then points out at length how his own view—that the entire aggregate of things, intelligent and non-intelligent, has its Self in Brahman in so far as it constitutes Brahman's body—is in accord with all *Sruti* texts. "Those, on the other hand," he says, "who take their stand on the doctrine proclaimed by all Upanishads, that the entire world forms the body of the Brahman, may accept in their fulness all the texts teaching the identity of the world with Brahman. For as genus (*jāti*) and quality (*guṇa*), so substances (*dravya*) also may occupy the position of determining attributes (*viśeshaṇa*), in so far namely as they constitute the body of something else..... The body is, in reality, nothing but a mode of the Self; but, for the purpose of showing the distinction of things, the word 'body' is used in a limited sense. Analogously words such as 'whiteness', 'generic character of a cow', 'species', 'quality' are used in a distinctive sense (although 'whiteness' is not found apart from a white thing of which it is the *prakāśa* and so on). Words such as 'god', 'man', etc., therefore, do extend in their connotation up to the Self. And as the individual souls, distinguished by their connection with aggregates of matter bearing the characteristic marks of humanity, divine nature, and so on, constitute the body of the highest Self, and hence are modes of it, the words denoting those individual souls, extend in their connotation up to the very highest Self. And as all intelligent and non-intelligent beings are thus mere modes of the highest Brahman, and have reality thereby only, the words denoting them are used in co-ordination with the terms denoting Brahman." Rāmānuja adds that he has made this point clear in his earlier work, the *Vēdārtha Sangraha* and quotes the *Sūtra*, *Ātmēti tūpagachchanti grāhayanticha* (IV. 1. 3) in support of his position remarking that it declares that "the identity of the world and Brahman consists in the relation of body and Self."[1007]

Commenting on I. 1. 4 (*Tattu samanvayāt*), Rāmānuja sets out at length the view that scriptural texts have,

[1007] *Ibid.*, 134–138.

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for their subject, Brahman which constitutes the highest aim of man. Such, he states, is the connected meaning of the whole aggregate of words which constitutes the Upanishads. As against this view, he puts forward several different views, each of which he rejects. Among these is the *Bhēdābhēda* view which he elaborates in considerable detail and then rejects. It is interesting to note that he eventually rejects it on the ground that the idea of *Bhēdābhēda* is contradictory and cannot be maintained. This position is reached after a long argumentation which is worth some consideration, having regard to the force with which it is put forth and the closeness of the reasoning adopted.

"Nor can we approve," he says, "of the doctrine held by some that there is no contradiction between difference and non-difference; for difference and non-difference cannot co-exist in one thing, any more than coldness and heat, or light and darkness. Let us first hear in detail what the holder of this so-called *bhēdābhēda* view has to say. The whole universe of things must be ordered in agreement with our cognitions. Now we are conscious of all things as different and non-different at the same time: they are non-different in their causal and generic aspects, and different in so far as viewed as effects and individuals. There indeed is a contradiction between light and darkness and so on; for these cannot possibly exist together, and they are actually met with in different abodes. Such contradictoriness is not, on the other hand, observed in the case of cause and effect, and genus and individual; on the contrary we here distinctly apprehend one thing as having two aspects—'this jar is clay', 'this cow is short-horned'. The fact is that experience does not show us anything that has one aspect only. Nor can it be said that in these cases there is absence of contradiction, because as fire consumes grass, so non-difference absorbs difference; for the same thing which exists as clay, or gold, or cow, or horse, etc., at the same time exists as jar or diadem, or short-horned cow or mare. There is no command of the Lord to the effect that one aspect only should

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belong to each thing, non-difference to what is non-different, and difference to what is different. But one aspect only belongs to each thing, because it is thus that things are perceived! On the contrary, we reply, things have two-fold aspects, just because it is *thus* that they are perceived. No man, however wide he may open his eyes, is able to distinguish in an object—*e.g.*, a jar or a cow—placed before him which part is the clay and which the jar, or which part is the generic character of the cow and which the individual cow. On the contrary, his thought finds its true expression in the following judgments: 'This jar is clay'; 'this cow is short-horned'. Nor can it be maintained that he makes a distinction between the cause and genus and as objects of the idea of persistence, and the effect and individual as objects of the idea of discontinuance (difference); for, as a matter of fact, there is no perfection of these two elements, in separation. A man may look ever so close at a thing placed before him, he will not be able to perceive a difference of aspect and to point out 'this is the persisting, general element in the thing, and the non-persistent, individual element.' Just as an effect and an individual give rise to the idea of one thing, so the effect *plus* cause, and the individual *plus* generic character, also give rise to the idea of one thing only. This very circumstance makes it possible for us to recognise each individual thing, placed as it is among a multitude of things differing in place, time, and character. Each thing thus being cognized as endowed with a two-fold aspect, the theory of cause and effect and generic character and individual, being absolutely different, is clearly refuted by perception.

"But, an objection is raised, if on account of grammatical co-ordination and the resulting idea of oneness, the judgment 'this pot is clay' is taken to express the relation of difference *plus* non-difference, we shall have analogously to infer from judgments such as 'I am a man', 'I am a divine being' that the self and the body also stand in the *bhēdābhēda* relation; the theory of the co-existence of difference and non-difference will thus act like a fire which a

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man has lit on his hearth, and which in the end consumes the entire house! This, we reply, is the baseless idea of a person who has not duly considered the true nature of co-ordination as establishing the *bhēdābhēda* relation. The correct principle is that all reality is determined by state of consciousness not sublated by valid means of proof. The imagination, however, of the identity of the self and the body *is* sublated by all the means of proof which apply to the Self. It is in fact no more valid than the imagination of the snake in the rope, and does not therefore prove the non-difference of the two. The co-ordination, on the other hand, which is expressed in the judgment 'the cow is short-horned' is never observed to be refuted in any way, and hence establishes the *bhēdābhēda* relation.

"For the same reasons the individual soul (*jīva*) is not absolutely different from Brahman, but stands to it in the *bhēdābhēda* relation in so far as it is a part (*aṁśa*) of Brahman. Its non-difference from Brahman is essential (*svābhāvika*); its difference is due to limiting adjuncts (*aupādhika*). This we know, in the first place, from those scriptural texts which declare non-difference—such as 'Thou art that'[1008]; 'There is no other seer but he'[1009]; 'This Self is Brahman'[1010]; and the passage from the *Brahmasūkta* in the *Samhitōpanishad* of the Atharvaṇas which, after having said that Brahman is Heaven and Earth, continues, 'The fishermen are Brahman, the slaves are Brahman, Brahman are these gamblers; man and woman are born from Brahman; women are Brahman and so are men.' And, in the second place, from those texts which declare difference: 'He who, one, eternal, intelligent, fulfils the desires of many non-eternal intelligent beings'[1011]; 'There are two unborn, one knowing, the other not knowing; one strong, the other weak'[1012]; 'Being the cause of their connexion with him, through the qualities of action and the qualities of the Self, he is seen as another'[1013]; 'The Lord of nature and the souls, the ruler of the qualities, the cause of the

[1008] *Chch. Upa.*, VI.
[1009] *Brihad. Upa.*, III. 7. 23.
[1010] *Ibid.*, II. 5. 19.
[1011] *Chch. Upa.*, II. 5. 13.
[1012] *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 9.
[1013] *Ibid.*, V. 12.

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bondage, the existence and the release of the *Samsāra*'[1014]; 'He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs'[1015]; 'One of the two eats the sweet fruit, without eating the other looks on'[1016]; 'He who dwelling in the Self'[1017]; 'Embraced by the intelligent Self he knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within'[1018]; 'Mounted by the intelligent Self he goes groaning'[1019]; 'Having known him he passes beyond death'[1020]. On the ground of these two sets of passages the individual and the highest Self must needs be assumed to stand in the *bhēdābhēda* relation. And texts such as 'He knows Brahman'[1021], which teach that in the state of Release the individual soul enters into Brahman itself; and again texts such as 'But when the Self has become all for him, whereby should he see another'[1022], which forbid us to view, in the state of Release, the Lord as something different (from the individual soul), show that non-difference is essential (while difference is merely *aupādhika*).

"But, an objection is raised, the text 'He reaches all desires together in the wise Brahman,' in using the word 'together' shows that even in the state of Release the soul is different from Brahman, and the same view is expressed in two of the *Sūtras*, *viz.*, IV. 4. 17; and IV. 4. 21 (*Jagadvyāpāra varjam prakaraṇādasannihitatvāchcha* and *Bhōgamātrasāmya lingāchcha*). This is not so, we reply; for the text, 'There is no other seer but he'[1023] and many similar texts distinctly negative all plurality in the Self. The *Taittirīya* text quoted by you means that the man reaches Brahman with all desires, *i.e.*, Brahman comprising within itself all objects of desire; if it were understood differently, it would follow that Brahman holds a subordinate position only. And if the *Sūtra* IV. 4. 17 meant that the released

[1014] *Ibid.*, VI. 16.
[1015] *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 9.
[1016] *Ibid.*, IV. 6.
[1017] *Brihad. Upa.*, III. 7. 22.
[1018] *Ibid.*, IV. 3. 21.
[1019] *Ibid.*, IV. 3. 35.
[1020] *Śvēta. Upa.*, III. 8.
[1021] *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 9.
[1022] *Brihad. Upa.*, II. 4. 13.
[1023] *Ibid.*, III. 7. 23.

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soul is separate from Brahman, it would follow that it is deficient in lordly power; and if this were so the *Sūtra* would be in conflict with other *Sūtras* such as IV. 4. 1 (*Sampadyāvirbhāvassvēna śabdāt*). For these reasons, non-difference is the essential condition; while the distinction of the souls from Brahman and from each other is due to their limiting adjuncts, *i.e.*, the internal organ, the sense organs, and the body. Brahman indeed is without parts and omnipresent; but through its adjuncts it becomes capable of division just as ether is divided by jars and the like. Nor must it be said that this leads to a reprehensible mutual dependence—Brahman in so far as divided entering into conjunction with its adjuncts, and again the division in Brahman being caused by its conjunction with its adjuncts; for these adjuncts and Brahman's connection with them are due to action (*karma*), and the stream of action is without a beginning. The limiting adjuncts to which a soul is joined spring from the soul as connected with previous works, and work again springs from the soul as joined to its adjuncts: and as this connection with works and adjuncts is without a beginning in time, no fault can be found with our theory. The non-difference of the souls from each other and Brahman is thus essential, while their difference is due to the *upādhis*. These *upādhis*, on the other hand, are at the same time essentially non-distinct and essentially distinct from each other and Brahman; for there are no other *upādhis* (to account for their distinction if non-essential), and if we admitted such, we should again have to assume further *upādhis*, and so on *in infinitum*. We therefore hold that the *upādhis* are produced, in accordance with the actions of the individual souls, as essentially non-different and different from Brahman.

"To this *bhēdābhēda* view the Pūrvapakshin now objects on the following grounds:—The whole aggregate of Vēdānta texts aims at enjoining meditation on a non-dual Brahman whose essence is reality, intelligence and bliss, and thus sets forth the view of non-difference; while, on the other

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hand, the *karma*-section of the Vēda, and likewise perception and the other means of knowledge, intimate the view of the difference of things. Now, as difference and non-difference are contradictory, and as the view of difference may be accounted for as resting on beginningless Nescience, we conclude that universal non-difference is what is real. The tenet that difference and non-difference are not contradictory because both are provided by our consciousness, cannot be upheld. If one thing has different characteristics from another there is distinction (*bhēda*); of the two the contrary condition of things constitutes non-distinction (*abhēda*); who in his senses then would maintain that these two—suchness and non-suchness—can be found together? You have maintained that non-difference belongs to a thing viewed as cause and genus, and difference to the same viewed as effect and individual; and that, owing to this two-fold aspect of things, non-difference and difference are not irreconcilable. But that this view also is untenable, a presentation of the question in definite alternatives will show. Do you mean to say that the difference lies in one aspect of things and the non-difference in the other? or that difference and non-difference belong to the thing possessing two aspects? On the former alternative the difference belongs to the individual and the non-difference to the genus; and this implies that there is no one thing with a double aspect. And should you say that the genus and the individual together constitute one thing only, you abandon the view that it is difference of aspect which takes away the contradictoriness of difference and non-difference. We have moreover remarked already that difference in characteristics and its opposite are absolutely contradictory. On the second alternative we have two aspects of different kinds and an unknown thing supposed to be the substrate of those aspects; but this assumption of a triad of entities proves only their mutual difference of character, not their non-difference. Should you say that the non-contradictoriness of two aspects constitutes simultaneous difference and non-difference in the thing

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which is their substrate, we ask in return—How can two aspects which have a thing for their substrate, and thus are different from the thing, introduced into that thing a combination of two contradictory attributes (*viz.*, difference and non-difference)? And much less even are they able to do so if they are viewed as non-different from the thing which is their substrate. If, moreover, the two aspects on the one hand, and the thing they inhere on the other, be admitted to be distinct entities, there will be required a further factor to bring about their difference and non-difference, and we shall thus be led into a *in regressus in infinitum*. Nor is it a fact that the idea of a thing inclusive of its generic character bears the character of unity, in the same way as the admittedly uniform idea of an individual; for wherever a state of consciousness expresses itself in the form 'this is such and such' it implies the distinction of an attribute or mode, and that to which the attribute or mode belongs. In the case under discussion, the genus constitutes the mode, and the individual that to which the mode belongs; the idea does not therefore possess the character of unity.

"For these very reasons the individual soul cannot stand to Brahman in the *bhēdābhēda* relation. And as the view of non-difference is founded on Scripture, we assume that the view of difference rests on beginningless Nescience. But on this view want of knowledge and all the imperfections springing therefrom, such as birth, death, etc., would cling to Brahman itself, and this would contradict scriptural texts such as 'He who is all-knowing' [1024] 'That Self free from all evil'.[1025] Not so, we reply. For all those imperfections we consider to be unreal. On your view, on the other hand, which admits nothing but Brahman and its limiting adjuncts, all the imperfections which spring from contact with those adjuncts must really belong to Brahman. For as Brahman is without parts, indivisible, the *upādhis* cannot divide or split it so as to connect themselves with a part only; but necessarily connect themselves

[1024] *Mund. Upa.*, I. 1. 9. [1025] *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 1. 5.

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with Brahman itself and produce their effects on it. Here the following explanation may possibly be attempted. Brahman determined by an *upādhi* constitutes the individual soul. This soul is of atomic size since what determines it, *viz.*, the internal organ is itself of atomic size; and the limitation itself is without beginning. All the imperfections therefore connect themselves only with that special place that is determined by the *upādhi*, and do not affect the highest Brahman which is not limited by the *upādhi*. In reply to this we ask—Do you mean to say that what constitutes the atomic individual soul is a part of Brahman which is limited and cut off by the limiting adjunct; or some particular part of Brahman to which, without thereby being divided of, is connected with an atomic *upādhi*; or Brahman in its totality as connected with an *upādhi*; or some other intelligent being connected with an *upādhi*, or finally the *upādhi* itself? The first alternative is not possible, because Brahman cannot be divided; it would moreover imply that the individual soul has a beginning, for division means the making of one thing into two. On the second alternative it would follow that as a part of Brahman would be connected with the *upādhi*, all the imperfections due to the *upādhis* would adhere to that part. And further, if the *upādhi* would not possess the power of attracting to itself the particular part of Brahman with which it is connected, it would follow that when the *upādhi* moves the part with which it is connected would constantly change; in other words, bondage and release would take place at every moment. If, on the contrary, the *upādhi* possessed the power of attraction, the whole Brahman—as not being capable of division—would be attracted and move with the *upādhi*. And should it be said that what is all-pervading and without parts cannot be attracted and moved, well then the *upādhi* only moves, and we are again met by the difficulties stated above. Moreover, if all the *upādhis* were connected with the parts of Brahman viewed as one and undivided, all individual souls, being nothing but parts of Brahman, would be considered as non-distinct. And should

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it be said that they are not thus cognized as one because they are constituted by different parts of Brahman, it would follow that as soon as the *upādhi* of one individual soul is moving, the identity of that soul would be lost (for it would, in successive moments, be constituted by different parts of Brahman). On the third alternative (the whole of) Brahman itself being connected with the *upādhi* enters into the condition of the individual soul, and there remains no non-conditioned Brahman. And, moreover, the soul in all bodies will then be one only. On the fourth alternative the individual soul is something altogether different from Brahman and the difference of the soul from Brahman thus ceases to depend on the *upādhis* of Brahman. And the fifth alternative means the embracing of the view of the *Chārvāka* (who makes no distinction between soul and matter)."[1026]

Rāmānuja reverts to this topic of *Bhēdābhēda* once again when he comments on II. 2. 31 (*Naikasminnasambhavāt*). As is well known, he considers under this *Sūtra* the Jaina theory of the *Saptabhangi nyāya*, with whose help, he says, the Jainas prove that all things—which they declare to consist of substance (*dravya* and *paryāya*) (particular states of substances)—to be existing, one and permanent in so far as they are substances, and the opposite in so far as they are *paryāyas*. As the particular states of substances are of the nature of Being as well as Non-Being, they manage to prove existence, non-existence and so on. "With regard to this," he says, "the *Sūtra* (II. 2. 31) remarks that no such proof is possible, 'Not so, on account of the impossibility in one'; *i.e.*, because contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing, not any more than light and darkness. As a substance and particular states qualifying it—and (by the Jainas) called *paryāya*—are different things (*padārtha*), one substance cannot be connected with opposite attributes. It is thus not possible that

[1026] George Thibaut, *Vēdānta-Sūtras with the Commentary by Rāmānuja*, 189-196.

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a substance qualified by one particular state, such as existence, should at the same time be qualified by the opposite state, *i.e.*, non-existence. The non-permanency, further, of a substance consists in its being the abode of those particular states which are called origination and destruction; how then should permanency, which is of an opposite nature, reside in the substance at the same time? Difference (*bhinnatva*) again consists in things being the abodes of contradictory attributes; non-difference, which is the opposite of this, cannot hence possibly reside in the same things which are the abode of difference; not any more the generic character of a horse and that of a buffalo can belong to one animal." This matter, Rāmānuja adds, he has already explained at length under I. 1. 1 (*Athātō Brahmajīgnāsā*) when refuting the *Bhēdābhēda* theory.[1027]

Sankara's Criticism of Bhedabheda.

We now turn to the criticism offered from the Advaita standpoint. We have, ere this, referred to the *Bhāmati's* comment on *Sūtras* I. 4. 20 (*Pratignāsiddhērlingamāśmarathyaḥ*) and I. 4. 21 (*Utkramishyata ēvambhāvādityauḍulōmiḥ*) and pointed out how the theories of *Bhēdābhēdavāda* and *Satyabhēdavāda* have been traced to them by its author. Sankara in commenting on these two *Sūtras* and on 1. 4. 22 (*Avasthitēriti kāśakritsnaḥ*) which follows them, rejects definitely the first two views propounded in them and attaches himself to the third. "Of these three opinions," he says, "we conclude that the one held by Kāśakritsna accords with Scripture, because he agrees with what all the Vēdānta texts (so, for instance, the passage 'That art thou') aim at inculcating. Only on the opinion of Kāśakritsna, immortality can be viewed as the result of the knowledge of the soul; while it would be impossible to hold the same view if the soul were a modification (product) of the Self and as such liable to lose its existence by being merged in its causal substance. For the same reason, name and form cannot

[1027] *Ibid.*, 516–518.

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abide in the soul (as was above attempted to prove by means of the simile of the rivers), but abide in the limiting adjunct and are ascribed to the soul itself in a figurative sense only. For the same reason the origin of the souls from the highest Self of which Scripture speaks in some places as analogous to the issuing of sparks from the fire, must be viewed as based on the limiting adjuncts of the soul. The reference here is to the *Bhēdābhēda* view, which is thus rejected by him. It is for this reason that Sankara interprets I. 4. 20 in the manner he does. "Āśmarathya," he says, "although meaning to say that the soul is not (absolutely) different from the highest Self, yet intimates by the expression, 'On account of the fulfilment of the promise'—which declares a certain mutual dependence—that there does exist a certain relation of cause and effect between the highest Self and the individual soul (*i.e.*, not on the relation of absolute identity)." His disposal of the *Satyabhēdavāda* of Auḍulomi is equally clear. "The opinion of Auḍulomi," he says, "again clearly implies that the difference and non-difference of the two depend on difference of condition (*i.e.*, upon the state of emancipation and its absence)." Commenting on the words "Because the soul when it will depart is such" (*Utkramishyata ēvambhāvāt*, etc.), he adds that "the statement as to the non-difference of the soul and the Self (implied in the declaration that the Great Being rises, etc.)[1028] is possible, because the soul when—after having purified itself by knowledge and so on—it will depart from the body, is capable of becoming one with the highest Self." He winds up by observing that "the individual soul and the highest Self differ in name only, it being a settled matter that perfect knowledge has for its object the absolute oneness of the two; it is senseless to insist (as some do) on a plurality of Selfs, and to maintain

[1028] The *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* text which declares that the Great Being which is to be seen arises from out of these elements: "Rising from out of these elements he vanishes again after them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge."

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that the individual soul is different from the highest Self and the highest Self from the individual soul. For the Self is indeed called by many different names, but it is one only. Nor does the passage 'He who knows Brahman which is real, knowledge, infinite, as hidden in the cave'[1029] refer to some one cave (different from the abode of the individual soul). And that nobody else but Brahman is hidden in the cave we know from a subsequent passage, *viz.*, 'Having sent forth he entered into it,'[1030] according to which the Creator only entered into the created beings. Those who insist on the distinction of the individual and the highest Self oppose themselves to the true sense of the Vēdānta texts, stand thereby in the way of perfect knowledge, which is the door to perfect beatitude and groundlessly assume release to be something effected and therefore non-eternal (while release, as often remarked, is eternal, it being in fact not different from the eternally unchanging Brahman). And (if they attempt to show that *mōksha*, although effected, is eternal) they involve themselves in a conflict with sound logic."

In commenting on II. 1. 13 (*Bhōktrāpattēravibhāgaśchēt syāllōkavat*), Sankara answers the objection whether non-duality which has been made out by a connected interpretation of Vēdic texts can be held to be proved false by *pratyaksha*, etc., *i.e.*, by sensuous perception, empirical inference and the like which reveal a distinction between the perceiver and the things perceived. He poses the question in this telling fashion:

"Another objection, based on reasoning, is raised against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world. Although Scripture is authoritative with regard to its own special subject-matter (as, for instance, the causality of Brahman), still it may have to be taken in a secondary sense in those cases where the subject-matter is taken out of its own grasp by other means of right knowledge; just as *mantras* and *arthavādas* have occasionally

[1029] *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.
[1030] *Ibid.*, II. 6.

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to be explained in a secondary sense (when the primary, literal sense is rendered impossible by other means of right knowledge). Analogously reasoning is to be considered invalid outside its legitimate sphere; so, for instance, in the case of religious duty and its opposites. Hence Scripture cannot be acknowledged to refute what is settled by other means of right knowledge. And if you ask, 'Where does Scripture oppose itself to what is thus established?' we give you the following instance. The distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is well known from ordinary experience, the enjoyers being intelligent, embodied souls, while sound and the like are the objects of enjoyment. Devadatta, for instance, is an enjoyer, the dish (which he eats) an object of enjoyment. The distinction of the two would be reduced to non-existence if the enjoyer passed over into the object of enjoyment, and *vice versa*. Now this passing over of one thing into another would actually result from the doctrine of the world being non-different from Brahman. But the sublation of a well-established distinction is objectionable, not only with regard to the present time when that distinction is observed to exist, but also with regard to the past and the future, for which it is inferred. The doctrine of Brahman's causality must therefore be abandoned, as it would lead to the sublation of the well-established distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment."

To this objection he replies, "It may exist as an ordinary experience." He then says:—"To the preceding objection we reply, "It may exist as an ordinary experience. Even on our philosophic view the distinction may exist, as ordinary experience furnishes us with analogous instances. We see, for instance, that waves, foam, bubbles, and other modifications of the sea, although they really are not different from the sea water, exist, sometimes in the state of mutual separation, sometimes in the state of conjunction, and etc. From the fact of their being non-different from the sea water, it does not allow that they pass over into each other: and, again, although they do

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not pass over into each other, still they are not different from the sea. So it is the case under discussion also. The enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over into each other, and yet they are not different from the highest Brahman. And although the enjoyer is not really an effect of Brahman, since the modified creator himself, in so far as he enters into the effect, is called the enjoyer (according to the passage, 'Having created he entered into it'[1031]), still after Brahman has entered into its effects it passes into a state of distinction, in consequence of the effect acting as a limiting adjunct; just as the universal ether is divided by its contact with jars and other limiting adjuncts. The conclusion is, that the distinction of enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment is possible, although both are non-different from Brahman, their highest cause as analogous instances of the sea and its waves demonstrates."

Between the perceiver and the things perceived, there is thus really no distinction as in the case of the ocean in connection with which we perceive both duality and non-duality. In the form of waves, it is dual and as a body of water, it is non-dual. Only, he suggests, these opposites, duality and non-duality, cannot co-exist in that thing which does not altogether admit of even a distinction of aspects and is absolutely one. Therefore, he argues, when it is possible to distinguish two aspects—non-dual as Brahman, and dual as differentiated into the perceiver and the objects of perception—the Vedic doctrine cannot be disputed because it is opposed to our perception of duality. Here, it will be seen, while duality of *aspects* is conceded, the *co-existence* of opposites in a thing which does not admit of even a distinction of aspects and is absolutely one, is opposed.

Again, in commenting on the next following *Sūtras* II. 1. 14 to II. 1. 20, *Tadananyatvamārambhaṇa śabdādibhyaḥ* to *Yathāchaprāṇādiḥ*, Sankara first considers the question: Is this non-duality in duality absolutely real or only

[1031] *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 6.

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apparently so? The *prima facie* view is that it is absolutely real; for it never proves false in the case of Brahman any more than in the case of the ocean. The *Siddhānta* is established that there is neither duality nor the commingling of duality with non-duality. The refutation contained in II. 1. 13, *Bhōktrāpattēravibhāgaschētsyāllokavat*, was, says Sankara, set forth on the condition of the practical distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment being acknowledged. In reality, however, that distinction, he remarks, does not exist because there is understood to be non-difference (*i.e.*, identity) of cause and effect. The effect is this manifold world consisting of ether and so on; the cause is the highest Brahman. Of the effect it is understood that in reality it is non-different from the cause, *i.e.*, has no existence apart from the cause. How so? "On account of the scriptural word 'origin' and others." The word 'origin' is used in connection with a simile in a passage undertaking to show how, through the knowledge of one thing, everything is known, as in the *Chchāndōgya* text[1032]: "As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (*i.e.*, the effect, the thing made of clay) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely" etc. The meaning of this passage is that, if there is known a lump of clay which really and truly is nothing but clay, there are known thereby likewise all things made of clay such as jars, dishes, pails, and so on, all of which agree in having clay for their true nature. For these modifications or effects are names only, exist through or originate from speech only, while in reality there exists no such thing as a modification. In so far as they are names—individual effects distinguished by names—they are untrue; in so far as they are clay, they are true. This parallel instance is given with reference to Brahman; applying the phrase "having its origin in speech" to the case illustrated by the instance quoted, we understand that the entire body of effects has no

[1032] *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 1. 4.

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existence apart from Brahman. Later on, again, the text, after having declared that fire, water and earth are the effects of Brahman, maintains that the effects of these three elements have no existence apart from them, "Thus has vanished the specific nature of burning fire, the modification being a mere name which has its origin in speech, while only the three colours are what is true."[1033] Other sacred texts also whose purport it is to intimate the unity of the Self are to be quoted here, says Sankara, in accordance with the words "and others" of the *Sūtra*. Such texts are "In that all this has its Self; it is the True, it is the Self; Thou art that;"[1034] "This everything, all that is Self;"[1035] "Brahman alone is all this;"[1036] "The Self is all this;"[1037] "There is in it no diversity."[1038] On any other assumption it would not be possible to maintain that by the knowledge of one thing everything becomes known, as the text quoted above declares. We therefore must adopt, adds Sankara, the following view. In the same way as those parts of ethereal space which are limited by jars and water pots are not really different from the universal ethereal space, and as the water of a mirage is not really different from the surface of the salty steppe—for the nature of that water is that it is seen in one moment and has vanished in the next, and moreover, it is not to be perceived by its own nature, *i.e.*, apart from the surface of the desert—so, this manifold world, with its objects of enjoyment, enjoyers and so on, has no existence apart from Brahman.

But, says Sankara, it might be objected that Brahman has in itself elements of manifoldness. As the tree has many branches, so Brahman possesses many powers and energies dependent on those powers. Unity and manifoldness are, therefore, both true. Thus, a tree considered by itself is one, but it is manifold if viewed as having branches; so the sea in itself is one, but manifold as

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[1033] *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 4. 1.
[1034] *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 8. 7.
[1035] *Brihad. Upa.*, II. 4. 6.
[1036] *Mund. Upa.*, II. 2. 11.
[1037] *Chch. Upa.*, VII. 25. 2.
[1038] *Brihad. Upa.*, IV. 4. 25.

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having waves and foam; so the clay in itself is one, but manifold if viewed with regard to the jars and dishes made of it. On this assumption the process of final release resulting from right knowledge may be established in connection with the element of unity (in Brahman) while the two processes of common worldly activity and of activity according to the *Vēda*, which depend on the *Karmakāṇḍa*, may be established in connection with the element of manifoldness. And with this view the parallel instances of clay, etc., agree very well. This theory, Sankara remarks, is untenable because in the instance—quoted in the Upanishad—the phrase "as clay they are true" asserts the cause only to be true while the phrase "having its origin in speech" declares the unreality of all effects. But, it may be said, he adds, that Scripture itself, by quoting the parallel instances of clay and so on, declares itself in favour of a Brahman capable of modification; for we know from experience that clay and similar things do undergo modifications. This objection, Sankara remarks, is without force, because a number of scriptural passages by denying all modifications of Brahman, teach it to be absolutely changeless (*kūṭastha*). Such passages are, "This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahman"[1039]; "That Self is to be described by No, no";[1040] "It is neither coarse nor fine".[1041] For to the one Brahman the two qualities of being subject to modification and of being free from it cannot both be ascribed. And if you say, "Why should they not be both predicated of Brahman (the former during the time of the subsistence of the world, the latter during the period of reabsorption) just as rest and motion may be predicated (of one body at different times)?" Sankara answers that the qualification "absolutely" (*kūṭastha*) predicates this. For the changeless Brahman cannot be the substratum of varying attributes. And that, on account of the negation of all

[1039] *Brihad. Upa.*, IV. 4. 25.
[1040] *Ibid.*, III. 9. 26.
[1041] *Ibid.*, III. 8. 8.

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attributes, Brahman really is eternal and changeless has already been demonstrated.[1042]

It has been remarked that Sankara is much more emphatic in his rejection of the *Bhēdābhēda* in his commentary on the *Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, which, indeed, has been claimed in certain quarters as one continuous protest against it. In commenting on *Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, V. 1. 1. (*Om pūrṇamadaḥ pūrṇamidam*, etc.), Sankara criticises the *Bhēdābhēda* view. First, he remarks that Brahman is infinite, all-pervading, like the ether, without a break, and unconditioned. So also, he says, is *this* conditioned Brahman manifesting through name and form and coming within the scope of relativity (of the universe), infinite or all-pervading indeed in its real form as the Supreme Self, not in its differentiated form circumscribed by the limiting adjuncts. This differentiated Brahman, the effect, proceeds from the infinite, or Brahman as cause. Although it emanates as an effect, it does not give up its nature, infinitude, the state of the Supreme Self—it emanates as but the infinite. Taking the infinitude of the infinite, or Brahman as effect, that is, attaining perfect unity with its own nature by removing through knowledge its apparent otherness that is created by ignorance, through contact with limiting adjuncts, the elements, it remains as the unconditioned infinite Brahman alone, without interior or exterior, the homogeneous Pure Intelligence. Next, Sankara reiterates that what has been said before, *viz.*, " This (Self) was indeed Brahman in the beginning. It knew only Itself. Therefore it became all" (I. 4. 10) is the explanation of this *mantra*. He suggests that ' Brahman ' in that sentence is the same as ' That is infinite ' ; and ' This is infinite' means ' This (universe) was indeed Brahman in the beginning ' and he quotes another *Sruti* text in support, " Whatever is here is there and whatever is there is here."[1043] He adds that Brahman, which is the theme of all the Upanishads, is

[1042] See George Thibaut, *Vēdānta-Sūtras with the Commentary by Sankarāchārya*, Part I, Sūtras II. 14-24, pp. 320-347.

[1043] *Katha. Upa.*, IV. 10.

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described in this *mantra* to introduce what follows; for certain aids, to be mentioned immediately thereafter, *viz.*, *Om*, self-restraint, charity and compassion, have to be enjoined as steps to the knowledge of Brahman—aids, that, occurring in this supplementary portion, form part of all meditations. It is at this point, he takes up the other point of view represented by the *Bhēdābhēda* and criticises it. First, he enunciates the position thus:

"Some[1044] explain the *mantra* thus: From the infinite cause the infinite effect is manifested. The manifested effect is also infinite or real at the present moment, even in its *dvaita* form. Again, at the moment of dissolution, taking the infinitude of the infinite effect into itself, the infinite, causal form alone remains. Thus in all the three stages of origin, continuance and dissolution, the cause and the effect are infinite. It is just one infinity spoken of as divided into cause and effect. Thus the same Brahman is both *dvaita* and *advaita* (*Dvaitādvaitātmakamēkam Brahma*). For instance, an ocean consists of water, waves, foam, bubbles, etc. As the water is real, so also are its effects, the waves, foam, bubbles, etc.—which appear and disappear, but are a part and parcel of the ocean itself—real in the true sense of the word. Similarly the entire *dvaita* universe, corresponding to the waves, etc., on the water, is absolutely real, while the Parabrahman stands for the ocean water. If the universe is thus real, the *karmakāṇḍa* portion of the *Vēdas* is also valid. If, however, the *dvaita* world is but apparently so—if it be a creation of *Avidya*, false like a mirage and is in reality the one without a second, then *karmakāṇḍa* portion, having nothing to work upon, becomes invalid. This would only mean a conflict, for one portion of the *Vēdas*, *viz.*, the *Upanishads*, would be valid, since they deal with the Reality, the one without a second, but the *karmakāṇḍa* would be invalid, since it deals with *dvaita*, which is unreal. To avoid this conflict,

[1044] The reference here is said to be to the view taken by the *Bhartriprapancha*.

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the *Sruti* speaks of the reality of both cause and effect, like that of the ocean, in the *mantra*, 'That is infinite,' etc.

"All this is wrong, for neither an exception nor an option—which are applicable to specified objects—is possible with Brahman. It is not a well-considered view. Why? Because an exception can be made with regard to some part of an action, where the general rule would otherwise apply. For example, in the dictum, 'Killing no animal except in sacrifices',[1045] the killing of animals prohibited by the general rule, is allowed in a special case, *viz.*, a sacrifice such as the *Jyōtishṭōma*. But that will not apply to Brahman, the Reality. You cannot establish Brahman, the one without a second, by the general rule, and then make an exception in one part of it; for it cannot have any part, simply because it is the one without a second. Similarly, an option also is inadmissible. For example, in the injunctions, 'One should use the vessel *Shōḍaśi* in the *Atirātra* sacrifice', and 'One should not use the vessel *Shōḍaśi* in the *Atirātra* sacrifice,' an option is possible, as using or not using the vessel depends on a person's choice. But with regard to Brahman, the Reality, there cannot be any option about its being either *dvaita* or *advaita*, for the Self is not a matter depending on a person's choice. Besides there is a contradiction involved in the same thing being both one and many. Therefore this is not, as we said, a well-considered view.

"Moreover, it contradicts the *Sruti* as well as reason. For instance, *Sruti* passages that describe Brahman as Pure Intelligence, homogeneous like a lump of salt, without a break, devoid of such differences as prior or posterior, interior or exterior, including the external and internal, birthless, 'Not this, not this,' neither gross nor minute, not short, undecaying, fearless and immortal—passages that are definite in their import and leave no room for doubt or mistake—would all be thrown overboard as mere trash. Similarly, it would clash with reason, for a thing that has parts, is made up of many things and has

[1045] *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 15. 1.

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activity, cannot be eternal ; whereas the eternity of the Self is inferred from remembrance, etc.—which will be contradicted if the Self be transitory. Your own assumption too will be useless, for if the Self be transitory, the *karma-kāṇḍa* portion of the *Vēdas* will clearly be useless, since it will mean that a man will be getting the reward for something he has not done, and be deprived of the reward for what he has actually done."

Meeting here the possible objection that there are the illustrations of the ocean, etc., to show the *dvaitādvaita* of Brahman, and that, therefore, one cannot say that the same thing cannot be both one and many, Sankara replies : Not so, for they refer to something quite different. We have said that *dvaita* and *advaita* are contradictory only when applied to the Self, which is eternal and without parts, but not to effects, which have parts. Therefore your view is untenable as it contradicts the *Sruti*, the *Smriti* and reason. Rather than accept this, it is better to abandon the *Upanishads*. Besides, your view is not in accordance with the Scriptures, for such a Brahman is not fit for meditation. A Brahman that is teeming with differences, comprising thousands of evils in the shape of births, deaths, etc., has parts like an ocean, a forest and so forth, and is heterogeneous, has never been presented by the *Srutis* either as an object of meditation or as a truth to be realized. Rather they teach its being Pure Intelligence ; also, 'It should be realized in one form only' (IV. 4. 20). There is also the censure on seeing it as multiple : 'He goes from death to death who sees difference, as it were, in it' (IV. 4. 19 ; *Ka.* IV. 10). What is deprecated by the *Srutis* is not to be practised ; and that which is not practised (as being forbidden) cannot be the import of the Scriptures. Since the multiple aspect of Brahman, in which it is regarded as heterogeneous and manifold, is condemned, it is not to be sought after with a view to realization ; hence it cannot be the import of the Scriptures. But the homogeneity of Brahman is what is to

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be sought after, and is therefore good, and for that reason it ought to be the import of the Scriptures.

"You said that one part of the *Vēdas* would be invalid in the sphere of *Karmakāṇḍa* because of the absence of the *dvaita* world, while another part would be valid in the realm of *advaita*. This is wrong, for the Scriptures seek to instruct merely according to existing circumstances. They do not teach a man, as soon as he is born, either the *dvaita* or the *advaita* of existence, and then instruct him about rites or the knowledge of Brahman. Nor is *dvaita* required to be taught; it is understood by everyone as soon as he is born; and nobody thinks from the very outset that *dvaita* is false, in which case the Scriptures would first have to teach the reality of the *dvaita* world and then establish their own validity. (The unreality of the universe is no bar to the validity of the Scriptures), for even the disciples of those who deny the *Vēdas* (and do not believe in the objective universe)[1046] would not hesitate to accept the authority of their Scriptures when they are directed (to do something helpful in accordance with them) by their teachers. Therefore the Scriptures, taking the *dvaita* world as it is—created by *Avidya* and natural to everybody—first advise the performance of rites calculated to achieve the desired ends, to those who are possessed of that natural ignorance and defects such as attachment and aversion, afterwards, when they see the well-known evils of actions, their factors and their results, and wish to attain their real state of aloofness, which is the opposite of *dvaita*, the Scriptures teach them, as a means to it, the knowledge of Brahman, consisting in the realization of the *advaita* of the Self. So when they have attained that result—their real state of aloofness, their interest in the validity of the Scriptures ceases. And in the absence of that, the Scriptures too just cease to be Scriptures to them. Hence the Scriptures having similarly fulfilled their mission with regard to every person, there is not the least chance of a conflict

[1046] The reference here is said to be to certain Schools of Buddhism.

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with them; for such *dvaita* differences as Scripture, disciple and discipline terminate with the knowledge of *advaita*. If any of these survived the others, there might be a conflict with regard to it. But since Scripture, disciple and discipline are interdependent, not one of them survives the rest; and when all *dvaita* is over, and only *advaita*, the one without a second, the Good, alone stands, with whom is conflict apprehended? Hence also there is no non-contradiction either.

"Even taking your position for granted, we have to say that it is useless, for even if Brahman be both one and many, there will be the same conflict with the Scriptures. That is to say, supposing we admit that the same Brahman has both forms of *dvaitādvaita* like the ocean, etc., and that there is no other thing, even then we cannot escape the charge of a conflict with the Scriptures that you have levelled against us. How? For one and the Parabrahman has both forms of *dvaita* and *advaita* and plurality; being beyond grief, delusion, etc., it would not seek instruction; nor would the teacher be different from Brahman, for you have admitted the same Brahman to be both one and many. If you say, since the *dvaita* world is manifold, one can teach another, and it will not be instruction imparted to or by Brahman, we reply that you contradict your own statement that Brahman in its two-fold aspect of *dvaita* and *advaita* is one and the same, and that there is nothing else. Since that world of *dvaita* in which one teaches another is one thing, and *advaita* is of course another thing, your example of the ocean is inappropriate. Nor can we presume that Brahman, if it is one consciousness, as the ocean is one mass of water, will either receive instruction from, or instruct, anyone else. If Dēvadatta is both *dvaita* and *advaita* consisting of the hands, etc., it is absurd to think that between his tongue and ear—both parts of him—the tongue will instruct and the ear only receives the instruction, while Dēvadatta himself will neither instruct nor receive any instruction, for he has only one consciousness, as the ocean is made up of the same volume

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of water. Therefore such an assumption will clash with the *Sruti* and reason, and frustrate your own object. Hence our interpretation of the *mantra*, 'That is infinite,' etc., is the correct one."[1047]

Sripati's View of Bhedabheda.

We may now turn to Srīpati to see how he interprets the self-same *Sūtras* which Rāmānuja and others have interpreted as suggesting the rejection by the Sūtrakāra of both the *Saptabhangi* and *Bhēdābhēda* doctrines. Srīpati includes under *Ēkasminnasambhavādhikaraṇam* the following five *Sūtras*: *Naikasminnasambhavāt*; *Ēvanchātmākartsnyam*; *Śarīrāṇām chānavasthita parimāṇatvāt*; *Nachaparyāyādapyavirōdhō vikārādibhyaḥ*; *Antyavasthitēśchōbhayanityatvādaviśēshaḥ*. Sankara, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Srīkanṭha, Ānandatīrtha, Nimbārka, Vallabha and Vignānabhikshu do *not* mention the *Sūtra*, *Śarīrāṇām chānavasthita parimāṇatvāt*. For what purpose did Srīpati include this particular *Sūtra* in this *Adhikaraṇa*?[1048] In *Naikasminnasambhavāt*, Srīpati rejects the simultaneous existence and non-existence as enunciated in the *Saptabhanginyāya*. Since he says the changes are evidenced in a really existing thing (*vastu*) which is subject to *vikāra* or change of form at different times, the different forms are seen to be admitted but not their simultaneous existence and non-existence. The *Sūtra* disproves, according

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[1047] See *Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, V. 1. Swāmi Mādhavānanda's Edition, pp. 801-813.

[1048] It may be useful to state that the introduction of a new *Sūtra* like this by Srīpati which does not appear in the texts of other Bhāshyakāras is not peculiar to him. The *Sūtra* entitled *Pratignā virōdhāt* (I. 1. 9) is peculiar to Rāmānuja and Srīpati while *Ata ēva cha sa Brahma* (I. 2. 16) appears only in Rāmānuja and not in Sankara, Ānandatīrtha and Srīpati. Again, the *Sūtra* entitled *Dṛiśyatēcha* (II. 1. 7) is peculiar to Ānandatīrtha, being omitted by Sankara, Rāmānuja and Srīpati. The same remark applies to the *Sūtras* entitled *Pratignānuparōdhāchcha* (II. 4. 3). Similarly *Yuktēścha* (II. 3. 19), *Yathētamanēvam cha* (III. 1. 9) appear only in Ānandatīrtha. The *Sūtra* entitled *Pravruttēscha* (II. 2. 2) appears only in Ānandatīrtha and Sankara and not in Rāmānuja and Srīpati.

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to Srīpati, the Jaina doctrine only but not the real existence of matter and its different forms of existence at different times. Matter (*dravya*) has two inevitable states of existence: its original and its altered conditions; for it is always subject to change. We have, therefore, to accept the existence of two states of matter, genesis (*utpatti*); destruction (*vināśa*); its altered condition (*pariṇāmaviśēsha*) and its eternality (*nityatva*). In the altered condition, matter is seen with its opposing characteristics. This is called *bhinnatva.* Its original condition (*viparītam cha*) is what is called *abhinnatva.* If it is asked how are these opposite states to be intimately united (*samavaiti*), the reply is that if at different times we admit and agree to the existence of *bhēda* and *aḃhēda* (*kālabhēdēna bhēdābhēdāngīkārē*), then only such intimate union may occur, but not just as a horse (*aśva*) and buffalo (*mahisha*) being intimately united in one and the same animal at the same time, which is impossible. It is also observed in this world generally that things are classed differently. If it is asked, again, how Śivātmaka Parabrahman, who is one and all-pervading, is observed in the *chētana* and *achētana* worlds, which are of different characters, and still he pervades through these two in his all-knowing (*Sarvagnatva*) character, the reply is that with Parabrahman's omnipotence, he is capable of exhibiting that he is all-one; he is *kshētra* and *kshētragna* also. *Kshētra* and *kshētragna* are naturally of the same undivided character (*abhinnatvēpi*). Naturally meditation on Śiva Parabrahman is the character (*svabhāva*) of *jīva* in trying to liberate himself from bondage and realize the eternal blissful all-glorious Parabrahman. Ultimately the *Kīṭa* assumes the form of *Bhramara* through meditation (*dhyāna*) and *dhāraṇa*, such realization being the gist of all *Vēdānta.* But the doctrine of the Jaina School which attains the simultaneous appearance of matter in the changed condition and the unchanged condition involves really a serious contradiction and cannot be accepted. One thing, however, is a fact and that is that matter

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allows of its existence in different states at different times. But the Kshapaṇakas argue otherwise. Hence this *Sūtra* rejects their argument.

Propounding the next *Sūtra*, *Ēvanchātmākārtsnyam*, Srīpati says: "*In this way follows the non-universality of the Ātma.*" Commenting on the *Sūtra*, he says that the non-universality of the *Ātma* is to be agreed. This amounts to saying that the *Jīva* is to exist in a particular locality (*pradēśa*). Then, it has to exhibit itself in bodies of *Sthūla* and *Sūkshma* forms just like ants, etc. (*pipīlikādi*). *Jīva*, then, has both tiny little forms of existence and heavy body forms like elephants, etc. For it is stated that when the *jīva* realizes *Mōksha*, the *sūkshma* form prevails and he attains to *Paralōka*. The next *Sūtra* establishes these states of existence. *Śarīrāṇām chānavasthitaparimāṇatvāt*. It is stated in the Śāstras that flies (*maśaka*) on account of their good deeds in one birth, are born as big elephants (*gaja*) in their next birth. It cannot then be said that the tiny little form of a fly could not be born with the huge body of an elephant. And conversely, a huge-bodied elephant as the result of its sinful deeds is said to assume the form of a fly in its next birth. And this cannot either be denied. So that, if these two conditions are accepted, the *jīva* is subject to these altered states of existence in these two forms. If this is objected to, the next *Sūtra* affirms their different states of existence: *Na cha paryāyādapyavirōdhō vikārādibhyaḥ*. This *Sūtra* clearly proves these two states of existence, the contracted and expanded (*sankōcha* and *vikāsa*) forms and their existence cannot be objected to as contradictory, for we generally see the separate existence of the *jīva* in the forms of elephant, horse, son, daughter and fly (*gaja*, *turaga*, *putra*, *putrikā* and *maśaka*). That the *jīva* enters into these forms can neither be denied nor contradicted. And it is also seen that *jīvas* exist with bodily forms (*sāvayava*) not in the forms of *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, both of which are subject to destruction in their assumed forms. If this opinion is contradicted, the next *Sūtra* proves

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Parabrahman (*mūrta* and *amūrta*) sum up the gist of the whole of the Vēdānta. And therefore it is only by postulating *bhēdābhēda* that you can harmonise all *Sruti* texts (*Sarvaśrutisamanvayāya*). And in this opinion he says Bādarāyaṇa agrees.

Differences between Sankara, Ramanuja, Srikantha, Anandatirtha and Sripati.

Enough has been said to show that though Srīpati calls his system *Bhēdābhēda*, his conception of *abhēda* is exceedingly thin. He almost entirely dissents from Sankara's views and rejects the fundamental factors of the *Advaita* system. Like Rāmānuja, he upholds *Dvaita*. His *abhēda* or *advaita* would seem to mean merely *nitya-sāmīpya*, *sārūpya* and *bhōgamātra*, which makes equality (*samatva*) infinitely small as between Īśvara and *jīva*. Both are *nitya*; but there the sense of equality ceases. While Īśa is *Pūrṇa*, the *jīva* is *Apūrṇa*; while Īśa is *Prabhu* or *Śakta* (He is called *Mukhya* by Srīpati) the *jīva* is *Aśakta*; and finally while Īśa is *Sarvasvatantra*, the *jīva* is *Sarvādhīnatantra*. The characteristics mentioned indicate clearly *sārūpyabhukti*, to which is limited *Śivasāmarasya*. Equality (or identity) is only in form and does not, according to him, transcend that limit. Elsewhere also, Srīpati speaks of the *sārūpya* form of Brahman and not of the *sāyujya* (*svasvarūpatayā param brahma*) and describes *mukti* in these words: *niratiśaya-svarūpānanda sākshi svaprakāśa śivarūpa parāhambhāvā-pattiḥ muktiḥ*. Though he upholds *Dvaita*, Srīpati does so only upto a point. Madhva's system has been described as the *Pancha bhēda mata*, which includes *five* kinds of difference: (1) Every *jīva* differs from every other *jīva*; (2) Every *jīva* differs from Brahman; (3) Every *jaḍa* differs from every other *jaḍa*; (4) Every *jaḍa* differs from Brahman; (5) Every *jaḍa* differs from every *jīva* (*cf. Jīvēśayōrbhidā chaiva jīvabhēdaḥ parasparam । Jaḍēśayōrjaḍānām cha jaḍajīvabhidā tathā ॥ Panchabhēdā imē nityāḥ sarvāvasthāsu chōchyatē*). Srīpati holds that the *jīva* differs from Brahman in the *samsāra* stage of existence

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(*jīvabrahmaṇōḥ samsāradaśāyām svābhāvika bhinnatvam; mōkshadaśāyām tadvadabhinnatvam*; *Brahmaṇō mūrtāmūrtatvam*, etc., IV. 4. 22). The difference between Srīpati, Sankara, Rāmānuja, Srīkanṭha and Ānandatīrtha will have been clear from what has been thus far said. Srīpati rejects Sankara's *jaganmithyātva* and the Māya theory. He does not agree with Rāmānuja's theory that the *jagat*, which consists of *chētana* and *achētana* beings, is the body of Īśvara. He does not agree with Ānandatīrtha in regard to absolute *bhinnatva*, both before and after *mōksha*, though he accepts other parts of Ānandatīrtha's system, such as that Īśvara, *Jīva* and *Prakriti* are *anādi* (without beginning). With Srīkanṭha, he upholds the position that Śiva is the supreme deity but he does not follow Srīkanṭha in the *viśishṭādvaita* turn he gives to his system. On the other hand, he assigns the *kartrutva* of the *chētana* and *achētana* beings to Brahman. In other words, he holds the *chētana* and *achētana prapancha* as different from and dependent upon Brahman. (II. 3. 1. *Na viyad aśrutēḥ*, where he says *Svapaksha vikshēpādidōshagandhābhāva kshāpanāya Brahma kāryatvēnābhimata chētanāchētana prapancha kārya prakārō vishōdyatē*). He does not agree with Sankara and Rāmānuja when they suggest that certain Śāstras should be treated as *Pūrvapaksha* and certain others as *Siddhānta* (*e.g.*, see II. 3. 1 which both Sankara and Rāmānuja treat as a *Pūrvapaksha Sūtra* while Srīpati treats it definitely as a *Siddhānta Sūtra*), very much like Ānandatīrtha, as a comparison of the comments of both Ānandatīrtha and Srīpati on this *Sūtra* will show. Similarly, as regards the *Sūtra* II. 3. 20 (*Nāṇuratachchrutēriti chēnnētarādhikārāt*) which Sankara holds as a *Pūrvapaksha Sūtra*, Rāmānuja treats as a *Siddhānta Sūtra*. Srīpati, however, makes it part of his argument for establishing the truth of the *Adhikaraṇa*, *Utkrāntigatyadhikaraṇam*, which according to him is intended to reject the *Advaita* doctrine that the *jīva* and *Brahman* are one. But Srīpati would seem to treat each *Adhikaraṇa* by itself and that in such a manner that it is made to strengthen the position he desires to set forth in it. The

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middle position he occupies will thus be seen to be one for which he has had to work with great circumspection and care.

The stress he lays upon the supremacy of Śiva and his identification of Śiva with Parabrahman is in keeping with his position as an exponent of the Vīraśaiva position. Partly religious learnings and partly the position of importance occupied by Vīraśaivas during his period account for this standpoint. As before remarked, following Basava, in the 12th century A.D., Vīraśaivism attained its summit of regal support and popular favour about the beginning of the 15th century A.D. The reign of Dēva Rāja II (1423—1446) of the Vijayanagar dynasty was marked by the production of some of the most well-known works on Vīraśaivism. Among the writers of the period were Mahālinga Dēva, the author of *Ēkōttara Shaṭsthaḷa* and the *Shaṭsthaḷa Vivēka*; Lakkaṇṇa Daṇḍēśa who wrote the *Śiva-tattva-chintāmaṇi*; Kumāra Bankanātha, the author of *Shaṭsthaḷōpadēśa*; Chāmarasa, who wrote the *Prabhulingalīle*; and Kallumaṭha Prabhudēva, the author of *Lingalīlā Vilāsa*. An age that was responsible for works of this kind could not have gone dry in the philosophical field. Srīpati, who wrote about this period, reinterpreted the theory of *Bhēdābhēda* in a manner that while it retained as much of the *Bhēda* doctrine as might be deemed essential for the elucidation of Vīraśaivism on the philosophical side, endeavoured to keep to the *Abhēda* doctrine in so far as it was required to make it square with the *Saguṇa* Brahman which is postulated by the theory. *Bhēdābhēda*, as presented by Srīpati, endeavours to combine realism with idealism and presents a position which is, in the main, in keeping with the fundamental articles of faith of Vīraśaivism. Hence it is that Srīpati calls this theory *Bhēdābhēdātmaka Viśēshādvaita*, that is, it is a theory which embodies the *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* doctrines with belief in a *qualified* Brahman and *Advaita* in the *Mōksha daśā*. How is this *mōksha* to be attained? This has been elaborated above, but it might

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be useful to sum up Srīpati's position in a few words. By adherence to the theory of *Bhēdābhēda* and the practice of *Shaṭsthaḷa*, *Śivatva* is attained on the analogy of the *Bhramarakīṭanyāya*. By *upāsana*, *dhyāna*, *dhāraṇa* and *gnāna*, the earthly sheath is cast off and *Śivatva* is attained. *Shaṭsthaḷa* is the connecting link between the *jīva* and the Brahman. The *jīva* attains Brahmatva by *gnāna*. *Gnāna* is obtained by *drashṭavya* (closely examining the truth); *śrōtavya* (learning the *Smritis* by the *guru's upadēśa*); *mantavya* (meditation); and *nidhidhyāsitavya* (concentration). If concentration is thus acquired, the result is the *jīva* attains to Śivatva. Without knowledge of *Shaṭsthaḷa*, such attainment is impossible. For *gnāna*, initiation into it is essential. *Shaṭsthaḷa* accordingly marks the six stages which signify the acquisition of the *gnāna* which leads on to *sāmarasya*, or equality with Brahman. These six stages are termed *bhakti*, *mahēśa*, *prasāda*, *prāṇalinga*, *śaraṇa* and *aikya*. What *aikya* means and what *sāmarasya* means, Srīpati has set down in no unintelligible terms, as will be seen from what has been said above. *Lingāṅga-sāmarasya* would, according to him, mean that the individual *jīva* (*anga*) has attained the form of the subtle frame or body, the indestructible original of the gross or visible body (the *linga*). That is the form described by Srīpati in the words *Svasvarūpatayā param brahma*. And we should note that, in keeping with the spirit of Vīraśaivism, it is laid down by Srīpati that even after *mōksha*, *i.e.*, even after *sāmarasya* is attained, the *upāsana* would still continue for the *jīva*, *i.e.*, even in the *mukti* stage. *Mukhyatva*, according to him, would remain in Parabrahma Śiva and thus he would remain supreme even in *Mukti* and the *Mukta*, though in Śiva's form, would be offering worship to him.

The organic view of *Bhēdābhēda* which Srīpati represents and which for him has come to mean the basis of knowledge, ethics and even, in a sense, Reality, is due mainly to his close reading of the Upanishadic texts and of the necessity he seems to have felt of harmonising them

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in a manner at once simple and intelligible. To him it is a philosophy for it has helped a rational interpretation of Reality as a whole. To him the world is actually before and within us—just as it seems to be. To him, it is the negation of philosophy to try to regard it as if somehow it was put there by our minds or were built up through an instrument uncritically called knowledge. That there is an objective world in which we ourselves have our places as objects is a basic fact of experience. Such experience is ours at a certain standpoint and level which might have been different. But for us it is our necessary point of departure: it is our "that". To seek for the genesis of knowledge in which it appears is to misconceive the problem. For such a genesis must be itself a fact within a knowledge which is its own entire knowledge. We come thus to a view of the objective world and ourselves in it as a reality of which we are distinctly conscious in an experience which includes and is inseparable from feelings and sensations as falling within it. The world is something more than the particular minds which compose it. The minds are objects of experience in and along with it. They are thus finite (*Viśēshātmaka*) but because they are fashions in which knowledge presents itself through them, they are always more than they take themselves to be. Their foundation is broader than they are, and that is why the penetrative power of thought knows no limit that it does not itself create, and is incapable of superseding. But it is conditioned by its state in nature, its point of departure. Srīpati suggests that knowledge should be interpreted as a whole. Difficulties will then disappear, if not they will appear insuperable. What objective idealism should effectively aim at is: No barrier must be set to knowledge or its interpretation. Daily experience may present it at levels which we can recognize and with a demarcation of subject from object. But these are on the face of the partial aspects and distinctions within a fuller and more complete entirety which is our objective in a sustained effort to know. It is in the ideal of that entirety of

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knowledge that we find what enables us to look beyond partial aspects that are merely fragmentary, and having reached the conception of the entirety inductively as implied from the beginning, later on to interpret by means of it deductively from above. Thus, according to him, philosophy is an attempt at a rational interpretation of Reality as a whole.

It may be urged that Srīpati is unable to distinguish between philosophy and religion. But the answer should be that if the perfectly real can alone be perfectly known, and if to know Brahman, the perfectly real Being, is eternal life, the goal of philosophy is the same as the goal of religion—perfect knowledge of the Perfect. Nor can a man's philosophy be completely separated from his religion. Srīpati shows us the way to bridge the dilemma of idealism and realism, a dilemma which still confronted the philosophical controversies of his time. In declaring all realism to be ideality, idealism does not, according to him, imply that objectivity is a subjective illusion, or that the framework and contact of the universe is such stuff as dreams are made of; on the contrary, it affirms, in his view, that the real is the ideal because only the ideal is concrete, and every attempt to set up the object as reality in complete independence of the subject of experience and of the conditions of experience in vain. Success could only be, as has been well put, the hypostatization of an abstraction. Abstractions are not unreal in the absolute sense, but it is in their claim to independent reality that the antinomies of ordinary thought arise. Srīpati thus makes the great historical development of philosophical speculation known as the *Bhēdābhēda*, which, as we have seen, has its roots deep-drawn in the *Sūtras* themselves. In him we recognize the wonderful philosophical abilities of the mediæval Indian theologian combined to the abilities of a philosopher who tries to harmonise Realism with Idealism. He endeavours to exhibit truth and reality, as he sees them, in the light of the criterion which is the positive non-contradictory whole. His philosophy must have taken its form and colour from

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what he must have most deeply made his own in life; or rather what he most deeply made his own in life was selectively determined by the same leanings and impulses which his philosophy has expressed in no uncertain fashion. The position which *Bhēda* in his conception holds is of interest in determining the range that *Abhēda* holds in it. *Abhēda*, as we have seen, is criticized at great length by him, its various constituent parts being attacked by him in no uncertain voice. But the basic principle of *Abhēda*—the oneness, the unity of the whole universe, the maker and the made—is never lost sight of by him. Like Plato, he not only confirms the dualism of "this" world and "the other", but also passionately strives to demonstrate the unity of things, the unity of the universe. He demonstrates that "the other world" is not in its nature remote but is here and now for you, if you could but see it and live it. With higher experiences, he suggests an end of dualism in principle though fragments of dualistic formulæ might float in the ocean of his thought undissolved for the moment. The law of value—that which is filled with the more real and is more really filled—and the vital stability of experience led to this result. His philosophy was thus, like Plato's again, philosophy as it takes up in its embrace both the ideal and the real, at once the sensible and the super-sensible world.

Western Thought and Bhedabheda.

This brings us to Western philosophers, whose views may be considered briefly in order to see if they have propounded or held doctrines analogous to *Bhēdābhēda*. Mediæval philosophy was based on that of Aristotle, who propagated the doctrines of Plato. Indeed, Aristotle has been reckoned the oracle of the scholastic philosophers and theologians in the Middle Ages. The very incarnation of the philosophic spirit, Aristotle, by the vast field of speculation he covered by his many writings, has influenced besides the progress of modern thought and clear science

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which establish the value of his works. Scholastic philosophy made, with the aid of Aristotle, an attempt at reconciliation between dogma and thought, between faith and reason, an attempt to form really a scientific system on that basis founded on the pre-supposition that the creed of the Christian Church was absolutely true and capable of rationalization. This held the ground in Europe during the period beginning with the fall of the Roman Empire in 476 A.D. and closing with the invention of printing, the discovery of America and the revival of learning in Europe in the fifteenth century. It is in the period succeeding the Middle Ages that we get the first attempts at bold speculations relating to Man, Nature and God. The direct cause of this was the Revival of Learning that marked the Renaissance (15th and 16th centuries A.D.). The capture of Constantinople in 1453 by the Turks drove learned Greeks into Italy. Their arrival quickened the growth of study of Classical, especially Greek, literature. This, in its turn, aided, by the invention of printing, the gradual extinction of the dry, barren scholasticism so far in vogue in Europe. The new learning, based on the study of ancient models in the literature and art of Greece and Rome, awakened in the cultured classes the free and broad humanity which inspired them. The Renaissance thus marks an epoch—the transition from the rigid formality of mediaeval to the enlightened freedom of modern times. First among the products of the Renaissance was the Italian Giordano Bruno, the bold and fervid original thinker, who was burned as a heretic in 1600 A.D., after seven years spent in prison, at the hands of the Inquisition. Bruno, though currently described by European writers as a pantheist, was really a qualified monist. He regarded God as the living omnipresent soul of the universe, and Nature as the living garment of God—as the Earth-Spirit does in Goethe's *Faust*—a definition of Nature which finds favour in the pages of *Sartor Resartus* and sounds as a mere echo of Rāmānuja's conception of *Viśishṭādvaita*. In illustration

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of Rāmānuja's view, one single passage taken from his commentary on Bādarāyaṇa's *Sūtra* II. 1. 15, *Tad-ananyatvam ārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ* will prove instructive. After quoting numerous *Sruti* texts and remarking that these intimate that non-difference only is real, he says:—"It is in this way that we prove, by means of the texts beginning with *ārambhaṇa*, that the world is non-different from the universal cause, *i.e.*, the highest Brahman. Brahman only having the aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings for its body and hence for its modes (*prakāras*) is denoted by all words whatsoever. The body of this Brahman is sometimes constituted by sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle state, when—just owing to that subtle state—they are incapable of being (conceived and) designated as apart from Brahman whose body they form. Brahman is then in its so-called causal condition. At other times the body of Brahman is constituted by all sentient and non-sentient beings in their gross, manifest state, owing to which they admit of being thought and spoken of as having distinct names and forms: Brahman then is in its "effected" state. The effect, *i.e.*, the world, is thus seen to be non-different from the cause, *i.e.*, the highest Brahman. And that in the effected as well as the causal state of Brahman's body as constituted by sentient and non-sentient beings and of Brahman embodied therein, perfections and imperfections are distributed according to the difference of essential nature between Brahman and its body as proved by hundreds of scriptural texts we have shown above."[1049]

Bruno, who was open to Neo-Platonic influences, admits only one first principle, cause, or substance in the universe. Much like Rāmānuja—and other Visishtādvaitic philosophers of India—he is never tired of dwelling on the unity of all things, which he regards as a multiform unity embracing the whole and present in every part. He

[1049] Thibaut, *Vēdānta-Sūtras with the Commentary of Rāmānuja*, 458-459. See also Rāmānuja's commentary on I. 4. 27, *Pariṇāmāt*, Thibaut, 402–407.

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rejects the notion of formless matter, and maintains that matter and form are inseparable. Finite things differ from one another, not in other being, but only in their mode of being so that in them the one substance is not diverse but only diversely fashioned and figured; all things are in the universe, and the universe in all things. The study of Nature seems to disclose two substances of mind and body, but further contemplation reduces them to one; and the ultimate object of all philosophy and science is declared (with an ironical reservation as to supernatural knowledge) to be the perception of unity. In one dialogue the speaker who represents Bruno's own opinions asserts that the "first principle" is infinite in all its attributes, and that one of those attributes is extension (*uno amplissima dimensionale infinite*). Again, it is animated, in as much as it includes all life as part of one and the same being; all particular lives are effects of the divine life present in all things, *Natura est deus deus in rebus*. The terms *attribute* and *mode* appear in Bruno in a manner which suggest Spinoza's adoption of them, though the precision with which he uses them is his own. Similarly, in parts of Bruno's writings, much prominence is given to the identification of the highest kind of speculative knowledge with the love of God, or the one perfect object; and the power and surpassing excellence of this ideal and intellectual love are dealt with, as Pollock remarks, with exuberant poetic fancy. Notwithstanding the wide difference between Bruno's manner and Spinoza's, the thought and even the expressions are often strikingly like those of the *Essay on God and Man*.[1050]

Contemporaneous with Bruno was Jacob Boehme (1575-1624), the celebrated German mystic, who also suffered for his views at the hands of the men of the letter. His philosophy anticipated in no small measure the secret of Hegel, who, indeed, acknowledges him as one of the

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[1050] See Pollock, *Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy*, Chap. III, 98–99.

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fathers of German philosophy. His writings bear witness to a scheme of mystical philosophy which sets forth the trinity in unity of the Hegelian system, that is, viewing the divine as it is itself, as it comes out in Nature, and as it returns to itself in the human soul. These are the first instances—Bruno and Boehme—we have in modern western philosophy of anything like a systematised conception of Reality consisting in one-ness—the One Substance of Spinoza. Spinoza (1632—1677), indeed, is said to have come largely under the influence of Bruno. This is evident as much from the system of thought we associate with the name of Spinoza as from his writings. Almost every one—for instance, Pollock, Avenarius and Sigwart—stresses the influence of Bruno, while Hale White gives a selection of parallel passages from Bruno in his translation of Spinoza's *Ethics* which is decisive in the matter. Spinoza was also largely influenced by Descartes (1596-1650) and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1619), who were both his contemporaries, and by the writings of Francis Bacon (1561-1626), who had just died when he was born. To the last of these, the father of the inductive method of scientific inquiry, he did not owe more than his method and the scientific attitude. Spinoza had evidently studied the *Novum Organum* as some Baconian phrases occur in his writings, but as Pollock says, the influence Bacon exercised on him " at all events, was a transitory one". To Descartes he owed more, though his allegiance was brief, for he invites attention to his differences with him, not only on minor issues but also on fundamental points. All the same, Spinoza owed to Descartes his knowledge of contemporary metaphysical thought, and what is more, his knowledge of physical science. As Pollock observes, Spinoza derived his notions of physical science and his doctrine of conservation of matter to Descartes. His *Principles of Cartesianism Geometrically Demonstrated* shows that he well knew the system he discarded. Descartes' philosophy starts with Doubt, and by one single step it arrives at Certainty. " If I doubt, it is plain, I exist " and from this certainty,

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that is, the existence of the thinking subject, he deduces his whole system. If all comes from the formula *cogito, ergo sum*, "I think, therefore I exist," *i.e.*, the thinking ego exists; in which thinking, philosophy ere long sums the universe up, regarding it as a void, without thought. The extent of the influence exerted by Cartesianism on Spinoza has been increasingly doubted in recent years. It is now suggested that he owed more to his Jewish parentage than to Cartesianism. At any rate his starting point and inspiration is now sought for in the religious speculations of his Jewish predecessors. Histories of philosophy describe his theory as the logical development of Descartes, doctrines of the One Infinite and the two finite substances. Mr. Pringle-Pattison, however, remarks, Spinoza himself was never a Cartesian. He brought his pantheism and determinism with him to the study of Descartes from the mystical theologians of his race.[1051] Earlier than Pattison, Pollock has remarked that the pantheist, or as he calls it the mystical element in Spinoza, is to be traced to the mediæval Jewish philosophers, with whose works Spinoza is known to have been familiar.

Spinoza postulated a system—popularly called to-day Spinozism—which regards God as the one self-subsistent substance and both matter and thought attributes of Him. The foundation of Spinoza's philosophy is the doctrine of one infinite substance, of which all finite existences are modes or limitations (modes of thought or modes of extension). God is thus the immanent cause of the universe; but of creation or will there can be no question in Spinoza's system. God is throughout as equivalent to Nature. The philosophical standpoint comprehends the necessity of all that is—a necessity that is none other than the necessity of the divine nature itself. To view things thus is to view them, according to Spinoza's favourite phrase, *sub-specie æternitatis*. His doctrine has been summed up thus:

[1051] See Pringle-Pattison's article on *Spinoza* in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, XXV (Eleventh edition).

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Whatever is, is; and that is extension and thought. These two are all that is; and besides these there is nought. But these two are one; they are attributes of the single substance (that which, for its existence, stands in need of nothing else), very God, in whom, then, all individual things and all individual ideas (modes of extension those, of thought these) are comprehended and take place. Spinoza, it will be seen, includes under the term extension all individual objects, and under thought all individual ideas, and these two he includes in God, as he in whom they live and move and have their being—a great and fruitful conception, being the speculative ground of the being of all that lives and is. This oneness of Spinoza ran the risk of being called "atheistic" in his own life-time—that was the reason why he refrained from publishing his *Ethics* during his life-time, it being published a year after his death—and in later times came to be generally spoken of as "pantheism" or "mysticism". The greatness of Spinoza, in Western eyes, consists in not merely placing the pantheistic or mystic element besides the scientific element, but fusing it into one with it. The scientific element is that of the unity and uniformity of the world. Nature, as conceived by him, includes thought no less than things, and the order of nature knows no interruption. Again, there is not a world of thought opposed to or interfering with a world of things; we have everywhere the same reality under different aspects. Nature is one as well as uniform. The combination of these two elements—the physical and speculative—is what makes, in the opinion of Sir Frederick Pollock, Spinoza's philosophy great.[1052] The pantheist or mystical element is traced by Sir Frederick to the mediæval Jewish philosophers, with whose works, it is known, Spinoza was familiar. "This," adds Sir Frederick, "is to some extent a matter of direct evidence." A claim has also been put in, and with likelihood practically amounting

[1052] Sir Frederick Pollock, *Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy*, 80-81.

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to certainty, for Giordano Bruno. Now Bruno himself was subject in certain ways to Oriental influences, while the Jewish and Arabic Schools of the Middle Ages were again strongly imbued with Neo-Platonism, and Neo-Platonism in turn has a semi-Oriental character. It seems impossible even if it were worth while, to disentangle all the details. But it remains sufficiently clear, whatever theory we may adopt, that the East has a considerable share in this portion of Spinoza's materials. Next, as to the scientific element, Sir Frederick says that it "may be assigned without hesitation to Descartes, though Spinoza carried out the scientific view of the world farther and more vigorously than Descartes himself." As regards its union with the mystical element, it is material to remark, adds Sir Frederick, that "a nascent scientific impulse runs through the naturalism of the Renaissance philosophy as represented by Bruno and others; and thus, the line of contact was in a manner already traced." The monistic element is given, in Sir Frederick's opinion, "by reaction from the dualism of Cartesian philosophy" and determined chiefly, in his opinion, by considerations of a scientific order. The pantheist idea may also have its part —that, one would think, is permitted by way of concession. "But we can strike," remarks Sir Frederick, "no exact account between the two, for Spinoza had completed the fusion of the mystical and scientific principles before he settled his monism in its final form." Though Spinoza might have had ideas and suggestions of a general kind from Descartes, and a good deal of more definite material from Hobbes, Sir Frederick holds that the conception of natural law is "the most independent work of Spinoza's genius".

It will be readily seen that Sir Frederick Pollock in analysing the birth and growth of Spinoza's philosophical ideas sets down what he calls the "pantheist or mystic element" to Jewish philosophers. Writing further on this topic, he traces the Jewish influence to Moses Maimonides (1135-1204 A.D.); Chasdai Creskas (14th century); Gersonides (1288-1340); and the Kabbalah. Of these, Maimonides

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was the great Jewish Rabbi, who, born at Cordova, came to be regarded by the Jews as their Plato and called "The Lamp of Israel" and "The Eagle of the Doctors". He was a man of immense learning and taught his co-religionists to interpret their religion in the light of reason. He wrote a *Commentary on the Mishna and the Second Law* but his chief work is the *Moreh Nebochim*, or *Guide to the Perplexed*. Gersonides, who was born at Bagnal in Provence, was thoroughly Aristotelian in his outlook, though he professed to be a mere interpreter of the Scriptures. The influence of these writers on Spinoza is admitted to be "comparatively slight" in the purely philosophical part of his work. As a matter of fact, Spinoza's object was indeed opposite to that of Maimonides. He was not impressed with Maimonides' artificial system of interpretation and suggests that it is idle to seek philosophy in the Scriptures. In the *Ethics*, in particular, Sir Frederick admits, there are only traces of influence of these Jewish writers "apart from the doctrine of the mind's eternity" (in the Fifth Part), which Sir Frederick believes "comes from the Averroists through Gersonides." The Averroists were, it might be added, the followers of Averroes (1126-1198), the celebrated Arabian physician and philosopher, a Moor by birth and a native of Cordova, who devoted himself to the study and exposition of Aristotle, earning for himself the title of the "Commentator", though he appears to have coupled with the philosophy of Aristotle the oriental doctrine of emanations. It must also be remarked that certain of the views of Maimonides were not peculiar to him. They were the common possession of the scholastic writers and perhaps might be further traced much farther back to Neo-Platonism. Next as to Chasdai Creskas, his chief work *Adonai*, or the *Light of the Lord*, contains many thoughts and views which come "near to characteristic points of Spinoza's philosophy". He evidently exercised a great deal of influence on Spinoza, in regard to the making up of "extension", his idea of the perfection of God consisting not in knowledge as the Aristotelians hold, but in love, and

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his conception of determinism. But Spinoza took his suggestions in detail and worked them into a systematic connection of his own which, as Pollock puts it, "would probably have found little favour in Chasdai's eyes". The influence on Spinoza of the mystical literature represented by the Kabbalah has also been widely discussed. The metaphysical foundations of the later Kabbalah appear to have been derived by some road not fully known from Neo-Platonism and they bear evident traces of imitation from Greek. The doctrine of emanations and intermediate powers between God and the world was adopted as a counterblast to Maimonides and the rationalists. In Spinoza's time, this system had attained its highest development. Spinoza himself refers to its "follies". The doctrines of emanation and the transmigration of souls are both fundamental to it and these are incompatible with Spinoza's system. But he shows marked respect to the earlier Kabbalistic system. "Only an accomplished Orientalist can be entitled" says Pollock, "to a positive opinion on the sources and antiquity of these speculations." But at the same time, he admits that "all mysticism is Eastern in its ultimate origin, and the choice would seem to be substantially between holding that the Jewish mysticism was indirectly delivered from the East through Neo-Platonism and the Alexandrian Schools, or that it came, as we know that modern Jewish theology came, earlier and more directly from the old Persian religion, in which case Jewish and Alexandrian mysticism would be related to one another, not in a direct line of descent, but as parallel and partly intermixed streams from the same fountain-head." Personally, Pollock would adhere to the latter view. He also notes the fact that Giordano Bruno, whose relationship to Spinoza is known, was not free from Neo-Platonic influence. Bruno is known to have used the writings of the Jewish Neo-Platonist Avicebron (Ibn-Gebirol) who lived about 1200 A.D. This was another road by which, says Pollock, "Neo-Platonic ideas may have found their way to Spinoza." In his speculative writings, Avicebron is known to have

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followed Plotinus, the Neo-Platonist (207-270), who, as we know, taught a system of philosophy which based itself on the intuitions of the soul elevated into a state of mystical union with God, who in his single unity sums up all and whence all emanates, all being regarded as an emanation from Him. Pollock draws attention to the close resemblance there is between Bruno and Spinoza in regard to the prominence given by both to the identification of the highest kind of speculative knowledge with the love of God, or the one perfect knowledge and the exuberant manner in which they dwell on the power and surpassing excellence of this ideal and intellectual love. Despite the fact that even their expressions are similar, Pollock thinks, that as this topic is "so much the common property of all mystic and mystically inclined writers" it is hardly possible to hold that these resemblances "add very much to the evidence of a specific connection between the two thinkers." It would, he says, be no great matter for surprise if an equally good parallel could be produced from the Persian Sufis, whom Spinoza had certainly not studied. The strong resemblances that exist between Spinoza's doctrines and the mystical schools of mediæval Christianity are also referred to by him. But he dismisses all these as sources of Spinoza's philosophy for "there is neither evidence nor probability to warrant any belief in a historical connection". But cultural and religious contacts have a tendency to influence metaphysical and religious thought and that is what seems ignored by Pollock. As to Sufism, for instance, there is reasonable ground for belief that, at least in its later stages, it borrowed from Hindu philosophy. Its chief doctrines are, according to Klein,[1053] that the souls of men differ in degree, but not in kind from the Divine Spirit, of which they are emanations and to which they ultimately return; that the spirit of God is in all He has made and it in Him; that He alone is perfect love and beauty and that hence love to Him is the only real thing and all besides is mere illusion; that the present

[1053] T. A. Klein, *The Religion of Islam* (1906).

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life is one of separation from the Beloved; that the beauties of nature, music and art revive in man the divine idea and recall his affections from wandering from God to other objects. The highest state of bliss is oneness with God, absorption in the Eternal—oneness in the sense as being inseparable from God and absorption in the sense as being always together, in all conditions, as associates which is "Dualism appearing as Monism". The Sufis are also required—as among Hindus—to implicitly obey their teachers. The doctrine that the soul is a direct emanation from the Deity seems incompatible with the fundamental article of the Muslim faith which exalts God as a being passing all comprehension, but such is the influence of cultural contact that it overcomes even such obstacles and produces changes too remarkable for words.

Thus the common saying that the system of Spinoza owes as much to the Jewish Rabbis as to Descartes is only partially true. It is nearer the truth to say that while it owes something to the Rabbis, it owes much to Giordano Bruno who himself owed a great deal to Oriental influences, while the Jewish Rabbis and Arabic Schools of the mediæval times were again strongly imbued with Neo-Platonism and Neo-Platonism in its turn had been largely coloured by Hindu thought and doctrine. The Christian mystics, too, to whom Pollock refers, were, it is admitted, profoundly influenced by Neo-Platonism and Dionysian thought. It is to-day conceded that Dionysius, the Areopagite,[1054] was a

[1054] Dionysius, St., the Areopagite (Judge of the Areopagus) according to *Acts* XVII: 34, was a convert of St. Paul's, became bishop of Athens and died a martyr in 95 A.D. He has been long regarded as the father of mysticism. He is said to have been the author of writings imbued with a pantheistic idea of God and the universe. While some have expressed doubts as to the authenticity of this tradition, modern opinion seems to favour it. Dean Inge holds that the mediæval mystics were "steeped" in Dionysius. His works (6th century A.D.) were translated into Latin by John Scotus Erigena (9th century) who worked up his theories "into a consistent philosophical system". See Dean Inge, *Christian Mysticism* (7th Edn.), 101-122. Harnack places him in the second half of the 4th century

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Neo-Platonist. "No one doubts at present," writes Max Müller in his *Theosophy or Psychological Religion*, "that the writer was a Neo-Platonist Christian, and that he lived towards the end of the fifth century, probably at Edessa in Syria." The fact that he was a Neo-Platonist and that he had been at one time in Alexandria, which was the centre for Indian thought in his days, shows that his source of inspiration should have been India. Admittedly Neo-Platonism has Indian elements in it—elements too which, it is significant, have no basis in Greek, Jewish or Christian thought. It is not Christianity that has influenced Neo-Platonism but it is Neo-Platonism that has shaped Christian thought. "The influence of Christianity" says Harnack, "whether Gnostic or Catholic, on Neo-Platonism was at no time considerable.... If we search Plotinus for evidence of any actual influence of Jewish and Christian phraseology, we search in vain; and the existence of any such influence is all the more unlikely because it is only the later Neo-Platonism that offers striking and deep-rooted parallels to Philo and the Gnostics."[1055] On the other hand, there is to be seen a close similarity—some have termed it "identity"—between Indian beliefs and doctrines and Neo-Platonism. Ammonius Sakkas of Alexandria (175-200 A.D.), the founder of Neo-Platonism, gave a religious and mystical turn to Greek philosophy. It was he that combined to the ideas and doctrines of Plato and Pythagoras, the Hindu ideas and doctrines. His teaching was such that it could not be traced to any known philosophy current in the Alexandria of his day. Tradition says he lived in contact with travellers who reached Alexandria from almost all countries in the East or the West,

A.D. Dean Inge remarks that Dionysius is quoted not much beyond 500 A.D.

[1055] Adolph Harnack (born 1851), the German theologian and Professor, has written on the history of dogma in the Christian Church, on Gnosticism, early Christian literature and the Apostle's Creed. On the last of these, he has written in a manner which has not commended itself to the orthodox. As to Indian ideas being current in Alexandria, see H. G. Rawlinson, *Intercourse between India and the Western World.*

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including Palestine, Syria, Chaldæa, Persia and India, besides Greece and Rome. His teaching was held to be so novel that he came to be called "God-taught". Among his students were Longinus, Origen, Herennius and Plotinus. Of these, Plotinus was the most distinguished. Plotinus had his practical spiritual training under Ammonius and for long, kept his teachings a secret. He, indeed, did not make them known until some of his co-students had published them. It has been suggested that the novel character of Ammonius' teaching is also confirmed by this fact. In view of the general similarity that exists between the Hindu and the Neo-Platonic views, it seems fair to infer that the teaching of Ammonius was derived from Hindu sources. A consideration of the views of Plotinus, his greatest pupil, seems to confirm us in this view. It was Plotinus who actually developed and systematised Ammonius' doctrines and theories. Born at Lycopolis in Egypt, he studied under some teachers in Alexandria and finally became a pupil of Ammonius. Eleven years he studied under this great master and then desired to know first hand the philosophy of the Persians and the Hindus. He accordingly joined the army of Marcus Antonius Gordianus, grandson of the Emperor of the same name, who was surnamed Africanus and was Emperor from 238-244 A.D., in the hope of reaching Persia and India. But as misfortune would have it, though Gordianus drove back the Persians beyond the Euphrates and relieved Antioch, he was assassinated by his own soldiers while preparing to cross the Euphrates. Though he was thus effectually prevented from accomplishing his ambition, Plotinus must, from his very objective, be held to have been a spirit which claimed kindred with that of Persia and India. This view is confirmed by the nature and character of philosophy he developed and systematised. By him all existence is referred not to two principles, but only one. "God or the primal Essence is the simple unity that lies above all multiplicity. As such, God is without thought, because thinking requires plurality; and without will, because willing pre-supposes duality. God

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is the absolutely transcendent One, exalted above every thing, above consciousness and unconsciousness, above rest and motion, above life and being. Hence God is entirely unattainable in our knowledge. Thinking must here abandon itself and become Not-thinking, if it is to apprehend God in blessed vision and unite itself with Him. But at the same time God is the original source and ground of all things; finite things arise out of Him by emanation of what is absolutely simple unfolding itself into an ever-advancing series of finite things, that are always the more imperfect the farther they are removed from God. In all things, therefore, there is only one divine power and essence, but in different degrees of perfection, so that every higher existence embraces the lower with itself. Finite things long for a return to their origin, and this is especially true of the human soul, which, banished into this earthly life as a punishment for former sin, strives to soar aloft to its higher home.... The higher goal is immediate intuition of the primal divine Being. This is the true philosophy, the perfection of the spirit and likewise the highest happiness. By such intuition the soul becomes completely one with the primal Being and sinks in ecstasy into deity."[1056]

Dean Inge, who has written at length on Plotinus, remarks that he laid "the coping stone on the edifice of Greek philosophy by a scheme of idealism which must always remain one of the greatest achievements of the human mind". He welds into one compact whole several of the most characteristic doctrines of mysticism which in Plato are only thrown out tentatively. Among the doctrines developed by him are his theory of the Absolute, whom he calls the One, or the Good, and his theory of the Ideas which differs from Plato's. Plato represents the mind of the World-Artist as immanent in the idea of the Good, while Plotinus makes the Ideas immanent in the universal mind. In

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[1056] See B. Punjer, *History of the Christian Philosophy of Religion* (1887).

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other words, the real world (which he calls the "intelligible world," the sphere of the Ideas) is in the mind of God. Further, in his doctrine of vision, he attaches an importance to revelation which was new to Greek philosophy. Above all, to his psychology, which is really the centre of his system, the Christian church and Christian mysticism became most indebted. With the soul is the meeting-point of the intelligible and the phenomenal. It is diffused everywhere. Animals and vegetables participate in it and the earth has a soul which sees and hears. The soul is immaterial and immortal, for it belongs to the world of real existence, and nothing that *is* can cease to be. The body is in the soul, rather than the soul in the body. The soul creates the body by imposing form on matter, which in itself is no-thing, pure indetermination, and next door to absolute non-existence. (If matter were *nothing*, it could not desire to be something; it is only no-thing.) Space and time are only forms of our thought. The concepts formed by the soul by classifying the things of sense are said to be "Ideas unrolled and separate," that is, they are conceived as separate in space and time, instead of existing all together in eternity. The nature of the soul is triple; it is presented under three forms, which are at the time the three stages of perfection which it can reach. There is first and lowest the animal and sensual soul, which is closely bound up with the body; then there is the logical, reasoning soul, the distinctively *human* part; and lastly, there is the superhuman stage or part in which man "thinks himself according to the higher intelligence, with which he has become identified, knowing himself no longer as a man, but as one who has become altogether changed, and has transferred himself into the higher region". The soul is thus "made one with Intelligence without losing herself; so that they two are both one and two". The soul is not altogether incarnate in the body; part of it remains above, in the intelligible world, whither it desires to return in its entirety. The world is an image of the Divine Mind, which is itself a reflection of the One. It is therefore not bad or evil. "What more

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beautiful image of the Divine could there be", he asks, "than this world, except the world yonder?" And so it is a great mistake to shut our eyes to the world around, "and all beautiful things". The love of beauty will lead us up a long way—up to the point when the love of the Good is ready to receive us. Only we must not let ourselves be entangled by sensuous beauty. Those who do not quickly rise beyond this first stage, to contemplate "ideal form, the universal mould," share the fate of Hylas; they are engulfed in a swamp, from which they can never emerge. The universal resembles a vast chain, of which every being is a link. It may also be compared to rays of light shed abroad from one centre. Everything followed from this centre, and everything desires to flow back towards it. God draws all men and all things towards Himself as a magnet draws iron, with a constant unvarying attraction. The whole universe is one vast organism, and if one member suffers, all the members suffer with it. This is why a "faint movement of sympathy" stirs within us at the sight of any living creature. All existence is drawn upwards towards God by a kind of centripetal attraction, which is unconscious in the lower, half conscious in the higher organisms. Plotinus' Trinity are the One or the Good, who is above existence, God as the Absolute; the Intelligence, who occupies the sphere of real existence, organic unity comprehending multiplicity—the One—Many, as he calls it, or, as we might call it, God as thought, God existing in and for Himself; and the Soul, the One and Many, occupying the sphere of appearance or imperfect reality—God as action. Soulless matter, which only exists as a logical abstraction, is arrived at by looking at things "in disconnexion, dull and spiritless". It is the sphere of the "merely many", and is zero, as "the One who is not" is Infinity. The Intelligible World is timeless and spaceless, and contains the archetypes of the Sensible World. The Sensible World is our view of the Intelligible World. When we say that it does not exist, we mean that we shall not always see it in this form. The "Ideas" are the

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ultimate form in which things are regarded by Intelligence, or by God. Evil is disintegration. In its essence it is not merely unreal but unreality as such. It can only *appear* in conjunction with some low degree of goodness—as Plotinus finely puts it, "Vice at its worst is still human, being mixed with something opposite to itself". The "lower virtues", as he calls the duties of the average citizen, are not only purgative, but teach us the principles of measure and rule, which are Divine characteristics. As the Sensible World is a shadow of the Intelligible, so is action a shadow of contemplation, suited to weak-minded persons. From this proceeds the doctrine—styled "heartless" by Dean Inge—that public calamities are to the wise man only stage tragedies—or even stage comedies. Finally as to the conditions under which the vision is granted. "The soul," says Plotinus, describing the ecstatic vision, "when possessed by intense love of Him divests herself of all form which she has, even of that which is derived from Intelligence; for it is impossible, when in conscious possession of any other attribute, either to behold or to be harmonised with Him. Thus the soul must be neither good nor bad nor aught else, that she may receive Him only, Him alone, she alone. While she is in this state, the One suddenly appears, 'with nothing between', and they are no more two but one; and the soul is no more conscious of the body or of the mind, but knows that she has what she desired, that she is where no deception can come, and that she would not exchange her bliss for all the heaven of heavens."[1057] Dean Inge thinks that the vision of the One is no part of Plotinus' philosophy, but "a mischievous accretion". "What," he asks, "is the source of this strange aspiration to rise above Reason and Intelligence, which is for Plotinus the highest category of Being and to come out on the other side of Being?" Plotinus says himself elsewhere that "he who would rise above Reason, falls outside it"; and yet he regards as the highest reward of the philosopher-saint to

[1057] See Dean Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, Seventh Edition (1933), 91-96. Also, his study of *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, 2 vols. (1929).

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converse with the hypostatised Abstraction who transcends all distinctions. Accordingly Dean Inge holds that the vision cannot be a part of Plotinus' philosophy. For he adds, though the "super-essential Absolute" may be a logical necessity, we cannot make it, even in the most transcendental manner, an object of sense, without depriving it of its Absoluteness. What is really apprehended is not the Absolute, but a kind of "form of formlessness," an idea not of the Infinite but of the Indefinite. It is then impossible to distinguish 'the One', who is said to be above all distinctions, from undifferentiated matter, the formless No-thing, which Plotinus puts at the lowest end of the scale.[1058] How then did the theory of the "vision" of the One become part of the Neo-Platonic system? Dean Inge thinks that its accretion was due to two different causes. First, he says, "there was the direct influence of Oriental philosophy of the Indian type, which tries to reach the universal by wiping out all the boundary-lines of the particular, and to gain infinity by reducing self and the world to zero"; and secondly, there was the influence as well of the blank trance which was a real psychical experience, quite different from the "visions", of which we have abundant evidence. But to dismiss the "vision" thus from the philosophy of Plotinus cannot be justified, because in keeping with the Hindu system with which Plotinus allied himself, both immanence and transcendence have to be conceded to the God predicated by Plotinus. Not only that; there are other parts of Plotinus' theory which show the influence that the Hindu system exerted on his own. Plotinus' conception of the One is the same as Brahman; the Absolute is as inexpressible to him as to the authors of the *Upanishads*; his Divine Mind seems to be analogous to the Īśvara in the Vēdānta system; his World-Soul represents the *Hiraṇyagarbha* of the Vēdānta; and his Nature takes the place of *Prakriti*. Then, again, his view of man as spirit, soul and body corresponds to *kāraṇa*, *sūkshma* and *sthūla upādhi*; his three spheres

[1058] Dean Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, 98.

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of existence or states of being, or hypostases of being correspond to the *avasthā-traya*, the three states of *jāgrata*, *svapna* and *sushupti*; and his ecstasy is indistinguishable from *samādhi*. Finally, he is a believer in the theories of reincarnation and *karma*, his law of Necessity being akin to the latter. Of course, parallels of this kind can be set up easily between two different systems of thought, but still when the general probability of Plotinus' relation to Hindu thought, as systematised in the *Upanishads*, is once conceded, all points of coincidence have a certain cumulative effect, though each may in itself be capable of a different explanation. It will be seen that Dean Inge, in common with other writers, fully acknowledges that Neo-Platonism owes its doctrine of ecstasy directly to the influence of Oriental philosophy of the Indian type, though he doubts if it was really part of Plotinus' teachings. According to tradition Plotinus practised ecstacy—*samādhi*—and if his disciple Porphyry is to be believed, ended his life in the manner of the Indian *yōgis*, *i.e.*, by deliberately entering into *samādhi* and giving up the body. His last words were: "Now I seek to lead back the Self within me to the All-Self."[1059] Evidently as Max-Müller says, "Plotinus and his school seem to have paid great attention to foreign, particularly to Eastern, religions and superstitions and endeavoured to discover in all of them remnants of divine wisdom." Porphyry of Tyre (233-305 A.D.), the disciple and biographer of Plotinus, developed Neo-Platonism on its religious side. The replies which have come down to us against his

[1059] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, vol. XIX, page 373, article on Neo-Platonism. Porphyry records the fact that on four occasions during the six years of their intercourse, Plotinus attained to this ecstatic union with God. See also Dean Inge's *Plotinus*, Vol. I, pages 114-121. Dean Inge records that when Puteoli, his friend and physician, came to see him for the last time, he uttered these last words: "I was waiting for you, before that which is divine in me departs to unite itself with the Divine in the Universe." See also Swāmi Ashōkānanda, *The Influence of Indian Thought on the Thought of the West*, Advaita Ashrama, Mayavati, Almora (1931).

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animadversions against his Christian contemporaries suggest the wide influence exercised by the doctrines of Plotinus on the Christian church of the day. His disciple and successor, Iamblichus of Coele-Syria (333 A.D.), developed the mystical side and taught a system of theurgy (*divya-drishti*), which would seem to indicate the part the "vision" had been playing in the Neo-Platonic system. Next, Proclus (412-485 A.D.), born in Constantinople, built up a whole system of dogmas and philosophy, which depict Neo-Platonism as a fully blown system of thought. Neo-Platonists like Synesius of Cyrene (*circa* 430 A.D.), who was a disciple of the Neo-Platonist Hypatia of Alexandria, and Bœthius (470-524 A.D.), one of the last of the Neo-Platonists, when they became Christians carried their Neo-Platonism into their new religion.

The question whether the influence of Persian and Indian thought can be traced in Neo-Platonism, or whether that system was purely Greek—including in that word the Hellenized Jew—is discussed by Dean Inge and it is worth while to note his view as well here. Though he remarks that it is a quite hopeless task to try to disentangle the various strands of thought which make up the web of Alexandrianism, "there is," he says, "no doubt that the philosophers of Asia were held in reverence at this period." Origen, in justifying an esoteric mystery-religion for the educated, and a mythical religion for the vulgar, appeals to the example of the "Persians and Indians". And Philostratus, in his life of Apollonius of Tyana, says, or makes his hero say, that while all wish to live in the presence of God, "the Indians alone succeed in doing so. And certainly there are parts of Plotinus, and still more of his successors, which strongly suggest Asiatic influences. (Proclus used to say that a philosopher ought to show no exclusiveness in his worship, but to be the hierophant of the whole world. This eclecticism was not confined to cultus.) When we turn from Alexandria to Syria, we find Orientalism more rampant. Speculation among the Syrian monks of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries was perhaps more unfettered and more

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audacious than in any other branch of Christendom at any period." To illustrate this remark, Dean Inge refers to the book of Hierotheus, which the canonised Dionysius praises in glowing terms as an inspired oracle. Dionysius, indeed, professes that his own object in writing was merely to popularize the teaching of his master. Hierotheus was the holy man converted by St. Paul and the teacher of the original Dionysius the Areopagite. The book attributed to him is believed to have been written really by one Stephen bar Sudaili, a Syrian mystic, who is assigned to the 5th century A.D. According to Hierotheus, everything is an emanation from the Chaos of bare indetermination which he calls God, and everything will return thither.[1060] There are three periods of existence. First, the present world, which is evil, and is characterised by motion; secondly, the progressive union with Christ, who is all in all—this is the period of rest; and thirdly, the period of fusion of all things in the Absolute. He says that the three Persons of the Trinity will then be swallowed up, even the evil spirits being thus ending their existence. Further, these three world-periods are also phases in the development of individual souls. In the first, the mind aspires towards its first principles; in the second, it becomes Christ, the Universal Mind; and in the third, its personality is wholly merged. Much space is given to the adventures of the Mind including the ladder of perfection. The writer of the book—whether it was Hierotheus or the Syrian Stephen bar Sudaili—professes to have attained to ecstatic union more than once and describes the process of preparation for it in words characteristically *yōgic*. "To me," he says, "it seems right to speak without words, and understand without knowledge, that which is above words and knowledge; this I apprehend to be nothing but the mysterious silence and mystical quiet which destroys consciousness and dissolves forms. Seek, therefore, silently and mystically,

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[1060] *Cf.* with what has been said in the preceding pages in the Commentary on the *Sūtra*, *Asaditichēnna pratishēdhamātratvāt*, II. 1. 7.

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the perfect and primitive union with the Arch-Good."[1061] It is interesting to note the various transmutations the Mind undergoes in its "ascent". At one stage, it is crucified "with the soul on the right and the body on the left"; it is turned for three days; it descends into Hades; then it ascends again, till it reaches Paradise, and is united to the tree of life: then it descends below all essences, and sees a formless luminous essence, and marvels that it is *the same essence* that it has seen on high. Now it comprehends the truth, that God is consubstantial with the Universe, and that there are no real distinctions anywhere. So it ceases to wander. "All these doctrines," concludes the seer, "which are unknown even to angels, have I disclosed to thee, my son"(—Dionysius, probably). "Know, then, that all nature will be confused with the Father—that nothing will perish or be destroyed, but all will return, be sanctified, united and confused. Thus, God will be all in all." Dean Inge's remark on this description of the process of apotheosis is significant. "There can be no difficulty," he writes, "in classifying this Syrian philosophy of religion. It is the ancient religion of the Brahmins, masquerading in clothes borrowed from Jewish allegorists, half-Christian Gnostics, Manicheans, Platonising Christians and pagan Neo-Platonists."[1062] Dionysius, who uses his master's theory, is even more distinctively Hindu in his thought, so much so that he may be said to carry the Hindu ideas into Christianity as it prevailed in the 5th century A.D. He was a theologian, and not a mere mystic. As Dean Inge puts it, his main object was "to present Christianity in the guise of a Platonic mysteriosophy" and he uses the technical terms of the mysteries wherever he can. His philosophy is that of his day—"the later Neo-Platonism, with its

[1061] *Cf.* with the Commentary on the *Sūtras*, *Om āvrittir asakridupadēśāt*; *Lingāchcha*; and *Ātmēti tūpagachchanti grāhayanti cha*, IV. 1. 1-3.

[1062] W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, 104. The summary of Hierotheus' doctrine is taken by him from Frothingham's account of Hierotheus, *Ibid.*, 102, *f. n.* 1.

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strong Oriental affinities". His theories are those of Proclus rather than Plotinus. He is so Oriental in his view that Dean Inge is tempted to class him as a Syrian monk who "probably perpetrated a fraud—a pious fraud in his opinion—by suppressing his own individuality and fathering his books on St. Paul's Athenian Convert". Though pretended to have been written in the first century A.D., it is full of the later Neo-Platonic theories of probably the second half of the fourth century A.D. As Dean Inge remarks, readers of the sixth century A.D. did not see anything strange in the success that the "imposture" attained and the mediæval church was even ready "to believe that this strange semi-pantheistic Mysticism dropped from the lips of St. Paul." The fact of the matter is that Christianity early absorbed Hindu ideas and its so-called mysticism is entirely Hindu in its origins. Proclus propounds a trinitarian view of the universe and regards the All, abstractly viewed as contained in the Divine, ever emerging from it and returning into it. This doctrine, as we know, is implied in the *Gospel of St. John*[1063] (I. 1), and appears in a

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[1063] The *Gospel of St. John* is presumed to have been written by St. John at Ephesus about 78 A.D. Recent criticism assigns it to somewhere between 160 and 170 A.D. Though its authenticity has also been greatly debated, there is no question that its portrayal of Jesus as the light of life shows its author as a person who should have imbibed a great deal of the Neo-Platonic philosophy current in the second century A.D. The Gospel of St. John, says Arnot Naumann in his *Jesus*, "cannot be placed earlier than the second century, and arising as it did as a protest against Judaising parties and as a defence of ideas of religion conceived in an unhistorical way, all the details in the story, as regards localities, time and personal characteristics, have been adapted to the requirements of that Christian philosophy in which the Gospel is steeped, or have been misplaced through its influence. To the author of this Gospel, Jesus is the 'Word of God,' that is to say, the second person of the Godhead, who existed before Abraham, and in fact took part in the creation of the world (I. 1. 3; VIII. 5. 8; XVII. 5). Holding this view, he is naturally obliged to represent the appearance of Jesus as the thinly-veiled manifestation of a Divine Being. .....The author's conception of the religion of Jesus, pervaded

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highly developed form in Hegel. But it is a later idea and is traceable to outside influences exerted on Christianity when it was still under development. Dionysius beginning with the Trinity, identifies God the Father with the Neo-Platonic Monad and describes Him as "Super-essential Indetermination," "Super-rational Unity", "the Unity which unifies every unity", "Super-essential Essence", "Irrational Mind", "Unspoken Word", "the absolute No-thing which is above all existence". But he is a good Platonist. "The Good and the Beautiful," he adds, "are the cause of all things that are; and all things love and aspire to the Good and the Beautiful, which are, indeed, the sole objects of their desire." Then he tries to reconcile the two ideas—the Platonic with the Hindu. "Since then," he says, "the Absolute Good and Beautiful is honoured by eliminating all qualities from it, the non-existent also must participate in the Good and Beautiful." Dean Inge characterises this attempt at reconciliation as the "pathetic absurdity" to which we are driven "if we try to graft Indian nihilism upon the Platonic ideas." Dionysius found the co-existence of the two sets of ideas and what he attempted was a reconciliation and no more. And the fact that Dionysius attempted such a reconciliation should be set down to his credit rather than be made a matter for adverse criticism; as "God is the Being of all that is," Being being identical with God or Goodness, evil as such does not exist. It only exists by its participation in good. Evil must arise from "disorderly and inharmonious motion". "All evil is done with the object of gaining some good; no one does evil as evil." Evil in itself is that which is "no-how, no-where and no-thing. God sees evil as good." All this is in accordance with Hindu theory. According to this theory, there is nothing intrinsically evil in nature. Evil has neither objective existence nor ultimate reality, apart from

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throughout by the spirit we have indicated, is certainly sublime enough, but it is far removed from the simple, sober, naive facts of history as we find in the Gospels according to Mark, Matthew and Luke."

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Brahman whose real nature consists of good only. The true principle is that sin is its own punishment and virtue its own reward. That is the essence of the law of Karma. It is not surprising, therefore, that Dean Inge should see from this point of view, certain of the chapters in Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* show "a certain sympathy with Oriental speculative Mysticism," "Oriental" here standing for "Hindu". Nor is it surprising that he should see in other parts of the theory of Dionysius the influence of "the old religion of India". Dionysius propounds the theory that all things flow from God, and all will ultimately return to Him. The first emanation is the Thing in itself, corresponding to the Johannine Logos. He gives it the names of "Life in Itself" and "Wisdom in Itself". "The Divine Wisdom," he says, "in knowing itself will know all things". "It will know the material immaterially and the divided inseparably, and the many as one, knowing all things by the standard of absolute unity." In creation, the "One is said to become multiform". The world is a necessary process of God's being. He created it "as the sun shines", "without premeditation or purpose". But he does not assert that all separate existence will ultimately be merged in the One. The highest Unity gives to all the power of striving, on the one hand, to share in the One; on the other, to persist in their own individuality. And more than once he speaks of God as a Unity comprehending, not abolishing, differences. "God is before all things"; "Being is in Him, and He is not in Being." The transcendence of God is thus safeguarded, while immanence is not denied. The outflowing process is appropriated by the mind by the *positive* method—the downward path through finite existences: its conclusion is, "God is All". The return journey is by the *negative* road, that of ascent to God by abstraction and analysis: its conclusion is, "All is not God". The mystic, according to Dionysius, "must leave behind all things both in the sensible and in the intelligible worlds, till he enters into the darkness of nescience that is truly mystical." This "Divine darkness,"

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he says in another place, "is the light unapproachable" mentioned by St. Paul. It is dark through excess of light. "This doctrine," remarks Dean Inge, "really renders nugatory what he (Dionysius) has said about the persistence of distinctions after the restitution of all things"; for as "all things agree in the dark," so, "for us, in proportion as we attain to true knowledge, all distinctions are lost in the absolute".

According to Dionysius, the soul is bipartite. The higher portion sees the "Divine images" directly, the lower by means of symbols. Symbols, he suggests, should not be despised for they are, in his view, "true impressions of the Divine characters," and necessary steps, which enable devotees to "mount to the one undivided truth by analogy". Dionysius holds that this is the way we should use the Scriptures whose symbolic truth and beauty can be perceived only by those who free themselves from the "peurile myths" in which they are sometimes embedded. Dean Inge is somewhat startled by the language used in this connection by Dionysius, a saint of the Church. But there is no need for any surprise for Dionysius was something more than a mere saint; for he was also one who had attained to enlightenment. Dean Inge notes that the theory propounded by Dionysius that we can approach God only by analysis or abstraction was not an "invention" on his part, but found also in Plotinus (third century A.D.) and Proclus (fifth century A.D.). Proclus, indeed, we find using phrases like "sinking into the Divine Ground", "forsaking the manifold for the One", etc. This would make the doctrine as old as the beginning of the third century A.D. Since Basilides also is seen to hold it, it may be even referred back to the early part of the second century A.D., as Basilides is known to have died about 139 A.D. Basilides, indeed, presents it in an extreme form. "We must not," he says, "even call God ineffable, since this is to make an assertion about Him. He is above every name that is named."[1064]

[1064] Dean Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, 111, quoting Harnack, III, 242, 243.

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Christian tradition absorbed the doctrine. Dean Inge points out how Cyril's catechism repeats the common-place of Christian instruction that "in Divine matters there is great wisdom in confessing our ignorance". At the bottom, Dean Inge remarks, "the doctrine that God can be described only by negatives is neither Christian nor Greek, but belongs to the old religion of India."[1065] Though he misapprehends the implications of the doctrine, there is no doubt that he is right in seeking for the root of the doctrine in "the old religion of India". What texts he has in view he does not specifically mention. Since he quotes not long after the *Vēdāntasāra*,[1066] it is, perhaps, permissible to go back to well-known Upanishadic texts on which generalizations of this kind should be held to be based, for example, the famous one in the *Kāṭhakōpanishad*, VI. 12, *Naiva vāchā na manasā*, etc.;[1067] *Taittirīyōpanishad*, II. 4 and 9, *Yatō vāchō nivartantē*, etc. The *Vēdāntasāra* itself opens with a description of the Brahman which is largely *negative* in character. Brahman, for instance, is termed *Akhaṇḍa*, partless, a negative description. Again, he is called *Sachchidānanda*, which has to be interpreted negatively, being placed between two negative epithets. *Sat* does not predicate *being* of *ātman* but only denies "becoming" of it. In the same way, *chit* and *ānanda* do not predicate intelligence and *bliss* but only deny objectivity and strife that arises from the consciousness of mere diversity.[1068] Dean Inge elaborates at some length the negative argument and its

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[1065] *Ibid.*, 111.

[1066] He quotes Hunt's summary of the philosophy of the *Vēdāntasāra* as given in the latter's *Pantheism and Christianity*, 19. The *Vēdāntasāra* referred to here is the work of the same name by Sadānanda, the disciple of Narasimhasarasvati, who lived about the beginning of the 16th century. His chief sources are the *Māṇḍūkyōpanishad* and the *Panchadaśi* attributed to Vidyāraṇya.

[1067] *Kaṭha. Upa.*, VI. 12, which may be thus rendered: Neither by words nor by mind can one perceive the divine source! no, not by the eye—for none apart from the believers true, can grasp the Real.

[1068] *Cf.* Sankarachārya's commentary on *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

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consequences. "Since God is the Infinite, and the Infinite is the antithesis of the Finite," he remarks, "every attribute which can be affirmed of a finite being may be safely denied of God." Hence, God can only be *described* by negatives; He can only be *discovered* by stripping off all the qualities and attributes which veil Him; He can only be *reached* by diverting ourselves of all the distinctions of personality, and sinking and rising into an "uncreated nothingness"; and He can only be *imitated* by aiming at an abstract spirituality, the passionless "apathy" of an universal which is nothing in particular. Thus we see that the whole of those developments of Mysticism which despise symbols, and hope to see God by shutting the eye of sense, hang together. They all follow from the false notion of God as the abstract unity transcending, or rather excluding, all distinctions. Of course, it is not intended *to exclude* distinctions, but to rise above them; but the process of abstraction, or subtraction, as it really is, can never lead us to "the One". The only possible unification, he says, with such an Infinite is that of the Nirvāṇa. Dean Inge, it would seem, misses the whole point of view involved in the conception of the Nirguṇa Brahman. Even though described as Nirguṇa, it is not pure nothing, for it is fundamentally one, with our own self, which it is impossible to negate. God is not abstract Unity transcending distinctions but the ultimate Reality. According to the doctrine of Advaita, of which Dean Inge is really thinking in this connection, the only Reality is the Supreme Brahman. It postulates an organic Unity of the whole which is ever maintained by the power of the Brahman. Both the inanimate objects of nature and the individual *ātman* are comprehended in the Brahman. They have their essential being in the Brahman by an organic Unity which does not permit the world of any separate existence apart from the Brahman. Neither the inanimate objects nor the individual *ātman* can exist or fulfil their functions of their own accord apart from the Brahman, who controls the world from within by inexorable laws, maintaining a synthetic unity of the world as

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a whole in its different states of creation, preservation and destruction. This primal doctrine of Unity is what is known as Advaita. It postulates the unity of the entire world in the Brahman. The Upanishadic texts, *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma*, etc. and *Sadēva saumyēdamagra āsīt*, etc.[1069] fully establish, in the opinion of Advaitins, this doctrine of organic unity of the world. It is needless to add that this doctrine of organic unity of the world should not be confounded with the doctrine of pantheism as it is commonly understood in the West. Pantheism in the latter sense takes cognizance of only the empiric world of reality. Thus, Weissenborn defines Pantheism as the system which identifies God and the *all of things*, or the *unity of things*.[1070] Pantheism, thus conceived, does not comprehend the whole metaphysical truth. It simply attempts to identify the Supreme Being and the Universe, including those in it. It does away with the distinctions between matter and spirit, cause and effect, and subject and object of the empiric world. The doctrine of Advaita correctly conceived, does not seek to identify spirit with matter in its manifest condition in the world. Spirit is immaterial and cannot be identified with matter which is not real. This being so, what the Advaita aims at is to attempt to identify the individual *ātman* with the Supreme Brahman and to set up a relation of non-separateness between the self and nature, the individual *ātman* and matter having their being in pure spirit, thus preserving the unity of the world. This relationship is postulated in the great Upanishadic texts: *Aham Brahmāsmi*;[1071] *Tattvamasi*;[1072] *Pragnānam Brahma*;[1073] *Ayamātmā Brahma*;[1074] etc. The second of

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[1069] *Chch. Upa.*, III. 13. 1 and VI. 2. 1.

[1070] K. R. Hagenbach, *History of Christian Doctrines* (1880), III, 323.

[1071] *Brihad. Upa.*, I. 4. 10.

[1072] *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 8. 7.

[1073] *Ait. Upa.*, V. 3.

[1074] *Brihad. Upa.*, II. 5. 19.; *cf. Sadeva Saumya, Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 1 and *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma, Chch. Upa.*, III. 14. 1.

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these texts may be taken to sum up Vedāntic thought at its highest. It is the text on which Uddālaka bases his teaching to Svētakētu in the *Chchāndōgya Upanishad*. Dean Inge suggests that the negative view popularised in the West by the "old religion of India" held the ground throughout the mediæval period. "It held sway," he says, "for a long time—so long that we cannot complain if many have said, 'This is the essence of Mysticism'." It is interesting to note what he thinks was the cause which made popular in Europe the *via negativa*, which, in metaphysics, religion and ethics he regards as "the great accident of Christian Mysticism". How it became the ruling passion as it were of Christian thinkers is described by him in terms which it is well to note. "The break-up of the ancient civilization, with the losses and miseries which it brought upon humanity and the chaos of brutal barbarism in which Europe weltered for some centuries," he says, "caused a widespread pessimism and world weariness which is foreign to the temper of Europe, and which gave way to energetic and full-blooded activity in the Renaissance and Reformation. Asiatic Mysticism is the natural refuge of men who have lost faith in civilization, but will not give up faith in God. 'Let us fly hence to our dear country!' We hear the words already in Plotinus —nay—even in Plato. The sun still shone in heaven, but on earth he was eclipsed. Mysticism cuts too deep to allow us to live comfortably on the surface of life; and so all 'the heavy and the weary weight of all this unintelligible world' pressed upon men and women till they were fain to throw it off, and seek peace in an invisible world of which they could not see even a shadow round about them." This explanation for the spread of what is termed "Asiatic Mysticism" may be true to the extent it goes, but it does not explain the whole position. "Asiatic Mysticism" is not the refuge of people who have "lost faith in civilization" but of people who have believed in it, but set due bounds to it in their scheme of life. Its spread into the West was primarily due to the fact that it was the natural line of

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development that religion and with it philosophy sought in the centuries following the rise of Christianity. It was an Eastern religion and it followed its modes of thought—the thought in which it was born and had had its living. The Renaissance and Reformation did not altogether kill it. The broad humanism of the former prepared the way for the latter which may be fully described—at least in the domains of religion and philosophy—as a spent force. Though described as a revolt of light against darkness, it had, even during the time it had its highest effect, no uniform effects on the states of Europe. Its appeal varied from nation to nation and country to country. Austria, according to Carlyle, preferred "steady darkness to uncertain new light"; in Spain people stumbled "in steep places in the darkness of midnight"; Italy shrugged its shoulders and elected "going into Dilettantism and the Fine Arts"; and France "with accounts run up on compound interest", had to answer the "unit of summons" with an all too indiscriminate "Protestantism" of its own. Whether this enshrines a true picture of its effects or not, there is nothing to show that it barred the march of mysticism in Western Europe. Martin Luther himself (1483-1546) published a remarkable book by an unknown writer, *German Theology*, which is held to have prepared the way for the Reformation. This work is mystical in tone and contends that "the more the Self, the I, the Me, the Mine, that is, self-seeking and selfishness, abate in a man, the more doth God Himself, increase in him." Pollock finds much in common between this writer and Spinoza. Valentine Weigel (1533-1588) is another mystic of the Reformation period. He holds that God is conscious in man of His own being and that in pitying man He has pity on Himself. Followers of Weigel continued down to the 18th century. St. Juan of the Cross (1542-1591) is perhaps the greatest Catholic mystic of modern times. He tried to restore Mediæval Christianity as a protest against the fanatics of the Renaissance. "Obey God; cast thyself on Him; He resembles no created thing; put your faith in Him; contemplate on Him; and your

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soul, by participation, becomes God." In this mystic state, "the soul gives God to God; for she gives to God all that she receives of God; and He gives Himself to her." Jacob Boehme (1575-1624), the great Nature mystic, has already been referred to. William Law, the English mystic (1686-1761), translated Boehme's work and thus became the exponent of his views in England. Michael Molinos, the founder of Quietism (1640-1696), expounded Spanish mysticism. On most of these Dean Inge himself has written at some length.[1075] What has been said thus far is sufficient to show that the Renaissance and the Reformation did not do away with mysticism which is deep-rooted in the Christian religion because of its root origins in contemplative Hindu thought. Nor does Dean Inge himself hold that the "negative road is a pure error". As he himself frankly admits, "there is a negative side in religion, both in thought and practice. We are first impelled to seek the Infinite by the limitations of the finite, which appear to the soul as bonds and prison walls. It is natural first to think of the Infinite as that in which these barriers are done away. And in practice we must die daily, if our inward man is to be daily renewed...." The individual has generally to pass through the quagmire of the "everlasting No", before he can set his feet on firm ground; and the Christian races, it seems, were obliged to go through the same experience. Moreover, there is a sense in which all moral effort aims at destroying the conditions of its own existence, and so ends logically in self-negation. Our highest aim, as regards ourselves, is to eradicate not only vice but temptation. We do not feel that we have the victory until we no longer wish to offend."[1076] But a thought crosses the mind of Dean Inge and he says that a being who is entirely free from temptation would be either

[1075] See Dean Inge, *Christian Mysticism*; for German Theology at pages 363-365; for Luther, at page 196; for Weigel, at pages 274-76; for Boehme, at pages 277-86; for Molinos, at pages 231-34 and for Law, at pages 278-86.

[1076] *Ibid.*, 115-116.

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more or less than a man—either a beast or a God, as Aristotle has it. There is, accordingly, " a half truth ", in his opinion, "in the theory that the goal of earthly striving is negation and absorption ". It at once becomes false, he adds, " if we forget that it is a goal which cannot be reached in time, and which is achieved, not by good and evil neutralising each other, but by death being swallowed up in victory. If morality ceases to be moral when it has achieved its goal, it must pass into something which includes—as well as transcends—a condition which is certainly not fulfilled by contemplative passivity." This criticism would be true if the premises on which it is based were granted to be true. But as Dean Inge himself admits, it would be a misuse of the term *via negativa*, to interpret it in this extreme manner. The negative road marks but the line of argument which establishes the transcendence of God, as the " affirmative road " establishes His immanence. A theory or practice is not tested by its extremest abuse of it. The negative mode stresses the affirmative and the so-called " contemplative passivity", at least so far as the *Upanishads* go, is intended to affirm the affirmative. The text goes " Let him meditate (*upāsīta*) on mind as Brahman" and concludes " He who knows this (*vēda*) shines, warms, etc."[1077] Further on we have the text, by means of *upās*, " teach me the deity on which you meditate."[1078] Similarly we have texts, which have the same meaning as the text " He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest "—*viz.*, " the Self should be seen, be heard, be reflected on, be meditated upon (*nididhyāsitavya*)"; " Then he sees him meditating (*dhyāyamāna*) on him as without parts" ;[1079] and others use the verb *dhyai* to express the meaning of *vid*. *Dhyai* means to think of something not in the way of mere representation but in the way of *continued* representation. And *upās* has the same meaning ; for we see it used in the sense of uninterrupted concentration of the mind on one object. It has, therefore, to

[1077] *Chch. Upa.*, III. 18.

[1078] *Ibid.*, IV. 1. 2.

[1079] *Munda. Upa.*, III. 1. 8.

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be concluded that the verb *vid* is used interchangeably with *dhyai* and *upās*, the mental activity referred to in texts such as "He knows Brahman" and the like is an often-repeated continuous representation.[1080] The "contemplative passivity" suggested by Dean Inge is a non-existent, indefinite idea and his suggestion that the negative way is liable to abuse —as it did in the case of the early Christian mystics—is only partially—if at all—true. As he frankly admits, even these Christian mystics should not be judged with "impatience or contempt". "The limitations incidental to their place in history," as he justly remarks, "do not prevent them from being glorious pioneers among the high passes of the spiritual life, who have scaled heights which those who talk glibly about the mistake of asceticism have seldom ever seen afar off."[1081] This, indeed, is a just appreciation of the teaching of the early Christian mystics. They are easily charged as being pantheists in the looser sense of the term. But as Mr. H. B. Workman says, however much they might play with phrases tending to convey loose ideas of pantheistic belief, there are few of them who do not seek to conserve personality. "For the mystics were conscious," as Mr. Workman remarks, "that the originality of Christianity[1082] consists in its revelation through the person of Christ of the depth and inexhaustibleness of human personality." Accordingly in the Christian mystics, dangerous as their language with reference to absorption may be at times, there is always an emphasis of purpose; in the later mystics, for instance, much is made of the will—and this in itself is fatal to pantheism of the looser variety. This is so, because the foundations of belief of the early Christian

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[1080] See the illuminating comment of Rāmānuja on IV. 1. 1, *Āvṛittirasakridupadēśāt.*

[1081] Dean Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, 117.

[1082] As compared with Judaism, and not with Hinduism in which the looser pantheistic ideas do not find any prominent place. Indeed, they are put into the shade in almost every known text of the *Upanishads* which speak of the all-inclusive character of the Brahman.

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mystics, who led the way in this matter, were based on Upanishadic teachings *via* the Neo-Platonists, as above indicated. Not much is required by way of proof to show that " absorption ", according to Upanishadic ideas, does not mean loss of personality. Indeed, the stress laid on this particular idea by the different schools of philosophy in India, more particularly by the Dvaitins, Vishistādvaitins, the Bhēdābhēdins and others, is proof positive of the affirmation of personality even after the attainment of salvation. There is thus need to distinguish between types of pantheism and this, indeed, is what Dean Inge is compelled to do.

" True Pantheism ", according to Dean Inge, " must mean the identification of God with the totality of existence, the doctrine that the Universe is the complete and only expression of the nature and life of God, who in this theory is only immanent and not transcendent. On this view, everything in the world belongs to the Being of God, who is manifested equally in everything; whatever is real is perfect; reality and perfection are the same thing." For a perfect example of this type of pessimism, we have to go, he says, to India, and quotes the text " The learned behold God alike in the revered Brahman, in the ox and in the elephant, in the dog and in him who eateth the flesh of the dogs." He styles this type of " pantheism " an " error " and describes it as leading to " all manner of absurdities and even immoralities ", as inconsistent with any belief in *purpose*, either in the whole or in the parts; that, according to it, evil cannot exist for the sake of a higher good but must be itself good. " It is easy to see," he adds, " how this view of the world may pass into pessimism or nihilism; for if everything is equally real and equally Divine, it makes no difference, except to our tempers, whether we call it everything or nothing, good or bad." This is an extreme way of putting the case against pantheism and though Dean Inge rescues most of the mystics with whom he deals from this error, he thinks Eckhart comes perilously near it and Emerson seriously compromised in its direction. So far as Upanishadic teaching is concerned, it is enough to state

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the sky; the revealed *Vēda* is his voice; the wind his breath; the universe his heart; from his feet is the earth; He is the inmost self in all things."[1093] In what manner, however, is the relation of Brahman to this his evolution as the manifold universe to be conceived? Deussen would answer "as identity", following in this the later Vēdānta, which appeals to the word used to express attachment.[1094] But this word is, as he justly remarks,[1095] a mere make-shift; there is still always a broad distinction, between the one Brahman and the multiplicity of his appearances. A concession is made to the empirical consciousness, tied down as it is to space, time and causality. Brahman is regarded as the cause antecedent in time, and the universe as the effect proceeding from it. The inner dependence of the universe on Brahman and its essential identity with him is represented as a creation of the universe by and out of Brahman. We find ourselves at a point where we apprehend the creation theories of the *Upanishads*—unintelligible though they may seem from the standpoint of its idealism—form an unconscious accommodation to the forms of our intellectual capacity. A few of the more important texts which set out the essential identity of the created universe with the Creator may be noted here. In the *Brihad-āraṇyaka* we read: "Just as the spider by means of its thread goes forth from itself, as from the fire the tiny sparks fly out, so from this *Ātman* all the spirits of life spring forth, all worlds, all gods, all living beings. Its secret name (*Upanishad*) is: "The Truth of truth." "The Reality of reality." "The vital force is truth, and it is the truth of that."[1096] These illustrations of the spider and the fire are repeated in another *Upanishad*.[1097] That

[1093] *Mund. Upa.*, II. 1. 4.

[1094] *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 1. 3; see also Sankara's commentary on *Brahma-Sūtras*, II. 1. 14, *Tadananyatvamārambhaṇa śabdādibhyaḥ*. This *Sūtra* is II. 1. 15 according to Rāmānuja. The word *ārambhaṇa* is to be noted in this *Sūtra*.

[1095] *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, 163-166.

[1096] *Brihad. Upa.*, II. 1. 20.

[1097] *Mund. Upa.*, I. 1. 7; II. 1. 1.

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the material substance of things also is derived solely from Brahman is taught in connection with the illustration of the spider, in the text of the *Śvētāśvatara Upanishad*,[1098] where Brahman is described as the god "who spider-like by threads which proceed from him as material (*pradhānam*), concealed his real nature". The last words, according to Deussen, mean that Brahman, by not bringing objects forth from himself, but changing himself into the objects, "has concealed his real nature" (*svabhāvato · · · · svām āvrinōt*). In this sense it is said as early as the *Rig-Vēda* that Visvakarman by his entrance into the lower world was "concealing his original state" (*prathamāchchād*).[1099] Similarly another Upanishadic text declares[1100] that the *Ātman* has "entered" into this universe "upto the finger-tips, as a knife is hidden in its sheath, or the all-sustaining fire in the fire-preserving (wood). Therefore is he not seen; for he is divided; as breathing he is named breath, as speaking speech, as seeing eye, as hearing ear, and as thinking mind." According to another text, the *Ātman* is *amritam satyēna chchannam*, "the immortal, concealed by (empirical) reality;"[1101] and in a third, we read that "it is with him as with a lump of salt, which, thrown into the water, is lost in the water, so that it is not possible to take it out again; whence, however, we may always draw, it is salt throughout." This thought is developed in another text.[1102] To meet a possible objection the same idea occurs in another text[1103] in an altered form: "It is with him as with a lump of salt, which has no (distinguishable) inner or outer, but throughout consists entirely of taste," etc. Likewise, in this manner, efforts are made in other texts to show that Brahman by his transformation into the universe has forfeited nothing of the perfection of his own nature. This

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[1098] *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 10.
[1099] *Rig-Vēda*, X. 81. 1.
[1100] *Brihad. Upa.*, I. 4. 7.
[1101] *Ibid.*, I. 6. 3.
[1102] *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 13.
[1103] *Brihad. Upa.*, IV. 5. 13.

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idea was not a new one to the Upanishadic seers. It is seen in the *Rig-Vēda*,[1104] in the famous *Purusha Sūkta*, where it is said that all beings are only a fourth of the Purusha while the three other fourths remain immortal in heaven. This teaching appears in the *Upanishads* again and again,[1105] in one of which it is elaborated in a manner which is strikingly impressive. This text referring to the Brahman as Gāyatri, describes one-fourth of his as consisting of the three worlds (Earth, Sky and Heaven), the second of the triple knowledge of the *Vēda*, the third of the three vital breaths, while the fourth, exalted above the dust of earth, shines as the Sun.[1106] The same idea is expressed still more clearly in another well-known text which says that Brahman, after having created the three worlds with that which lies above and beyond them, himself entered "that half beyond".[1107] Still another Vēdic text describes the infinite nature of Brahman,[1108] in keeping with which is the famous Upanishadic text *Ōm Pūrṇamadaḥ pūrṇamidam*, etc.[1109] which stresses the theme that though a man may journey from the perfect to the perfect, yet that which is perfect yet remains over and above all. It holds forth that Brahman is infinite, that this universe is infinite, and that the infinite proceeds from the infinite. Then, taking the infinitude of the infinite (universe), it remains as the infinite (Brahman) alone. This same idea is amplified

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[1104] *Rig-Vēda*, X. 10. 3. The full text is: "Such is his greatness; and Purusha is greater than this: all beings are one-fourth of him; his other three-fourths, (being) immortal, (abide) in heaven." And X. 10. 4 is as follows:—"Three-fourths of Purusha ascended; the other fourth that remained in this world proceeds repeatedly and diversified in various forms, went to all animate and inanimate creation." Deussen's citations have been checked and corrected.

[1105] *Chch. Upa.*, III. 12. 6, which repeats the *Rig-Vēda* text; *Maitr. Upa.*, VII. 11.

[1106] *Brihad. Upa.*, V. 14. 1.

[1107] *Satap. Br.*, XI. 2. 3.

[1108] *Atharva-Vēda*, X. 8. 29.

[1109] *Brihad. Upa.*, V. 1. 1.; this reiterates what is enunciated in I. 4. 10; *cf.* also *Kaṭha. Upa.*, IV. 10.

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in greater detail in the beautiful verses of another Upanishadic text, which have been thus rendered in inimitable manner by Deussen :—" The light, as one, penetrates into space, and yet adapts itself to every form ; so the inmost self of all beings dwells enwrapped in every form, and yet remains outside. The air, as one, penetrates into space, and yet adapts itself to every form ; so the inmost self of all beings dwells enwrapped in every form, and yet remains outside. The Sun, the eye of the whole universe, remains pure from the defects of eyes external to it ; so the inmost self of all beings remains pure from the sufferings of the external worlds."[1110] Thus, it will be seen that though there are passages in the *Upanishads* which identify the *ātman* as the infinitely small within us with the infinitely great outside of us, and in this way the identity of the two, the *ātman* and the universe, is incessantly emphasized, as though it were a matter which stood greatly in need of emphasis, still, as Deussen has pointed out, the equation that " *ātman* = universe " has remained " very obscure ". The one *ātman* and the manifold universe, often as they were brought together, always fell asunder again. A natural step was therefore taken, when more and more as time went on, instead of this unintelligible identity the familiar empirical category of causality made its appearance, by virtue of which the *ātman* was represented as the cause chronologically antecedent and the universe as its effect, its creation. Thus a connection with the ancient Vedic cosmogony became possible. Several *Upanishads*[1111] can be quoted to support this position. It is characteristic at this point that the *ātman*, after having evolved the universe from himself, enters himself into it as soul. Thus, we read, in the *Chchāndōgya Upanishad* : " That deity resolved : ' Verily into these three deities (heat, water, food), I will enter with this living

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[1110] *Kaṭha. Upa.*, V. 5. 11.

[1111] *Chch. Upa.*, III. 19 ; VI. 2. *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 6 ; *Ait. Upa.*, I, 1, etc.

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self'."[1112] Again in the *Taittirīya Upanishad*, we have the following: "After he had created the universe, he entered into it";[1113] and in the *Aitarēya Upanishad*, we read: "He reflected: 'How could this subsist without me?' ....accordingly he cleft here the crown of the head, and entered in through this gate"[1114] Even at this stage, the individual soul maintains its identity with the *ātman*. It is not like everything else, a created work of the *ātman*; but it is the *ātman* himself as he enters into the world he has created. But the stage is soon reached when the contrast between the Supreme and individual souls appears. This was early anticipated;[1115] but later on the individual soul became more and more definitely opposed to the Supreme Soul as "another".[1116] With the rise of theism, a theory of pre-destination was also evolved.[1117] The *Śvētāśvatara Upanishad*, on which Srīpati relies so much, is the best evidence of this theism. But it must be remembered, however, that here all the earlier stages of development, the idealistic, pantheistic and cosmogonistic, continue to exist side by side, as already remarked, as indeed generally in the religious sphere the old is accustomed to assert its time-honoured right by the side of the new, the fruits of which are readily seen in the far-reaching inner contradictions, with which we are often confronted. Thus, not only the origin of Indian pantheism—strictly so called, according to which the universe is real, and yet the *ātman* remains the sole reality, for the *ātman* is the universe—is very different from the pantheism of Europe but also its identification with the philosophy of the *Upanishads* is apt to be wholly misleading. Even in the West, pantheism has been defined in a variety of views and it will not do to confuse these different views with one another. Weissenborn

[1112] *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 3. 2.
[1113] *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 6.
[1114] *Ait. Upa.*, I. 3. 11.
[1115] See *Brihad. Upa.*, IV. 4. 22; *Kaush. Upa.*, III. 8.
[1116] See *Kaṭha. Upa.*, I. 3; *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 6, 7, 5, 8, etc.
[1117] See *Kaṭha. Upa.*, II. 2. 3; *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 3.

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defines it as the system which identifies God and the *all of things*, or *the unity of things*.[1118] At least six forms of Pantheism are known in the West. Mechanical or materialistic pantheism represents God as being the mechanical unity of existence; ontological pantheism, which postulates abstract unity, represents God as being the one substance in all—this school being associated prominently with the great name of Spinoza; dynamic pantheism, which represents God as being the only force in all; psychical pantheism, which represents God as being the soul of the world; ethical pantheism, which represents God as being the universal moral order, a school at whose head stands Fichte; and logical pantheism, which is enunciated by Hegel. These different views of Western pantheism show how dangerous it would be to seek to define Upanishadic pantheism, as we find it developed in the texts above quoted, in terms not strictly covered by them. If Christian mystics are loosely charged with being pantheists, the Upanishadic seers are worse so, for the charge is not only loose but also entirely unsubstantiated. The fact that pantheism in the *Upanishads* is connected with idealistic and realistic thought should never be forgotten in any discussion pertaining to its exact connotation. Dean Inge finds consolation in the dictum of Amiel that "Christianity, if it is to triumph over Pantheism, must absorb it". Upanishadic teaching has, indeed, triumphed over it by actually absorbing it. This is best illustrated in the *Bhēdābhēda* of Srīpati which is a serious attempt at reconciling theism with pantheism. From what has been thus far said, it will be clear that both Neo-Platonism and early Christian mysticism were largely influenced by Hindu religion and philosophical thought, and they in their turn influenced Western philosophical thought, especially, through Bruno, the great philosophy propounded by Spinoza. This philosophy outlined a

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[1118] See K. R. Hagenbach, *History of Christian Doctrines*, III, 323.

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world-idea, which in its essence is the idea underlying the system of *Bhēdābhēda* postulated by Srīpati. In this view of Spinoza's philosophy, it is necessary to set out briefly its main features.

Spinoza's System of Philosophy.

To metaphysical speculations on the nature of the Deity derived from his studies of Hebrew writers and others who had come under the influence of Hindu thought, Spinoza combined the scientific aspect of the world, revealed by Descartes. Though he perceived at first some conflict between the two views, as he pondered, he found their outlines fused ; and he saw that really there was only one view to propound. The universe unfolded itself to him as the necessary result of the Perfect and Eternal God. Though he owed something to Bacon and Hobbes, yet he was indebted mainly to the Jewish Rabbis, the Neo-Platonists and Descartes. Briefly put, Spinoza conceived as a vast unity all existence, actual and possible. Indeed, between the actual and the possible he recognizes no distinction. For, if a thing does not exist, there must be some cause which prevents its existing, or, in other words, renders it impossible. This unity he terms, rather indifferently, Substance or God. Being the sum of existence, it is necessarily infinite, for there is nothing external to itself to make it finite ; and it can be the Cause also of an infinite number of results. It must necessarily operate in absolute freedom, for there is nothing by which it can be controlled ; yet, it must necessarily operate in accordance with eternal and immutable laws, fulfilling the perfection of its own nature. Substance displays itself through an infinite number of Attributes, but of these only two, Extension and Thought, are knowable by us. This being so, the rest may be left out of account in our inquiries. These Attributes are not different things, but different aspects of the same thing.[1119] Extension and Thought are thus

[1119] As Mr. R. H. M. Elwes remarks, Spinoza does not make it clear whether the difference is intrinsic or due to the percipient. See *Chief Works of Spinoza*, I. Introd. xvi.

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not parallel and interacting, but identical, and both acting in one order and connection. Accordingly all questions of the dependence of mind on body or body on mind, are summarily done away with. Every manifestation of either is but a manifestation of the other, seen under a different aspect. Attributes display themselves through an infinite number of Modes; some eternal and universal in respect of each Attribute, such as motion and the sum of all physical facts; others having no eternal and necessary existence, but acting and reacting on one another in ceaseless flux, according to fixed and definite laws. These latter have been compared in relation to their Attributes to waves in relation to the sea; or to the myriad hues which play over the iridescent surface of a bubble. Each is the necessary result of that which went before, and is the necessary precursor of that which will come after. All are modifications of the underlying film. The phenomenal world is made up of an infinite number of these Modes. It is manifest that the Modes of one Attribute cannot be acted upon by Modes of another Attribute, for each may be expressed in terms of the other; within the limits of each Attribute the variation in the Modes follows an absolutely necessary order. When the first is given, the rest follow as inevitably as from the nature of a triangle it follows that its three angles are equal to two right angles. Nature is uniform and no infringement of her laws is conceivable without a reduction to chaos. Hence it follows that a thing can only be called contingent in relation to our knowledge. To an infinite intelligence, such a term would be unmeaning. Hence also it follows that the world cannot have been created for any purpose other than that which it fulfils by being what it is. To say that it has been created for the good of man, or for any similar end, is to indulge in grotesque anthropomorphism. Among the *Modes* of Thought may be reckoned the human mind; among the Modes of Extension may be reckoned the human body; taken together they constitute the Mode man.

Man's mind, according to Spinoza, is the idea of

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man's body, the consciousness of bodily states. Bodily states are the result, not only of the body itself but also of all things affecting the body. Hence, the human mind takes cognizance, not only of the human body but also of the external world, in so far as it affects the human body. Its capacity for varied perceptions is in proportion to the body's capacity for receiving impressions. The succession of ideas of bodily states cannot be arbitrarily controlled by the mind taken as a power apart, though the mind, as the aggregate of past states, may be a more or less important factor in the direction of its course. We can, in popular phrase, direct our thoughts at will, but the will, which we speak of as spontaneous, is really determined by laws as fixed and necessary, as those which regulate the properties of a triangle or a circle. The illusion of freedom, in the sense of uncaused volition, results from the fact, that men are conscious of their actions, but unconscious of the causes whereby those actions have been determined. The chain of causes becomes, so to speak, incandescent at a particular point, and men assume that only at that point does it start its existence. They ignore the links which still remain in obscurity.

If mind be simply the mirror of bodily states, how can we account for memory? When the mind has been affected by two things in close conjunction, the recurrence of one reawakens into life the idea of the other. Mind is—to put it illustratively—like a traveller re-visiting his former home, for whom each feature of the landscape recalls associations of the past. From the interplay of associations are woven memory and imagination. Ideas may, however, be adequate or inadequate, in other words, either distinct or confused. Both kinds are subject to the law of causation. Falsity is merely a negative conception. All adequate ideas are necessarily true and bear in themselves the evidence of their own veracity. The mind accurately reflects existence, and if an idea be due to the mental association of two different factors, the joining, so to speak, may, with due care, be discerned. General notions and

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abstract terms arise from the incapacity of the mind to retain in completeness more than a certain number of mental images; it, therefore, groups together points of resemblance, and considers the abstractions thus formed as units.

Knowledge is of three kinds: opinion, rational knowledge, and intuitive knowledge. The first alone is the cause of error; the second consists in adequate ideas of particular properties of things, and in general notions; and the third proceeds from an adequate idea of some Attribute of God to the adequate knowledge of particular things. Reason does not regard things as contingent, but as necessary, considering them under the form of eternity as part of the nature of God. The Will has no existence apart from particular acts of volition and, since acts of volition are ideas, the Will is identical with the understanding. Next as to the emotions. In so far as it has adequate ideas, *i.e.*, is purely rational, the mind may be said to be active; in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it is passive and therefore subject to emotions. Nothing can be destroyed from within, for all change must come from without. In other words, everything endeavours to persist in its own being. This endeavour is simply the result of a thing being what it is. When it is spoken of in reference to the human mind only, it is equivalent to the Will; in reference to the whole man it may be called appetite. Appetite is thus identified with life; desire is appetite, with consciousness thereof. All objects of our desire owe their choice simply to the fact that we desire them: we do not desire a thing, because it is intrinsically good, but we deem a thing good, because we desire it. Everything which adds to the bodily or mental powers of activity is pleasure, everything which detracts from them is pain. From these three fundamentals—desire, pleasure and pain—the entire list of human emotions is deduced. Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause; hatred is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause. Pleasure or pain may be excited by anything,

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incidentally, if not directly. Almost all the emotions arise from the passive condition of the mind, but there is also a pleasure arising from the mind's contemplation of its own power. This is the source of virtue, and is purely active. And in what does this virtue consist? The answer to this question leads on to the consideration of man, in so far as he is subject to the emotions. Spinoza here defines the terms "perfect" and "imperfect", "good" and "evil". A thing can only be called "perfect" in reference to the known intention of its author. That is "good" which we know with certainty to be useful to us; we style "evil" that which we know will hinder us in the attainment of good. By "useful" we mean that which will aid us to approach gradually the ideal we have set before ourselves. Man, being only a part of nature, must be subject to emotions, because he must encounter circumstances of which he is not the sole and sufficient cause. Emotion can only be conquered by another emotion stronger than itself; hence knowledge will only lift us above the sway of passions, in so far as it is itself "touched with emotion". Every man necessarily, and therefore rightly, seeks his own interest, which is thus identical with virtue; but his own interest does not lie in selfishness, for man is always in need of external help, and nothing is more useful to him than his fellow-men. Hence individual well-being is best promoted by harmonious social effort. The reasonable man will desire nothing for himself, which he does not desire for other men; therefore he will be just, faithful and honourable. Thus, rational emotion rather than pure reason is necessary for subduing the evil passions. What are the means whereby man may gain mastery over his passions? These depend on the definition of passion as a confused idea. As soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of a passion, it changes its character and ceases to be a passion. With due care, it is possible to form a distinct idea of every bodily state. Accordingly, a true knowledge of the passions is the best remedy against them. While we contemplate

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the world as a necessary result of the perfect nature of God, a feeling of joy will arise in our hearts, accompanied by the idea of God as its cause. This is the intellectual love of God, which is the highest happiness man can know. It seeks for no special love from God in return, for such would imply a change in the nature of the Deity. It rises above all fear of change through envy or jealousy, and increases in proportion as it is seen to be participated in by our fellow-men. "The human mind," says Spinoza, "cannot be wholly destroyed with the body, but somewhat of it remains, which is eternal." The eternity thus predicated cannot mean indefinite persistence in time, for eternity is not commensurate with time. It must mean some special kind of existence; it is, in fact, defined as a mode of thinking. As we have seen, the mind consists of adequate and inadequate ideas; in so far as it is composed of the former, it is part of the infinite mind of God, which broods, as it were, over the extended universe as its expression in terms of thought. As such, it is necessarily eternal, and, since knowledge implies self-consciousness, it knows that it is so. Inadequate ideas will pass away with the body, because they are the result of conditions, which are merely temporary, and inseparably connected with the body, but adequate ideas will not pass away, inasmuch as they are part of the mind of the Eternal. Knowledge of the third or intuitive kind, above mentioned, is the source of our highest perfection and blessedness; even as it forms part of infinite mind of God, so also does the joy with which it is accompanied—the intellectual love of God—form part of the infinite intellectual love, wherewith God regards Himself.

According to Spinoza, morality rests on a basis quite independent of the acceptance of the mind's Eternity. Virtue is its own reward, and needs no other. He holds passionately to this doctrine. For him who is truly wise, Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself. "And though the way thereto be steep, yet it may be

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found—all things excellent are as difficult, as they are rare."[1120]

Such in brief is the system of Spinoza, if it can be called one.[1121] It has been compared to Sankara's system of Advaita by more than one writer. Pollock himself was evidently inclined to this view, as we see him prefix to a chapter, as a motto, a couplet descriptive of Sankara's main teaching, for explaining Spinoza's fundamental doctrine of the unity of the world. The first line offers the admonition: "Know in thyself and the world one self-same soul"; and the second one demands: "Banish the dream that sunders part from the whole." Another writer suggests that the substance of Spinoza corresponds to the Upanishadic *sat* and *ātman*; he compares the *Kārya Brahman* to Spinoza's *natura naturans*; and the *Kāraṇa Brahman* to Spinoza's *natura naturata*. The last of these has, it is added, all the properties of Spinoza's Substance. He is infinite in all things finite and is eternal in all things fugitive. He is the ultimate and the highest reality. In this view, Sankara anticipated Spinoza's theory of knowledge by a thousand years. But the criticism is offered that neither one—neither Sankara nor Spinoza—explains the world; they, it is said, only xplain it away, because they are acosmists, affirming the Ātman (or Brahman) or Deus (*i.e.*, God) and denying the

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[1120] R. H. M. Elwes, *Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza*, I, Introd.; also Sir Frederick Pollock, *Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy*, especially Chap. IX.

Pollock's version of the passage quoted is as follows:—

"And if the way I have shown to lead hither seems exceedingly hard, yet it may be discovered. That truly must be hard which is so seldom found. For if salvation were so easy and could be found with little trouble, how should it come to pass that nearly all mankind neglect it? But every excellent work is as difficult as it is rare." (These are the last words of Spinoza's *Ethics*.)

[1121] Sir Frederick Pollock has remarked that Spinozism as a living and constructive force is not a system but a habit of mind (*loc. cit.*, 381). He adds: "The genuine and durable triumphs of philosophy are not in systems but in ideas." (*Ibid.*)

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world. To Sankara, it is said, Being or *Sat* is identical with perfection. By a similar thought, Spinoza, we are told, identifies Substance with God. Spinoza begins his system with the Substance, without any preceding inquiry as to its reality. From there he proceeds to the attributes, and thence to the *modi* in order to explain the world away. Sankara proceeds in the same way. Brahman, or being, requires no further proof for its existence, because from it springs forth all possibility of thinking and recognition. To Sankara, intuitive and immediate recognition is the highest form of knowledge. He too visualises the world, *Sub specie æternitatis*. The totality of things he sees as an indivisible oneness from which everything flows with mathematical necessity. All miracles and extraordinary events are as taboo to Sankara as they are to Spinoza, for to both everything happens only by absolute necessity. Both were engineers of fate who tried to encase it in immutable and unchangeable laws. It will thus be seen, we are told in conclusion, that the monism of both Sankara and Spinoza is correlated to pantheism in equal measure, because both represent the same type of consciousness.[1122] While a good part of the argumentation as to similarity in reasoning observable in Sankara and Spinoza may, perhaps, prove acceptable to some, the conclusion drawn from it would not. Does Spinoza postulate really monism? This view of Spinoza has not been approved even by certain Western scholars, notably by John Caird, who lays bare the contradiction that would result in accepting such an interpretation. Spinoza's conception of Substance as unity in the abstract would, in a word, be in conflict with his concrete idea of Attributes and Modes, as applied to finite beings. If Substance is absolute and indeterminate, it cannot display itself, as postulated, through an infinite number of Attributes nor could there be Extension and Thought, the only two Attributes knowable by us. Concisely conceived, Spinoza's theory must be understood

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[1122] Melamed, *Spinoza and Buddha*, 241, 251, 254.

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to correlate the Substance with the idea of its displaying itself through an infinite number of Attributes and allow these Attributes again into displaying themselves through an infinite number of Modes ; some eternal and universal, in respect of each Attribute, such as motion and the sum of all physical facts ; others having no eternal and no necessary existence but acting and reacting on one another in ceaseless flux, according to fixed and definite laws. These latter have been compared in relation to their Attributes to waves in relation to the sea ; or to the myriad hues which play over the iridescent surface of a bubble. The conception underlying a theory like this shows that Spinoza by postulating it was trying to connect the infinite with the finite, thus providing for the manifestation of the finite from the infinite. The Self-Evolution of the Infinite would thus seem to be the bed-rock on which Spinoza's theory is based. This idea is inherent in the theory of *Bhēdābhēda* and it would seem that, in its essence, Spinoza's system, in so far as it is a system, is of the *Bhēdābhēda* variety. " Extension " and " Thought " help towards the maintenance of the doctrine of *æternitas* and thus is got over the need for the absorption of the finite in the infinite. This, it will be seen, is the very position advanced by Srīpati in the enunciation of his own theory. There is unity, and yet there is diversity ; unity in the Substance and Variety, through Extension and Thought and the infinite number of Modes that Attributes can themselves display.

About the time that Spinoza propounded his philosophy, there were others who put forward views that were far different from his own. Among these were Descartes and Hobbes, to each of whom, as we have seen, Spinoza owed something ; Leibniz ; and Locke. Of these, Descartes, who introduced the mathematical method into philosophy, accepts the reality of the world of experience in so far as this is distinct. Next, he concedes supernaturalism and as such accepts that the world is the creation of God and is wholly dependent on Him for its continued existence. Finally, he holds that the created world consists

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of two classes of things, bodies (or "extended things") and minds (or "thinking things"), between whom there can be no interaction, they being quite distinct. The soul can, and through the aid of God, direct but not produce the movements of the body. Hobbes (1588-1679), while opposed to supernaturalism, extended the scope of mechanistic explanation to the whole world of reality. His naturalism landed him in materialism. To him, matter and motion become the sole realities and account for everything. The pressure of matter on the sense organs produces sensations, and sensations produce knowledge. Sensations and thoughts are only kinds of motion, while mind—or soul—is also matter. The same tendency—the tendency to persist in their present condition, whether of motion or of rest—characterises all things. God may be the first Cause, but man cannot have any idea of Him. Spinoza, as we have seen, was influenced by Descartes, from whom he took over the mathematical method. But it was from Hobbes that he derived his naturalism, which he applied more systematically than even Hobbes. To him reason became supreme and with the aid of reason, he tried to discover the inter-connection that exists between things. With him, accordingly, naturalism and rationalism go together, though naturalism, in his hands, becomes something quite different from the naturalism of Hobbes. He finds place in Nature for both the material and the spiritual, for the divine and the human. To him, accordingly, Nature is God and God is Nature. To Spinoza, God is All and All is God. Every finite object or event is dependent on innumerable others, which ramify in all directions. Each of these is, in its turn, dependent on innumerable others. A world consisting of such contingent objects and events would be unintelligible. There should therefore be predicated some self-dependent reality—which Spinoza calls "Substance"—which sustains all dependent things and events. This self-dependent, self-existing "Substance", however, need not be sought in any external creator. The cosmic system—or Nature—may in its entirety take the place of God.

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This conception of God avoids the problem of creation from nothing. God is thus deemed to be co-extensive with Nature. Nature or God is accordingly all-comprehensive, infinite and perfect. Nature is, besides, dynamic, exercising every existing form of energy. Each ultimate kind of energy is an Attribute of God. Of these ultimate Attributes, man only knows two. And these, according to Spinoza, are Extension and Thought, *i.e.*, physical energy and mind energy. As before stated, Spinoza holds that there may be infinity of other Attributes. All material bodies and physical events are " modes ", *i.e.*, modifications or states, of the attribute Extension, and all minds and mental experiences are modes of the attribute Thought. The apparent interaction between body and mind arises from their being concomitant modes of the constitutive Attributes of the one ultimate reality. The various finite modes are not illusions, but real while they last; and even when they pass away, they do not utterly disappear. For, the One remains in which the many change and change again. To Spinoza, God is not a Person. He is more than a Person; he is super-Personal, for he is more than what we can understand by designating him a "person". And he is, for this reason, not the less worthy of love. Indeed, Spinoza's philosophy ends in " the intellectual love of God ", which, as Professor Wolf well expresses it, "is the fruit of that highest intuition to which man attains when, after an adequate discipline of intelligence and character, he arrives at a synoptic vision of One and All."

John Locke (1632-1704), who was born in the same year as of Spinoza and lived for twenty-seven years after Spinoza's death, propounded a philosophy which was limited to the study of human nature and human knowledge. His *Essay on the Human Understanding* was intended to show that all our ideas are derived from experience, *i.e.*, through the senses and reflection on what they reveal. The mind has the power of reflecting upon the course of its ideas, and in reflection, higher ideas (such as power, cause, unity, relation) are formed. He thus explains universal

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ideas on an empirical basis. According to him, there are thus no innate ideas. The understanding being dependent on sensations, it can reflect on these and combine them into more complex wholes, but it cannot add to them. Sensations, however, are only appearances of the primary qualities of things—extension, shape, solidity, number, motion, sensations of secondary qualities—colour, smell, sound, taste—are merely subjective effects produced in us by primary qualities, and are not copies of anything objective. Then as to substances (bodies and souls) our ideas are vague, and cannot be justified by sense-experience. It is accordingly impossible to say whether the soul is a spiritual substance or a material substance endowed with the capacity to think. Man, being strictly limited to his experience, does not know the real essence of anything. Every person can be sure only of his own existence, by intuition, and of the existence of God as the cause of his existence.[1123] Locke reaches his conclusions by the use of the inductive method. He thus makes observation his starting point and rejects all metaphysical ideas as to the origin of knowledge—innate ideas, pre-established harmony, divine inspiration.

Leibniz (1646-1716), who was a contemporary of Spinoza and corresponded with him, propounded a theory of reality which is wholly psychological in character. Its pivotal points are his doctrine of monads, the principle of pre-established harmony, and the law of continuity. He tries to reconcile mind and matter in what Dr. Aveling has described as "a panpsychism", a universe in which all that exists is held to be spiritual. To Leibniz, mental substances are independent activities, essentially individual, yet together constituting a world. These active forces he

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[1123] Prof. Saintsbury makes the characteristic remark that "Locke is eminently—*i.e.*, before all his contemporaries—of such stuff as dreams are *not* made of." He is wholly a prosaic, practical man and Englishman.

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calls " monads ".[1124] Like material atoms, they are simple, indivisible and indestructible; they are also, according to Leibniz, endowed, in varying degrees, with the power of mental representation. The human soul is such a monad, conscious of what it represents. Others represent the universe confusedly or even unconsciously, and so reflect every other monad in existence. The world consists of these immaterial monads in an ascending scale of perfection, their place being determined by the degree of clearness with which each actively represents the rest. They are thus of all degrees of development, some having but a very low kind of consciousness or sub-consciousness, others are in a higher dream-state, yet others are wide awake, and have clear thoughts, while God enjoys the most intense and most active consciousness. The monads are infinite in number and infinite in gradation, no two monads being exactly alike. Each monad is self-contained and is not affected by the others, except only by God who has created them by a kind of emanation, or "fulguration". The appearance of inter-action between different monads is due to a " pre-established harmony ". God has so made them that they all act in harmony. The corespondence of the succession of ideas in the mind with the movements of the monads of the body is explained in the light of the same theory. Soul and body agree like two clocks, originally set going by God and absolutely synchronised. As observed by Professor Wolf, the whole theory bears the " impress of supernaturalism ". The motive which prompted this theory on Leibniz's part, according to him, was " the anxiety to justify the belief in the ultimate reality and permanence of individual souls".

It will be seen that Leibniz makes a difference between minds and ordinary souls. In ordinary souls, for instance the souls of brutes, there is some connection between conscious perceptions in accordance with the laws of memory

[1124] *Monad*, from Greek *monos*, alone; an ultimate atom; a micro-organism of extremely simple character. In his *Monadology*, Para 1, Leibniz defines it as " a simple substance which enters into compounds; simple, that is, without parts ".

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and imagination; but minds, which have clear and distinct apperceptions, are further gifted with reason. Ordinary souls are the living mirrors of the universe of created things, whereas minds are also images of the Divinity himself, the Author of nature, and are capable of knowing the system of the universe. This makes minds capable of entering into a kind of society with God, so that they are members of the City of Minds, the most perfect state under the most perfect of monarchs. Just as within the world of nature there is harmony between the two kingdoms of efficient and of final causes, so there is a harmony between the physical kingdom of nature and the moral kingdom of grace. In other words, there is accord between God as Architect of the machine of the universe and God as Monarch of the divine City of Minds.[1125] By reason of this harmony, there is no good action without reward, and no evil action without punishment. All things work together for the good of the righteous in a universe which is the image of the infinite perfections of God.[1126] According to Leibniz, then, substances are really unities and cannot be affected by anything outside themselves; that if the constituent elements of things are real unities, they must be the only real unities, and that if they are to keep together as real unities, they can only be compounded by aggregation; that we have in experience an instance of such a real unity in our self, which, though indivisible into parts, but yet is capable of great variety; that the mind is unaffected in its experience by anything outside of itself, which shows that real unities are pregnant with their own nature; that the essence of material substance is not extension, nor even motion, but force, a character in things which is pre-supposed by solidity and motion; that real entities must, therefore, be conceived to be endowed with force in the same manner

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[1125] A generalization based on Leibniz's own words occurring in his *Monadology*, Paras 85 to 89.

[1126] See *Monadology*, Para 90. *Vide The Philosophical Writings of Leibniz*, ed. Mary Morris and C. R. Morris.

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as the soul is endowed with activity; that since there cannot be any interaction between real unities, there must be pre-established harmony in order to give unity to the universe, as without such harmony, there would be a chaotic plurality and everything would be purposeless, which seems absurd; that reality is governed not by mechanical laws, but by the law of sufficient reason; that the real world is not the only possible world, but the best of possible worlds; that everything is ordered not by a mechanistic necessity but by the moral necessity to work for the highest good of minds; and that this is achieved by making the kingdom of nature subservient to the kingdom of minds, God being at once the Architect of the one and the Monarch of the other.[1127] Leibniz thus postulates that minds are the mirrors of the Divinity himself; they are capable of knowing the system of the universe; they are capable of entering into a kind of society with God; they are members of the City of Minds, the most perfect state under the most perfect of monarchs.[1128] There is thus evidence enough to indicate that Leibniz postulates not only individuality of the soul, but also its permanence; not only its permanence but also its association with God; not only its association with but also its origin in God. In these views, Leibniz approaches certain aspects of the *Bhēdābhēda* view. He holds that "there is never, strictly speaking, absolute generation nor perfect death, consisting in the separation of the soul. And what we call *generation* is a development and a growth, while what we call *death* is an envelopment and a diminution." In the next paragraph, Leibniz adds that "philosophers have been much embarrassed over the origin of forms, entelechies or souls. But to-day when exact researches on plants, insects and animals have revealed the fact that the organic bodies of nature are never produced from a chaos or from putrefaction, but always

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[1127] See C. R. Morris, *Introduction to the Philosophical Writings of Leibniz*, xxiv-xxv.

[1128] *Monadology*, Paras 83-85.

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from seeds, wherein there was certainly some *performation*, we conclude not only that the organic body was already present before conception, but also that there was a soul in this body; that, in a word, the animal itself was present, and that by means of conception it was merely prepared for a great transformation, so as to become an animal of another kind. We even see something of this kind apart from birth, as when worms become flies, and caterpillars become butterflies."[1129]

Leibniz did not agree with Spinoza in fundamental points and expresses his dissent from him in some of his works.[1130] Pollock strongly criticizes Leibniz's attitude towards Spinoza, and his "tone of systematic depreciation", as he calls it, in his works. He even says that Leibniz's attitude "encouraged injustice towards Spinoza" and contributed its share "in keeping Spinoza out of his rightful place".[1131] Whether this is so or not, there is no question that Leibniz, holding the views he did, could not but disagree from the views of Spinoza.

Influence of Spinoza: Bhedabheda in the West.

The views of later writers on philosophy are mainly based on the systems of Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke or Leibniz. These provided, as Professor Wolf says, "the broad foundations for all, nearly all the philosophies" which have been propounded since then during the past two centuries. There is hardly any doubt that Leibniz helped Kant to effect the Copernican revolution he did in logic. Through Wolff, the chief follower of Leibniz, Kant sought to revivify philosophy. But the influence of Spinoza on German thought generally was far greater than that of Leibniz. F. H. Jacobi (1743-1819) spoke of Spinoza's philosophy as logically unanswerable though

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[1129] *Monadology*, Para 74.

[1130] See *Theodicy*. Morris, *Philosophical Writings of Leibniz*, page 196; page 242, Para 173.

[1131] Pollock, *loc. cit.*, 355.

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morally unacceptable.[1132] Lessing (1729-1781) said that there was no other philosophy but Spinoza's. Kant was not wholly unaffected by its rising influence but Goethe (1749-1832) assimilated and used it. J. G. Fichte (1762-1814), though he started as a disciple of Kant, broke away from him subsequently and developed a philosophy in which we see how he had studied Spinoza and how he had felt the power and the influence of Spinoza's world-idea. He took Spinoza's metaphysical interpretations of theology with but little alteration, though he diverged from Spinoza's theory of substance. He argued that even the Absolute is the product of the mind. The whole of experience—not its form only—is generated by the "absolute self" in which individual minds participate. The "absolute self" divides itself into a knowing self and a known object, because the moral growth of the self needs objects as obstacles to be surmounted by moral endeavour. For similar reasons, he holds that the absolute self must divide into many selves, otherwise there would be no opportunity for the exercise of moral duties. But the many selves are all expressions of one moral order, which is the absolute self or God. He thus tries to harmonize realism with idealism and in doing so reaches the *Bhēdābhēda* position. No wonder that his philosophy impressed Carlyle. "So robust an intellect, a soul so calm," said Carlyle of Fichte, "so lofty, massive, and immoveable, has not mingled in philosophic discussion since the time of Luther....the cold, colossal, adamantine spirit standing erect and clear, like Cato Major among degenerate men; fit to have been the teacher of the Stoa and to have discoursed of Beauty and Virtue in the groves of Academe."

[1132] Jacobi contended for the dogma of immediate cognition as the special organ of the supersensuous. As Schwegler suggests, he failed to note that cognition has, as already described, a series of subjective intermediating movements and can pretend to immediacy only in entire oblivion of its own nature and origin.

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Hegel (1770-1831), though he criticized Spinoza, was greatly influenced by him. He repeatedly said that to be a philosopher, you must first be a Spinozist and that if you have not Spinozism, you have no philosophy. It is to be feared that Hegel criticized Spinoza not for what he actually said or thought but for what was understood as Spinoza's view in his time.[1133] However this may be, the fact remains that his theory endeavours to harmonize the absolute with the many. The philosophy of Hegel resolves being into thought, and thought into the unity of the logical moments of simple apprehension, judgment and reason, all purely spiritual acts, whereby being in itself, or *seyn*, becomes other than itself, or *für sich seyn*, the universal being first by separating from itself particularised, and then by return into itself individualised, the whole being what Hegel characterizes as *Des Process des Geistes* or "the Process of the Spirit". This is what has been called "the secret of Hegel". It is an open secret, as has been well said, and one too that pervades the whole of his system. "Open where you will," writes Dr. Sterling, the first of his chief exponents in England, "you find him always engaged in saying pretty well the same thing"—always identity by otherness passing into selfness or making that for itself which is at first *in* itself. The unity that Hegel aims at is, again, *Bhēdābhēda*, wherein difference is particularised while unity is stressed. The two seem to be opposed to each other but are really allied to each other. Hegel's identity of the opposites is what we see in *Bhēdābhēda*. The similarity does not end there, for we see *Bhēdābhēda* more than lurking in Hegel's description of the nature of the absolute and its separation from itself.

F. W. S. Schelling (1775-1854), though originally a student of Hegel, later attached himself to Fichte, and then departed from him in restoring the Absolute to the position of an unknown thing-in-itself. He re-established once

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[1133] See Pollock, *loc. cit.*, 372, f.n. 2.

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again the reality of the physical world. To him the beauty of the material world is sufficient ground for its reality. It is an expression of the Absolute as the mind is. The Absolute thus is neither mind nor matter, though it expresses itself in both. Thus Schelling's theory of unity is essentially based on the idea of the Absolute being allowed its place of pre-eminence. Though he has been criticized as having gone back to Spinozism, it is clear that he urges as much the reality of the Absolute as the reality of the material world. That is just where he agrees with the *Bhēdābhēda* theory, which refuses to yield either the Absolute or the material world.

J. T. Fechner (1801-1887), the great psychophysicist, who laid the foundations of the science of psychophysics in his *Elements of Psychophysics*, has elaborated a theory which has to be described as a phase of *Bhēdābhēda*. He regards the universe as a society of souls, and God as the supreme all-embracing Soul. To him, inwardly all souls are mental, though they appear outwardly to each other as material bodies. Just as smaller bodies are included in larger bodies, and all bodies are included in physical nature, so some souls are included in others, and the soul of God embraces all other souls.

Rudolph Hermann Lotze (1817-1881), the German philosopher, author of *Microcosmus*, developed a system of teleological idealism—sometimes also called as idealistic pantheism—which is largely based on ethical considerations. According to it, ultimate reality is mental substance. Material phenomena are, in his view, appearances produced by souls or spiritual monads, but he held that these monads are not independent substances, but modes or states of God, who is the sole and infinite Substance. He repudiated both agnosticism and a mere mechanical view of the universe. In his view, mechanistic phenomena are appearances resulting from the uniform laws with which God comes out of these immanent activities which, he suggests, are, at the same time, directed to divine ends. He thus endeavoured to reconcile idealism with what might be called qualified

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monadism of a kind which, while it is a departure from that of Leibniz, contains the elements of the *Bhēdābhēda* doctrine.

T. H. Green (1838-1882) and F. H. Bradley (1846-1924) continued in the spiritual tradition set up by Hegel. Green led the protest against empiricism and evolutionism, which denied to man a sense of moral obligation. Man is not a being who is simply " the result of natural forces ". To understand his real nature, it is necessary to understand, first, the nature of our consciousness, the reality of which is all that we are sure of in the first instance. Human consciousness is essentially self-consciousness. In man, even the simplest process of sense-perception is not a mere change, but the consciousness of a change. Human experience, thus, consists not only of mere events, physical or mental, but of recognitions of such events. What is apprehended, accordingly, is never a bare fact, but a recognized fact, a synthesis of relations in a consciousness which involves a self as well as the elements of the objects apprehended, which it holds together in the unity of the act of perception. Knowledge therefore always implies the work of the mind or self. The work of the mind, however, is not capricious or arbitrary. This is attested by the common distinction between truth and error, between reality and illusion and by the very existence of the sciences. But all this, in the view of Green, implies that the reality which we know is an intelligible reality, an ideal system, in short, a spiritual world. And such a world, in his opinion, can only be explained by reference to a spiritual " principle which renders all relations possible and is itself determined by none of them ", an absolute and eternal self-consciousness which apprehends as a whole what man knows only in part. This " principle ", this absolute, and eternal self-consciousness, is, to him, God. In some measure, man partakes of the self-consciousness of God. This participation is the source of morality and religion. For a self-conscious personality, according to him, cannot be supposed to pass away but

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must partake of the nature of the eternal. A bridge between the Absolute and the finite is thus created—by the "principle which renders all relations possible and is itself determined by none of them". The Absolute is the ideal and the finite partakes of its nature—the self-consciousness of the one being the self-consciousness of the other. Thus, the finite partakes of the "nature of the eternal". Green thus affirms both unity and difference between the Absolute and the finite and harmonizes both by postulating a spiritual world, an "ideal system", drawn from his Hegelian repertoire. F. H. Bradley, if anything, is even more specific. He feels that the Hegelian view that the "real" is the natural, adopted by Green, is far from satisfying. He finds this kind of idealism not only "as cold and ghost-like as the dreariest materialism" but also the apparent glory of the perceived world as much "a deception and a cheat", if it covers "some spectral woof of impalpable abstractions, or unearthly ballet of bloodless categories," which Hegel's idealism regards as ultimate reality. He makes "immediate experience" rather than "cognitive consciousness" his starting-point. He finds in immediate experience "an immediate feeling, a knowing and being in one". It is doubtless at first an undifferentiated unity, and non-relational but it contains implicitly numerous distinctions which discursive thought or judgment makes explicit. For immediate experience is felt to be inadequate, and thought is our endeavour to supplement it by introducing distinctions, abstractions, qualifications, relations, etc. But the categories and concepts with which thought operates, though useful as working ideas for the special tasks of science, are unsatisfactory for a philosophic understanding of ultimate reality. "The nature studied by the observer and by the poet and painter, is in all its sensible and emotional fulness a very real Nature. It is in most respects more real than the strict object of physical science." For the concepts of science are abstract and not ultimately true. Space and time, relation and quality, primary and secondary qualities, motion and change, causation and

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activity, self and things-in-themselves—all these notions, when closely examined, end in self-contradiction, and are therefore applicable only to mere "appearances", not to ultimate reality. For ultimate reality must be self-consistent and harmonious. Yet even "appearances" cannot be mere illusions, though Bradley sometimes describes them as such. They must have a place in ultimate reality. How is ultimate Reality, the Absolute, to be conceived? The clue to such a conception, though a very inadequate conception, is sought by Bradley in immediate experience, at least in immediate experience at—as it has been put—a higher remove. The Absolute is a Spirit embracing and completing all finite experiences and "appearances". And the experience of the Absolute or the Absolute experience, repeats at a higher remove, with infinitely greater wealth and perfection, the "immediate feeling", the "knowing and being in one", which characterizes the "immediate experience" of human beings. "Reality is one experience" and "experience" exhausts all reality. "There is no being or fact outside of that which is commonly called psychical existence. Feeling, thought and volition—any groups under which we class psychical phenomena—are all the material of existence. And there is no other material actual or even possible." Spirit is to Bradley "the unity of the manifold in which externality of the manifold has utterly ceased. "Outside of spirit," according to him, "there is not, and there cannot be, any reality, and the more that anything is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably real." To Bradley, the Absolute was supra-personal, and it "has no history of its own, though it contains histories without number." The Absolute is a Spirit which embraces and completes all finite experiences and "appearances". And that Spirit is the unity of the manifold in which the externality of the manifold has ceased. Finite experiences are there, but they are embraced in the Spirit—the Absolute; the unity of the manifold makes the Spirit, the externality of the manifold having ceased. This conception of

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the Absolute is much like *Bhēdābhēda*, which postulates the unity of the manifold, the manifold having lost its externality.

B. Bosanquet (1848-1923), who makes thought the pathway to absolute reality, reaches the *Bhēdābhēda* position in a different manner. He refutes the idea that thought could lead, by its abstraction, to any inconsistencies. It is wrong, in his view, to identify thought with the formation of abstract universals, which naturally lead to an inadequate interpretation of reality. Thought is not merely abstract; it is, at its best, systematic. It helps to construe the systemic character of reality. Its characteristic "universal" for the understanding of reality is the "concrete universal", *i.e.*, the conception of a "whole" or "system", not the merely "abstract" universal which is only concerned with what is common or general in things instead of with their systematic inter-relations in a whole or system. Thus conceived, thought leads, not to contradiction or illusory appearance, but to the very heart of reality. It is, in fact, to Bosanquet, "the self-revelation of reality". Thought and reality are, to him, correlative. "Thought," he says, "is always an affirmation about reality." And reality "is the whole that thought is always endeavouring to affirm." In all experience, the influence of "the whole" or the concrete universal, is implicit. In logical thought, which follows the natural impulse to seek the truth and reality, we have "the whole" operating explicitly as the criterion. In it "the idea of system, the spirit of the concrete universal, in other words, of individuality, is the central essence." All higher experiences are characterised by the fact that in them comes to light the coherence of things, the "wholeness", or system, *i.e.*, integrity, of the universe, that is, the Absolute. In such experiences, accordingly, we feel "the heart-beat of the Absolute". And the Absolute is the final synthesis of mind and nature. Nature and mind are correlative. Nature is what is revealed to mind, and mind is what apprehends or interprets nature.

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In the Absolute all finite experiences are transmuted and perfected into a complete whole. As such a whole in which everything is adjusted in relation to the rest, the Absolute may be described as self-directing. The Absolute is thus the one, according to Bosanquet, in which all finite experiences are changed and perfected into a whole. It is thus self-conditioned and self-regulating. The finite has no significance without it; in it, it finds its coherence or systemic integrity. But its individuality is not denied; but is affirmed and, indeed, without such individuality, the very conception of the idea of system, would be in danger. Only it would be without purpose, if it were not correlated to the whole, the Absolute. In his view, the finite can have no separate existence but must find its place in the Absolute, if human experience is any guide.

Professor Benedetto Croce (born 1866), the leading Italian Idealist philosopher, has propounded a philosophy of the spirit which is likewise a form of the *Bhēdābhēda* theory. He starts with the view that conscious experience is the only sort of reality that need be assumed. But he concedes that spiritual reality contains more than the experience of merely finite minds. He also posits a universal consciousness or spirit which is immanent in all finite minds and is more than the mere totality of finite minds. While Hegel and his school of thought conceived of the dialect of thought as essentially logical rather than temporal in character—though Hegel had to agree that it was also a process in time—Croce definitely regards the cosmic spirit as a process in time and identifies reality with history. In other words, he represents reality as incessantly changing, always active, ever creative. Much like Bergson and James, he rejects the idea of a static, immutable Absolute, or "block universe," complete once for all. Cosmic activity proceeds in cycles, but is without a beginning and without an end. Within this total spiritual activity, certain phases, aspects or factors may, he holds, be distinguished, though not separated. He distinguishes theoretical from practical activity. Within each of these, he makes further distinctions.

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Under theoretical, he differentiates intuitions from concepts, which are thoughts or ideas. Intuition, he holds, is the act of creating the materials of cognition and exemplifies it by the creation of the artist. In this case, the mind has no material from outside supplied to it; it simply creates or produces its intuitions. On the other hand, conceptual thinking operates on intuitions and traces relations between them, or traces what is universal in them. Concepts, indeed, are immanent in the intuitions, it being impossible to separate them. Concepts, however, have a certain special significance. They are common to all minds and are the means of communion between them. They are universal, and are expressive of the Universal Spirit that is immanent in all finite minds. As to the objects to which theoretical activity must always be directed, they also are the creations of that activity. In fact the process of thinking, the object of thought, and the discrimination between the activity and the object are all of them aspects of the same total experience. They seem separate, but are not. It is only by a process of abstraction that a world of seemingly independent objects is set up over against the world of thought. Next, as to practical activity, Croce holds that this is always volition, since there are no physical actions in a spiritual world. As volition depends on cognition, practical activity is dependent on theoretical activity. To Croce, this world is in the region of pure intuition, of experience accepted for its own sake. The question of the reality of experience does not arise in this region. We are satisfied with experience itself, simply as such. But anything can be intuited and taken as pure experience. The world then can be imagined as simply existing and as satisfying our desires simply by being so imagined. This does not preclude the conception of a world that exists and of the idea that its existence is an affair of perfect interconnection and coherence. Croce is largely governed by the Hegelian idea of the supremacy of the Spirit, though he differs from his master in suggesting that religion is only imperfect philosophy and not the

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supreme form of the Spirit. However this may be, Croce agrees with *Bhēdābhēda* when he refuses to accept the "block universe" idea; when he speaks of a universal consciousness or spirit as immanent in all finite minds and is something more than a mere totality of finite minds; when he suggests the Cosmic Spirit as a process in time; and when he speaks of concepts as being universal and as expressive of the universal Spirit that is immanent in all finite minds.

J. Royce (1855-1916), the well-known American philosopher, approaches to some extent the views of Bradley. To him finite ideas are not mere images, but imply some mode of action, and therefore some purpose. Such purpose constitutes its internal meaning. They also possess an internal meaning; the external meaning having reference to objects beyond themselves. But objects cannot be really independent of the knowledge relating to them. To be related, the object and the idea should have something in common. The reality of these objects of reference thus consists in their fulfilment of the inner meanings of the corresponding ideas. The reality of an object is accordingly conceived as the realization in experience of the purpose involved in the internal meaning of an idea. Whether this purpose is or is not fulfilled can only be judged by the idea itself. Thus the idea itself is constructed as having a purpose and will of its own. Thought thus came to be conceived by Royce as a conscious life in which ideas embody their purposes in objects. From this point of view, "to be" means to express "the complete internal meaning of an absolute system of ideas". This is so, because reality in its fulness must fulfil all ideas. It follows from this that finite ideas must be assumed to be absorbed in one complete system of ideas and one all-comprehensive purpose which finds its satisfaction in the total realm of existence. Absolute experience, however, embraces much that is beyond finite experience. According to Royce's conception, human individuals are not merely engulfed in the Absolute, but are, in some way, conserved. Each individual

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expresses in his own way something of the Absolute will, and so constitutes a unique part of the unique whole. Even time, in his view, is not entirely superseded, in the Absolute, by an eternity that is utterly different from it. He rather would suggest that "Eternity is the Absolute's simultaneous apprehension of all time, somewhat in the same way as a melody is the simultaneous apprehension of a certain sequence of notes." The significance of Royce's theory in the light of *Bhēdābhēda* will be evident when it is said that he tries to reconcile by it the theories of monism and pluralism in a manner which is strikingly illustrative of the hold of this doctrine in modern Western philosophy.

This is even more evident when we review the views of a few other Western philosophers of modern times, who have propounded what may be styled composite types of Realism in their endeavour to effect compromises between different kinds of philosophical opposites—monism and pluralism, idealism and materialism, empiricism and rationalism. Renouvier, who essayed a fusion of positivism and idealism on a basis of phenomenalism, is a good example of this tendency. In his later writings, he admitted the existence of more organic individualities than orderly aggregates of phenomena, namely, monads, spiritual individualities and personalities. "When freedom makes its appearance," he says, "in a given being, that being, bound by a thousand relations to other beings, acquires an incomparably more individual existence; what was only distinguished is now separated; what was a self becomes self-subsistent, an essence, or....a substance....; an individual, and the most individual that is known—the human individual, the human person." Further, to form a comprehensive view of reality as a whole, more is needed than a knowledge of the categories and particular laws. We have to assume the law of contradiction, and have recourse to the principle of free Belief under the inspiration of our whole personality. Renouvier believed in a kind of harmony between man and the universe, in virtue of which the universe responds to the moral demands of man. In

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view of his rather wide departure from absolute idealism, Professor Wolf is inclined to class him with critical idealism or even monadism, but he is not only idealistic but his very monadism and indeed his pluralism enables us to put him down under the Bhēdābhēdavadins. Next, G. Gentile (born 1875) for whom self-consciousness is ultimate reality, suggests that just as the self-consciousness of a finite mind or spirit is immanent in each of its experiences, so the universal consciousness or spirit is immanent in each finite self-consciousness. Finite minds are therefore only moments or aspects of the universal mind which at once is and creates the universe. Although the subjective and objective phases or moments of self-experience (finite or cosmic) are not really separate, yet they are distinguishable.

W. E. Hocking (born 1873) who elaborates a philosophy which admittedly contains elements drawn from idealism, naturalism and pragmatism, suggests that sense experience is a common link between many selves and that thereby we get to know directly not only other human selves but even God himself. Hocking regards the whole world as a self. "This word Self," he writes, "indicates chiefly that the mental life within the world has its unity, and that all the meanings of things cohere in a single will." The ultimate evidence for the self-hood of the whole world is to be found in immediate experience. "We, as a group of human selves," he adds, "know that we are not alone in the universe: that is our first and persistent intuition." But the self of the universe is infinite in its depth and mystery. And human life is a reaching out to the reality of things as a region in which the discovery of value need never end. The human self spans past and future, lives on values, and is free, determining out of a matrix of many possibilities which shall become fact. But the human self is not all these things from the beginning—its freedom and its immortality must be won. In these respects man is the creator of his own destiny. That is not a mere echo of *Bhēdābhēaa*, but *Bhēdābhēda* itself in its fullest sense as

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propounded in the last *Sūtras* of the *Vēdānta-Sūtras* by Srīpati and his school of thought.

James Ward (1843-1925) propounded a theory which partakes of the character of *Bhēdābhēda*. Though agreeing with contemporary idealists to some extent, he fell back on theism to avoid, it would seem, speculation. He maintained that actual experience does not involve a dualism of matter and mind, but a duality of subject and object and that this duality-in-unity (*Bhēdābhēda*) is consistent with a spiritual monism in which the unity of nature is conceived to be the counterpart of the unity of experience. Beginning with the plurality of reals, he proceeded to find out where such an empirical method would lead him, assuming the existence of an indefinite variety of psychical beings of all grades, some higher than human minds, others much lower, but all tending to self-conservation and self-realization. This conception of all entities as psychical individuals, based on the principle of continuity, led him to endow them with spontaneity. Spontaneous activity leads into regular habits while their co-operation and organization leads to progress by a kind of creative synthesis, just as a melody comes into being when single notes follow in a certain sequence, or a certain level of culture is attained when society is organized on certain harmonious lines. As the final of progress, he suggests the " eventual consummation of a perfect commonwealth, wherein all co-operate and none conflicts, wherein the many have become one, one realm of ends." Ward thus construes the world as a plurality of psychical beings, primarily independent as regards their existence, and yet always mutually acting and reacting upon each other, " an ontological plurality that is yet somehow a cosmological unity". Fearing that all this might mean " some ground beyond itself ", he called in the aid of theism to supplement his spiritual pluralism. Without subscribing to the common ideas of creation, he held that God in some sense sustains the world by a continuous act of self-limitation. The pluralistic aspect of *Bhēdābhēda* implicitly postulates such a view and though Ward feared that he had been

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more speculative in this part of his philosophy, and treated it as a matter of faith and his belief in God and in immortality on moralgrounds, there is reason to believe that the conclusion he arrived at was the more sound because any other would not be in keeping with the premises with which he started his simple, yet daring, theory.

The ethical philosopher W. R. Sorley (born 1855) tries to harmonise natural laws which constitute the causal order of the existing world with values which constitute its moral order. Values apply to personal life, and their validity consists in expressing an ideal which people feel they ought to realize. Natural laws apply to phenomena in space and time, and their validity consists in their reality. A satisfactory theory of reality must harmonise these two orders. Sorley's solution postulates a universe consisting of a Supreme Mind, or God, to whom finite minds and their environment owe their reality. God is the creator, the essence and source of all values, but is willing that these values should be shared by the free minds who owe their being to Him. If Sorley had persuaded himself to follow out his theory, he would have naturally ended in *Bhēdā-bhēda*, for that seems implicit in it. He thus lacks not so much definiteness as a purposeful pursuing of his theory.

The moral philosopher A. E. Taylor (born 1869), who seeks to harmonise the exigencies of scientific thought with the moral and religious demands of life, suggests that the reality of religious experience is evidence of the reality of its object. Postulating a theistic position, he holds that the ultimate ground of things is a single supreme reality which is the source of everything other than itself, and has the characteristic of being intrinsically complete or perfect, and an adequate object of adoration or worship. This supreme reality is best conceived after the analogy of the human spirit at its very best. The reality of moral progress, in his view, presupposes the reality of time, of causal agency, of free-will, and of permanent personality. The moral life is a life of tension between the temporal and the eternal and is only possible to a being which is neither abiding nor

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simply mutable, but both at once. It is a life of real adventure which begins with "nature" and ends in "super-nature". The attainment of a fully unified personality depends on our finding our principal good in God, the concrete unity of all good in its source. The implication of morality is thus a double one. It points to the existence of God as the absolute and final plenitude of good, and to an eternal destiny for the moral person whose aim is the fruition of the good. Taylor's conception of supreme reality after the human spirit at its best has its counterpart in *Bhēdābhēda* which asks the devotee to concentrate on the Self as the Brahman (*Brahma-Sūtras*, IV. 1. 1–3). His description of moral life as a life of tension between the temporal and the eternal; his idea of God as the unity of all good in its source; and his suggestion that the attainment of a fully unified personality depends on our finding our principal good in God—find a place in the theistic turn that *Bhēdābhēda* receives at the hands of Srīpati. Taylor's forecast of the nature of man's life "in Heaven", after his present life of "probation" is also worthy of remark. While the process of character-forming will be over, the activity issuing from character will, Taylor says, remain. In *Bhēdābhēda* of the type enunciated by Srīpati, this "activity" is countenanced.

The Russian philosopher Lossky (born 1870) adumbrates a philosophical standpoint which, as Professor Wolf puts it, oscillates "between spiritual pluralism and absolute idealism", a something which seems allied to *Bhēdābhēda*. Lossky conceives the principle of life not as a force but as a substance exercising the creative activity that is the source of its laws and not their slave. He conceives the universe on this analogy. The world, to him, is an organic whole —an organic whole which is prior to its parts, so that the parts can only come into being and continue to exist within the whole. "The unity of the intelligible world is," further to him, "not a functional unity of abstract ideas but a community of beings that live an infinite life." Such an organic life cannot, however, be self-existent. It

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has to be grounded, in his view, on some higher principle. He traces the unity of the cosmos, accordingly, to "a super-cosmic principle, the Absolute, as the source of a plurality of substances which form a unity more intimate than the abstract unity of the world, and nevertheless remain free in their activity." It is thus that Lossky finds a philosophical basis for theism in his "Organic Concrete Ideal-Realism" which, rather not very picturesque name, seems to signify nothing more than a phase of *Bhēdābhēda*, much akin to what Srīpati has propounded.

The German E. Husserl (born 1859), one of the greater leaders of the Neo-Kantianism and the founder of the phenomenological movement, propounds a theory which starts with realism and ends with idealism, which is the characteristic of *Bhēdābhēda* considered as a philosophy. It is his idealism that animates his phenomenological method from the start. He suggests that the minds, objects and the activities by which it apprehends them are not ultimately different in kind, only in degree. The acts of the mind may themselves become its objects, and the mind is just as active when it is itself and its activities for its objects. (See *Brahma-Sūtras*, IV. 1–3.) What the mind gets to know of its objects is only their "whatness", not their "thatness", that is, their universal characters, their "essences", not their peculiarities as their particular existents. The phenomenological method is, therefore, aptly described by Professor Wolf, as a method of "intuiting essences". In the last resort, the "essences" which the mind comes to know are really the forms of its own *a priori* activity. Husserl assumes that all "being" is "being in consciousnes". The objectivity of objects is held to be due to the fact that over and above the empirical ego there is the transcendental ego, in relation to which the empirical ego is only one object among many. And it is the transcendental ego that constructs all objects and their essences according to its own *a priori* forms. Finally, all the transcendental egos jointly constitute one supreme transcendental Being or Spirit, much like the

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Absolute of Hegel. Husserl, it will be seen, starting with Kant ends in Hegel, which is enough to indicate his kinship with *Bhēdābhēda*.

The philosophy of H. Bergson (born 1859) bears more than a mere trace of the theory of *Bhēdābhēda*. Protesting against scientific mechanism, he tries to vindicate the spiritual character of the universe as a whole. He does not, however, deny altogether the reality of matter and of natural law. What Professor Wolf calls the "key concepts" of his system are those of change, activity, freedom, creative evolution, duration and intuition. His philosophy is commonly described, for this reason, as the "philosophy of change" or of "creative evolution". To him, ultimate reality is neither material nor mental, but something less determinative from which both mind and matter derive. It is "change", a flow of events, a surging *life*, moving incessantly to new forms. It is not static. The functions which Bergson attributes to matter are not wholly evil. It is the principle of individuation, it divides the sea of life into separate individualities who can each develop distinctive personalities. Moreover, the very obstacles that matter presents serve as an incentive to the intensification of activity, which is "life". In the last resort, "all the living hold together". In not denying reality to matter and to natural law, in investing the universe with a spiritual character, in postulating the principle of individuation and in making all life to hold together and God, the central radiation of life, Bergson shows an affinity to *Bhēdābhēda* which seems unmistakable. There can at least be no doubt that the *Bhēdābhēda* elements in the philosophy of Bergson ought to be noted, especially as he is held to be the most significant thinkers of to-day.[1134]

From Bergson to Professor W. James (1842-1910), the chief exponent of Pragmatism, seems natural. Like

[1134] "I find too....in the teaching of Bergson so many things that make up almost the very body of truth and fact upon which Pragmatism, and Humanism and Idealism, all repose (or ought to repose.)"—William Caldwell in *Pragmatism and Idealism*, 234.

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Bergson, James develops a psychology which lays stress on the activity of consciousness or experience, which, under the influence of emotional and practical interests, selects for attention only certain things from a "theatre of simultaneous possibilities". His philosophy is a protest against excessive intellectualism and the monism or singularism or of absolute idealism and its conception of an eternally finished static world or "block universe". He has a keen feeling for what lives and moves, and to this feeling is traced by Professor Wolf the most distinctive factors in his philosophy—its pluralism, individuality, freedom and novelty.[1135] James bases his world-view on his psychology. His conception of reality is thus built on "experience". He accordingly came to accept the reality of a superhuman consciousness composed of all finite minds. He found justification for this view from evidence derived from psychical research, the phenomena of multiple personality, and more than all from the "varieties of religious experience" known. Though he approved of theism, he regarded God as finite, or of limited power and responsibility. This last conception was little understood in contemporary Europe and it led to many facetious remarks.[1136] But James does not seem to

[1135] James seems to have resembled Bergson in his anti-intellectualism. Caldwell, writing of Bergson, says, "Bergson's anti-intellectualism rests ultimately upon his contention that the human intellect is related in the main to the needs of action, that the brain is an organ of action rather than an organ of thought, that our intelligence is at home only in the realm of the physical and the mathematical sciences, that contrivance and invention and the practical comprehension of the "material" are its proper activities and that for these latter purposes it splits up the world of the senses and the understanding into a discontinuous aggregate of physical units, which it then proceeds to reconstruct in a spatial and temporal order." According to Caldwell, the pragmatist elements in Bergson's philosophy are (1) his Anti-intellectualism, and (2) his Activism or Action, which latter culminates in his freedom-philosophy and his spiritualism." W. Caldwell, *loc. cit.*, 234-235.

[1136] One of these came from the French philosopher Bourdeau, who has suggested that the Pragmatist God is not really God, but merely an old domestic servant destined to do us personal services—

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have meant more by this suggestion than that the world is undetermined so that it is quite possible, as Professor Wolf puts it, to realize in it whatever we reasonably think ought to be realized. James' world-view thus rejects a static conception of the world; accepts pluralism; grants individuality and freedom; and concedes a superhuman consciousness composed of all finite ends. All these are elements in *Bhēdābhēda*, while his *activism* seems closely allied to a type of *Saktism*.

Among modern realists, Professor S. Alexander (born 1859), whose system of philosophy is held to be in consonance with the spirit of modern science, suggests a point or two of alliance with *Bhēdābhēda*. According to him, though consciousness is the highest quality in human beings, there are still higher qualities in the universe. The highest quality is designated by him the "deity" or "divinity", which is the highest quality of God. The whole is, in his view, the body of God, mind being a lower quality. The nature of "deity" is always changing, as the universe is never complete and higher qualities may continue to emerge. Thus "deity" is always becoming, always yet to be. But God as the whole universe tending towards "deity" exists always. This accounts for the human longing for God, and for communion with Him. The finite many are related to infinite One in this manner: "the One is the system of the many in which they are conserved, not the vortex in which they are engulfed." Professor Alexander's suggestion that the quality of "deity" is what we aim at or rather should aim at; that the whole universe is the body of God; and that the infinite One "conserves" in itself the finite many postulates a world-idea which is strangely like certain elements of *Bhēdābhēda*.

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help us to carry our trunk and our cross in the midst of sweat and dirt. He is not gentleman even. "No wonder," he adds, "it was condemned at Rome." See his *Pragmatisme et Modernisme*, 82. See Caldwell, *loc. cit.*, 193, where he remarks that Pragmatists were forgetful of many of the deeper facts of life and of the economy of human civilization.

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L. T. Hobhouse (1864-1929) propounded a system of philosophy, described as a form of evolutionary realism, which is worthy of note because of its attempt to reconcile a number of mutually opposing theories—monism and pluralism, idealism and materialism, and empiricism and rationalism. Following Bosanquet, he pleads for the organic function of reason. He suggests that the whole and the parts should be considered together. "The whole rests upon the parts and in turn maintains them, and it is this principle of mutual support through inter-connection which is the Reason." On the speculative side, reason is the continuous and comprehensive effort towards harmony in the judgments which interpret experience. On the practical side, reason is the same impulse applied to all our experience that we value. He holds that it is a mistake to assume that the whole somehow explains the parts, without seeking also the explanation of the whole in the nature of the parts which it holds together. It is this mistake, he says, which is mainly responsible for the idealist identification of knowledge with reality, for it violates the claim of knowledge to refer to objects beyond itself. He offers the antithetical remark: "Nothing exists because it is known, but is known because it exists." He explains that "there is in the nature of knowledge itself no ground for restricting the nature of the known or knowable. What they are must be learnt from the reports of our immediate judgments in so far as their deliverances are reduced to consistency." Knowledge, in his opinion, is the correlation both of immediate judgments and of objects, for he urges the interconnected system of judgments asserts a Reality of interconnected objects. This is so, not because objects adapt themselves to thought but because thought adapts itself to its objects. But he does not exaggerate the interconnection of objects. Accordingly he distinguishes between *organic* and *harmonic* unity. Wherever there is some degree of both mutual dependence and independence among the parts, there is, in his opinion, organic unity. The greater the mutual dependence, the greater is the tendency towards

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harmony. Reality has, he says, an organic unity, though it is only slowly moving towards harmony. Mind, which is teleological in its activity, helps towards inter-relation and harmony. Harmony helps to keep all things alive. Reality, in this view, stands for development. Hobhouse's conception of Reality is thus closely connected with development, and a development too which, as remarked by Professor Wolf, is " not the peace of death, but the harmony which keeps all things alive ". The theory of *Bhēdābhēda* is touched by him in its very kernel here, for it stands for development, in which the mind plays the largest part in bringing about the harmony he speaks of. *Bhēdābhēda* is sometimes, on this account, known as *Pariṇāmavāda*, the theory which makes change or transformation its corner-stone.

A. N. Whitehead (born 1861) has propounded a " philosophy of organism " by which he tries to reconcile the claims of science with those of humanity. His theory is a protest against the mechanistic tendency of science, which concentrates on abstractions and mere logical entities. Actual experience is always an experience of concrete events. These events may be analysed into simpler elements. These events of experience are thus concrete systems or " organisms ", in which the character of the whole influences the very characters of various subordinate parts, elements or events which constitute it. " Organism " in this sense is a characteristic of all reality and is not restricted to living organisms. It is a fundamental feature throughout the whole of nature. The universe consists of events and their inter-relations. Larger events are systems of lesser events, and eventually of " atomic " events. Reality is thus conceived as a flux, though an attempt is made to save something of permanence by positing forms, "eternal objects", or universals. " In the inescapable flux," it is said, " there is something that abides; in the overwhelming permanence there is an element that escapes into flux." Atomic events are " actual occasions ", so that an event is a nexus of actual

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occasions, inter-related in some determinate fashion in one extensive quantum. A thing or a person is a society of events, or a systematic stream of such events, having a certain causal continuity. As each actual occasion is connected with every other such occasion, the universe is one compact, organic system of actual occasions, an "interlocked community" of events. The interlockings of actual occasions are called "pretensions", and conceived causally. Each actual occasion is generated from its pretensions of preceding occasions, and is pretended by succeeding occasions. In this way, each actual occasion attains "objective immortality" in spite of the flux. The "togetherness" of the universe, and the principle of "concretion" is identified with God. Whitehead, however, adds that "God is not concrete, but he is the ground of concrete actuality." Not only that; "the world is the multiplicity of finites seeking a perfected unity." And finally, God is "the unity of vision seeking physical multiplicity". God is also "the lure for feeling, the second stage of desire", and each creature has its "pretension into God". "The theme of cosmology, which is the basis of all religions," says Whitehead, "is the story of the dynamic effort of the World passing into everlasting unity, and of the static majority of God's vision, accompanying its purpose of completion by absorption of the World's multiplicity of effort." But he adds, "neither God nor the World reaches static completion. Both are in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty." Thus Whitehead's world-idea not only postulates an organic world, but also a realistic world; but the realistic world is in a state of flux—nothing is but everything becomes, that the truth of being is becoming. It is not surprising that Professor Wolf should recall the fact that there is in Whitehead's theory not only the Heraclitian idea of everything throughout the universe being in constant flux but also something of Plato's ideas of "eternal objects" in it. His doctrine of "pretensions" conceived causally, which Professor Wolf compares to Bergson's conception of the

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telescoping of the past in the present, resembles the cosmic process which is postulated by the *Bhēdābhēdins* in so far as they admit a realistic view of this world. But the elements in Whitehead's theory which are pre-eminently of the *Bhēdābhēda* order are where he speaks of the "togetherness" of the universe and of "the principle of concretion"; where he suggests that God is the "ground of concrete reality"; where he says that "the world is the multiplicity of finites seeking a perfected unity" and where he suggests that God is "the unity of vision seeking physical multiplicity". The other idea that neither God nor the World reaches static completion also finds its counterpart in *Bhēdābhēda* which differs in this respect fundamentally from *Abhēda*.

Spinoza, Father of Modern Western Philosophy.

The manner in which *Bhēdābhēda* is reflected in Western philosophy since the time of Spinoza has been touched upon so far. Spinoza's influence was vast, not only on Germany but throughout the Western world. He has moulded modern culture, philosophy and religion as perhaps no single thinker in Europe has done. Pollock has set out in his work the extent and range of Spinoza's influence in Europe. He has been acclaimed the founder of modern philosophy, a verdict which has been confirmed by the general voice of German criticism.[1137] Pollock singles out, in England, Wordsworth and Shelley, the latter of whom tried even a translation of the *Tractatus*; then come, in his view, F. D. Maurice and G. H. Lewes; Matthew Arnold and Froude; and in France, Victor Cousin, Taine, Flaubert, Paul Janet and Renan.[1138] Mr. Melamed, in his recent study of Spinoza, has enlarged this list and points out how greatly Spinoza has influenced modern culture. Lenin, the maker of Soviet Russia, is said to treat him as the official philosopher of Red Russia. Bismarck, who built the old German Empire, was attached to his philosophy, if

[1137] Pollock, *loc. cit.*, 373-374.
[1138] *Ibid.*, 374; 375; 378.

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his biographer Busch is to be believed. Then comes Frederick Nietzsche, the philosopher of Superman. Besides Goethe, Kant, Fitche, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer, who have been already mentioned, Herder and Schiller were overwhelmed by Spinoza's philosophy. Though a critic of Spinoza, Eduard von Hartmann, defends his monism and doctrine of the Substance. To the very end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, Spinozism remained an important factor in Western philosophy. Herbert Spencer in England, Wundt and Lotze in Germany, Bergson and Renouvier in France were greatly influenced by many elements in Spinoza's philosophy.

Spinoza and Modern Science.

In the religious sphere, the influence of Spinoza was as great as on the philosophical. The entire Protestant Church was against him. The German philosopher Wolff, though he disagreed from Spinoza, still defended him. Enlightenment, however, soon spread. Lessing's religious theory—differentiating the religion of Christ from the Christian religion—was suggested to him by Spinoza. Kant's hostile attitude towards the Old Testament, he owed to Spinoza. Judaism to him is an example of organized religion without any moral basis to support it. To him true religion starts with Christianity and Jesus the first great religious teacher. Schleiermacher discovered salvation and beatitude in Spinoza's intellectual love of God. Religion to him was not identical with knowledge. To him, its primary purpose was to visualize the universe in its every aspect and in all its manifoldness. This renders man humble and meek. Religion thus becomes the immediate consciousness of being, the recognition that all finality is part of the infinite and that all timeliness is part of eternity. To seek, to find, and to recognize eternity in everything that moves and lives, in all action and suffering, is religion. Hence it is only a state of mind bordering on passivity and mystical vision. Schleiermacher thus makes religion a pious vision from which meekness, love, gratitude, pity and repentance must

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be deduced. These phenomena are not ethical but religious in character. Religion is not thus the support of morality or ethics, but only the companion of man. It cannot be expressed in terms of law, for it is not reason but emotion. Religion thus is identical with emotion. Thus though he began with Spinoza, Schleiermacher ends with himself. He attempted to formulate an emotional rather than an intellectual love of God. But emotion divorced from reason may degenerate into wild passion which inspired the Spanish Inquisition and the witchcraft superstition in Europe. In England, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, following Spinoza, endeavoured to rationalize religion. He rejected the dogmatic theories of revelation in the Christian Scriptures, though he was fully convinced of their ethical value. He was for the religion of Christ and not for the Christian Church. To Carlyle, too, religion is a matter of the heart and of the emotions, originating not in man's intellect, but in his intuition; with Spinoza and Goethe, he rejects the idea of a God who pushes and moves the world from without. He holds that God can only be found in the human heart. Though God is the central problem of religion, man's activities must also find a place in it. Both Francis Newman and Matthew Arnold came under Spinoza's influence. The personality of Spinoza so deeply impressed Arnold that he came to identify ethics with religion. He could not believe in the existence of a supermundane God or accept Biblical miracles. Newman adopted in part Spinoza's attitude towards the Bible. In France, Spinoza's influence was less because of the great personality of Descartes. Still, Victor Cousin, Ernest Renan, Taine and many others of the nineteenth century fell under his spell. More important than this, Spinoza broke through Roman Catholicism and made it yield in the matter of higher criticism. Even the greatest poets of England, France and Germany, including Goethe, Shelley and Hugo, came under Spinoza's sway. Mr. Melamed devotes many pages in his volume to describe the new cynicism that his influence gave birth to. Not only poets but

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also men of science became the votaries of Spinoza. Among these may be mentioned Albert Einstein, Reichenback, Planck. These, however, were the successors of an earlier set which includes Friedrich Wilhelm Stock, the physiologist; Holbach and Delamettrie, the vitalist Miller and the mechanist Hæckel. Among psychologists may be mentioned Fechner, Wundt and Freud. Though in physics, his influence has been on the wane—both his theory of causation and his theory of substance have been subjected to adverse criticism—there is no gainsaying that he still wields considerable sway over science to-day. "As long as Spinoza's world-picture will continue to dazzle humanity," as Mr. Melamed puts it, "so long will it continue to influence science."[1139]

Upanishadic Origin of Spinoza's Root-Ideas.

Where did Spinoza get his main ideas from? We have seen the influence on him of Descartes, Hobbes, Bacon; of the Rabbinical writers; of Bruno; and of the Neo-Platonists. The Jewish school of thought and Bruno were influenced by Neo-Platonism and Neo-Platonism in its turn was semi-oriental in character. As Pollock has remarked, whatever theory we may adopt "the East has a considerable share in this portion of Spinoza's materials." But Pollock, however, avers that "it seems impossible, even if it were worthwhile, to disentangle all the details." This is rather inexplicable, especially if we are able to "disentangle all the details". Apart from earlier writers, to whom he owes much, this is what Mr. Melamed—in his *Spinoza* and *Buddha*—has attempted to essay and it seems necessary to refer to his arguments to indicate briefly the Upanishadic *and* Buddhistic elements in the philosophy of Spinoza. It is interesting to note Mr. Melamed describing Spinoza as "the greatest occidental representative of Eastern mysticism". Though somewhat rhetorical in character, Mr.

[1139] Melamed, *loc. cit.*, 115. See also *Notes and Bibliography*, included in his work for indicating Spinoza's influence in Germany and England, 368-375.

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Melamed's work shows considerable study and thought, both of Eastern and Western philosophy and religion. Though a lack of first-hand knowledge of Eastern writers in philosophy—mainly Indian—has proved an evident disadvantage to him, still, it must be acknowledged he has tried to probe matters deeply and endeavoured to get to the roots of the main issues involved. A question that he raises is this :—Is there any possible connection between Buddhism and the ideas underlying Spinoza's system ? This question is discussed at length by Mr. Melamed in a long and interesting chapter in which he describes how Buddhism spread westward and swamped the Western world with its passive world-idea :

"It is one of the most astounding paradoxes in the history of man's spiritual development that not the active world-idea of the Greek or Hebrew, but the passive world-idea of the Hindu, became predominant in the Western world. But the paradox is easily explained when one considers that the representatives of the active world-idea had exhausted themselves through centuries of combat and strife with each other. When the sources of subjectivism and individualism in Judea and Greece had spent themselves, the spirit of passivity and pessimism of the Middle East settled upon the Grecian Polis and upon the Judean hamlets. The figure of the ancient Greek Eros transformed itself into the patent God-seeker, and the virile and courageous Prophet of Jerusalem was replaced by the meek and the will-less scribe.

"Hinduism in its Buddhistic form finally overwhelmed the Western world, not because its world-idea was inherently superior to that of the Greek or the Hebrew, but because, being passive and still from the very beginning, it had not spent itself as did the other two world-concepts. With death as its goal it could not die, for nothing is more immortal than the cemetery.

"After the death of Gautama, Buddhism stole into the Western world and rooted itself into the soil. It spread its wings over the dying cities of Aramaic lands and

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even enveloped the great seeds of Hellenistic civilization. And just as the Eastern Aryan, because of his weakened physique, surrendered to nature, so now did the Western Aryan, in his hour of exhaustion, surrendered to the spirit of the East.

" Although from times immemorial there were certain contacts between the Eastern and the Western Aryans, the logic of history demanded that Palestine should become the meeting-ground of the East and the West. This was not due to any blind caprice of fate. Palestine is geographically situated midway between the settlements of the Eastern and the Western Aryans, and was thus the logical battle-ground for the two contradicting world-ideas to encounter and to decide man's spiritual destiny for a thousand years. Buddhism closed in on Palestine from Persia and Babylonia on the East and from Greece and Egypt on the West. The struggle between the Buddhist and the Hellenist in Palestine destroyed not merely the Greek but also the Jew.

" The triumph of Buddhism in Palestine led to the greatest religious upheaval in the world's history, resulting, first, in the destruction of Judea; second, in the rise of Christianity; and, third, in the destruction of ancient Rome. All historians and scholars, except St. Augustine, agree that the rise of Christianity spelled ruin to ancient Rome. Not the aggressive barbarians, but the ascetic saints who planted Eastern holiness in the Western world, were the true destroyers of Rome. It is equally true that not the Roman Cæsar but the Buddha Gautama destroyed Judea. Not the desolation of the land by the Roman legions, but the dilution of Judaic culture by Buddhism, destroyed the entire fabric of Jewish life in Palestine. The moment when the spirit of Buddhism infiltrated into Palestine and led to the formation of sects, which were opposed to the fabric ideas of the supremacy of man and the value of earthly life, the die was cast. The Essenes, the Mandeans, and the various Nazareans, who were permeated with the spirit of more or less diluted Buddhism, brought there by Buddhistic monks and Missionaries,

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spread the gospel of salvation, redemption, beatitude through self-denial, resignation and deadening of the senses. There the ideal of the holy as against the ideal of the good or the beautiful destroyed the devitalized and decadent Hebraic culture and set the stage for the elimination of ancient Hebraism as a force in the world's history.

" In describing the processes of the origin of Western redemptive religiosity, it will become evident that the powerful tendencies emanating from the East, which had reached their culmination point in Buddhism, continued themselves in St. John, St. Paul, and St. Augustine. Their spirit uprooted and destroyed the civilization of classical antiquity and forced upon occidental humanity a new mentality. Paulinic Christianity is a new mentality rather than a new religion."

Tracing the history of the spread of Hindu philosophical ideas into the West, Mr. Melamed suggests that the speculative and scientific ideas associated with the name of Pythagoras were already current in India as early as 600 B.C. He draws attention to the analogies that exist between the Sānkhya and Pythagorean systems. Further, the Pythagorean doctrine of metempsychosis is allied to the Hindu tenet of the transmigration of the soul. Even the so-called Pythagorean theorem of the irrational number had been developed long before him in the *Sulva Sūtras* in India. "The very character of the Pythagorean organization, the religious fraternity," he says, "was Hindu and not Greek in origin. Whether he acquired his Hindu wisdom in India or in Persia, there can be no doubt that he represents an Eastern tendency in Western thought."[1140] Not only Pythagoras but also Empedocles, Xenophanes and Parmenides represent, according to him, Hindu wisdom in the West. He alludes to the striking similarity in the views of the Xenophanes and the *Upanishads*. Xenophanes, the founder of the Eleatic School of Grecian

[1140] Melamed, *loc. cit.*, 304-305, quoting Sir William Jones and Leopold von Schroeder. See the latter's Essay: *Pythagoras und die India* (1894).

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philosophy, was born in Asia Minor and was evidently influenced by Indian thought. He was the first to enunciate in the West the doctrine "all is one" but without specifying whether this unity was intellectual or moral, though Aristotle says he called God the one. Parmenides and Zeno were leading adherents and advocates of this school of thought, all three belonging to Elia from which fact the School takes its name. Parmenides flourished about the 5th century B.C. He seeks to demonstrate the existence of an Absolute which is unthinkable because it is without limits, and which he identifies with thought, as the one in the many. Zeno, a contemporary of Parmenides, completed this school of philosophy. The Eleatic School had thus for its ground-principle the affirmation of the unity, negativing the diversity, of being—in other words, the affirmation of pure being as alone real to the exclusion of everything finite and merely phenomenal. These doctrines of the Eleatics sound like echoes of the *Upanishads* and the systems of Vēdāntic thought built upon them.[1141] Empedocles (440 B.C.), who conceived the universe as made up of "four eternal, self-subsistent, mutually underivative, but divisible, primal material bodies, mingled and moulded by two moving forces, the uniting one of friendship and the disuniting one of strife," has also been held by Garbe to have derived his doctrine from Hindu sources. Likewise, Heraclitus' (480 B.C.) theory of the eternal change has been held to correspond to the doctrine of the Sānkhya philosophy. His theory that everything throughout the universe is in constant flux and nothing permanent, but in transition from being to nothing and from nothing to being, from life to death and death to life, that nothing is, that everything becomes, that the truth of being is becoming, that no one, nothing is exempt from this law, the law symbolised by the fable of the Phœnix in the fire corresponds, according to many scholars, to a similar theory of the

[1141] Melamed, *loc. cit.*, 304-305, quoting Garbe's *Philosophy of India* (1897). See also Albert Schwegler's *History of Philosophy*, translated by H. Stirling.

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Sānkhya philosophy. Heraclitus' theory of the many annihilations and reformations of the universe, in Colebrook's opinion, is analogous to a similar one found in the Sānkhya system. There are many elements in Plato's philosophy which are, says Melamed, of Hindu origin, he basing them through Pythagoras. Summing up, Mr. Melamed writes that "a thorough examination of the century-old controversy about Hindu-Greek relationships justifies the assumption that both branches of the Āryan race were in touch with each other. The analogies and parallels in the philosophical thought of both cultures are so striking that they cannot be explained by logical continuity alone." "Ancient India," he adds, "was never hermetically sealed to the outer world. From times immemorial, it was reached by traders from Western and Central Asia. A country with a rich culture like India, which was constantly visited by traders from many countries, was bound to colour the historical process of other countries which were in contact with the West. The cultural stream moved westward from India, and not eastward from Greece, for the eastern Āryan matured intellectually before his Western cousin. Alexander's attraction to the East was stimulated, not by a sudden vision of the Orient, but by older Greek tradition."

In the Post-Buddhistic era, the relationship even grew stronger, Indian kings sending ambassadors to the courts of foreign kings. This is well exemplified in the case of King Aśoka, whose Edicts testify to the fact that he not only kept up friendly relations with neighbouring kings in India but also sent missions to Antioches of Syria (B.C. 261-246), Ptolemy II of Egypt (B.C. 285-247), Magas of Cyrene in North Africa (died 258 B.C.), Antigonas of Macedonia (B.C. 277-239) and the King of Epiros. The desire for closer contact brought from Seleucus the well-known Megasthenes as ambassador to Aśoka's court and Ptolemy sent Dionysius to India. A continuous stream of intercourse was thus set up between India and the West by way of the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus and Armenia. There was also the sea-route through Ceylon. Buddhism

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thus profoundly affected the religious thought of countries like Syria, Egypt and even further westwards. This movement—of traders, emissaries, ambassadors and missionaries—carried not isolated Hindu ideas but, says Mr. Melamed, "the framework of a definite system of culture, namely, Buddhism". Aśoka's inscriptions show "a highly organized, legalized and missionarized" Buddhism spreading about the third century B.C. in and beyond the land of its birth. From one of these, we learn that the Buddhistic trinity—Buddha, Dharma and Sangha, identified with God-father, God-son or Logos, and the Holy Spirit—had already been carried by Buddhist priests to all parts of the Western World. In the second century B.C., many cultural centres in Asia Minor were permeated by Buddhism. Mr. Melamed suggests that evidence of this is afforded by a passage of Alexander Polyhistor, preserved by Cyril of Alexandria, in which Buddhists are referred to as *Samanos*, which is a corrupt form of *śramaṇa*, a name which was given to Buddha, and then to all Buddhist priests.[1142] Rome and Alexandria became the goal of Hindu missionaries and propagandists. The statement of Aśoka in his Edicts that the kings of Syria and Macedonia were followers of the Buddhist law confirms such a suggestion. Literary works composed in the West on India have been lost, as for instance, that of Seneca. The fragments which have come down testify to the influence of Hindu thought in Europe. Clemens of Alexandria, one of the Greek Fathers of the Church (second and third centuries A.D.), who had Origen for

[1142] Sanskrit *śramaṇaḥ*, meaning an ascetic, a devotee, a religious mendicant in general; more especially a Buddhist ascetic. A female devotee is termed *śramaṇi*. Evidently so called from their *dress*, which consisted of robes coloured in a pigment derived from the Bengal madder plant known as *śramaṇa*. It is the climbing perennial plant, *Rubia tinctorum*, the root of which furnishes valuable dyes and pigments. *Shamanism*, the religion professed by the Turanian races of Siberia, derives its name from *Shaman*, the name given to the Siberian priest-magician. It has been suggested that all Siberia had early come under the influence of Buddhism, its priests, called *śramans*, giving their name to the *Shamans* of later days.

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his pupil, mentions Buddha by name. Brought up in Greek philosophy, he was converted to Christianity from finding in his appreciation of knowledge over faith confirmation of it in his philosophy, to which he still adhered. He was evidently a product of his age, which was thoroughly under the influence of Gnosticism. "Buddhism," says Mr. Melamed, "stormed into the Western world at a time when the creative genius of the ancient Greeks had already spent itself. Its commingling with a decadent Greek culture resulted in a new spiritual orientation, which found its expression in Neo-Platonism, Neo-Pythagoreanism, and Gnosticism. A similar metamorphosis took place in Palestine, when it, in its turn, was overwhelmed by Buddhistic influences. Essenism, Mandaism, Ebionitism, Nazareanism were the Palestinian products of the encounter between Hebraism and Buddhism. These sects are the connecting link between Buddhism and Christianity."

The Essenes above referred to, though they grew upon the soil of Judea and had establishments in it, were not of it. Similarly though they accepted the Old Testament, they repudiated it in effect. The descriptions we have of them from Philo and Josephus stamp them "definitely as a Buddhistic sect". "To consider them to be a Jewish sect," says Mr. Melamed, "is to misunderstand completely the entire historical process." Their original name was *Ashi*, which in Chaldean means *Bathers* or *Baptists*. Their very name shows that religiously they had deviated from the traditions of their race, which, by the way, did not recognize baptism as a religious act. They differed from the Pharisees in that they led an ascetic life, practised the most ceremonial cleanness and developed a monastic spirit unknown to the Jewish faith. All the characteristics of Buddhistic life, says Mr. Melamed, such as celibacy, communism, puritanism, passivity, contempt for sensuous pleasures, the refusal to take an oath, and the like testify to their non-Jewish character. Like all Buddhistic religious groups, he adds, they were organized as an order, and as a closed fraternity. Like all Buddhistic

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groups, again, they too turned away from life. Their conception of immortality of the soul, too, establishes their philosophical dependence on Buddhism. "The soul is neither mortal nor immortal." This view, says Mr. Melamed, represents a mystical type of consciousness that was utterly strange to the logical Greek or to the rationalistic Hebrew. Only the mystic can affirm and deny in the same breath. Only the mystic can accept monotheism and trinity at the same time. Arguing from the opposite direction, even Schürer, the great Biblical scholar and author of the *History of the Jewish People*, is forced to admit that "Essenism is first and mainly of Jewish formation, and in its non-Jewish features it had most affinity with the Pythagorean tendency of the Greeks". And the whole tendency of the Pythagoreans, in a practical aspect, was ascetic and aimed only at rigid castigation of the moral principle in order thereby to ensure the emancipation of the soul from its mortal prison-house and its transmigration into a nobler form. It is with the doctrine of the transmigration of souls that the Pythagorean philosophy is specially associated, and this doctrine finds a place of fundamental importance in the *Upanishads* and Buddhism.

Like the Essenes, there were other sects who practised asceticism in the spirit of Buddhism. Among these were the Mandeans, a group of whom who work to-day as skilled artisans has survived in the Persian province of Khuzistan and in Basra on the Euphrates. In their principal sacred work they have developed a metaphysical principle, which is, says Mr. Melamed, "reminiscent of the Ātman-Brahman theory of ancient India". Their cosmic principle, the All, is bounded only by itself and all things emanate from it. It is, adds Mr. Melamed, the golden egg of the Brahminic cosmogony, and corresponds to the Hindu Ātman. In the Mandean metaphysics, there is already fully developed the principle of the trinity. It is not surprising, therefore, that Reitzenstien, a great authority on Comparative Religion, should remark that "the doctrines of the Mandeans bear no

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resemblance to those of Judaism ".[1143] Ado, the founder of the sect, is described as a wandering mendicant and in all probability a Buddhistic monk. This sect accepted St. John the Baptist and by doing so made it possible for Christianity to arise. But the stress laid by them on knowledge, from which they derive their name (*Manda* meaning *gnosis*, knowledge), allies them at the other end with the Gnostics, their religion being, apart from Babylonian, Jewish and Persian elements, a mixture of Buddhistic and Gnostic practices and beliefs. There is much to be said for the view of Reinach that "it is not impossible that John the Baptist may have belonged to a primitive sect of Mandeans; if at this early period they already called themselves Nazarenes, we should have an explanation of the tradition which made Nazareth the birthplace of the Messiah, who was himself called a Nazarene.[1144] Mandeism was Buddhism in one sense and Gnosticism in another; Gnosticism and Neo-Platonism were, like Pythagoreanism, largely made up of Buddhistic elements and they, in their turn, influenced very considerably the spiritual life of Alexandria. Lassen maintains that Gnostic Cosmogony is purely Buddhistic in character. And as pointed out by Mr. Melamed, "there are many analogies and parallels between Gnosticism and Buddhism, chief among which are the identification of soul and light and the contrast of soul and matter." Similarly he suggests that the Logos idea, which has shaped Christianity so much, is largely Buddhistic in origin. Philo of Alexandria who developed this theory was, in Mr. Melamed's view, directly susceptible to Buddhistic influences. Alexandria, in those days, "seethed," he says, with Buddhistic missionaries, who not only spread the gospel of Buddha, but also propagated the philosophical teachings of their race. Philo's doctrine of the Logos was coloured by these currents, which originated in the *Rig-Vēda*, in the conception of *vach* (*vākh*) or voice or the word. His idea

[1143] *Das Iravische erlosung mysterium* (1921).

[1144] S. Reinach, *Orpheus* (1910).

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of God has nothing in common with the Old Testament, since it is nothing else than the Upanishadic Brahman or Ātman idea in Hellenistic garb. His is, like the Brahman of the *Upanishads*, a static god. But to him, a Jew and one imbued with Greek culture, the idea of such a god controlling the living world was difficult of reconciliation. He, therefore, evolved the theory of the Logos, which served the purposes of "an intermediary between a static god and a dynamic world". It is the world's representative to God and God's representative to the world—in the former capacity to lay the world's prayers before God and in the latter to administer the world for God. Logos is, as Mr. Melamed puts it, the son of God and the first-born. Man himself is a divine being only to the extent that he participates in Logos. As God's son, Logos is the second God. He is uncreated in the earthly sense, but is an emanation of God. This doctrine of the Logos evolved by Philo Judæus is to-day held to be unconnected with the Logos idea of Heraclitus but directly traceable to the *Upanishads*.[1145] Many other Buddhistic ideas are to be found in Philo which shows how fully in the first century A.D., Alexandria was subject to Buddhistic influence. The idea of a static god, the conception of a mediator between God and the world, the vision of a God remote from reality and such other ideas were strange to the Hebrew mind. It is, therefore, as Mr. Melamed suggests, a misreading of history which has caused countless theologians and historians to regard Philo "as the connecting link between Hebraism and Christianity". As a matter of fact, "he is the most direct link between Hinduism and Christianity. His Logos-idea and his

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[1145] Mr. Melamed points out that Oswald Spengler and numerous other scholars have urged that the Alexandrian doctrine cannot be traced to the Heraclitan theory. He also suggests that Philo was not inspired by the Stoics in this connection. "While the Stoics' Logos meant," he remarks, "destiny or pneuma, an all-penetrating moral and rational force, but not a metaphysical principle, Philo's Logos is a cosmic, metaphysical entity resembling the attribute of thinking of Spinoza's Substance."

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conception of salvation and its attainment by self-denial point to ancient India."

Thus Buddhism had permeated into Palestine and had affected Hebraic thought. The political ferment created by Roman rule, the economic pressure induced by foreign occupation, the Hellenising process from within, the religious tension induced by these causes, the influence of the ideas put forth by the different new sects which came into being as the result of the impact produced by Buddhistic doctrines, and the growing contempt for life imbibed by the people as a consequence of the alien domination of the country combined to create a situation in Palestine, about the time that Jesus was born, which could not but affect and colour his views and doctrines. The people too expected at the time a political Messiah—one consecrated by God who would emancipate his chosen people from bondage and exalt them in the eyes of all the other nations of the earth as His Elect Nation, and for the glory of His name. In this state of expectancy, when all eyes were turned heavenward, there appeared John the Baptist. He spoke of the world to come. He personified the tendencies of the time. He broke through the Jewish tradition. In religion he was a Mandaic. It was his call which aroused Jesus. Like John the Baptist, he too was enveloped in the apocalyptic spirit. He too pictured only the world to come, not the world that is. As Mr. Melamed well puts it, "he hoped that the Redeemer would soon come and cause the world to expiate for its sins. When he was completely absorbed by the certainty of the coming of the Redeemer, it flashed upon him that He, Himself, was the Redeemer. At first, he barely dared to admit it to himself; later he slowly revealed it to his friends, who spread his message over the entire countryside: 'The Redeemer is coming.' While those who were close to him believed in his mission, He Himself was still tortured by doubts, and the possibility that He was in error robbed Him of his peace of mind." That was but natural for, living in an apocalyptic world, he could not rid himself of visions of terror and despair, of hope and

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salvation, which at times overtook him. He truly described himself when he said, " I am not of this world ". Nothing on this earth and nothing that grew out of it attracted Him. His one message to humanity was the Kingdom of God, which had but little in common with the hereafter of the Rabbis. According to Jesus, Mr. Melamed writes, " not this world, not this life with its many turns of the wheel of fate, with its tragedies and comedies, but the Kingdom of God is the goal of man. Not ceremonials, rituals, or prayers, but faith in God, is man's purpose, care and aim. Since this world is not man's final goal, everything in it is valueless and meaningless. This new doctrine by its affirmation of God denies life, man, and the world. Since man cannot serve two masters, God and mammon, it is necessary that he dispose of his earthly goods to the poor in order that he may gather celestial rewards. To serve God it is necessary to free one's self from all ties of earthly life, to forego human relations, loves and friendships, rights and privileges, to suppress all natural urges, to endure injustice and disgrace, to offer no resistance to the enemy but to love and to bless him for the sake of Christ." It was with this doctrine of self-denial and negation of life and the world that Jesus broke with the traditions of His people. Like the Essenes He was entirely unconcerned with earthly life and its future. His aspirations were purely religious and it is questionable whether He even hoped to become a religious reformer. He and His Kingdom were not of this World. Not man's welfare but the saving of man's soul was His main concern. This attitude of Jesus was fundamentally opposed to ancient Hebraism, which affirmed life, the world and men. By discarding the world, Jesus renounced Judaism. In suggesting that He was the mediator between man and God, He put His people against Himself, for it is a primary article of faith with Judaism that God faces all humanity and does not require an intermediary. As Mr. Melamed puts it, "although Jesus was of Jewish blood, His mind was not hewn from pure Jewish rock, for His main doctrines originated not in the valley of the Jordan but along the banks of the Ganges."

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Mr. Melamed argues that Jesus though a Jew by race was not a Jew in spirit; that he is not to be linked to the prophets of Israel but to be described as the Buddha of the West; and that there are similarities, analogies and parallels between the Buddhist and Christian gospels which indicate Buddhism as the source of the religion of Jesus.[1146] Answering the objection that these similarities and analogies are but mere "chance coincidences", Mr. Melamed says that "yet the fact remains that Buddhist canons were already known to the Western world before the coming of Jesus", in fact, long before the death of Clemens of Alexandria, who mentions Buddha by name in 220 B.C. "Today hardly any Indologist of note denies," he adds, "an organic connection between the two redemptive religions (the religions of Buddha and Jesus). So close is the connection between them that even the details of the miracles recorded by Buddhism and Christianity are the same. Of Buddha, too, it was told that he fed five hundred men with one loaf of bread, that he cured lepers, and caused the blind to see." In the light of these facts, it would be preposterous to assume, he remarks, that the poets of the *New Testament* originated their own folklore. Long anterior to the birth of Jesus, Buddhistic doctrines had made heavy inroads in the Western world. Innumerable sects preaching some form of Buddhism, made their appearance in the century preceding the coming of Jesus. Mr. Melamed, accordingly, supports the view of Seydel that "it is not permissible to admit an independent origin of the

[1146] He quotes Rudolph Seydel's *Das Evangelium von Jesus—in seinen verhaltuissen zu Buddha—sage und Buddhalehre*, in which that great German historian of religion has demonstrated clearly that all the tales, miracles, similes and proverbs of the Christian gospels have their counterparts in the Buddhistic gospels. He also cites Edmund's *Buddhistic and Christian Gospels compared* (1907) in which it is shown how the tales about Jesus in the *New Testament* have their exact parallels in Buddha's life and career and how in many respects the two gospels are so similar even in their expression as to become almost indistinguishable. See Melamed, *loc. cit.*, 321, 325.

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parables, legends, similes, and proverbs of Christianity and Buddhism. Inasmuch as Buddhism precedes Christianity by some five hundred years, one cannot escape the assumption that the newer religion was inspired by the older. The principal canon of Buddhism, called the Pali Canon, was fixed eighty years before Christ. No Christian scholar of note has asserted that the Synoptic Gospels influenced Buddhism, but numerous scholars long ago discovered Buddhistic elements in the Gospel of John and also recognized the Buddhistic background of Essenism, by which Jesus was greatly influenced. The conclusion is inescapable that Palestine, together with many other parts of Asia Minor, was inundated by Buddhistic propaganda for two centuries before Christ. The world in which Jesus lived was Buddhistic territory in the spiritual meaning of the term, and not Hebraic or Judaic. Hence Christianity, including the personality of its founder, is not an offshoot of religiosity but of Buddhistic theology. Only this phenomenon explains the gigantic struggles within the young Christian Church, and the various schismatic tendencies, sects, and controversies in the first five hundred years of its existence." Jesus thus was, like Buddha, not of this world and his religion was, like Buddhism, not concerned with the world. No wonder it was not legalistic like Judaism but redemptive like Buddhism. When Jesus died, he scarcely had a following in the land of his birth; yet within half a century, his religion spread westward and shook the very foundations of the Roman Empire! How did this happen? This was the work of Paul, the great Apostle, who, as Mr. Melamed says, "used the figure of Jesus to impose upon Western humanity an Eastern world-picture".

Saul belonged to Tarsus, an international city, the capital of south-western Asia Minor. It was the meeting-place of the East and the West and the scene, in those days, of Buddhistic propaganda. The Jewish community in it was a small one and was not famous for its learning. If Paul, accordingly, lacked education, he made up by his

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metropolitan outlook. Belonging to a Provincial City and proud of his Roman Citizenship, he was attracted to Rome and to the West. Renouncing a worldly life and adopting the missionary rôle, for which Nature had fitted him admirably, he devoted himself to the task of transforming the apocalyptic religion that Jesus had taught on the Galilean coast into the world religion called Christianity. For, be it remembered, Paul's one goal and object was not even the Kingdom of God that Jesus had preached, but Jesus Christ as he conceived him. He made himself the Prophet of Jesus Christ, the Redeemer. It was thus he presented himself to Western humanity. It was entirely due to his activities that "Christianity, an Eastern religion, made such rapid headway in the Occident rather than in the Orient". This success of Paul was partly due "to the fact that he carried westward not the Eastern Jesus, but the Western Christ, the Logos which was known in some form to the entire Western world of that time. He christianized the Western world by westernizing Christianity. His main doctrine is the doctrine of salvation, which has as its goal redemption from this world. Man in this life is under the rule of the flesh, of sin, of the law, and of death. These are powers which represent frightfully mysterious forces, and which reign whimsically and despotically. Christ redeemed man from all these dark forces." But "Christ is not Jesus of Nazareth, the humble carpenter's son, but is a heavenly being who pre-existed in God. He became man only to redeem the world and His work of salvation began upon becoming man. The redemption of the world was accomplished through His death and rise from His grave, for He thus freed Himself from the serfdom of this world. By the fall of Adam this world became filled with unredeemable sin, and the human race would have been doomed if not for the death and rise of Christ." Such was the doctrine relating to the person of Christ propounded by Paul. "A highly subjective conception of the deed of Jesus was interpreted by St. Paul as an objective occurrence, which has nothing to do with personal

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experiences and inner processes. He who accepts these doctrines obediently is *ipso facto* redeemed."[1147] The mass inculcation of this belief became the main vocation of Paul's life. It moved him, as Mr. Melamed remarks, "to accomplish immortal feats, and it gave him the strength and power of a conqueror." But it also brought to an end his connection with the Jewish faith. He saw that if the acceptance of the Jewish law was to be a condition precedent to joining the Church, the doctrine of Christ would be professed but by a few. He accordingly permitted the Gentiles to join the Church untrammelled by any

[1147] Perhaps Christianity, according to the Pauline conception, has never been defined with greater brevity and precision than it is by Ruskin in his *Prætirita*. "The total meaning of it," he says, "was and is, that the God who made earth and its creatures, took at a certain time upon the earth, the flesh and form of man; in that flesh sustained the pain and died the death of the creature he had made; rose again after death into glorious human life, and when the date of the human race is ended, will return in visible human form, and render to every man according to his work. *Christianity is the belief in, and love of, God thus manifested.* Anything *less* than this, the mere acceptance of the sayings of Christ, or assertion of any less than divine power in His Being, may be, for aught I know, enough for virtue, peace and safety; but they do not make people Christians, or enable them to understand the heart of the simplest believer in the old doctrine." The belief is fundamental that there is in Christ, as in no other, from first to last, a living incarnation, a flesh and blood embodiment, for salvation, of the ever-living spirit of the ever-living God and Father of man, and except by eating His flesh and drinking His blood, that is, except by participating in his divine-human life, or except in His Spirit, there is no assurance of life everlasting to any man. The religion of Jesus was simple. In order to adapt it to the Western world of his time—dominated by the Græco-Roman civilization prevalent then—Paul elaborated and to some extent transformed it. A community of disciples became a Church. The divine aspect of Christ was emphasized. Jesus became a Redeemer sent from heaven to deliver mankind from sin and death, and His death a vicarious sacrifice of atonement. The sacred acts of Christianity —such as Baptism and the Lord's Supper—began to receive a sacramental importance. Paul and John saw mysticism in the Gospel and developed along these lines.

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conditions. He urged that the law and the ceremonial was an obstacle to the acquisition of holiness and virtue. The law did not lead, he put forth, to virtue and salvation, but bred sin. Man tends towards sin for the flesh is weak and the law cannot hinder him. Accordingly "to annihilate sin and death, God handed over the Messiah, His son, to the forces of death, only to bring Him to life again. He became the second Adam who wiped out original sin, overcame death, and restored eternal life. Thus, Jesus Christ means the end of the law, and he who believes in Him is already righteous and has a share in His life which is free from sin and temptation. The Jewish Messiah was supposed to redeem the nations from the yoke of oppression, but Jesus Christ redeemed them from sin." St. Paul thus put Christianity as the antithesis of Judaism. The latter rests on law; the former, on freedom and grace. The law, according to him, is void, while Christ is supreme. Thus was Judaism rendered ineffectual as a religion by St. Paul in the West. St. Paul was, remarks Mr. Melamed, "justified" in rejecting Judaism entirely. He urges that St. Paul's doctrine "consists of a diluted Buddhism". That is, that it represents a form—an attenuated form—of Buddhism current in the land where Paul was born and brought up. "Both Buddha and St. Paul," he says, "were confronted with the same problems—the worthlessness of life, its sinfulness, its futility, and its evil; both had a negative attitude to it; both had the same starting-point—original sin. Both sought to attain holiness and eternal happiness—by overcoming life, by rejecting it, by estranging one's self from it, and not by participating in its joys and pleasures. Both had the same eschatology. Buddha's central goal was Nirvāṇa and St. Paul's was Christ, which is more tangible because St. Paul was not an Easterner, but a Westerner, both by education and experience. The God of St. Paul is as unsubstantial and lifeless as was Buddha's Brahma. Like Buddha, St. Paul too, tries to escape both from life and from death. He was not satisfied with the thought that Jesus purified life,

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but was very happy that he freed man from death. This paralysing fear of death is one of the outstanding features of redemptive religiosity. Death is terrifying and must be overcome." Then, again, "Buddha and St. Paul both used many terms to describe man's sinful disposition. Both identified flesh with sin and taught that the age of fulfilment is the age when the flesh will be overcome. St. Paul's term of spirit is as ambiguous as Buddha's term of soul. Their doctrines are not of and for this world." Both denied man. Finally, "Buddha described Nirvāṇa as the union of the soul with Brahma, and St. Paul described Christ as a being in whom God and man are joined. Buddha speaks of man's innumerable existences; St. Paul speaks of Christ as having pre-existed in God. To Buddha the first-born was 'Logos' (*Vākh*); to St. Paul it was Christ." The spiritual relationship—rather descent—of St. Paul thus becomes easily descernible.

St. Paul's Christology, says Mr. Melamed, is Philo's Logos. Though many modern theologians do not favour this view, there is much force in the contention of Mr. Melamed that St. Paul's theology is not traceable to any other Jewish source. If Philo Platonized, St. Paul Philonized. "St. Paul's theology," adds Mr. Melamed, "is anti-Hebraic and anti-Rabbinic in character. Not only his Christology but also his entire world-picture is strange to the Jewish mind. His Christ is not the Hebrew Messiah, his redemption is not the Hebraic Geulah, and his doctrine of the two Adams has no foundation in Judaism. These concepts are to be traced to the Book of Wisdom or to Philo." If Philo's Logos is only a Greek edition of the Hindu *Vākh*, St. Paul's Kingdom of God is only a Western copy of the Buddhistic Nirvāṇa. "It has no analogy," writes Mr. Melamed, "in the Rabbinic doctrine of Oolom Habo, for it is not spatial in character. It is only a state of mind—the union of man with Christ. All the main features of the Hinduistic world-picture such as universalism, determinism, pessimism, salvationism, and nihilism, as well as a deep-rooted contempt for everything

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earthly, reverberates in the theology of St. Paul. He was the first typical Eastern mystic in the Western world."

St. Paul detached early Christianity from its Jewish origin and linked it to ancient Greek culture. The Gnostics, who immediately followed him, not only Hellenized Christianity but were also hostile to Old Testament beliefs. As Harnack has put it, they tried to capture Christianity for Hellenic culture and Hellenic culture for Christianity, giving up the Old Testament in order, with the aid of Hellenism, to assert the absoluteness of Christianity. The Hellenism they stood for was not the Hellenism of the Græcized Middle East but the culture of Ancient Greece, which was predominantly Hellenic, "tinged with Hinduistic motives". Both St. Paul and the Gnostics were true Hellenists. Both were concerned more with Eastern mysteries than with theological dogmas; both moved westward, though driven by Eastern forces; and their Hellenization of Christianity was more formal than substantial. As Mr. Melamed remarks, "it is difficult to understand how a theological master like Harnack, in enumerating the various Gnostic schools of thought and their motives, could overlook their Hinduistic background." Thus, the ascetic element in Gnosticism has to be set down as a Hindu contribution. The stress laid on impersonal Christ, in preference to the historical Jesus, has to be attributed to the influence of the idea of a historyless Brahman so well known to Hinduism. But after St. Paul, Christianity branched off in two opposite directions, the one beginning with Marcion and leading to Manichæism and the other beginning with Arius and leading to the Reformation. Marcion, who adopted St. Paul's interpretation and stuck fast to his Christ idea, made ascetic life the essence of Christianity.[1148] Not only that; he and his followers, called

[1148] To Marcion, the Old Testament was the Bible of the Jewish God, the creator of evil, while the New Testament became the Bible of the God of the Redeemer. "Marcion was the real creator of the Christian scripture, which was entirely detached from the Hebrew spirit and background. It is a purely Oriental creation, teeming

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Marcionites, who viewed life through the prism of Hinduism, not only rejected the Old Testament but also taught that its God was only a demiurge—a mere creator of the world of sense like Brahma of the Hindu Trinity—and that Christianity represents the separation of the Supreme God—Christ analogous to Brahman of the Vēdānta—from the God of the Old Testament, a highly individualistic being, who has nothing in common with the God of Christianity.[1149] Marcion may be taken as representative of Roman Gnosticism, as Saturnius of Antioch could be of the Syrian. But many sects grew up on the Syrian soil. From there, it spread to Alexandria, where it became associated with Basilides, Valentinus and Carpocrates, who all belonged to the second century A.D. An examination of the chief tenets of these representative leaders shows the exact relationship of Gnosticism to Hindu thought. Basilides recognized one Supreme Being or First Cause. From it sprang, he taught, Understanding (*Nous*), from Understanding—the Word (or *Logos*), from the Word—Providence,

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with Oriental (*i.e.*, Buddhistic) myths, which it stresses in preference to dogma. Both his metaphysics and his ethics betray his Hinduistic and Parseeistic (*i.e.*, Zoroastrian) leaning."—S. M. Melamed in *Spinoza and Buddha*, 337. Mr. Melamed treats as a settled question that Buddhism influenced Christianity and devotes an Appendix to quotations taken from J. Edmund's *Buddhistic and Christian Gospels, being Gospel Parallels from Pali Texts* (Philadelphia, 1908). See Melamed, *loc. cit.*, 376-381.

[1149] Of the Jews, it has been observed that "their religion was determined by a moral standard; through them more than through any other race has the moral principle, or the law of conscience, been evolved in humanity as the sovereign law of life and this at length resolved itself into a faith in one God, the sole ruler in heaven and on earth, the law of whose government is truth and righteousness; only they stopped short with the assertion of this divine unity, and in their hard monotheism stubbornly refused, as they do still, to accept the doctrine of the trinity in unity which, spiritually understood is, as it has been well defined, the central principle of the Christian faith, the principle that to have a *living* morality, one must have a faith in a Divine Father, a Divine Son and a Divine Spirit, all three equally Divine."

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from Providence—Power, from Power—Wisdom, from Wisdom—Righteousness, from Righteousness—Peace. From these, again, sprang the higher angels, principalities and powers; and from these the lower angels. The God of the Jews was only one of those angels of the lowest kind who created the world. Christ, the Son (*Nous*) of the Supreme Being was sent down to bring to man, who had become corrupt, heavenly knowledge. He joined himself to the man Jesus, and it was this man, not the Christ, who was crucified. As Basilides regarded matter as evil, he did not believe in the resurrection of the body. But he taught the doctrine of the transmigration of souls. Saints and martyrs, he said, suffered because they had sinned in a previous state of existence. Every one, he held, had to atone for his sins in this way, by living again in a different body. The philosophy or rather theology of Valentinus is full of symbolism. He regarded pre-Christian religions as preparatory to Christianity and Christ as the full and final development in human form of a series of fifteen stages of emanation from the infinite divine—the original, invisible, ineffable and self-existent Existence—to the finite divine in Him "the fulness of Him that filleth all in all," each stage in the process being achieved by the union of a male element with a female, that is, a conceptive and a susceptive. Like Basilides, he stresses more the Christ rather than the Jesus aspect and makes creation the work of Demiurgos, made out of psychic animate substance. Demiurgos creates mankind, material and psychic. Some of these catch a spark of the spiritual substance, and become superior or spiritual men. The spiritual men do not need to be saved; the material men cannot be saved. The psychic men can be saved, if they are helped. "The scheme of redemption," as Duchesne puts it,[1150] "is intended for them. The Redeemer is formed of four elements. The first, without being actually material, has the semblance of matter; the semblance is sufficient, as matter does not

[1150] L. Duchesne, *Early History of the Christian Church* (1909).

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need salvation. The second element is psychic; the third pneumatic; the fourth divine: this is Jesus, the last æon. These three last elements then proceed respectively from the Demiurge, Haehamoth, and from the Pleroma. The æon Jesus did not, however, descend into the Redeemer until the moment of his baptism; at the moment of his being brought before Pilate, he returned to the Pleroma, taking with him the pneumatic or spiritual element, and leaving the psychic element, clothed with his material semblance, to suffer." Finally Haehamoth and the spiritual men will pass into the Pleroma. The Demiurgos and the best of the psychic men will follow. The points to note are that the theory of emanations is the pivotal factor in Valentinus' theory; the place assigned to the original, ineffable, self-existent Existence, is analogous to that assigned to Parabrahman in the Vēdānta; the work of creation assigned to the Demiurgos, is analogous to that assigned to Brahma in the Hindu Trinity; and the differentiation made between Christ and Jesus. Carpocrates also believed in one God, from whom, according to him, emanated a whole hierarchy of angels. The visible world is their work. The souls of men first moved around the Father-God; then they fell into the power of matter, from which they have to be released to go back to their original state. Jesus, the son of Joseph, naturally born like other men, and subject as they are to transmigration, was able by a remembrance of what he was in his first existence, and by power sent from above, to obtain dominion over the rulers of the world, and to re-ascend to the Father. It is in the powers of all men, by following his example, and by the method he used, to despise the creators of this world and to escape from them. They can achieve this equally, or even better, than he did. This scheme of deliverance is consistent with all conditions of life, and with every kind of act.[1151] Carpocrates not only believed in the transmigration of the soul but also in its final emancipation from all external

[1151] L. Duchesne, *loc. cit.*

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bonds and obligations by means of concentrated meditation on the divine unity, and a life in conformity therewith. He was as much a Platonist as a Gnostic and his followers paid reverence not only to images of Jesus Christ, but also to those of Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle and other sages. Amid the diversity of these different Gnostic systems certain common and fundamental conceptions can be easily perceived. Among these are: (1) God, the Creator and Lawgiver of the Old Testament, is not the true God. Above him, at an infinite distance, is the Father-God, the Supreme First Cause of all being. (2) The God of the Old Testament knew not the True God, and in this ignorance the world shared, until the appearance of Jesus Christ, who proceeded from the True God. (3) Between the True God and creation is interposed a series of beings, divine in their origin, there occurring a catastrophe, at some point or other in this series, which destroys the harmony of the whole. The visible world—often including its Creator—originates in this primal disorder. (4) In humanity there are some elements capable of redemption, having come in one way or another from the celestial world above the Demiurge. Jesus Christ came into the world to deliver them from it. (5) As the incarnation could not really amount to a true union between divinity and matter, the accursed, the Christian Gospel story is explained as a moral and transitory union between a divine æon and the concrete personality of Jesus, or again, by a simple semblance of humanity. (6) Neither the passion nor the resurrection of Christ is therefore real; the future of the predestinate does not permit of the resurrection of the body. (7) The divine element which has strayed into humanity, that is, the predestinated soul, has no solidarity with the flesh which oppresses it. Either the flesh must be annihilated by asceticism (rigorism), or at least the responsibility of the soul, for the weaknesses of the flesh must be denied (libertinism).[1152] This analysis of Gnosticism shows its parentage in broad outline. This philosophy had perforce

[1152] L. Duchesne, *loc. cit.*

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to be eclectic deriving as it did its root ideas from Hellenic and Hindu beliefs dominant in the place of its origin.[1153] Gnosticism possessed great vitality. Though persecuted in the Christian Church, it persisted by taking refuge underground. For a thousand years, writes Workman, we find it living a subterranean existence, ever and anon coming to the surface in some new form—usually stigmatised as "heresy" in the Christian Church—the roots of which lie deep in the older Gnosticism, or rather in the religions older even than Gnosticism to which Gnosticism was so largely indebted. In the third century, it appears in the formidable movement known as Manichæism, so called from Mani, the founder of the sect. Born at Ecbatana, about 215 A.D., Mani came of ancient Persian stock, but being brought into close contact with certain of the Gnostic sects—the Elkesaites and the Mandæans, the latter of whom regarded John the Baptist and not Jesus as

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[1153] H. B. Workman, in his *Christian Thought to the Reformation* (1911), describes Gnosticism as an eclectic philosophy of religion, chiefly Hellenic in character, though in union with many Oriental elements, cosmical speculations and mystic theosophy similar to what we find in Hinduism. This description errs in laying greater stress on the Hellenic rather than the predominantly Hindu elements which lie imbedded in Gnosticism. For instance, among the Gnostics, the formula, "I am thou, and thou art I," which finds expression in Bādarāyaṇa's text: *Ātmētitūpagachchanti grāhayanticha* (*Brahma-Sūtras*, IV. 1. 3.), itself being based on well-known Upanishadic texts, was common. It indicates that belief in the merging of the separate individuality in the Supreme Existence was a cardinal article of faith among the Gnostics. Lassen has remarked in his *Indian Antiquity* that "the Hindu elements in the Gnostic systems were derived from Buddhism and exercised a considerable influence upon the spiritual life in Alexandria." And this remark is the more noteworthy because Lassen stoutly denies that ancient India ever affected Hellenic thought. The Gnostics anticipated what the Neo-Platonists succeeded in achieving. Their main idea seems to have been to reconcile speculative and revealed religion by systematising the symbols of transcendental and mystic thought. They failed to digest what they borrowed from Oriental thought, largely dominated by Hindu philosophical and cosmological ideas.

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the true prophet—he was largely influenced by their tenets and doctrines. He regarded himself as the last and greatest of a series of prophets, including Adam, Noah, Abraham and the phantom Christ, and described himself as the "leader," "ambassador" and "Paraclete". His religion was one of physical redemption, and admits the worship of no personal redeemer. As may be imagined from its headquarters being in Babylon, its doctrines were in the main akin to the old Babylonian native religion, modified by Zoroastrian dualism which ascribes the created universe to two antagonistic principles, one essentially good, and the other essentially evil—with some admixture, especially in the West, of the Gnostic Christianity as developed by Basilides and Marcion. Partly owing to their minute and strict asceticism and their rigid morality, and partly also, as Harnack observes, to the great number of "the cultured who sought for a rational and yet, to some extent, Christian religion, and who had exalted free inquiry, especially as regards the Old Testament, into a battle-rag," Manichæism attained to a great position in Christian circles, especially in North Africa, and even claimed, for a time, Augustine among its votaries.[1154]

Thus the practical effect of the preaching of St. Paul and the Gnostics was to displace the Old Testament and to concentrate attention on the Christ idea rather than on the personality of Jesus. St. Paul declared the Old Testament was fulfilled and replaced by a new religious development. Marcion entirely eliminated the Old Testament as obsolete and made the New Testament the book of the Redeemer. Marcion became "the real creator of the Christian Scripture, which was entirely detached from the Hebrew spirit and background." "It is," says Mr. Melamed "a purely oriental creation, teeming with oriental myth, which it stresses in preference to dogma. Both his metaphysics and his ethics betray his Hinduistic and Parseeistic (*i.e.*, Zoroastrian) leanings. Jehovah, whom he identifies with evil, can be overcome only through the

[1154] See Workman, *loc. cit.*

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subjugation of the senses. This repression necessitates self-denial, asceticism and celibacy. His doctrine represents the ancient struggle between Oriental universalism and Occidental individualism." But Marcion did not completely free Christology from Hellenistic influences. St. Paul had, by Hellenizing Christianity, prevented its complete Orientalization. Mani still further orientalized Christianity and as we have seen threatened the very existence of Christianity by his dualism. St. Augustine, though he came under Mani's influence, later left him and asserted himself a devotee of the Church. His opposition to Pelagius (400–418 A.D.) shows him in the light of one who desired to make his own theology safe for the Church. A favourite principle with Pelagius was the declaration, "I ought, therefore, I can". He stood for a rational idea of God. In his view, Augustine's doctrine of total depravity and of the consequent bondage of the will, cut the nerve of all human effort. He insisted, accordingly, that man is able to do all that God commands. In keeping with this, he denied original sin, holding that since obligation implies ability, the power of choosing the good exists after the Fall precisely as before it. It is apparent that these positions rest upon a theory of freedom quite different from St. Augustine's. Augustine believed in freedom in the ordinary actions of life, but taught that in its highest form, as the power to keep God's law, freedom is a lost gift, which only grace can restore. By freedom Pelagius meant an equipoise of the will, which enables us at any time, whatever our previous history may have been, to choose between the evil and the good. The condemnation of Pelagius by the Council of Ephesus in 431 A.D. meant the acceptance by the Church of St. Augustine's doctrine of pre-destination, which later became a matter for hot dispute in the Christian Church.[1155]

[1155] See J. H. Blunt, *Dictionary of Sects* (1903); also the *Protestant Dictionary*. Semi-pelagianism, a modified form of Pelagianism, was a reaction against the Augustinian views of pre-destination and grace. This was also condemned in 529 A.D. See Blunt, *loc. cit.* and the *Protestant Dictionary*, and *Catholic Dictionary*.

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Philosophically, his doctrine is eclectic and a combination of Aristotelianism, Stoicism, and Neo-Platonism. "In its final form," says Mr. Melamed, "his God-idea is reminiscent of Plotinus, Philo and many of the Gnostics. It is the timeless, attributeless, intangible oneness, removed from all reality and is a dead deity. It is as bereft of will or intellect as Buddha's Brahma, Philo's Theos and Spinoza's *Deus*." It was this neo-Platonic God-doctrine, the Western echo of the Brahman doctrine, which crowded Manichæism out of St. Augustine's head and brought him close to the Christ idea of St. Paul. He must be ranked a neo-Platonic monist rather than a monotheist. He identified God with being *per se*. God is unknowable because He has no attributes and He is unknowable because we can know nothing about Him. Our knowledge of Him is purely negative. We only know that He is not identical with any of the phenomena of nature or mind. Since He is everywhere He is also in man's mind and hence it has some perception of Him. It can have a premonition of Him, although it cannot visualize Him. Our initiative knowledge of Him cannot be expressed in words. He cannot be even called the unspeakable, for in doing so, we already speak of Him. St. Augustine, following Plotinus, uses only negative formulæ to indicate God's ineffability. Though he speaks of the triune God, and as such makes Him appear tangible, he speaks of Him as inexpressible, indefinable and unknowable. Like the One of Plotinus, his God also transcends time. Time is the measure of corporeal motion and where there is no corporeal motion there is no time. In God, however, there is no-motion and so there can be no experience of time. God can, therefore, only know the present. He is pure being and for Him whatsoever is only is. How a dynamic world could be created by a static God, is not explained by St. Augustine. Holding, as he does, conflicting views drawn from Old Testament, Platonic and Stoic sources, he holds that the world has not always existed; that it was created out of nothing in a

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given moment; and that with its creation, motion and time began. The purpose of creation in the economy of a static God is, however, not indicated by him. While he denies intellectuality to God, he asserts that God created the world by an act of his own free will. While he does not explain God's relationship to this world—or its reality —he yet paints a detailed picture of creation. While he describes Him as bare being, he individualises Him suddenly and evolves the doctrine of the Trinity. As Mr. Melamed puts it, Augustine "attempted to synthesise the impossible—Biblical individualism and neo-Platonic universalism," derived, as above shown, from Hindu sources. The latter theory he owed to Plotinus, in whose doctrine of the three hypostases of the divine, a Trinity theory is clearly to be seen. St. Augustine gave form to what was vague in Plotinus. Though the founder of the Western, he developed an Eastern trend of thought. His denial of the reality of the world made him arrive at the very doctrine of self-denial and asceticism, which Buddha had preached long before him. Similarly, the development of the Logos doctrine—derived from the Neo-Platonists—marks the abandonment of the idea of the Old Testament individual God in favour of the Hindu idea of Parabrahman and all it connotes—an idea with which Plotinus and his successors were fully acquainted. This is what Mr. Melamed, in his eloquent language, describes as "the triumph of Eastern mysticism over Western rationalism". It must be added that Mr. Melamed invites pointed attention to the similarity in views between St. Augustine and Buddha. Thus St. Augustine's doctrine of self-denial and asceticism is reminiscent of Buddhism; he denied freewill like Buddha; he held that the conduct of man is the necessary fruit of either a good or a bad tree, against which Mr. Melamed quotes the doctrine of Buddha that man is the fruit of a tree; his static God is like that of Buddha; his doctrine of predestination is only an exaggerated form of Buddhistic determinism applied to religious life.[1156] The doctrine that God alone is reality made

[1156] Melamed, *loc. cit.*, 350.

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little of man. Man had to surrender himself to God, losing his own personality. Not only St. Augustine but mediæval philosophers generally held fast to this idea in some form. The goal of man thus became—a return to God. The idea of self-surrender led not only to the exalting of ascetic life —the renouncing of worldliness and concentration on Godliness—but to the development of the doctrine of grace, without which mere surrender was powerless. Both these ideas of self-surrender and grace were Hindu and they had become inextricably bound with the patristic and scholastic philosophy of a Mediæval Europe. Though the influence of the East upon the West had slackened, if not ceased, by the third century A.D., it had succeeded, as Mr. Melamed remarks, "in putting a set of ideas into circulation which were to overwhelm the Western minds for more than a thousand years". Among these ideas were the two which have been mentioned above. "Union with God or with Christ" is a reverberation of "the Buddhistic yearning for Nirvāṇa" which itself is an echo of the older Upanishadic doctrine of the union of the soul with Brahman. In its mystical fervour, the Western Church excelled the Eastern. The representatives of the Greek Church recognized in Christ the Trinitarian figure—but his place in the Godhead was still a matter for theological speculation or dispute. In the Roman Church, St. Augustine introduced the new doctrine of "living in Christ" as a personal matter. St. Paul had said, "Let the same mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus." St. Augustine pushed this mystical doctrine to its logical conclusion. "God became man," he says, "to be to us an example of humility, to show us God's love, and to help us to realize and to hold in our hearts that the self-abasement in which it pleased God to be born of a woman, to be scorned, rejected and put to death by man, is the best remedy for an inflated pride. He was crucified and now it depends upon thee to take his poverty upon thyself: far from thee He lived, but in poverty He comes nigh unto thee." To Augustine and the Western Church, Christianity thus was no longer a definitely defined religion,

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but transformed into a "mystical state of mind, expressing itself in the love for humiliation, scorn, suffering, and contempt for worldliness". Asceticism accordingly became a known institution and a means to an end, the way to salvation. St. Bernard, who is commonly represented in art as bearing the implements of Christ's passion and who is one of the grandest figures in the Church militant and founded a hundred and sixty monasteries, turned this negative mysticism into a positive one. He, indeed, awoke Europe to a second Crusade, dealt death-blows all round to no end of "heretics", and declined all honours to himself, content if he could only awake some divine passion in other men. He inculcated the doctrine that it is the duty of the Christian believer "to have a part in Christ by having a part in His sufferings". This theme of his became the primary motive of piety in the Christianity of the west of Europe for many centuries after him.[1157] One who follows the Redeemer in poverty, who is

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[1157] St. Bernard lived and laboured between 1091-1174 A.D. He was a Cistercian and founded a monastery in 1115 A.D. at Clairvaux, a village in France, situated on the Aube, where he lived and lies buried. He is for this reason often called St. Bernard of Clairvaux, to distinguish him from others of the same name. The Cistercian Order to which he belonged was founded by Abbot Robert in 1098 A.D. at Citeaux, near Dijou. This Order followed the rule of St. Benedict, who reformed the Order after it had lapsed. St. Benedict (480-543 A.D.) was the founder of western monachism. Born near Spoleto, in Central Italy, he left home at 14; passed three years as a hermit in a cavern near Subiaco to prepare himself for God's service; was appointed to an abbey, but left it; founded twelve monasteries of his own; composed the "Regula Monachorum", which formed the rule of his Order. The famous Order of monks called Benedictines was founded by him and followed his rule; its cradle was the celebrated monastery of Monte Casino, near Naples; as an institution it reckoned among its members a large body of eminent men who in their day rendered immense service to both literature and science, and were, in fact, the only learned class of the Middle Ages; they spent their time in diligently transcribing manuscripts and thus preserving for posterity the classic literature of Greece and Rome. St. Benedict's life shows the severely ascetic form that Christianity took, a form which is indicative of the

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tireless in deeds, penitence and asceticism, and excels in self-denial, is assured of communion with the Redeemer. This desire for a union with Christ translated into human terms means the emptying of one's self of all human desires, of overcoming one's senses, and of attaining beatitude. "This beatitude is the Western term for the Eastern Nirvāṇa." The scholastics, who tried to reconcile dogma with thought and faith with reason, still further developed this subjective religiosity. They aspired not merely to a union with Christ, but to the absorption of the soul by the triune God. Only by becoming part of God, the Father Himself, can existence be made a true reality. The celebrated Duns Scotus (fourteenth century A.D.) who proclaimed the Will against Understanding (put forth by his contemporary Thomas Aquinas) as the principle from whose spontaneous exercise he derived all morality, taught that this union requires the complete surrender of the will. Only in this manner can the soul be merged with God. "This de-individualization

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influence exercised over Christianity by Buddhistic impulses and ideals, which were exclusively Upanishadic in character. As Professor Max Müller put it, Buddhism is nothing more than the Upanishads applied to social life. "The *Upanishads* are," he says, "to my mind the germs of Buddhism, while Buddhism is in many respects the doctrine of the *Upanishads* carried out to its last consequences, and, what is important, employed as the foundation of a new social system. In doctrine, the highest goal of the Vēdānta, the knowledge of the true Self, is no more than the Buddhist *Samyaksambodhi*; in practice the Sannyāsin is the Bhikshu, the friar, only emancipated alike from the tedious discipline of the Brāhmanic student, the duties of the Brāhmanic householder, and the yoke of the useless penances imposed on the Brāhmanic dweller in the forest. The spiritual freedom of the Sannyāsin becomes in Buddhism the common property of the *Sangha*, the Fraternity, and that Fraternity is open alike to the young and the old, to the Brāhman and the Sūdra, to the rich and the poor, to the wise and the foolish. In fact there is no break between the India of the *Vēda* and the India of the *Tripitika*, but there is an historical continuity between the two, and the connecting link between extremes that seem widely separated must be sought in the *Upanishads*."—Preface to the *Sacred Books of the East*, (1879), pp. li-lii.

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of man, forming as it does the high water-mark of mediæval Christian universalism, became," writes Mr. Melamed, "the driving force of Christian piety of the Middle Ages. Surrender, relinquish, became the cry word of mediæval mysticism; everything is meaningless, worthless, and unreal, and only Christ, or, as the ancient Hindu said, Brahma (*i.e.*, Brahman) is real····stupefied by the constant disaster called 'life', he····surrendered."

This passion for "surrender" receives a higher definition in the profoundly mystical Meister Eckhart. Born about the middle of the thirteenth century, he entered the Dominican Order and rapidly attained to a high position in the Church. But his daring speculations attracted attention and he was arraigned for "heresy" in 1325 A.D. but finally acquitted. A couple of years after his death in 1327, his writings were condemned as "heretical" by a Papal bull. He owed much to Thomas Aquinas, whom he usually introduces as "Master", though he differs from him in certain respects. Mr. Melamed refers to him as "a full-fledged pantheist" as one "whose doctrine resembles the metaphysics of Sankara". Both these descriptions seem to lack foundation. For one thing, Eckhart is only semi-pantheistic in his idealism and as regards his "metaphysics", he more nearly is of the view of Srīpati and Rāmānuja than Sankara, as will be shown below. Distinguishing between "the Godhead" and "God" he describes Godhead as the abiding potentiality of Being, containing within Himself all distinctions as yet undeveloped. He, therefore, cannot be the object of knowledge, nor of worship, being "Darkness" and "Formlessness". The Triune God is evolved from the Godhead. The Son is the Word of the Father, His uttered thought; and the Holy Ghost is the "Flower of the Divine Tree", the mutual love which unites the Father and the Son. The universe is the expression of the whole thought of the Father; it is the language of the Word. He says that "Nature is the lower part of the Godhead" and that "Before creation, God was not God". This is not crude pantheism, for he

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argues that without the Son the Father would not be God, but only undeveloped potentiality of being. He insists that the generation of the Son is a continual process. The three persons are not merely accidents and modes of the Divine Substance, but are inherent in the Godhead. And so there could never have been a time when the Son was not. The generation of the Son necessarily involves the creation of the ideal world; for the Son is Reason, and Reason is constituted by a cosmos of ideas. When creation and the world which had no beginning are spoken of, what is meant is, not the world of phenomena, but the world of ideas. The ideal world is the complete expression of the thought of God and is above space and time. Eckhart calls it "non-natured nature", as opposed to "*diu genā tūrte nātūre*", the world of phenomena. The Neo-Platonists subordinated that which emanates to that from which a thing emanates from, *e.g.*, the rays to the sun, as they recede from the central focus; but Eckhart does not subordinate the Son to the Father nor the Holy Ghost to the Son. The Son is the pure brightness of the Father's glory, and the express image of His Person. "The eternal fountain of things is the Father; the image of things in Him is the Son, and love for this image is the Holy Ghost." All created things abide "formless" (as possibilities) in the ground of the Godhead, and all are realized in the Son. Since subordination is denied, Eckhart seems more pantheistic. His intelligible world is really God —it is the whole content of the Divine mind. But he does not seem to have landed himself into pantheism completely. This seems clear when we consider his conception of the relation of the phenomenal world to the world of ideas. He offers the Christian dogma of the Incarnation of the Logos as a kind of explanation of the passage of "prototypes" into "externality". When God "speaks" His ideas, the phenomenal world arises. This is an incarnation. But the process by which the soul emancipates itself from the phenomenal world, is also called a "begetting of the Son". Thus the whole process is a circular

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one—from God and back to God again. Time and space, he says, were created with the world. Material things are outside each other, spiritual things in each other. But these things, as Dean Inge remarks, do not make it clear how Eckhart accounts for the imperfections of the phenomenal world, which he does not explain, as the Neo-Platonists did, by a theory of emanation. The difficulty cannot be solved by a recourse to modern theories of evolution. The idea of the world history, as Dean Inge points out, as a gradual realization of the Divine personality, is not to be seen in Eckhart. Nor are there any indications in it of the doctrine that the human mind is a necessary organ of the self-development of God. The "necessity" which impels God to "beget His Son" is not a physical but a moral necessity. "The good", he insists, "must needs impart itself." His view of the world, accordingly, is much nearer to acosmism than to pantheism. He sees in phenomena, only the negation of being, and it is not clear how he can also regard them as the abode of the immanent God. Dean Inge suggests it is probable that, like the thinkers of his time, Eckhart did not feel himself obliged to give a permanent value to the transitory and that the world interested him only to the extent that it served as the temporary abode of immortal spirits. He also hints that the stress Eckhart laid on the Christ aspect rather than the Jesus was due to the same feeling. Eckhart attaches no importance to the personal life of Jesus not because he does not believe in the miraculous but because he thinks that the Divine process in the "everlasting Now" is a fact of much greater value than any occurrence in the external world can be. This may be so, but there is no denying that the emphasis laid on the Christ aspect was not only in agreement with the view-point of his contemporaries but was also in keeping with his own moods on certain occasions when it was pronouncedly under the influence of Asiatic doctrines. His doctrine of immanence is distinctly Hindu. According to him, the human soul is a microcosm, which in a way contains all things in itself. At the "apex of

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the mind " there is a Divine " spark ", which is so closely akin to God that it is one with him, and not merely united to Him. This is what other scholastics and mystics called the *residue* and the Neo-Platonists the *scintilla*. Eckhart suggests this as the true *Wesen* of the soul, into which all its faculties may be transformed.[1158] Eckhart, however, is not clear in regard to his teaching about it. He calls it at first the " ground of the soul " and says it is created and describes it as being only the medium by which God transforms us to Himself. But his later view is that it is uncreated, the immanence of the Being and the Nature of God Himself. The latter view was adopted by his successors, with or without qualification. This spark, according to Eckhart, is the organ by which our personality holds communion with God and knows Him. It is with reference to it, as Dean Inge aptly reminds, that Eckhart uses the phrase which has so often been quoted to convict him (so unjustly and so groundlessly, one need hardly add) of blasphemous self-deification—" the eye with which I see God is the same as that with which He sees me ". The " uncreated spark " is really the same as the grace of God, which raises us into a Godhead. But, says Eckhart, " this grace is God Himself acting like a human faculty in the soul, and transforming it so that man

[1158] *Cf.* the Sūtra *Amśōnānāvyapadēśāt* and Śankara's comment on it, II, 3. 43. According to Sankara, this *Sūtra* propounds the theory that " the soul must be considered a part of the Lord, just as a spark is a part of the fire ". Rāmānuja likewise states that this " *Sūtra* declares that the soul is part of Brahman " (II. 3. 42) and raising the objection later on in the Sūtra *Apichasmaryate* (II. 3. 44) that if the soul is a part of Brahman, all the imperfections of the soul are Brahman's also, he states that the next Sūtra *Prakāśādivattu naivamparaḥ* (II. 3. 45) meets this objection. Commenting on this *Sūtra*, Rāmānuja remarks that " the individual soul is a part of the highest Self; as the light issuing from a luminous thing such as fire or the sun is a part of that body ", etc. The idea that the world is created from and by Brahman as the web from the spider and as sparks from the fire, is seen in Upanishadic texts. *Brihad. Upa.*, II. 1. 20; *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 10; *Māndū. Upa.*, I. 1. 7; II. 1. 1.

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himself becomes grace." The exposition of the doctrine shows that Eckhart laid much stress on it. "There is in the soul," he says,[1159] "something which is above the soul, Divine, simple, a pure nothing; rather nameless than named, rather unknown than known. Of this I am accustomed to speak in my discourses. Sometimes I have called it a power, sometimes an uncreated light, and sometimes a Divine spark. It is absolute and free from all names and all forms, just as God is free and absolute in Himself. It is higher than knowledge, higher than love, higher than grace. For in all these there is still *distinction*. In this power God doth blossom and flourish with all His Godhead, and the Spirit flourisheth in God. In this power the Father bringeth forth His only-begotten Son as essentially as in Himself; and in this light ariseth the Holy Ghost. This spark rejecteth all creatures and will have only God, simply as He is in himself. It rests satisfied neither with the Father, nor with the Son, nor with the Holy Ghost, nor with the three Persons, so far as each existeth in its particular attribute. It is satisfied only with the super-essential essence. It is determined to enter into the simple Ground, the Still Waste, the Unity—where no man dwelleth. Then in it is satisfied in the light; then it is one; it is one in itself, as this Ground is a simple stillness, and in itself immoveable; and yet by this immobility are all things moved." It is God that worketh in us both to will and to do His good pleasure; but our own nature and personality remain intact. It is plain that we could not see God unless our personality remained distinct from the personality of God. Complete fusion is as destructive of the personality of love and knowledge as complete separation. This is in fact the position of Srīpati in his *Bhashya* in propounding the *Dvaitādvaita* system.

Eckhart, as will be seen, distinguishes "the Godhead" from "God". This finds its counterpart in well-known

[1159] Dean Inge quotes this passage as perhaps "the most instructive" in this connection.

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Upanishadic texts like *Sadēva saumyē*,[1160] *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma*,[1161] etc. The "Brahman" or "Ātman" could not be the object of worship, any more than "the Godhead" of Eckhart could be. Hence the evolution of a God who can be conceived of as the Creator, Preserver and Destroyer,[1162] or as the Ruler, Governor and Controller,[1163] much as Eckhart endeavours to evolve the Triune God from the Godhead. The Supreme Being thus conceived of in the *Upanishads* becomes the object of worship as he is endowed with divine qualities[1164] and the power of dispensing justice.[1165] How this led eventually to the worship of the Brahman in his *Saguna* form and the manner in which it was to be done is also seen in the *Upanishads*.[1166] To Eckhart, personality was "the eternal ground-form of all true being, and the notion of Person is the centre-point of his system". He says that "the word *I am* none can truly speak but God alone". The individual must try, as Dean Inge commenting on this sentence puts it, to become a person, as the Son of God is a Person. This is in keeping with Eckhart's view that we could not see God unless our personality remained distinct from that of God, and that complete fusion would be destructive of love and knowledge as complete separation. This stress on personality is worthy of note from the point of view of the *Upanishads*. Eckhart in this belief comes nearest to the view of Rāmānuja with whom fusion means the keeping distinct of personality, though in its elaborated form, Eckhart's doctrine is more nearly in agreement with Srīpati's. The views

[1160] *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 1.
[1161] *Chch. Upa.*, III. 14. 1.
[1162] *Chch. Upa.*, III. 14. 1; *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.
[1163] *Brihad. Upa.*, IV. 4. 22; III, 8. 9; III. 7. 3. 23.
[1164] *Chch. Upa.*, III. 14. 1.
[1165] *Kaṭha. Upa.*, III. 9.
[1166] *Chch. Upa.*, III. 14; IV. 10. 5; III. 19. 1; VII. 2. 2; *Kaṭha Upa.*, I. 1-7; *Chch. Upa.*, V. 3-10; *Brihad. Upa.*, VI. 2. 9-16; *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 10-15; VIII. 1-6; V. 11-18; III. 1-11; *Brihad. Upa.*, II. 5; *Pras. Upa.*, VI.

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of both Rāmānuja and Srīpati are covered by the *Brahma-Sūtras* and by the *Upanishads* which they sum up. There is hardly any need to set out at any length the evidence on this point here, and it ought therefore to suffice if it is said that the modes of meditation prescribed or referred to in the *Upanishads* refer to the maintenance of this distinctness of personality even while declaring spiritual unity[1167] between the devotee and the Divinity. Any other mode of meditation is discountenanced.[1168] Eckhart's insistence on *Will* being everything is likewise an echo of teachings of the *Upanishads*.

On the doctrine that " It is in the Father's nature to beget the son and it is the son's nature to be born ", Eckhart bases the teaching that between God and creature there comes about a relationship with mutual surrender which is equally essential to both, and that God can do as little without man, as man can do without Him. When man's will becomes God's will, all is well ; but when God's will becomes man's will, that is perfect. In the first instance, man only subjugates himself, and in the second, God is born in him and the aim of creation is attained. Man, who surrenders his will, becomes by grace what God is by nature, and He is as near to us as the water which we drink. The doctrine of grace finds a prominent place in both Vaishnavism and Saivism and is reflected in the text of the *Bhagavad-gītā* : *Sarvadharmān parityajya*,[1169] a text, on which the whole of the *prapatti* doctrine has been built from very early days in India. The doctrine, as taught in the *Bhagavad-gītā*, is the most tolerant and catholic ; it is absolutely free from the sectarianism that has marked its growth in Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

Mr. Melamed and Spinoza.

In one respect Mr. Melamed has been less than just to Spinoza. There is a note of derision in the phrases

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[1167] *Kaṭha Upa.*, I. 6.

[1168] *Brihad. Upa.*, I. 4. 10.

[1169] *Bhagavad-gītā*, XVIII. 66. Also XVIII. 64 ; XVIII. 65 ; XVIII. 56-57 ; IX. 29.

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"Consumptive Jew," "Epileptic Jew," "Sickly Jew," "Lonely Jew", "Lonely Dutch Jew" "Lonely Jew of Amsterdam," that we find interspersed through his volume. At one or two points, he comes very near blaming the Jew for his birth (see pp. 22, 23, 30, 31 and *et passim*). Yet he was the Jew of whom Matthew Arnold wrote: "Spinoza led a life perhaps the most spotless to be found in the lives of philosophers; he lived simply, studious, even-tempered, kind, declining honours, declining riches, declining notoriety. Therefore, he has been in a certain sphere edifying, and has inspired in many powerful minds an interested admiration such as no other philosopher has inspired since Plato. In my father's house are many mansions, only, to reach any one of these mansions, there are needed the wings of a genuine sacred transport, of an immortal longing. These wings Spinoza had, and because he had them his own language about himself, about his aspirations, and course are true, his foot is in the *vera vita*, his eye on the beatific vision." Of him, Renan declared at the dedication of a statue to him at the Hague, in 1882: "Woe to him who in passing should hurl an insult at this gentle and pensive head! He would be punished, as all vulgar souls are punished, by his very vulgarity, and by his incapacity to conceive what is divine. This man, from his granite pedestal, will point out to all men the way of blessedness which he found; and ages hence, the cultivated traveller, passing by this spot, will say in his heart: 'The truest vision ever had of God came, perhaps, here.'" Earlier than Renan, Heinrich Heine (1797-1856) had said that "the only life with which that of Spinoza can be compared is the life of Jesus Christ."

Spinoza's Indebtedness to Hindu Metaphysicians.

We may now sum up and see how far Spinoza was indebted to Hindu metaphysicians for his views. Pythagoras and Plato owed much to the ancient Hindus. Hinduism in its Buddhistic form spread to the western world and being passive in form, it influenced effectively and lastingly western philosophical notions. A number of sects, more or

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less Buddhistic in character, came into being in Palestine and influenced Christianity. These sects adopted the fundamental Upanishadic doctrines, which through them passed into Christianity. Neo-Platonism and Gnosticism were largely shaped by Buddhism and its source, the *Upanishads*. Among the theories introduced by it into Christianity is the Logos idea, which helped to shape Christianity. Not only is there a close similarity between the lives of Buddha and Jesus, but also the main doctrines of Jesus recall to mind those of Buddha. These are more than mere coincidences. Christianity owes its doctrine of redemption to Buddhism. St. Paul carried westward the Logos idea, which had been already made familiar in the western world. He preached not Jesus but Christ, the Redeemer. His God was like Brahman, redemptive in character. His doctrine was a form of diluted Buddhism.[1170] His Kingdom

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[1170] The following comparison has been instituted between Buddhism and Spinozism :—

(1) "What is wealth, honor or lust of senses?" asks Spinoza and answers that they are all optic illusions. Only in salvation is their genuine happiness. Buddha said the same 2,300 years ago.

(2) Buddha understood that the general law of causation does not explain or include all the phenomena of life. Like Spinoza, he, therefore, resorted to a theory of external and internal causation. We may fail to understand external causation, because our knowledge is limited and confined to the inter-relation of the phenomena. We are, however, absolutely certain that internal causation is in operation and that our will determines our acts. Will or *Karma* is the source and kindling point of all our actions and is the only reality. "Everything that exists, exists by reason of *Cupiditas*," says Spinoza.

(3) Both Buddha and Spinoza agree about acosmism, while they disagree about causation. Buddha completely denies the phenomenal world. Spinoza causes it to be absorbed by the noumenal world. If the world is not reality, whether because it is flatly denied or is absorbed by another world, the problem of the prime mover and planner does not arise.

(4) Buddha's doctrine of causation, fundamental to his philosophy, is inter-woven with his theory of determinism, which assumes the form of fatalism. In its main features, it resembles that of Spinoza. Man is tied to pre-destined forces, from which there is, according to Spinoza, no escape. According to Buddha, however,

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of God was only a western copy of the Buddhistic Nirvāṇa. The mystery of Christ was the mystery of Brahman. Marcion, who introduced asceticism into Christianity, owed much to Hinduism. His disciples developed the Gnostic doctrines, and set the stage for Mani. Mani was frankly anti-Judaic and drew his ideas from Hinduism and Zoroastrianism. Simultaneously, the Neo-Platonists, headed by Ammonius, Sakkas and Plotinus, developed philosophical

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man has within himself the possibility of redemption. His four holy truths are an attempt to attain salvation by piercing the iron wall of the law of causation. The possibility of escape from a predestined life to Nirvāṇa implies a theory of being which is less rigid and less immutable than that of Spinoza. Thus Buddha says, " the reality of things is to be found in the oscillations between being and non-being." This is the content of existence. The world is because it is, and it is not at the same time. For the simple the world is, and for the wise it is not. When it is, it is the source and origin of suffering. When it is not, it is redemption and salvation. The worlds of Buddha and Spinoza are prisons, but in the one there is a crack, and the other is hermetically sealed. According to Buddha, redemption is theoretically possible through Nirvāṇa. But, according to Spinoza, there is no such possibility as he denies implicitly any extra-mundane reality.

(5) Buddha did not dogmatise about the soul. Life is impermanent and doomed to destruction and consciousness is ever changing and is thus transitory. That which is transitory is evil and cannot be eternal or soul. Thus Buddha repudiated the conception of the individual ego and denied the reality of the phenomenal world. Both the world and the individual ego are, according to him, in a state of flux. A transitory being, according to him, cannot say that it is permanent. So explicit is he on this point that Heraclitus, the Ephesian, is said by some to have borrowed his idea of the universe being in a constant state of flux from Buddha's doctrine. According to Spinoza, when body perishes, the soul is necessarily dissolved.

(6) In the Buddhistic as in the Spinozistic world-picture, morality is linked with usefulness. Ethics and morality are not based upon God or upon any other metaphysical principle, but are inspired by the vision of the goal—Nirvāṇa. Although no one commands or admonishes man to be good, yet he follows the path of righteousness. He will benefit by it and his life will be attended by joy. Buddha often described Nirvāṇa as

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doctrines which were largely Hindu in character. St. Augustine began as a Manichæan and his philosophy was a mixture of Neo-Platonism and Gnosticism, with traces of Aristotelianism and Stoicism. His God-idea is like the attributeless of Brahman. His doctrine of pre-destination is an exaggerated form of Buddhistic determinism applied to religious life. His God-idea was adopted by most of the mediæval philosophers. Man's one goal is his return to God—a reverberation of the old Buddhistic yearning for Nirvāṇa, itself the product of the Upanishadic doctrine which inculcated the union of the soul with Brahman. The central doctrine in Christian mysticism represents no more than this panting after union. The theories of self-surrender and grace are aspects of the same doctrine and these aspects were developed by St. Bernard and Meister Eckhart in a manner highly suggestive of the Hindu teaching of *mukti*, which is deep down in the *Upanishads*. The very ideology of mediæval Christian mystics is reminiscent of the *Upanishads*. Christian universalism of the mediæval era which made life in Christ the leading theme, finds its basis in the Upanishadic doctrine which makes the Brahman the one Reality. Spinoza, who drew as much from the Rabbinical as from the Neo-Platonic sources and the teachings of Descartes, owed thus not a little to those who contributed to the

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a union with the cosmic principle Brahman; as such it is identical with Spinoza's *amor Dei intellectualis*. Thus the main features of Spinoza's system, with but few exceptions, can, in the opinion of Mr. Melamed, be traced to Buddha, and his background, the *Upanishads*. (Melamed, *loc. cit.*, 256, 274.)

Gœthe thus describes the lesson he found in Spinoza :—" The whole of our education and experience bids us to renounce and resign : ' *Dass wir entsagen sollhn.*' The problem of man's life is to reconcile himself to this. One ready way is the superficial way of the many to proclaim that all things are vanity. But the path of wisdom, sought only by a few, is to cut short the pains of resignation in detail by a resignation once for all ; to rest one's mind on that which is eternal, necessary, and uniform, and possess ideas which remain undisturbed by the contemplation of a transitory world." This was the secret of Spinoza to Gœthe. (See Pollock, *loc. cit.*, 370.)

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building of the teaching of the Neo-Platonists and Platonists and Pythagoreans even. The dissemination of the teachings of the *Upanishads*, whether directly through the Alexandrian propounders of Neo-Platonism, or the Gnostics or the still earlier schools represented by Plato and Pythagoras or indirectly through the medium of Buddhism, which spread through the length and breadth of Asia and became particularly dominant in Asia Minor and Palestine, forms thus a not negligible foundation not only for mediæval Christian philosophy but also for the philosophy of Spinoza. Except on this basis, neither the central idea of mediæval Christian philosophy nor of the philosophy of Spinoza—the union of man with the order of the world, *i.e.*, with God—can be traced back to its original source.

Mr. Melamed's Views Examined.

Such in very brief is the line of argumentation suggested by Mr. Melamed. The grounds on which it is based may not be new. The presentation of his case is elaborate, though not always adequate; in some parts, it suffers from a lack of first-hand knowledge of Hindu sources of philosophical learning. Though this be so, it must be acknowledged that Mr. Melamed has done well in drawing pointed attention to the fact that the foundations of Christian philosophy, if not belief, are not far removed from the doctrines so definitely conceived of in the *Upanishads* and so scientifically synthetised in the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa. This, however, is not to say that agreement is possible in every view propounded by Mr. Melamed or in every suggestion thrown out by him in his highly recondite and vastly learned volume. His idea of "dead" or "static" Brahman, for instance, stresses an aspect which can at all be true only from one view-point of the teachings of the *Upanishads*. Even in that case, it is only theoretically so. His suggestion that a "static" Brahman of the *Upanishads* led to the conception of a "static" God in the hands of Spinoza, seems equally unsustainable. This latter statement does, in fact, serious injustice to Spinoza. Nature or God as conceived by Spinoza is all-comprehensive,

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infinite or perfect, so that there is nothing outside of the cosmic system, nothing supernatural. Nature, moreover, according to him, is not static but dynamic, exercising all existing forms of energy. Each ultimate kind of energy is described an attribute of God.[1171] Then, again, his criticism that a "passive" metaphysical idea which inculcates "passivity and eternal peace" lends to the de-individualizing of man and ends in "brutality and despotism", cannot prove acceptable. Expanding his view-point, Mr. Melamed says that "Spinoza's theory of the State and Buddha's indifference to the brutality of the caste system support the implication that causation as the only reality extends the realms of brute nature to the realm of human history. In the worlds of Spinoza and Buddha, man, overawed by the eternal immutable law, vanishes from the picture. And with him disappear all that revolves about man—history, ethics, politics, jurisprudence, social service, and true philanthropy. All that remains is the ceaselessly revolving wheel of fate which stares at the puppet show called human life."[1172] If this were really so, it would be truly appalling.

[1171] Mr. Melamed's statement that "philosophical thought in India is either non-dualistic or purely monistic (pp. 21, 40)," is too sweeping in character and betrays a lack of first-hand knowledge of Indian systems of philosophic thought which, it is but right to add, colours his whole study. He later qualifies his statement (see p. 253) by saying that "Monism was not the only religious expression of ancient India" and instances the Sankhya school of thought, which he describes as "one of the most important philosophical groups in India," which "propounded the absolute dualism of mind and matter". But his complaint is that "even the adherents of this system regarded knowledge as only a means to salvation".

[1172] Elsewhere Mr. Melamed remarks that "like all true Eastern mystics, Spinoza was interested not in man, but in the forces of eternity," p. 232. As to Buddha, he writes in the Introduction : "Buddha, too, was not concerned with the lot of the lower castes" p. 13-14. These criticisms form the central parts of Mr. Melamed's work. His description of the State as conceived of by Spinoza reminds one of Vico's characterization of it as "a city of hucksters", because of its alleged lack of the sense of duty. But this seems a piece of superficial criticism.

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But fortunately for us, it does not appear to be a correct reading of either Spinoza's political theory or of the Hindu caste system or of caste in the Buddhistic or the Upanishadic view. As Professor Watson points out, Spinoza holds that the State is the great means by which man is freed from "the wretched and almost brutish existence" which is spent by those "who live in a state of barbarism without a political order of life". It is true that the State cannot determine the whole life of man; there are spheres and interests which lie beyond it; nevertheless there is much which only a State can do, and it is one of the most important means of human happiness. From what source then does society derive its powers or rights? "The answer of Spinoza," remarks Prof. Watson, "is that man has a natural right which is coextensive with his power over things. The power is by no means unlimited, because each individual being is only a part of a whole order or system which is constituted by the essential nature of God. The good of man is that which will contribute to his greatest welfare or happiness.... The only way to make a man better is to give him reasons for changing his opinion. The society which by its laws encourages industry, enterprise, honesty and thrift, supplies to its citizens adequate reasons for regarding these qualities as for their good.... The end of the State is.... to make men free, that is, to induce them to live according to reason, and it can only do so by presenting and enforcing certain courses of conduct. The individual must obey the law or submit to the penalties imposed by the State. If every man followed reason, he would cease to speak of being under obligation to obey the law, and would speak only of liberty and happiness and the love of his fellows, which is identical with the love of God. A law is not properly a command, but a rule of conduct which a man prescribes to himself or to any other with a view to a certain end. But as the true end of life is recognized only by a very few, legislators have promised rewards to those who obey the law and threatened punishment to those who violate it. It is for

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this reason that a law has come to be regarded as a command. Man is not naturally moral or social, but must fight his way towards sociability, and the State is the chief moral agency in this contest. In the state of nature men are one another's enemies. But this is only the first state of man. Every one desires to live in security and without fear; and this end cannot possibly be attained as long as enmity, hatred, anger and guile rule in place of reason."[1173] Spinoza naturally rejects the view of Hobbes that in a state of nature there is "war of all against all". He holds to the view even in a state of nature, man is a social animal and but for his being social, life would have been impossible. In his view, the government is not an alien force; but the best friend that man has in the world. There is no antagonism between the individual's interest and interests of the community: "The *status civilis* has its natural source in the desire to be free from some common fear and to remove the common causes of unhappiness." The end of the State, then, is not to restrain men by fear, and subject them to a foreign yoke, but to "deliver each man from fear, so that he may be able to live with the utmost possible security; that is to say, that he may maintain in the best way his own natural right to exist and to act, without doing harm either to himself or to his neighbours."[1174] The State is indeed a necessity, but it is a necessity of thought. Spinoza's theory of the State marks a distinct advance upon that of Hobbes, especially in its conception of the source of duties. The notion that men have rights apart from society is the foundation on which Hobbes' theory of the Social Contract is built. Rights are thus divorced from duties and it is supposed that the only rights that they possess are those granted to them by positive enactment, except certain primitive rights, which survive under the new conditions. According to Spinoza, there can be no right which does not flow from the

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[1173] J. Watson, *The State in Peace and War*, 92-101.

[1174] *Tractatus Politicus*, III. 6.

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consciousness of a common interest on the part of members of a society. Such a right implies recognition by the common will. Spinoza's theory of the State may not, it may be suggested, seem to be consistent with itself as is, indeed, pointed out with great force by Professor Watson.[1175] But to say that it "extends the realms of brute nature to the realm of human history" seems an imperfect generalization of uncertain validity. There is, however, reason for this misunderstanding on the part of Mr. Melamed. Spinoza carries out unflinchingly the fundamental principle of his ethical philosophy, that man's highest good is the result of that *conatus sese conservandi* which is found in all forms of being. Anything like self-sacrifice or even self-blame he rejects. Asceticism is for him nothing but a *torva et tristis superstitio*. The true end of all action is to secure the greatest self-satisfaction or individual happiness and in this attitude of pure affirmation, Spinoza finds the secret not only of the State but of the highest form of blessedness. From passion, the motive operative in man in his first mind, liberation is to be obtained by an enlightened self-interest that leads to identification with the common weal. It is entirely a question of the greater enlightenment which comes from the wider view of reason. When we bring our own life into connection with the life of society as a whole, we see the irrationality of the narrow view of passion and we seek our own good in the common good.[1176] The fundamental mistake in Spinoza's political philosophy as in his general philosophy, according to Professor Watson, is "to conceive the bare individual as having a nature apart from society, whereas there can be no distinctively moral action except in so far as the individual discharges a function in society which enables him to minister to the well-being of the whole community.[1177] Spinoza was debarred from taking

[1175] J. Watson, *loc. cit.*, 99-101.
[1176] *Ibid.*, 100-101.
[1177] *Ibid.*, 1101-02.

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this view by his denial of all final causes. Holding that man like other beings is determined solely by material and efficient causes, " he can properly speak neither of rights nor of duties, both of which imply relation to an end, namely, the good of society as a whole." This does not prevent him from tacitly assuming that "human affairs are directed to an end as when he says that men seek to secure a higher form of civil society. He thinks that a clear understanding of the world will lead to an advance from a lower to a higher form of society; and in so doing he tacitly assumes that man is determined by the idea of social perfection and, not simply by the impulse to secure his own well-being. "[1178]

So far as to Mr. Melamed's misconception of the true theory of State as evolved by Spinoza. Next, as to his criticism of the Hindu caste system, it is only necessary to say a few words here to indicate his radical misunderstanding of it. The *Upanishads* do not, for instance, support the position put forward by him. According to the *Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*[1179] which describes the creation of the four castes and the law (*Dharma*) in keeping with the speculations of the period, insists on the essential equality, if not oneness, of all castes, each being created as required for the good of society, the law being above all. The special glorification of the Law which the *Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad* indulges in, shows that at the time it was composed, it was felt that in the eye of the Law all were equal and none could pretend to a higher status over another. In the *Bhagavad-gīta*, the exaltation of the *Dharma* is carried still further. The position taken in the *Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad* is emphasised, if not enlarged. The castes have not only their particular qualities but also their particular duties. And then we are told[1180] that the performance of one's own duty—and duty is throughout

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[1178] *Ibid.*, 102.

[1179] *Brihad. Upa.*, I. 4. 10-14.

[1180] *Bhagvad-gīta*, III. 35.

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stressed in the *Gīta* as nothing else is—though destitute of merit is better than the performance of another's duty well discharged. Death in performing one's own duty is preferable, the performance of the duties of others is dangerous. The theory of creation is referred to in two places in the *Gīta*[1181] and these indicate the position of the *Bhagavad-gīta* in regard to caste. In the first, Sri Krishna says:—"The four-fold division of castes was created by me according to the apportionment of qualities and duties." In the second, he enumerates the respective duties of the four castes, and then says:—"(Every) man intent on his own respective duties obtains perfection. Listen, now, how one intent on one's duty obtains perfection. Worshipping, by (the performance of) his own duty, him from whom all things proceed, a man obtains perfection. One's own duty, though defective, is better than another's duty well performed. Performing the duty prescribed by nature one does not incur sin." As Mr. K. T. Telang points out, in the *Bhagavad-gīta*, the duties of the different castes do not overlap. In Chapter X, in which the best of everything is mentioned, the Brāhmana is not declared to be the best of castes. On the other hand, the King is mentioned as the highest among men.[1182] The *Bhagavad-gīta* and Buddha agree first in their protests against the authority of the Vēdas, and second in their conception of the true view of the differences of caste. The *Gīta* shelves caste, while Buddha rejects it. The *Gīta* does not totally root out caste; but it places it on a less untenable basis. In Telang's view, the *Gīta* is really the predecessor of the Buddhist attempt to do away with caste.

Buddha's attitude towards caste is well brought out by his definition of an outcaste, which is illustrated by the story of the Chandāla who was re-born in the Brāhman world. In the *Sutta Nipāta*, in which the story is told, we read: "Not by birth does one become an out-caste;

[1181] *Bhagavad-gīta*, IV. 13; XVIII. 41.
[1182] *Ibid.*, X. 27.

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not by birth does one become a Brāhman; by deeds one becomes an outcaste, and by deeds one becomes a Brāhmana. Buddha himself is neither a Brāhman, nor a king's son, nor a *Vessa* (Vaisya), but a wandering mendicant." The *Sutta Nipāta* again asserts: "Do not ask about descent, but ask about conduct; from wood, it is true, fire is born; (likewise) a firm *muni*, although belonging to a low family, may become noble, when restrained (from sinning) by humility. One who has seen Buddha is appeased, even if he be of black colour." The Buddhist *Sūtras* maintain that the truth proclaimed by Buddha is open to all. According to the *Vinaya* texts, members of the four castes renounce their names and their lineage when they become Buddhist monks.

The Jaina attitude is equally clear. In the *Jaina Sūtras*, the story is told of the monk Harikesa Bala, born in the family of Svapakesa, the lowest of lowly castes, converting a Brāhmana. The self-same *Sūtras* state that a Brāhmana, Kshatriya, an Ugra or a Chchavi when entering the Order is not stuck up on account of its *Gōtra*. Their reasoning is direct and simple. If there were only one Soul, these could not be of Brāhmanas, Kshatriyas, Vaisyas and Sudras. This indifference to caste was adopted by the Śaivas, according to whom, men of different castes may become Brāhmanas. According to the *Vēdānta Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa, difference of castes results from the soul's connection with a body, though all souls are part of Brahman and equal.[1183]

The alleged "indifference" of the "brutality of caste" seems thus not justified; nor is it the alleged "brutality" due to his so-called "passive" philosophy. Caste has bound a whole sub-continent to orderliness and to law; caste has helped the spread of culture; and caste has meant social peace and domestic happiness. Politically it has been a great factor in building up a conglomeration of races into a single whole. Its so-called rigidity has been both its

[1183] See *The Indian Caste System*, 55-61.

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merit and demerit. The accident of birth is stressed, but it cannot be said that this bred "brutality" or cruelty—at any rate of the type that has made cruelty to the Negro in America a common thing and cruelty towards the Jew in modern Germany a great virtue. Racial differences have been stressed unduly in these two cases with the result that the so-called inequalities bred by the caste system—caste signifies difference rather than inequality—in India pale into insignificance. Whatever its defects, caste in India has helped to "ensure an amazing continuity, in tradition and in the arts and crafts".[1184] If it is, as has been suggested, a typical example of "introvert" disposition, then the credit for tolerance in religion, tolerance in social custom and habit, and tolerance in regarding differences as natural and even inevitable in some cases should go to the philosophy of the *Upanishads* and to the Buddhistic philosophy based on it, which made "looking inward" a not negligible factor in their make-up. It is because that this "looking inward" has been lacking in Europe that, despite the spread of culture and the propagation of philosophical views, tolerance is still unrecognized in practice even in the domains of religion and politics. It is not Spinoza's philosophy that is responsible for this defect in European character any more than caste can be held responsible for the inequalities we see in India, but despite Spinoza's philosophy and despite the doctrine of equality preached in the Upanishadic philosophy that intolerance and inequalities exist. In India at least, caste saved the aborigines from destruction, while its absence in other parts of the world has only meant their disappearance with the approach of immigrant foreign races, as in America, Australia, New Zealand and Africa.

Differing Saiva View-points.

Bhēdābhēda thus has not only a long and interesting history in India but has also been a favourite theory in the West as well. In India, the doctrine has been stressed

[1184] C. G. Seligman in *An Outline of Modern Knowledge*, 464.

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again and again by different writers, some of whose writings have not come down to us. Its earlier upholders are known only by implication in certain of the *Brahma Sūtras* themselves or from other stray references to them or their theory in the works of the later Commentators. In Srīpati's view, it is the doctrine propounded by Bādarāyaṇa in his *Sūtras* that, according to him, is the final truth declared in the *Upanishads*. The object of the *Jignyāsa* suggested in I. 1. 1 is nothing more therefore than the declaration of this as the final teaching of the *Upanishads*. As the special deity to which he is devoted is Siva, he throughout identifies the Absolute with that deity. As there are, however, differing Saiva view-points in regard to Upanishadic Philosophy, it is necessary to distinguish between them here. The first of these is the *Saiva Visishtādvaita*, represented by Srīkaṇṭha; the second the *Sivādvaita*, represented by Appaya Dikshita; and *Vīrasaiva Bhēdābhēdātmaka Visēshādvaita*, propounded by Srīpati. Enough has been said about these three view-points but before we conclude it seems necessary to refer briefly to the manner in which the Absolute came to be identified with Siva and what view the later *Upanishads* took of the doctrine of *Bhēdābhēdā* itself.

Rudra the counterpart of Siva in the *Rig-Veda*.

In the *Rig-Vēda*, Rudra represents Siva, who is not mentioned by that name in it. Rudra and Vishnu, though eclipsed to some extent by Indra, are still invoked in a manner which signifies their importance among the gods of the period. Rudra is celebrated in a lesser number of hymns than Vishnu, but that does not by any means indicate that he occupied a position less important than Vishnu. In one hymn (I. 8. 8) he is praised as "the wise, the most bountiful and mighty Rudra, who is (cherished) in our hearts". A grateful hymn is sung in his honour to obtain gifts "to our cattle, our people, our cows, and our progeny". He is spoken of as "the encourager of hymns, the protector of sacrifices, possessor of medicaments

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that confer delight." In another (I. 16. 9) he is spoken of as "the mighty Rudra, with the braided hair (*Kapardin*), the destroyer of heroes", and the Vēdic singers offer their praises to him "in order that health may be enjoyed by bipeds and quadrupeds and that all beings in this village may be (well) nourished and exempt from disease". He is asked to grant happiness and "freedom from disease and exemption from dangers". He is praised as "the accomplisher of sacrifices, the tortuous, the wise"; he is asked to remove far from them "his celestial wrath", for, they say, "they earnestly solicit his favour". They invoke him with reverence, as he "who has excellent food, who is radiant, and has braided hair (*Kapardin*), who is brilliant and is to be ascertained (by sacred study), holding in his hands excellent medicaments" and they pray to him to grant them "health, defensive armour, and a (secure) dwelling". They speak of him as "the father of the *Maruts*" and they pray: "Injure not, Rudra, those amongst us who are old or young, who are capable of begetting, or who are begotten, nor a father, nor a mother, nor afflict our precious persons." Again, they pray: "Harm us not Rudra, in our sons or grandsons, or other male descendants, nor in our cattle, nor in our horses; inflamed with anger, kill not our valiant men, for we, presenting clarified butter, perpetually invoke thee." And they add: "Father of the *Maruts*, bestow happiness....; thy auspicious benignity is the cause of successive delight, therefore we especially solicit thy protection." The double aspect of Siva—fierceness and benignity—is here significantly brought out. His universal supremacy is next expressed thus: "Destroyer of heroes, may thus cow-killing or man-slaying (weapon) be far away and let the felicity granted by thee be ours; favour us; speak, brilliant hero, in our behalf, and grant us—thou art mighty over the two (realms of heaven and earth)—prosperity." The idea re-appears in another hymn (II. 4. 1), in which Rudra is spoken of as "the chiefest of beings in glory", as "the wielder of the thunderbolt," "the mightiest of the

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mighty" and is asked to "waft" the singers "in safety over (the ocean) of sin" and to "repel all the assaults of iniquity". He is later spoken of in even higher terms. "(Firm) with strong limbs, assuming many forms, fierce and tawny-coloured, he shines with brilliant golden ornaments: vigour is inseparable from Rudra, the supreme ruler and lord of the world." He is not to be provoked to wrath by imperfect adorations; he is the invigorator of sons by his medicinal plants; he is a chief physician among physicians; he is to be pacified by praises; worshipped with invocations and oblations; is reverently invoked; is soft-bellied; of a tawny hue, and handsome chin; is the showerer of benefits; lord of the *Maruts*; supplier of invigorating food; the healer and delighter (of all); the dispeller of the sins of the gods; the white-complexioned; the consumer (of sin); who is glorified in the illustrious name of Rudra; the bearer of arrows and a bow; the wearer of an adorable and omniform necklace; the preserver of all this vast universe; there is no one more powerful than he; his javelin should be avoided; he is the giver of much (wealth), the protector of the virtuous; he is the cherisher of the world, the showerer (of benefits), omnicisent and divine (Rudra), etc. (II. 4. 1-15).[1185] In another hymn, the universal character of Rudra is even more strikingly brought out. In it, he is spoken of as "the divine Rudra, armed with the strong bow and fast-flying arrows, the bestower of food, the invincible, the conqueror, the creator, the wielder of sharp weapons";[1186] we are told "he is known by his rule over those of terrestrial birth, by his sovereignty over those of celestial (origin)". His are a thousand medicaments (VII. 3. 13).[1187]

[1185] The epithets "tawny-coloured" and "white-complexioned" both appear as descriptions of Rudra in the *Rig-Vēda* (II. 4. 5 and 8).

[1186] His sharp weapons are referred to again and again. See *Rig-Veda*, VIII. 4. 9, where he is referred to as holding his sharp weapons in his hand.

[1187] As to Wilson, he sees little of the Rudra of the *Puranas* in the Rudra of the *Rig-Vēda*, except his fierceness. As to his identification with Siva, Wilson holds that except *kapardin* no other

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Identification of Rudra with Siva.

There has been some discussion as to the identity of Rudra, the Vēdic god. According to Sāyana, there is hardly any doubt that he is to be understood as Siva. At any rate, the Hindu commentators so understood him. Sāyana defines the name *Rudra* to mean " he who makes to weep, who causes all to weep at the end of time ", thus identifying him with the destroying principle, or *Siva*. Wilson suggests that " there is nothing in the hymn (I. 8. 8) to bear out such an identification". On the contrary, he says, " he appears as a beneficent deity presiding especially over medicinal plants". Though this be so there, the Vēdic singers show fully well that they are afraid of him; pray to him to remove them far from his celestial wrath and beg of him not to injure them or their cattle or horses. There is an open avowal of his destroying nature in the hymns quoted above, though there is an equally frank declaration as to his capacity to keep them free from disease. His fierceness and his benignity are both acknowledged and it is thus his identity with Siva is established. The reference to him as the holder of medicaments is also indicative of his identity with Siva. According to Sāyana, *Rudriya* is *Rudra sambandhi bheshajam*—medicament in relation to or presided over by Rudra, conformably to the text *Ya te Rudra Shiva tanuh, Shiva Vishwaḥ, bheshaji Shiva, Rudrasya bheshajiti*,—whatever are thy auspicious forms, O Rudra, they are all auspicious; auspicious are medicaments, the medicaments of Rudra. In I. 16. 9, Rudra is styled *Kapardin*, he with the braided hair. *Kaparda* indicates the *jata* of Siva, for which reason Sāyana gives as its equivalent *jatilaya*. Even Wilson has to concede that "this looks very like a recognition of Siva in the person of Rudra". Rudra is, in II. 4. 1, spoken as the "white-complexioned", *shwitiche shwaityam anchate*, he who goes to or obtains whiteness. This

epithet applicable to Siva occurs in the *Rig-Vēda*. On the other hand, Macdonell speaks of Rudra of the *Rig-Vēda* as " the earlier form of Siva". (See Wilson, *Rig-Vēda*, Introduction; Macdonell, *Sanskrit Literature*, 74).

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refers to the white complexion of Siva, which evidently has its origin in this hymn. Later Western scholars—those who came after Wilson—assert that Rudra in the *Rig-Vēda*, is the earlier form of Siva.[1188] In the *Rig-Vēda*, the term *Siva* (meaning auspicious) is only used as an adjective in the sense of bringing good fortune, being gracious. It has even been suggested that it is used (in the *Rig-Vēda*) euphemistically. There is no doubt that it is commonly so used in the later *Vēdas*, and became his exclusive name in post-Vedic times. The transition is well marked in the period of the *Yajur-Vēda*.

Siva in the Yajur-Veda.

In the 16th chapter of the *Vājasaneyi Samhita* of the *Sukla Yajur-Vēda*, god Rudra is spoken of by a large number of epithets which, later, are peculiar to Siva. To these, in the 39th chapter, are added *Īśāna* (Ruler) and *Mahādēva* (Supreme God), which perhaps indicate the final conversion of Rudra into Siva. Evidently, in the special worship of Rudra, he was already reckoned the *Great God* and the *Ruler* of all. Accordingly, we would not be far wrong if we assumed that, in the period of the *Sukla Yajur-Vēda*, the Rudra of the *Rig-Vēda*, has become Siva, he being several times mentioned by the latter name as well as by other epithets peculiar to him, such as Sankara, Mahādēva, etc.

Siva in the Brahmanas and the Atharva-Veda.

In the first part of the *Gopatha Brāhmana* attached to the *Atharva-Vēda*, we find mention of Siva, which would seem to show that in post-Vēdic times, if not already in the *Brāhmana* period (800–500 B.C.), Siva had become fully established in place of Rudra. Indeed, in the *Atharva-Vēda*,[1189] Rudra is elevated to a higher position. Many other names are given to him, though the bearer of these different

[1188] *Taittiriya Samhita*, 4. 5. 1; *Vājasaneya Samhita*, 16. The name Siva occurs at the end of the *Śatarudrīya*.

[1189] *Atharva-Vēda*, IV. 28. 1; VI. 93. 2; VII. 87. 1; IX. 7. 7; X. 1. 3; XI. 2. 7; XI. 2. 4; XI. 2. 9; XI. 2. 10; XI. 2. 28; XI. 6. 9; XIII. 4. 4; XIII. 4. 28; XV. 5. 1-7.

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names is addressed individually and as a separate God. Among the more prominent names are Bhava, Sarva, Bhūtapati, Pasupati, Mahādēva, Ugra, Īśāna, etc. A study of these names shows that the double character of Rudra—destructive and beneficent—is still maintained. In the *Satapatha Brāhmana* and the *Kausītaki Brāhmana*, we see that the *Atharva-Vēda* position is still undisturbed and the names given to Rudra continue the tradition of his creative and destructive characters.[1190] In the *Grihya Sūtras*, however, the fearful side of Rudra is stressed (*Āśvalāyana Grihya Sūtra*, IV. 9; *Pāraskara Grihya Sūtra*, III. 8; III. 15).

In the Mahabharata.

There are numerous references to Siva in the *Mahābhārata*. The duality of his nature is to be seen in this epic as well. He is commonly styled Mahādēva or the Great God and Dēvadēva, the God of Gods, in it. He is spoken of as the son of Brahma, sprung from his forehead, hence called *Lalāṭaprabhava*.[1191] His abode is the Himavat. He is also called Pasupati and is described as rejoicing in the company of Umā.[1192] He has three eyes, hence called *Trinētra*.[1193] He has a blue neck, and is therefore called *Nīlakaṇṭha*[1194], *Srikaṇṭha*[1195] and *Sitikaṇṭha*.[1196] He has ten arms.[1197] He is clothed in skins, especially in tiger skins.[1198] His vehicle is the *Vrishabha*.[1199] His weapon is the fearful

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[1190] *Atharva-Vēda*, VI. 1. 3-7; VI. 1. 9.

[1191] *Mahābhārata*, XII. 13705, 13723. According to another version, he sprang from Vishnu's forehead, *Ibid.*, III.

[1192] *Ibid.*, VI. 218: XIII. 6339.

[1193] *Ibid.*, III. 11984, XII. 10357. How he got this third eye is detailed in *Ibid.*, III. 6362. For another version of the story see *Ibid.*, XII. 13205.

[1194] *Ibid.*, II. 1641; XIII. 843, 1154.

[1195] *Ibid.*, XII. 13705.

[1196] *Ibid.*, X. 253.

[1197] *Ibid.*, XIII. 1154.

[1198] *Ibid.*, II. 1643; X. 256.

[1199] *Ibid.*, II. 415.

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Pāsupata, with which he killed the *daityas* in battle.[1200] His battle-axe is the *Parasu*.[1201] His bow is the *Pināka*;[1202] hence he is styled *Pīnākin*.[1203] His trident is called *Trisūla*;[1204] after which he is called the *Sūlin*.[1205] His wife is called Umā,[1206] who is also called Pārvati[1207] and Gauri.[1208] Kubēra is his friend.[1209] Thus, though he has many names and shapes, he is not infrequently made the foremost of all the divinities. Thus he is made out to be Brahma himself in certain places.[1210] He has a thousand names and forms, *sahasranāma* and *bahurūpa*, all of which are classified under the terrible or the mild.[1211] In the terrible form, he appears mostly as Rudra, his *Rig-Vēdic* name;[1212] as Hara he is spoken as the destroyer of the universe;[1213] he is unborn;[1214] he is the maker of the world;[1215] he absorbs, at the destruction of the world, all things created;[1216] he draws in the whole universe at the end of a *yuga* and swallows up all things;[1217] everything owes its origin to him;[1218] he is the Mighty Ruler of the world and as such is called Īsāna, the Ruler; Īsvara, the Lord; Mahēsvara, the Great Lord; Visvēsvara,

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[1200] *Ibid.*, III. 11985; VII. 2838; XIII. 851.

[1201] *Ibid.*, XIII. 864.

[1202] *Ibid.*, XIII. 849, 6396.

[1203] *Ibid.*, XIII. 567, 7090.

[1204] *Ibid.*, XIII. 860.

[1205] *Ibid.*, III. 1642.

[1206] *Ibid.*, XII. 12169.

[1207] *Ibid.*, XII. 13220.

[1208] *Ibid.*, X. 258.

[1209] *Ibid.*, II. 417; XII. 10362.

[1210] *Ibid.*, XIII. 7496, 880, 1144; XII. 10346 in all of which passages he is made the foremost of all; in XIII. 1043, 590 and 704 he is made out to be Brahma himself.

[1211] *Ibid.*, XIII. 7504—7510; see also VII, 9599.

[1212] *Ibid.*, II. 1642; X. 252; XII. 10375; XII. 10370.

[1213] *Ibid.*, XIII. 1146; X. 249; XIII. 7497; XII. 2791.

[1214] *Ibid.*, X. 253.

[1215] *Ibid.*, III. 1626.

[1216] *Ibid.*, IX. 2236.

[1217] *Ibid.*, XIII. 941-943.

[1218] *Ibid.*, VII. 9465.

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Lord of all; Sthānu, the Immovable, etc.[1219] He is also Kāla as destroyer and as such creates all and sweeps away everything again and again.[1220] He is the beginning of the world and the absorber of the world.[1221] As Siva and Sankara, he is the merciful *Sarvabhūta sivaḥ sivaḥ*, he, who is friendly towards all;[1222] *Saumya vaktradhara*, he who has a mild countenance;[1223] *Sarvabhūtahitē rataḥ*, he who rejoices over the happiness of all beings.[1224] Among the heroic deeds of Siva, the most prominent, perhaps, are the following: the receiving of the heavenly Ganga on his head;[1225] the destruction of Daksha's sacrifice;[1226] reducing to ashes Kāma;[1227] the killing of Bhaga;[1228] the overthrowing of the Asura Andhaka;[1229] and the burning of the three fortresses, Tripura.[1230] Among his famous gifts are the following:— the grant of the spear Pāsupata to Arjuna;[1231] the gift of a sword to Aswathaman (*Sauptika Parva*, Chapter VII); the grant of eight boons to Krishna and eight more to Jāmbavati, Krishna's wife; and the gifts to Upamanyu.[1231] These two latter are mentioned in the *Anusāsana Parva* (Chapter XIV).

Puranas about Siva and Vishnu.

In the *Mahābhārata* are also to be found a number of *Purānas* whose object is to favour the worship of Siva in

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[1219] *Ibid.*, VII. 2876; VIII. 436; X. 252; XII. 4498; X. 252; V. 3825; XII. 10292; III. 7042; VII. 9625; X. 252; XIII. 843.

[1220] *Ibid.*, XIII. 7497, 1161, 1188, 942; XII. 5718, 1175; XIII. 56.

[1221] *Ibid.*, XIII. 918; VI. 1278; XIII. 53.

[1222] *Ibid.*, VII. 9622; VIII. 436.

[1223] *Ibid.*, VIII. 869.

[1224] *Ibid.*, XII. 5739.

[1225] *Ibid.*, VI. 223; XIII. 1784; XIII. 1856.

[1226] *Ibid.*, X. 786; VII. 9545; XII. 10272; XIX. 12212; III. 1627; X. 253; XIII. 6468.

[1227] *Ibid.*, XII. 6975-6980.

[1228] *Ibid.*, VII. 9538; XIII. 7475.

[1229] *Ibid.*, VII. 2876, 9462; XII. 10357; XIII. 908.

[1230] *Ibid.*, III. 14569; VII. 9555; XIII. 7482.

[1231] *Ibid.*, III. 11985; VII. 2838; XIII. 851.

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some cases and of Vishnu, in others. This Epic also contains enumerations of the thousand names of Siva and of Vishnu. Among the *Purānas* which favour the religion of Siva are the *Skanda*, the *Siva*, the *Linga* and the *Bhavishya*. The *Mārkandēya* and the *Padma Purānas* inculcate the belief that Brahma, Vishnu and Siva are only one being. This doctrine is found already prominently, mentioned in the *Harivamsa*. This tradition of a common origin is seen in the *Vishnu Purāna* as well, where Siva is the God who springs from the forehead of Brahma, who separates into male and female. The old *Rig-Vēdic* idea of his being the parent of the Rudras, or *Maruts*, half of whom are gentle and brilliant, and the others ferocious and black, is also to be traced in this *Purāna*.

Siva in the Svetasvatara Upanishad.

In the *Svētāśvatara Upanishad*, Siva has not yet become the name of Rudra, though its frequent use as an adjective in connection with the latter indicates that it is in course of becoming fixed as the proper name of the highest God. In this *Upanishad*, Rudra's supremacy is fully maintained, though the *bhakti* aspect is stressed in the most vigorous fashion.[1232] Knowing Siva one is free—we are told —from all nooses (*Śvēta. Upa.*, 16). When there was nothing but darkness, Siva alone existed (*Ibid.*, 18). This *Upanishad*, it is worthy of note, ends with a prayer of two verses addressed to Rudra to protect, of which one is taken from the *Rig-Vēda* (I. 114. 8). The Supreme Brahman is often identified in this *Upanishad* with Rudra, Siva, Īśāna and Mahēśvara. Umā is mentioned in the *Kēna Upanishad*, but though she is not identified as the wife of Rudra, there is the suggestion in it that she had come to be so regarded before that *Upanishad* came into existence. In this, as in other *Atharva-Vēda Upanishads*, the Saiva or

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[1232] *Śvētāśvatara Upa.*, 1-20. This *Upanishad* quotes verses from the *Satarudrīya*, the *Bhagavad-gītā*, and the *Purushasūkta*. The names given to Rudra are: Īśāna, Īśa, Siva and Bhagavat.

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Sākta aspect is stressed. In the *Sūryōpanishad*, the earliest phase of the Sākta school is seen. In the *Atharvasiras*, Rudra becomes the Brahman, while the importance of the *Bhasma* (the sacred ash) is urged as the mode of salvation. In the *Śarabhōpanishad*, the superiority of Rudra is indicated by explaining how Rudra, incarnating himself as Śarabha, destroyed the Man-Lion incarnation of Vishnu. It concludes by identifying Siva with the Supreme Brahman. The *Bhasmajābāla Upanishad* deals with *Bhasma*, *Rudrāksha*, the worship of the *linga*, etc., all intended to indicate the greatness of Siva. The *Akshamālika Upanishad* extols the *Japamāla*; the *Kālāgni-Rudrōpanishad* speaks of the importance of the *Bhasma* (sacred ash); while the *Rudrākshijābāla* refers to the greatness of Pasupati and the virtues attaching to the *Rudrāksha*, *Bhasma* etc. The *Brihad Jābāla* and *Bhasma Jābālōpanishad* likewise deal with the sacred ash and the *Rudrāksha*. The *Pāsupatabrahmōpanishad* makes Pasupati (Siva) the Supreme Brahman. Every phase of Vēdāntic thought is sought to be covered by this *Upanishad*. In the *Paippalādōpanishad*, Brahma is represented as teaching Pippalāda that Rudra is the Supreme Brahman. In the *Atharva-Vēda Upanishads*, the identification of Rudra and the description of Siva as the Absolute is complete.

Siva in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad.

In the *Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, this *Rig-Vēda* conception still persists. The Rudras, the progeny of Rudra, are called the ten vital breaths (*prānās*) with the heart as the eleventh, which seems opposed to the description of Siva as the destroyer of life. The double conception of creator and destroyer seems maintained here.

In the Bhagavad-Gita.

In the *Bhagavad-gītā*, the supremacy of Siva as the ruler of the world is maintained.[1233] Referring to the Rudras, Sri

[1233] See K. T. Telang, *Bhagavad-gītā*, in the *S.B.E.*, VIII. 219, 347.

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Krishna identifies himself with Sankara, which would seem to stress the aspect of beneficence associated with him.[1234]

Linga worship in the Rig-Veda.

The worship of Siva is closely associated with the *linga*.[1235] The earliest reference to the *linga* is to be found in the *Rig-Vēda*, where the context shows that it refers to a kind of worship prevalent not among the Aryans, but among their enemies, whom one authority identifies with the Dasyus.[1236] The worship of the *linga*, it has been suggested, has been taken to correspond to the worship of the phallus, the emblem of the generative power in nature, especially in certain religious or solemn usages. Literally the term *linga* means nothing more than a symbol, mark or sign. Secondarily, it has come to signify Siva worshipped in the form of a phallus. In one passage of the *Rig-Vēda*, Indra is requested not to allow those whose god is *Śiśna* to disturb the rites of the singers;[1237] while in another, he is spoken of as having acquired the riches of a city after having killed those whose god is *Śiśna*.[1238] Sir Ramakrishna Bhandarkar thinks that as we find phallic worshippers being denounced by the Aryans in these passages, Aryans must be taken to have been averse to such worship. He suggests that there is "no trace of this characteristic (*i.e.*, the worship of the *linga* or phallus) in the earlier literature, so far as we have examined it", thereby meaning in the *Rig-Vēda*. He also points out that this kind of worship should have been "borrowed" by the Aryans "from the

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[1234] *Bhagavad-gītā*, X. 23.

[1235] Siva has been identified with Avestic Saurva, see *Zend-Avesta*, *S.B.E.*, 4, lii; *Pahlavi Texts*, *S.B.E.*, 5, 104.

[1236] A. A. Macdonell, *Sanskrit Literature*, 153.

[1237] *Rig-Vēda*, VII. 21. 5.

[1238] Bhandarkar does not quote the exact reference to the *Rig-Vēda* for this statement. Professor A. A. Macdonell likewise refers to two passages in the *Rig-Vēda*, but does not set down the exact references. See *Sanskrit Literature*, 153.

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barbarian tribes with whom the Aryans came in contact". In his view, the learned classes did not adopt it "all at once" but only gradually.[1239] Much weight must naturally attach to this authoritative suggestion, especially as we find that Patanjali does not mention any emblem of Siva as being worshipped in his time but only an image (*pratikriti*).[1240] But apart from Siva worship being identified in *Rig-Vēdic* times with that of the *linga* or the generative principle in nature, there are at least three passages in the *Rig-Vēda* which seem to refer to the possible identification of the male generative organ with the deity. Thus, in one passage, Vishnu is referred to in this manner: "I offer, Vishnu, the oblation placed before thee with the exclamation 'Vashat'; be pleased *Shipivishta*, with my offering," etc.;[1241] then in another, we have the following hymn addressed to Vishnu: "What is to be proclaimed, Vishnu, of thee, when thou sayest, 'I am *Shipivishta*?' Conceal not from us thy real form, although thou hast engaged under a different form in battle."[1242] In a third, the first of these hymns is thus repeated: "I offer, Vishnu, the oblation placed before thee with the exclamation, 'Vashat'; be pleased, *Shipivishta*, with my offering," etc.[1243] The allusion in the second of these texts, is to an incident in which Vishnu is said to have aided Vasishṭha in battle, under an assumed name, and, when questioned, to have said, "I am *Shipivishta*,"—a word of ambiguous meaning. In the three contexts in which it occurs, it has been explained as "penetrated, or clothed with rays of light, *Rashmibhiravishta*, the radiant, the splendid." In common use, however, it means a man naturally without prepuce, in which sense it may be here

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[1239] *Vaishnavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems*, 114—115.

[1240] *Mahābhāshya*, on Pānini V. 3. 99. Patanjali probably lived in the second half of the 2nd century B.C., and in any case not later than the beginning of the Christian era.

[1241] *Rig-Vēda*, VII. 6. 10 (7).

[1242] *Ibid.*, VII. 6. 11 (6).

[1243] *Ibid.*, VII. 6. 11 (7).

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interpreted as implying comparison; in like manner as a man is so denuded, so is Vishnu, according to his own declaration, uncovered by radiance—*Tējasā anāchchhāditāt.* But this seems, as Wilson remarks,[1244] a refinement and it is probably to be understood as usual. The *Śabdakalpadruma* makes *sēpha* mean *purusha śiśna*, the male generative organ.[1245] Modern opinion tends to the view that the worship of the *linga* is fore-shadowed by Vishnu *Shipivishta*, the *Vēdic* deity Vishnu conceived as *Shipivishta.*[1246] Whether the evidence warrants our going so far as to affirm this as a fact may be doubted to some extent; but there can be no question that the idea of the worship of the generative principle in nature was not entirely absent in Vēdic belief. There is ground for the belief, in fact, that the identification of a deity with such worship is also to be seen. But the manner in which it came to be fixed on Siva and how the *linga* came to be identified with Siva, and how Vishnu, the Vēdic deity, came to be dissociated from it, are problems still awaiting consideration.

Linga Worship in the Yajur-Veda and the Mahabharata.

But since we do not see *linga* worship except in its incipient stages in the *Rig-Vēda* and find it in an advanced state in the *Sukla Yajur-Vēda*, where it is part

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[1244] Wilson, *Rig-Vēda*, on VII. 6. 11 (6) and VII. 6. 11 (7).

[1245] Rājarādhākāntadēv: *Śabdakalpadruma*; *Sēpha*; *purusha śiśna* (male generative organ). See *Mahābhārata*, X. 7. 38:

Vikatā kāla lambōshta bruhaschchēpānda pindakāḥ ।
Sēpha sētē rētah pātunā nantaram iti ॥
Sisnaḥ । Sukrāpātē sēpha sēthē patati iti sēphaḥ ॥

See also *Taittiriya Brāhmana*, 3. 33.

Idam prajāpatē rētaḥ sikta maghāvat tatsarōbhavattē dēvā abruvan mēdam prajāpate rētōdushaditi yadubruvan mēdam prajāpatē retōdushaditi, etc.

[1246] See Sir John Woodroffe, *Shakti and Shakta* (Third Edition, 1929), note to Chapter IV, by Brij Lal Mukherji, 104.

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of the *Sōma* sacrifice,[1247] it might, perhaps, be inferred that Siva worship and the identification of such worship with the *linga* had become general by then.[1248] In the *Mahābhārata*, we find the worship of the *linga* referred to in many passages. This shows that the *linga* had, by the time of the Epic period, come to be recognized as the emblem of Siva. Upamanyu's discourse with Krishna shows that this identification of Siva with the *linga* is complete. Upamanyu says that Siva and Umā are the real creators of animals, as these bear the marks of the two, and not the *discus* or the conch-shell or marks of any other god.[1249] This episode, in the opinion of Bhandarkar, fixes the adoption, in its final stage, of the *linga* as an object of worship by the higher classes.

In the Post-Virasaiva Period.

It is quite possible that with the general adoption of the *linga*, the original idea associated with its worship underwent a change. In its latest phase, represented by the period of Vīrasaiva activity, both the development of the *bhakti* doctrine and the reaction induced by philosophic ideas, made the *linga* the great object round which a complete system of philosophical thought and ritualistic worship came to be evolved. Siva possesses in himself a *sakti*, or power, consisting of the rudiments of the individual soul and the material world, and from this *sakti* develops the whole world.

[1247] The worship of the *linga* is held to be recognized in the Pravargya. See *Satapata Brāhmana*, *S.B.E.*, Vol. 44. xlvii.

[1248] The date of the Mohenjō Dāro remains in Sindh, in which the worship of Siva and the *linga* appears in their full-blown forms, should, from the point of view of the evidence afforded by them, be fixed in a period posterior to the *Rig-Vēda*, in which Siva (another form of Rudra) worship and *linga* worship are still in their early stages. The remains may be said to be *post-Rig-Vēdic* and probably also *post-Yajur-Vēdic*. The *Yajur-Véda* introduces us not only to a new geographical era but also to a new epoch of religious and social life in India.

[1249] *Mahābhārata*, *Ānusāsanaparva* (Chapter XIV).

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Evolution of Philosophical Theories.

It is this view that provides the groundwork, as it were, for the development of the opposing philosophical theories of Dvaita, Advaita, Visishtādvaita and Dvaitādvaita schools of thought within the ambit of the Saiva fold.

The Pasupata School.

Historically, the Saiva Dvaita view was first propounded by the Pāsupata school, which is mentioned in the *Mahābhārata*.[1250] It dates from about the second century B.C. and is referred to in lithic inscriptions and in literary writings dating up to the thirteenth century A.D., text-books on the system being in use in the tenth century A.D.[1251] According to this system, the supreme and individual souls are distinct entities, and the *Pradhāna* the constituent cause of the material world. In the delivered condition, the individual soul shakes off its ignorance and weakness and attains boundless knowledge and power of action.

The Saiva Siddhanta School.

The Saiva (or *Saiva Siddhānta*) school which represents the early Saiva system known[1252] is also dualistic but differs from the Pāsupata school in holding that the individual soul in the delivered condition becomes Siva himself; *i.e.*, attains perfect resemblance with God Siva, though he does not possess the power of creation. In the Pāsupata system, the fruit of deliverance is proximity to God, while in the Saiva, it is resemblance to Siva, *sārūpya* as distinguished from *sāmīpya*.

[1250] *Mahābhārata*, *Sāntiparva*, Chapter 349, verse 64. According to Bhandarkar "a certain historical person (Lakular or Nakula) was the founder of the main Saiva system which was the same as that explained by Mādhava as Nakulīsa-Pāsupata and that three other systems arose out of it in later times." *loc. cit.*, 121.

[1251] Bhandarkar, *loc. cit.*, 121, f.n. 2.

[1252] The *mantras* on which the Saiva Siddhānta appears to be based are traced to the *Taittirīya Āranyaka*, X. 43-47, the *Mahānārāyanīya Upanishad*, 17; the *Vāyavīya Samhita* refers to it as the Siddhānta school.

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The Spanda and the Pratyabhijna Schools.

Connected with the Saiva school, but which diverged from it somewhat, are the two systems associated with the names of Vasugupta (ninth century A.D.) and Abhinavagupta (tenth century A.D.) and known as the *Spandasāstra* and the *Pratyabhijnā* schools, together familiarly known as Kashmir Saivism. Both these schools hold that God is independent and creates merely by the force of his will all that comes into existence; neither a prompting cause like *Karma*, nor a material cause like the *Pradhāna* is required, according to them, for creation. Nor do they admit that God himself is the material cause; much less do they allow that Māya generates appearances which are false. God makes the world appear in himself, as if it were distinct from himself, though not so really, as houses or even towns appear in a mirror, and is as unaffected by it as the mirror is by the images reflected in it. The individual soul is thus, according to this system, identical with the Supreme Soul. According to the Spandasāstra school, this identity is not perceived by the individual soul on account of its impurity (*mala*). This impurity vanishes by means of intense contemplation as the result of which the Highest Being breaks in upon the mind of the devotee and absorbs all finite thought. When this condition becomes stabilized, the individual soul is free and becomes the Supreme Soul. According to the Pratyabhijnāsāstra, however, the perception of the identity comes through recognition. The individual soul fails to recognize, in its present condition, its real nature, though in its capacity for knowledge and action, it partakes of the nature of God. When it is led to realize its nature by its preceptor, it recognizes God in itself. These two schools thus actually postulate sameness as opposed to absolute non-duality as does the Advaita school.

The Virasaiva School.

The Vīrasaiva school, which is based on the older Saiva school and owes its origin to teachers (*āchāryas*) who

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preceded Basava,[1253] takes a view somewhat different. Its technique of belief and metaphysical ideology show a course of development which is so entirely different from the older school that it should have required time to develop. Accordingly while the Āchāryas developed a theory based on the ancient Saiva school, Basava, who followed them, probably a century or more later, popularised it and made it the religion of a large number of people inhabiting a vast extent of country. The philosophical idea underlying it has been elaborated in different works. Srīpati briefly describes it as *Dvaitādvaitābhidhāna visēshādvaita siddhānta*, *Dvaitādvaita* which connotes a qualified form of Advaita. He also styles it, as we have seen, as *Bhēdābhēdātmaka visēshādvaita vīrasaiva siddhānta*, the Vīrasaiva Siddhānta, which is a qualified form of Advaita which partakes of the character of *Bhēdābhēda*. It will be seen, he calls it *Dvaitādvaita* and *Bhēdābheda* and in both cases gives the alternative description that it is a variety of Advaita of the qualified type. It has been usual, until recently, to describe Vīrasaivism as *Saiva visishtādvaita*, *Visishtādvaita* which makes Siva the Brahman or the Absolute. From the description given by Srīpati, we have to reckon it as *Bhēdābhēda* or *Dvaitādvaita*, which is a qualified variety of Advaita. The former description has been largely popularised both by a misapprehension of the true character of Vīrasaivism and its theory and by a misattribution of the theory of Srīkantha to Vīrasaivism. Bhandarkar's suggestion that Srīkantha's view "appears to be identical with that of the Vīrasaivas" has also helped to increase the effect of the misattribution. Srīkantha's theory, as we have seen, is confessedly *Saiva visishtādvaita*, whereas Vīrasaivism, is admittedly something very different. Vīrasaivism as taught by the highest exponents of that faith, enunciates the attainment of *Siva tattva*—the one

[1253] The Panchāchāryas have been placed in the eleventh century A.D., though some of them at least must be considerably older, while Basava belongs to the twelfth century A.D.

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Sakti visishtādvaita, but such a description would seem to be not quite appropriate, for, the fundamental basis of true *Visishtādvaita* is lacking in it. The basic idea underlying the Vīrasaiva conception is that the original entity becomes divided, by reason of its own *Sakti*, into God and the individual soul, while its six forms represent only six different ways of looking at it. The first is the Infinite by itself; the second is the form in which it is conceived of as creating by its highest power; the third, as distinct from the material world; the fourth, as in its bodily form, the body being celestial in character; the fifth, as knowledge which it imparts to mankind; and the sixth, as guide to the individual soul in its efforts at seeking absolution. It will be seen that the relationship stressed as between the Infinite and the individual soul is one of a personal character and the *dvaita* aspect of dependence of the individual soul on the Infinite is fundamental to the conception as also the essential difference between the creator and the created. These aspects are even further stressed when we come to realize the extreme emphasis that is laid upon *Bhakti* as the path to salvation on the part of the individual soul. *Bhakti*, indeed, is described as natural to the individual soul; it is its characteristic. It is a tendency towards a leaning upon God, which is inherent in the individual soul. There are, according to the Vīrasaiva school, three stages in the progress of the *Bhakti* towards God, and corresponding to these three stages, there are three divisions in the *Angasthala*, the subject of the individual soul. These are *Yōgānga*, *Bhōgānga* and *Tyāgānga*—the means of attaining *yōga* or union with Siva; the means of enjoyment with Siva; and the means of self-surrender to Siva. Of each of these there are two kinds. Under the first, come *Aikya* and *Śarana*. *Aikya* consists in the partaking of the joys of Siva. This is familiarly called *Samarasa Bhakti*, in which the individual soul enjoys bliss together with God. In *Śarana Bhakti*, the individual soul sees the *Linga* or God, in himself and in everything else. It is a condition of joy to the individual soul by itself. Under the second,

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Bhōgānga, come *Prāṇa* and *Prasāda*. *Prāṇa* consists of self-renunciation and the concentration of the entire mind on the *Linga*. *Prasāda* is attained when the individual soul resigns completely all its enjoyment to the *Linga* and thus acquires serenity. Under the third, *Tyāgānga*, come *Mahēsvara* and *Bhakta*. *Mahēsvara* indicates firm belief in the existence of God and the unity of the *Linga* and the maintenance of rigid discipline which has Siva for its objective. *Bhakta* is one who turns away from this material world and makes to devotion his sole object of life. But in the reverse order, these six stages—*Bhakta*, *Mahēsa* (or *Mahēsvara*), *Prasāda*, *Prāṇalinga*, *Śaraṇa* and *Aikya* of life are called collectively *Shaṭsthaḷa*, a name by which they are famous in Vīrasaiva literature. They indicate in the order named the progress of the individual soul from a turning away from the material world through *Bhakti*, the first step, to *Aikya* or absolution, the last stage. This last stage is termed as *Lingānga sāmarasya*, which indicates equality in blissful experience with Siva. This is the highest stage aimed at and its attainment indicates salvation.[1254] The attainment of this goal, however, does not involve either the perfect identity of the individual soul with the Supreme Being or the shuffling off of its separateness by the individual soul and thus becoming a simple soul unconscious of itself as is propounded by the Advaita school. Vīrasaivism thus holds that Siva Parabrahman, by his own *sakti*, divided

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[1254] *Sāmarasya*, literally means identity in essence. *Cf. Paramam sāmyam upaiti*, See *Mand. Upa.*, III. 1. 3. Bhandarkar gives an account of *Shaṭsthaḷa* in his work quoted above and says it is based on an abstract of Māyideva's *Anubhavasāra* (*l.c.* 136, f.n. 1). The doctrine has received the very widest attention from Vīrasaiva writers, several important works being wholly devoted to its elucidation. Among these may be mentioned *Prabhudēva's Shaṭsthaḷa Gnānacharitra Vachana Tika*, also called *Shaṭsthaḷa Viveka*, which is Mahālingadeva's commentary on Prabhudeva's work; *Ēkottarasthaḷa* by the same author; Jakkanārya's *Nūrondu-sthaḷa*; Māyideva's *Shaṭsthaḷa Gadya*, etc. Māyideva wrote about 1430 A.D. and has been famous in later Vīrasaiva literature as *Shaṭsthaḷa Brahmavādi*. (For further information, see *Mysore Gazetteer*, new edition, Vol. I, 328-331.)

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himself into *Linga* and *Anga*, Supreme Being and individual soul, and by the influence of other kinds of *sakti*, became the creator of the world. His *sakti* is real; and the rudiment of creation is in his *sakti*. It thus differs from *Visishtādvaita*, which, according to Rāmānuja, holds that there is a real rudiment of the soul and of the material world characterising the Supreme Being which afterwards developes. Srīkantha, who calls himself a Siva Visishtādvaitin, and who was not a Vīrasaiva by faith, approximates to the Vīrasaiva philosophical position, though his view is not identical with it. Thus, he suggests that Siva with his *sakti* is the material cause of the world; then, again, he holds that the individual soul in *mukti* is similar to the Supreme Soul, *i.e.*, becomes possessed of its attributes; and finally, he agrees that in blissful experience, the individual and Supreme souls are equal.[1255] These similarities in view as between Srīkantha and Vīrasaivism are not to be wondered at when we remember that about the time he wrote—*circa* 1250 A.D.—Vīrasaivism had reached the zenith of its power and popularity. To concede that Srīkantha's views *approximate* in some points to the Vīrasaiva philosophical position is not, however, equivalent to admitting that he was a Vīrasaiva (or Lingāyat) by faith or belief. Much less was Appayya Dīkshit, who propounded the Sivādvaita view, a Vīrasaiva by faith or belief as has been suggested.[1256] Thus a rapid review of the different philosophical

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[1255] Srīkantha, *Brahma-Sūtras*, II. 2. 38; IV. 4. 3; IV. 4. 2.

[1256] See Keith, *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, at page 481, where he says:—"Srīkantha Sivâchârya, who wrote a *Saivabhāshya* (Ed., *Pandit* VI and VII) on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, belonged to the Vīrasaiva or Lingāyat School of Southern India in which *Bhakti* is specially inculcated and Appayya Dīkshita, the polymath of the 16th century, was of the same persuasion." It is needless to state that Srīkantha was professedly the inculcator of the Sivavisishtādvaita and not the Vīrasaiva school. As for Appayya, he was the chief exponent in his time of the Sivādvaita school. In modern parlance, Srīkantha and Appayya would be classed as *Smārthas* who, philosophically, taught the *Sivavisishtādvaita* and *Sivādvaita*

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schools which have grown round the name of Siva shows that they have, during the course of ages, developed varying points of view. While the earlier schools, including the Pāsupata and the earlier Saiva, were *dvaitic* in character, the later schools represented by the great names of Srīkantha, Srīpati, and Appayya Dīkshita developed theories which have been described as *Sivavisishtādvaita*, *Bhēdābhēdātmaka Viseshādvaita* and *Sivādvaita*.

Influence of Bhedabheda on the Later Upanishads.

In certain of the later *Upanishads*,[1257] the tendency to stress the *abhēda* aspect in *Bhēdābhēda* is seen. Thus, in the *Tejobindu Upanishad*, we have the following characterization which is well worth noting from the point of view suggested:—

Ajakukshau jagannāstihyātmakukshau jagannahi ।
Sarvathā bhēda kalanam dvaitādvaitam navidyatē ॥
Māyā kāryamidam bhēdamastichēd brahmabhāvanam ।
Dēhō 'ham iti dukkham chēd brahmāhamiti nischayaḥ ॥

The suggestion is that the *jagat* cannot be born in one who has no birth. In the womb of the formless *ātma*, there can be no world that is evident. Therefore, in *dvaitādvaita*, the idea of *bhēda* is a misnomer, a fault or defect (*Bhēdakalanam*). *Bhēda*, it is added, is an invention through *māya*. That can be *true* if the form of Brahman (*Brahmabhāvana*) is true. If the undergoing of misery by the body is a fact, then, "I am Brahman" is also a fact. If there is bondage in the

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views, while Srīpati was a Vīrasaiva who taught the *Sivādvaitādvaita* view. The statement of Keith may be traced back to Sir Ramakrishna Gopal Bhandarkar who, writing in 1913, said: "Srīkantha's view appears to be identical with that of the Vīrasaivas." This, as we have seen above, is only correct in a limited sense.

[1257] The word "later" is used here in a relative sense. The remark of Professor Max Müller that "any attempt to fix their relative age (*i.e.*, the age of the different *Upanishads*) seems....for the present almost hopeless" seems still to hold the ground. Introduction to the *Upanishads*, lxix.

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heart, then only could *Brahmachakra* cut it. If it is doubted, then the truth of Brahman can be immediately made to manifest itself.

The element of reality in *Bhēdābhēda* is stressed, though as might be expected in a qualified way, in the *Varāhōpanishad* (11-12) :—

Subhēchchaādi trayam bhūmi bhēdābhēda yutam smrutam ।
Yathāvadvēda buddhēdam jagad jāgrati drishyatē ॥
Advaitē sthairyamāyātē dvaitēcha praśamam gatē ।
Pasyanti svapnavallōkam turya bhūmi suyōgataḥ ॥

Here, we see emphasised the view that the three-fold desires bring to experience the *Bhēda*, the *Abhēda* and *Bhēdābhēda* conditions in this world ; the world appears in the wide-awake state as if it is real ; no sooner does the mind fix itself in immovable *advaita*, the *dvaita* aspect gradually fades off, just as the *ātman* in the dream states becomes one with the Brahman.

In the *Brahmavidyōpanishad*, we have a different note struck. The doctrine of *Dvaitādvaita* is there held to be acceptable. Thus, we have the following declaration :—

Pragnātō'ham Praśāntō'ham Prakāśaḥ Paramēśvaraḥ ।
Ēkadhā chintyamānō'ham dvaitādvaita vilakshaṇaḥ ॥

"I am *Pragnāta* personified, *Praśānta* personified and *Paramēśvara* personified. I am capable of meditating on everything simultaneously. I am both *Dvaita* and *Advaita* in indescribable fashion."

The *Mahōpanishad* refers to *Bhēdābhēda* both implicitly and explicitly. In one place (VI. 62), we have the following :—

Dvaitādvaita samudbhūtairjagan nirmāṇa līlayā ।
Paramātmamayī saktiradvaitaiva vijrumbhate ॥

Here we have the declaration that *jagan nirmāṇa līla* is the result of (the principle of) *Dvaitādvaita* ; this makes it appear or rather produces the impression—*as if Paramātma* and his *sakti* were different from each other. Paramātma and his *sakti*, appearing as two different things, become the cause of the sport of creation.

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In the *Annapūrnōpanishad* (V. 76-77), we have an echo of the same doctrinal declaration of one appearing to be two, though the stress is manifestly on the *advaita* aspect. Thus, we have the declaration:—

Ekaḥ sambhidyatē bhrāntyā māyayā na svarūpataḥ ।
Tasmādadvaita ēvāsti na prapanchō na samsrutiḥ ॥

We have here the suggestion that ignorance makes us think that one appears to split into two through the agency of *māya*, though it does not in reality; therefore, *advaita* alone prevails; there is neither the world nor existence (to talk of). Just as *ākāsa* is spoken of as *ghatākāsa* and *mahākāsa*, similarly through ignorance Īsvara is spoken of as *Jīva* and *Īsvara* (as being two different entities).

In the *Pāsupatabrahmōpanishad*, we have, as might be expected, a firmer adherence to the *Dvaitādvaita* view. First, we have the declaration (*Pāsupatabrahmōpanishad*, 25):—

Natat pasyati chidrūpam Brahmavastvēva pasyati ।
Dharmādharmitva vārtācha bhēdā satihi bhidyatē ॥

Here, we have it stated that the *bhinnarūpa* of *chidrūpa* is not seen by him; but he sees only the *Brahmavastu*; the expressions *Dharma* and *Dharmi*, even though they surely indicate the existence of *bhēda*, become destroyed of their meaning. Then, we have the following statement (*Ibid.*, 26):—

Bhēdābhēdastathā bhēdābhēdaḥ sākshāt parātmanaḥ ।
Nāsti svātmātirēkēna svayamēvāsti sarvadā ॥

Here, we are told that *Bhēda*, *Abhēda* and *Bhēdābhēda* are the visible forms of the Paramātma; they do not excel in their different eminences; they always exist of their own accord. Then, we have this other declaration (*Ibid.*, 27):—

Brahmaiva vidyatē sākshād vastutō vastutō apicha ।
Tathaiva Brahmavignānī kim grihṇāti jahāti kim ॥

We are here told that visibly and otherwise the Brahman form only is perceivable to the eye; if this be so, which of these (*Bhēda*, *Abhēda* or *Bhēdābhēda*) could a *Brahmagnāni* accept or reject. The obvious answer to this query is that he can neither abandon the one nor accept the others.

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heart, then only could *Brahmachakra* cut it. If it is doubted, then the truth of Brahman can be immediately made to manifest itself.

The element of reality in *Bhēdābhēda* is stressed, though as might be expected in a qualified way, in the *Varāhōpanishad* (11-12) :—

Subhēchchaādi trayam bhūmi bhēdābhēda yutam smrutam ।
Yathāvadvēda buddhēdam jagad jāgrati drishyatē ॥
Advaitē sthairyamāyātē dvaitēcha praśamam gatē ।
Pasyanti svapnavallōkam turya bhūmi suyōgataḥ ॥

Here, we see emphasised the view that the three-fold desires bring to experience the *Bhēda*, the *Abhēda* and *Bhēdābhēda* conditions in this world ; the world appears in the wide-awake state as if it is real ; no sooner does the mind fix itself in immovable *advaita*, the *dvaita* aspect gradually fades off, just as the *ātman* in the dream states becomes one with the Brahman.

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The influence of the *Bhēdābhēda* theory in later Vēdāntic thought is thus seen to be not negligible. It is worthy of note that the theory has never been a spent force but has again and again been enunciated in a manner which has borne testimony to its vitality.

Here, we may conclude. Srīpati's point of view is one that has the merit of correlating popular belief with philosophic texts, and philosophic texts with a conception of the Truth which has had a wide vogue. Srīpati finds a basis for the Vīrasaiva faith that has not only Vēdic and Upanishadic sanction in its favour, but also the authority of commentators more ancient than himself. He was not a mere systematiser of thought, but one who made faith accord with reason. His view is one that has found an echo in the West as well, and it is one too that can stand the test of a further examination at the hands of philosophic thinkers of the future, in the East and the West.

॥ OM TAT SAT ॥

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APPENDIX A.

A Comparative Table showing how the four principal Bhashyakaras formed the Adhikaranas and clubbed the Sutras as required by them.

Adhyaya I, Pada 1

According to Śrī Śankara Bhāshya		According to Śrī Rāmānuja Bhāshya		According to Śrī Madhva Bhāshya		According to Śrīkara Bhāshya	
Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—11	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—11	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—12	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—11
1	Jignāsādhikaraṇam	1	Jignāsādhikaraṇam	1	Jignāsādhikaraṇam	1	Jignāsādhikaraṇam
2	Janmādyadhikaraṇam	2	Janmādyadhikaraṇam	2	Janmādhikaraṇam	2	Janmādyadhikaraṇam
3	Śāstrayōnitvādhikaraṇam	3	Śāstrayōnitvādhikaraṇam	3	Śāstrayōnitvādhikaraṇam	3	Śāstrayōnitvādhikaraṇam
4	Samanvayādhikaraṇam	4	Samanvayādhikaraṇam	4	Samanvayādhikaraṇam	4	Samanvayādhikaraṇam
5–11	Īkshatyadhikaraṇam	5–12	Īkshatyadhikaraṇam	5–11	Īkshatyadhikaraṇam	5–12	Īkshatyadhikaraṇam
12–19	Ānandamayādhikaraṇam	13–20	Ānandamayādhikaraṇam	12–19	Ānandamayādhikaraṇam	13–20	Ānandamayādhikaraṇam
20–21	Antaradhikaraṇam	21–22	Antaradhikaraṇam	20–21	Antastatvādhikaraṇam	21–22	Antarādhikaraṇam
22	Ākāśādhikaraṇam	23	Ākāśādhikaraṇam	22	Ākāśādhikaraṇam	23–24	Ākāśādhikaraṇam
23	Prāṇādhikaraṇam	24	Prāṇādhikaraṇam	23	Praṇādhikaraṇam	25–28	Jyōtiradhikaraṇam
24–27	Jyōtischaraṇādhikaraṇam	25–28	Jyōtiradhikaraṇam	24	Jyōtiradhikaraṇam	29–31	Prāṇādhikaraṇam
28–31	Pratardanādhikaraṇam	29–32	Indraprāṇādhikaraṇam	25–27	Chchandōbhidhānādhikaraṇam	32	Bāhyaprāṇalingādhikaraṇam
				28–31	Pādāntyaprāṇādhikaraṇam		

Adhyaya I, Pada 2

Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—7	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—6	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—7	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—7
1–8	Sarvatraprasiddhyadhikaraṇam	1-8	Sarvatraprasiddhyadhikaraṇam	1-8	Sarvagatatvādhikaraṇam	1-8	Sarvatraprasiddhyadhikaraṇam
9–10	Attrādhikaraṇam	9-12	Attrādhikaraṇam	9-10	Attritvādhikaraṇam	9-10	Attritvādhikaraṇam
11–12	Guhāpravishṭādhikaraṇam	13-18	Antarādhikaraṇam	11-12	Guhādhikaraṇam	11-12	Guhādhikaraṇam
13–17	Antarādhikaraṇam	19-21	Antaryāmyadhikaraṇam	13-17	Antarādhikaraṇam	13-17	Antarādhikaraṇam

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Adhyaya I, Pada 2—(*Contd.*)

According to Śrī Śankara Bhāshya Sūtras	According to Śrī Rāmānuja Bhāshya Sūtras	According to Śrī Madhva Bhāshya Sūtras	According to Śrīkara Bhāshya Sūtras
18-20 Antaryāmyadhikaraṇam	22-24 Adriśyatvādiguṇakādhikaraṇam	18-20 Antaryāmyadhikaraṇam	18-20 Antaryāmyadhikaraṇam
21-23 Adriśyatvādhikaraṇam	25-33 Vaiśvānarādhikaraṇam	21-23 Adriśyatvādhikaraṇam	21-23 Adriśyatvādhikaraṇam
24-32 Vaiśvānarādhikaraṇam		24-32 Vaiśvānarādhikaraṇam	24-32 Vaiśvānarādhikaraṇam

Adhyaya I, Pada 3

Sūtras Adhikaraṇas 1—13	Sūtras Adhikaraṇas 1—11	Sūtras Adhikaraṇas 1-14	Sūtras Adhikaraṇas 1—13
1-7 Dyubhvādyadhikaraṇam	1-6 Dyubhvādyadhikaraṇam	1-7 Dyubhvādyadhikaraṇam	1-7 Dyubhvādyadhikaraṇam
8-9 Bhūmādhikaraṇam	7-8 Bhūmādhikaraṇam	8-9 Bhūmādhikaraṇam	8-9 Bhūmādhikaraṇam
10-12 Aksharādhikaraṇam	9-11 Aksharādhikaraṇam	10-12 Aksharādhikaraṇam	10-12 Aksharādhikaraṇam
13 Īkshatikarmādhikaraṇam	12 Īkshatikarmādhikaraṇam	13 Sadadhikaraṇam	13 Īkshatikarmādhikaraṇam
14-21 Daharādhikaraṇam	13-22 Daharādhikaraṇam	14-21 Daharādhikaraṇam	14-21 Daharādhikaraṇam
22-23 Anukrityadhikaraṇam	23-24 Pramitādhikaraṇam	22-23 Anukrityadhikaraṇam	22-23 Anukrityadhikaraṇam
24-25 Pramitādhikaraṇam	25-29 Dēvatādhikaraṇam	24-25 Vāmanādhikaraṇam	24-25 Pramitādhikaraṇam
26-33 Dēvatādhikaraṇam	30-32 Madhvadhikaraṇam	26-33 Dēvatādhikaraṇam	26-33 Dēvatādhikaraṇam
34-38 Apaśūdrādhikaraṇam	33-39 Apaśūdrādhikaraṇam	34-38 Apaśūdrādhikaraṇam	34-38 Apaśūdrādhikaraṇam
39 Kampanādhikaraṇam	40-41 Pramitādhikaraṇam	39 Kampanādhikaraṇam	39 Kampanādhikaraṇam
40 Jytōiradhikaraṇam	42-44 Arthāntaratvādhikaraṇam	40 Jyōtiradhikaraṇam	40 Jyōtiradhikaraṇam [karaṇam
41 Arthāntaratvādivyapadēśādhikaraṇam		41 Ākāśādhikaraṇam	41 Arthāntaratvādivyapadeśādhi-
42-43 Sushuptyadhikaraṇam		42 Sushuptyadhikaraṇam	42-43 Sushuptyadhikaraṇam
		43 Brāhmanādhikaraṇam	

Adhyaya I, Pada 4

Sūtras Adhikaraṇas 1—8	Sūtras Adhikaraṇas 1—8	Sūtras Adhikaraṇas 1—7	Sūtras Adhikaraṇas 1—8
1-7 Ānumānikādhikaraṇam	1-7 Ānumānikādhikaraṇam	1-9 Ānumānādhikaraṇam	1-7 Ānumānikādhikaraṇam
8-10 Chamasādhikaraṇam	8-10 Chamasādhikaraṇam	10-11 Jyotirupakramādhikaraṇam	8-10 Chamasādhikaraṇam
11-13 Sankhyōpasangrahādhikaraṇam	11-13 Sankhyōpasangrahādhikara-	12-14 Nasankhyōpasangrahādhikara-	11-13 Sankhyōpasangrahādhikaraṇam
14-15 Kāraṇatvādhikaraṇam	14-15 Kāraṇatvādhikaraṇam [ṇam	15 Ākāśādhikaraṇam [ṇam	14-15 Kāraṇatvādhikaraṇam
16-18 Bālākyadhikaraṇam	16-18 Jagadvāchitvādhikaraṇam	16-23 Samākarshādhikaraṇam	16-18 Bālākyadhikaraṇam
19-22 Vākyānvayādhikaraṇam	19-22 Vākyānvayādhikaraṇam	24-27 Prakrityadhikaraṇam [ṇam	19-22 Vākyānvayādhikaraṇam
23-27 Prakrityadhikaraṇam	23-28 Prakrityadhikaraṇam	28 Ētēnasarvēvyākhyātādhikara-	23-27 Prakrityadhikaraṇam
28 Sarvavyākhyānādhikaraṇam	29 Sarvavyākhyānādhikaraṇam		28 Sarvavyākhyānādhikaraṇam

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Adhyaya II, Pada 1

Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—13
1-2	Smrityadhikaraṇam
3	Yōgapratyuktyadhikaraṇam
4-11	Navilakshaṇatvādhikaraṇam
12	Śishṭāparigrahādhikaraṇam
13	Bhōktrāpatyadhikaraṇam
14-20	Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇam
21-23	Itaravyapadeśādhikaraṇam
24-25	Upasamhāradarśanādhikaraṇam
26-29	Kritsnaprasaktyadhikaraṇam
30-31	Sarvōpetādhikaraṇam
32-33	Prayōjanavatvādhikaraṇam
34-36	Vaishamyanairghrinyādhikaraṇam
37	Sarvadharmōpapatyādhikaraṇam

Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—10
1-2	Smrityadhikaraṇam
3	Yōgapratyuktyadhikaraṇam
4-12	Vilakshanatvādhikaraṇam
13	Śishṭāparigrahādhikaraṇam
14	Bhōktrāpatyadhikaraṇam
15-20	Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇam
21-23	Itaravyapadeśādhikaraṇam
24-25	Upasamhāradarśanādhikaraṇam
26-31	Kritsnaprasaktyadhikaraṇam
32-34	Prayōjanavatvādhikaraṇam

Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—11
1-3	Smrityadhikaraṇam
4-5	Navilakshaṇatvādhikaraṇam
6-7	Abhimānyadhikaraṇam
8-13	Asadadhikaraṇam
14	Bhōktrādhikaraṇam
15-21	Ārambhāṇādhikaraṇam
22-27	Itaravyapadeśādhikaraṇam
28-32	Śrutēstuśabdamūlatvādhikaraṇam
33-34	Naprayōjanādhikaraṇam
35-37	Vaishamyanairghrinyādhikaraṇam
38	Sarvadharmōpapatyādhikaraṇam

Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—11
1-2	Smrityanavakāśādhikaraṇam
3	Yōgapratyuktyadhikaraṇam
4-11	Navilakshaṇatvādhikaraṇam
12	Śishṭāparigrahādhikaraṇam
13	Bhōktrāpatyadhikaraṇam
14-20	Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇam
21-23	Itaravyapadeśādhikaraṇam
24-25	Upasamhāradarśanādhikaraṇa-
26-33	Kritsnaprasaktyadhikaraṇam
34-35	Vaishamyanairghrinyādhikara-
36	Sarvadharmōpapatyādhikara-

Adhyaya II, Pada 2

Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—8
1-10	Rachanānupapatyadhikaraṇam
11	Mahaddīrghādhikaraṇam
12-17	Paramāṇujagadakāraṇatvādhi.
18-27	Samudāyādhikaraṇam
28-32	Nābhāvādhikaraṇam
33-36	Ēkasminnasambhavādhi.
37-41	Patyādhikaraṇam
42-45	Utpatyasambhavādhikaraṇam

Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—8
1-9	Rachanānupapatyadhikaraṇam
10-16	Mahaddīrghādhikaraṇam
17-26	Samudāyādhikaraṇam
27-29	Upalabdhyadhikaraṇam
30	Sarvathānupapatyadhikaraṇam
31-34	Ēkasminnasambhavādhi.
35-38	Pasupatyadhikaraṇam
39-42	Utpatyasambhavādhikaraṇam

Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—12
1-4	Rachanānupapatyadhikaraṇam
5	Anyatrābhāvādhikaraṇam
6	Abhyupagamādhikaraṇam
7-8	Parushāśmādhikaraṇam
9-10	Anyathānumityadhikaraṇam
11-17	Vaiśēshikādhikaraṇam
18-25	Samudāyādhikaraṇam
26-29	Asadadhikaraṇam
30-32	Anupalabdhyadhikaraṇam
33-36	Naikasminnadhikaraṇam
37-41	Patyuradhikaraṇam
42-45	Utpatyadhikaraṇam

Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—9
1-9	Rachanānupapatyadhikaraṇam
10	Mahaddīrghādhikaraṇam
11-16	Paramāṇujagadakāraṇatvādhi.
17-26	Samudāyādhikaraṇam
27-29	Nābhāvādhikaraṇam
30-31	Sarvathānupapatyadhikaraṇam
32-36	Ēkasminnasambhavādhi.
37-41	Patyadhikaraṇam
42-45	Utpatyasambhavādhikaraṇam

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Adhyaya II, Pada 3

According to Śrī Śankara Bhāshya		According to Śrī Rāmānuja Bhāshya		According to Śrī Madhva Bhāshya		According to Śrīkara Bhāshya	
Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—17	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—7	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—19	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—15
1-7	Viyadadhikaraṇam	1-9	Viyadadhikaraṇam	1-7	Viyadadhikaraṇam	1-6	Viyadadhikaraṇam
8	Mātariśvādhikaraṇam	10-17	Tējō'dhikaraṇam	8	Mātariśvādhikaraṇam	7-8	Mātariśvādhikaraṇam
9	Asambhavādhikaraṇam	18	Ātmādhikaraṇam	9	Asambhavādhikaraṇam	9	Tējō'dhikaraṇam
10	Tējō'dhikaraṇam	19-32	Gnādhikaraṇam	10	Tējō'dhikaraṇam	10	Abadhikaraṇam
11	Abadhikaraṇam	33-39	Kartradhikaraṇam	11	Abadhikaraṇam	11	Prithivyadhikārādhikaraṇam
12	Prithivyadhikaraṇam	40-41	Parāyattādhikaraṇam	12	Prithivyadhikaraṇam	12	Tadabhidhyānādhikaraṇam
13	Tadabhidhyānādhikaraṇam	42-52	Amśādhikaraṇam	13	Tadabhidhyānādhikaraṇam	13	Viparyayādhikaraṇam
14	Viparyayādhikaraṇam			14	Viparyayādhikaraṇam	14	Antaravignānādhikaraṇam
15	Antaravignānādhikaraṇam			15-16	Antarādhikaraṇam	15	Charācharavyapāśrayādhi.
16	Charācharavyapāśrayādhi.			17	Ātmādhikaraṇam	16	Ātmādhikaraṇam
17	Ātmādhikaraṇam			18-19	Gnādhikaraṇam	17	Gnādhikaraṇam
18	Gnādhikaraṇam			20-26	Utkrāntyadhikaraṇam	18-30	Utkrāntigatyadhikaraṇam
19-32	Utkrāntigatyadhikaraṇam			27	Vyatirēkādhikaraṇam	31-37	Kartādhikaraṇam
33-39	Kartradhikaraṇam			28-29	Pruthagadhikaraṇam	38-39	Parāyattādhikaraṇam
40	Takshādhikaraṇam			30	Yāvadadhikaraṇam	40-50	Amśādhikaraṇam
41-42	Parāyattādhikaraṇam			31-32	Pumstvādhikaraṇam		
43-53	Amśādhikaraṇam			33-42	Kartrutvādhikaraṇam		
				43-50	Amśādhikaraṇam		
				51-53	Adrushṭādhikaraṇam		

Adhyaya II, Pada 4

Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—9	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—8	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—13	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—7
1-4	Prāṇōtpatyadhikaraṇam	1-3	Prāṇōtpatyadhikaraṇam	1-3	Prāṇōtpatyadhikaraṇam	1-3	Prāṇōtpatyadhikaraṇam
5-6	Saptagatyadhikaraṇam	4-5	Saptagatyadhikaraṇam	4	Tatprāgādhikaraṇam	4	Saptagatyadhikaraṇam
7	Prāṇāṇutvādhikaraṇam	6-7	Praṇāṇutvādhikaraṇam	5	Tatpūrvakatvādhikaraṇam	5-6	Prāṇāṇutvādhikaraṇam
8	Prāṇaśrēshṭhyādhikaraṇam	8-11	Vāyukriyādhikaraṇam	6-7	Saptagatyadhikaraṇam	7-11	Vāyukriyādhikaraṇam
9-12	Vāyukriyādhikaraṇam	12	Śrēshṭāṇutvādhikaraṇam	8	Aṇvadhikaraṇam	12-13	Jyōtirādyadhikaraṇam
13	Śrēshṭāṇutvādhikaraṇam	13-14	Jyōtirādhyadhishṭhānādhi	9-10	Śrēshṭādhikaraṇam	14-15	Ta indriyāṇi tadvyapadēśādhi.
14-16	Jyōtirādyadhikaraṇam	15-16	Indriyādhikaraṇam	11-12	Chakshurādyadhikaraṇam	16-18	Samgnāmūrtikliptyadhi.
17-19	Indriyādhikaraṇam	17-19	Samgnāmūrtikliptyadhikara	13	Panchavrityadhikaraṇam		
20-22	Samgnāmūrtiklriptyadhikaraṇam			14	Aṇuvadhikaraṇam		
				15-17	Jyōtirādhikaraṇam		
				18-20	Indriyādhikaraṇam		
				21	Samgnādhikaraṇam		
				22-23	Māmsādhikaraṇam		

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Adhyaya III, Pada 1

Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—6
1-7	Tadantarapratipatyadhi.
8-11	Kritātyayādhikaraṇam
12-21	Anishṭādikāryādhikaraṇam
22	Svābhāvyāpatyadhikaraṇam
23	Nātichirādhikaraṇam
24-27	Anyādhishṭhitādhikaraṇam

Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—6
1-7	Tadantarapratipatyadhikaraṇam
8-11	Kritātyayādhikaraṇam
12-21	Anishṭhādikāryādhikaraṇam
22	Tatsvābhāvyāpatyadhikaraṇam
23	Nātichirādhikaraṇam
24-27	Anyādhishṭhitādhikaraṇam

Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—20
1	Tadantarādhikaraṇam
2	Trayātmakatvādhikaraṇam
3	Prāṇagatyadhikaraṇam
4	Agnyādyadhikaraṇam
5	Prathamādhikaraṇam
6	Aśrutatvādhikaraṇam
7	Bhaktādhikaraṇam
8	Krutātyayādhikaraṇam
9	Yathaitādhikaraṇam
10-12	Charanādhikaraṇam
13-15	Anishṭādhikaraṇam
16	Apisaptādhikaraṇam
17	Tatrāpyadhikaraṇam
18	Vidyādhikaraṇam
19-23	Natritīyādhikaraṇam
24	Tatsvābhāvyādhikaraṇam
25	Nātichirēṇādhikaraṇam
26-27	Anyādhikaraṇam
28	Rēto'dhikaraṇam
29	Yōnyadhikaraṇam

Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—6
1-7	Tadantarapratipatyadhi-
8-11	Kritātyayādhikaraṇam
12-21	Anishṭādikāryādhikaraṇam
22	Tatsvābhāvyāpatyadhikaraṇam
23	Nātichirādhikaraṇam
24-27	Ananyādhishṭhitādhikaraṇam

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Adhyaya III, Pada 2

According to Śrī Śankara Bhāshya		According to Śrī Rāmānuja Bhāshya		According to Śrī Madhva Bhāshya		According to Śrīkara Bhāshya	
Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—8	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—8	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—20	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—9
1-6	Sandhyādhikaraṇam	1-6	Prāṇōpatyadhikaraṇam Sandhyādhikaraṇam	1-4	Sandhyādhikaraṇam	1-6	Sandhyādhikaraṇam
7-8	Tadabhāvādhikaraṇam	7-8	Tadabhāvādhikaraṇam	5	Parābhidhyānādhikaraṇam	7-8	Tadabhāvādhikaraṇam
9	Karmānusmritiśabdavidhyadhi.	9	Karmānusmritiśabdavidhyadhi	6	Dēhayōgādhikaraṇam	9	Karmānusmritiśabdavidhyadhi.
10	Mugdhādhikaraṇam	10	Mugdhādhikaraṇam	7	Tadabhāvādhikaraṇam	10	Mugdhādhikaraṇam
11-21	Ubhayalingādhikaraṇam	11-25	Ubhayalingādhikaraṇam	8	Prabōdhādhikaraṇam	11-20	Ubhayalingādhikaraṇam
22-30	Prakritaitāvatvādhikaraṇam	26-29	Ahikuṇḍalādhikaraṇam	9	Karmānusmrityadhikaraṇam	21-25	Prakrutaitāvatvādhikaraṇam
31-37	Parādhikaraṇam	30-36	Parādhikaraṇam	10	Sampatyadhikaraṇam	26-34	Ahikuṇḍalādhikaraṇam
38-41	Phalādhikaraṇam	37-40	Phalādhikaraṇam	11-13	Nasthānatō'pyadhikaraṇam	35-36	Tathānyapratibōdhādhi.
				14-17	Arūpādhikaraṇam	37-40	Phalādhikaraṇam
				18	Upamādhikaraṇam		
				19	Ambuvadadhikaraṇam		
				20-21	Vriddhihrāsādhikaraṇam		
				22	Prakrutyadhikaraṇam		
				23-27	Avyaktatvādhikaraṇam		
				28-31	Ahikuṇḍalādhikaraṇam		
				32-34	Paramatādhikaraṇam		
				35-36	Sthānaviśēshādhikaraṇam		
				37	Tathānyatvādhikaraṇam		
				38	Parādhikaraṇam		
				39-42	Phalādhikaraṇaśēshaḥ		

Adhyaya III, Pada 3

Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—36	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—25	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—42	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—28
1-4	Sarvavēdāntapratyayādhi.	1-5	Sarvavedāntapratyayādhi.	1-5	Sarvavēdādhikaraṇam	1-5	Sarvavēdāntapratyayādhi.
5	Upasamhārādhikaraṇam	6-9	Anyathātvādhikaraṇam	6-9	Upasamhārādhikaraṇam	6-9	Anyathātvādhikaraṇam
6-8	Anyathātvādhikaraṇam	10	Sarvabhēdādhikaraṇam	10	Prāptyadhikaraṇam	10	Sarvabhēdādhikaraṇam
9	Vyāptyadhikaraṇam	11-17	Ānandādyadhikaraṇam	11	Sarvabhēdādhikaraṇam	11-17	Ānandādhikaraṇam
10	Sarvabhēdādhikaraṇam	18	Kāryākhyānādhikaraṇam	12	Ānandādhikaraṇam	18	Kāryākhyādhikaraṇam

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11-13 Ānandādyadhikaraṇam
14-15 Ādhyānādhikaraṇam
16-17 Ātmagrihītyadhikaraṇam
18 Kāryākhyānādhikaraṇam
19 Samānādhikaraṇam
20-22 Sambandhādhikaraṇam
23 Sambhrutyadhikaraṇam
24 Purushavidyādhikaraṇam
25 Vēdhādyadhikaraṇam
26 Hānyadhikaraṇam
27-28 Sāmparāyādhikaraṇam
29-30 Gatērarthavatvādhikaraṇam
31 Aniyamādhikaraṇam
32 Yāvadadhikārādhikaraṇam
33 Aksharādyadhikaraṇam
34 Iyadadhikaraṇam
35-36 Antaratvādhikaraṇam
37 Vyatihārādhikaraṇam
38 Satyādyadhikaraṇam
39 Kamādyadhikaraṇam
40-41 Ādarādhikaraṇam
42 Tannirdhāraṇādhikaraṇam
43 Pradānādhikaraṇam
44-52 Lingabhūyastvādhikaraṇam
53-54 Śarīrēbhāvādhikaraṇam
55-56 Angāvabaddhādhikaraṇam
57 Bhūmajjayastvādhikaraṇam
58 Śabdādibhēdādhikaraṇam
59 Vikalpādhikaraṇam
60 Kāmyādhikaraṇam
61-66 Yathāśrayābhāvādhikaraṇam

19 Samānādhikaraṇam
20-22 Sambandhādhikaraṇam
23 Sambhrutyadhikaraṇam
24 Purushavidyādhikaraṇam
25 Vēdhādyadhikaraṇam
26 Hānyadhikaraṇam
27-31 Sāmparāyādhikaraṇam
32 Aniyamādhikaraṇam
33-34 Aksharādhyadhikaraṇam
35-37 Antaratvādhikaraṇam
38-40 Kāmādyadhikaraṇam
41 Tannirdhāraniyamādhikaraṇam
42 Pradānādhikaraṇam
43 Lingabhūyastvādhikaraṇam
44-50 Pūrvavikalpādhikaraṇam
51-52 Śarīrēbhāvādhikaraṇam
53-54 Angāvabaddhādhikaraṇam
55 Bhūmajjayastvādhikaraṇam
56 Śabdādibhēdādhikaraṇam
57-58 Vikalpādhikaraṇam
59-64 Yathāśrayābhāvādhikaraṇam

13 Priyaśirastvādhikaraṇam
14 Itarādhikaraṇam
15-16 Ādhyānādhikaraṇam
17 Ātmagrihītyadhikaraṇam
18 Anvayādhikaraṇam
19 Kāryādhikaraṇam
20-21 Samānādhikaraṇam
22-23 Navādhikaraṇam
24 Sambhrutyadhikaraṇam
25 Purushādhikaraṇam
26 Vēdhādhikaraṇam
27-28 Hānyadhikaraṇam
29-31 Chhandādhikaraṇam
32 Aniyamādhikaraṇam
33-34 Yāvadadhikaraṇam
35-37 Iyadāmananādhikaraṇam
38 Vyatīhārādhikaraṇam
39 Satyādhikaraṇam
40-42 Kāmādhikaraṇam
43 Nirdhāranādhikaraṇam
44 Pradānādhikaraṇam
45 Lingabhūyastvādhikaraṇam
46-47 Vikalpādhikaraṇam
48-49 Vidyādhikaraṇam
50 Śrutyadhikaraṇam
51 Anubandhādhikaraṇam
52 Pragnāntarādhikaraṇam
53 Nasāmānyādhikaraṇam
54 Parēnādhikaraṇam
55-56 Ekādhikaraṇam
57-58 Angāvabaddhādhikaraṇam
59 Bhūmādhikaraṇam
60 Nānāśabdādhikaraṇam
61 Vikalpādhikaraṇam
62 Kāmyādhikaraṇam
63-66 Angādhikaraṇam
67-68 Navādhikaraṇam

19 Samānādhikaraṇam
20-22 Sambandhādhikaraṇam
23 Sambhrutyadhikaraṇam
24 Purushavidyādhikaraṇam
25 Vedhādyadhikaraṇam
26 Hānyadhikaraṇam
27-31 Sāmparāyādhikaraṇam
32 Aniyamādhikaraṇam
33-34 Aksharādyadhikaraṇam
35-37 Antaratvādhikaraṇam
38-40 Kāmyadhikaraṇam
41 Tannirdhāraṇaniyamādhi.
42 Pradhānādhikaraṇam
43 Lingabhūyastvādhikaraṇam
44-50 Pūrvavikalpādhikaraṇam
51-52 Ēkātmādhikaraṇam
53-54 Angāvabaddhādhikaraṇam
55 Bhūmnaḥkratavajjayastvādhi.
56 Nānāsabdādibhēdādhikaraṇam
57-58 Vikalpādhikaraṇam
59-60 Angēshuyathābhāvāśrayādhi.
61-62 Samāhārādhikaraṇam
63-64 Navātatsahabhāvādhikaraṇam

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Adhyaya III, Pada 4

According to Śrī Śankara Bhāshya		According to Śrī Rāmānuja Bhāshya		According to Śrī Madhva Bhāshya		According to Śrīkara Bhāshya	
Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—17	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—15	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—11	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—17
1-17	Purushārthādhikaraṇam	1-20	Purushārthādhikaraṇam	1-9	Purushārthādhikaraṇam	1-16	Purushārthādhikaraṇam
18-20	Parāmarśādhikaraṇam	21-22	Stutimātrādhikaraṇam	10-12	Asārvatrikādhikaraṇam	17-20	Ūrdhvarētasyādhikaraṇam
21-22	Stutimātrādhikaraṇam	23-24	Pariplavārthādhikaraṇam	13	Aviśeshādhikaraṇam	21-22	Stutimātrādhikaraṇam
23-24	Pariplavādhikaraṇam	25	Agnīndhanādhikaraṇam	14-33	Stutyadhikaraṇam	23-24	Pariplavādhikaraṇam
25	Agnīndhanādyadhikaraṇam	26	Sarvāpekshādhikaraṇam	34-40	Ubhayalingādhikaraṇam	25	Agnīndhanādhikaraṇam
26-27	Sarvāpēkshādhikaraṇam	27	Śamadamādyadhikaraṇam	41-43	Ādhikārikādhikaraṇam	26	Sarvāpēkshādhikaraṇam
28-31	Sarvānnānumatyadhikaraṇam	28-31	Sarvānnānumatyadhikaraṇam	44-46	Phalaśrutyadhikaraṇam	27	Śamādyadhikaraṇam
32-35	Āśrayakarmādhikaraṇam	32-35	Vihitatvādhikaraṇam	47-48	Krutsnabhāvādhikaraṇam	28-31	Sarvānnānumatyadhikaraṇam
36-39	Vidhurādhikaraṇam	36-39	Vidhurādhikaraṇam	49	Anvayādhikaraṇam	32-35	Vihitatvādhikaraṇam
40	Tadbhūtādhikaraṇam	40-43	Tadbhūtādhikaraṇam	50	Aihikādhikaraṇam	36-37	Vidhurādhikaraṇam
41-42	Adhikārādhikaraṇam	44-45	Svāmyādhikaraṇam	51	Muktiphalādhikaraṇam	40-43	Tadbhūtādhikaraṇam
43	Bahiradhikaraṇam	46-48	Sahakāryāntaravidhyadhi-			44-46	Svāmyadhikaraṇam
44-46	Svāmyadhikaraṇam	49	Anāvishkārādhikaraṇam			47-48	Sahakāryāntaravidhyadhi.
47-49	Sahakāryāntaravidhayadhi.	50	Aihikādhikaraṇam			49	Maunādhikaraṇam
50	Anāvishkārādhikaraṇam	51	Muktiphalādhikaraṇam			50	Anāvishkārādhikaraṇam
51	Aihikādhikaraṇam					51	Aihikādhikaraṇam
52	Muktiphalādhikaraṇam					52	Muktiphalādhikaraṇam

Adhyaya IV, Pada 1

Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—14	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—11	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—8	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—10
1-2	Āvrityadhikaraṇam	1-2	Āvrityadhikaraṇam	1-2	Āvrityadhikaraṇam	1-2	Āvrityadhikaraṇam
3	Ātmatvōpāsanādhikaraṇam	3	Ātmatvopāsanādhikaraṇam	3	Ātmādhikaraṇam	3	Ātmādhikaraṇam
4	Pratīkādhikaraṇam	4-5	Pratīkādhikaraṇam	4	Napratīkādhikaraṇam	4-5	Pratīkādhikaraṇam
5	Brahmadrushtyadhikaraṇam	6	Ādityādimatyadhikaraṇam	5	Brahmādhikaraṇam	6	Ādityādimātyadhikaraṇam
6	Ādityādimatyadhikaraṇam	7-11	Āsīnassambhavādhikaraṇam	6	Ādityādhikaraṇam	7-12	Āsīnādhikaraṇam
7-10	Āsīnādhikaraṇam	12	Āprāyanādhikaraṇam	7-11	Āsinādhikaraṇam	13	Tadadhigamādhikaraṇam
11	Ēkāgratādhikaraṇam	13	Tadadhigamādhikaraṇam	12	Āprāyanādhikaraṇam	14	Itarādhikaraṇam

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12 Āprāyanādhikaraṇam
13 Tadadhigamādhikaraṇam
14 Itarasansleshādhikaraṇam
15 Anārabdhādhikaraṇam
16 Agnihōtrādyadhikaraṇam
17 Vidyāgnānasādhanatvādhi.
18–19 Itarakshapaṇādhikaraṇam

14 Itarādhikaraṇam
15 Anārabdhakāryādhikaraṇam
16-18 Agnihōtrādhikaraṇam
19 Itarakshapanādhikaraṇam

13-19 Tadadhigamādhikaraṇam

15 Anārabdhakāryādhikaraṇam
16-18 Agnihōtrādhikaraṇam
19 Bhogādhikaraṇam

Adhyaya IV, Pada 2

Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—11	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—11	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—10	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—11
1–2	Vāgadhikaraṇam	1–2	Vāgadhikaraṇam	1–2	Vāngmanōdhikaraṇam	1–2	Vāgadhikaraṇam
3	Manōdhikaraṇam	3	Manōdhikaraṇam	3	Manaḥprāṇādhikaraṇam	3	Manōdhikaraṇam
4–6	Adhyakshādhikaraṇam	4	Adhyakshādhikaraṇam	4	Adhyakshādhikaraṇam	4	Adhyakshādhikaraṇam
7	Āsrutyupakramādhikaraṇam	5–6	Bhūtādhikaraṇam	5	Bhūtādhikaraṇam	5–6	Bhūtādhikaraṇam
8–11	Samsāravyapadeśādhikaraṇam	7–13	Āsrutyupakramādhikaraṇam	6	Ēkasminnadhikaraṇam	7–13	Āsrutyupakramādhikaraṇam
12–14	Pratiśēshādhikaraṇam	14	Parasampatyadhikaraṇam	7–14	Samānādhikaraṇam	14	Sarvasampatyadhikaraṇam
15	Vāgadhikaraṇam	15	Avibhāgādhikaraṇam	15	Parādhikaraṇam	15	Avibhāgādhikaraṇam
16	Avibhāgādhikaraṇam	16	Tadōkōdhikaraṇam	16	Avibhāgādhikaraṇam	16	Tadōkōgrajvalanādhikaraṇa
17	Tadōkōdhikaraṇam	17	Raśmyanusārādhikaraṇam	17–21	Tadōkōdhikaraṇam	17	Raśmyanusārādhikaraṇam
18–19	Raśmyadhikaraṇam	18	Niśādhikaraṇam	22	Yōgyadhikaraṇam	18	Niśādhikaraṇam
20–21	Dakshaṇāyanādhikaraṇam	19–20	Dakshaṇāyanādhikaraṇam			19–20	Dakshiṇāyanādhikaraṇam

Adhyaya IV, Pada 3

Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—6	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—5	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—6	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—5
1	Archirādyadhikaraṇam	1	Archirādyadhikaraṇam	1	Archirādyadhikaraṇam	1	Archirādyadhikaraṇam
2	Vāyvadhikaraṇam	2	Vāyvadhikaraṇam	2	Vāyuśabdādhikaraṇam	2	Vāyvadhikaraṇam
3	Taḍidadhikaraṇam	3	Varuṇādhikaraṇam	3	Taṭidadhikaraṇam	3	Varuṇādhikaraṇam
4–6	Ātivāhikādhikaraṇam	4–5	Ātivāhikādhikaraṇam	4–5	Ātivāhikādhikaraṇam	4–6	Ātivāhikādhikaraṇam
7–14	Kāryādhikaraṇam	6–15	Kāryādhikaraṇam	6	Vaidyutādhikaraṇam	7–16	Kāryādhikaraṇam
15–16	Apratīkālambanādhikaraṇam			7–16	Kāryādhikaraṇam		

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Adhyaya IV, Pada 4

According to Śrī Śankara Bhāshya		According to Śrī Rāmānuja Bhāshya		According to Śrī Madhva Bhāshya		According to Śrīkara Bhāshya	
Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—7	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—6	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—11	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—6
1–3	Sampadyāvirbhāvādhikaraṇam	1–3	Sampadyāvirbhāvādhikaraṇam	1	Sampadyadhikaraṇam	1–3	Sampadyāvirbhūtādhikaraṇam
4	Avibhāgādhikaraṇam	4	Avibhāgenadrushṭatvādhi.	2	Muktādhikaraṇam	4–7	Avibhāgādhikaraṇam
5–7	Brāhmādhikaraṇam	5–7	Brāhmādhikaraṇam	3	Ātmādhikaraṇam	8–12	Sankalpādhikaraṇam
8–9	Sankalpādhikaraṇam	8–9	Sankalpādhikaraṇam	4	Avibhāgādhikaraṇam	13–16	Sandhyādhikaraṇam
10–14	Abhāvādhikaraṇam	10–16	Abhāvādhikaraṇam	5–7	Brāhmādhikaraṇam	17–21	Jagadvyāpārādhikaraṇam
15–16	Pradīpādhikaraṇam	17–23	Jagadvyāpāravarjādhikaraṇam	8	Sankalpādhikaraṇam	22	Anāvruttiśabdādhikaraṇam
17–22	Jagadvyāpārādhikaraṇam			9	Ananyādhipatitvādhikaraṇam		
				10–16	Abhāvādhikaraṇam		
				17–20	Jagadvyāpārādhikaraṇam		
				21–22	Sthityadhikaraṇam		
				23	Anāvrutyadhikaraṇam		

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APPENDIX B.

Table showing Adhikaranas and Sutras according to the four principal Bhashyakaras.

Bhāshyakāras	Adhyāyas	Pādas	Adhikaraṇas	Sūtras
Śrī Śankara Bhāshya	4	4	192	555
Śrī Rāmānuja Bhāshya	4	4	156	545
Śrī Madhva Bhāshya	4	4	223	564
Śrīkara Bhāshya	4	4	113	544

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APPENDIX C.

Table showing the Differences in Adhikaranas and Sutras according to four principal Bhashyakaras.

Adhyāya	Pāda	Adhikaraṇa	Śankara Bhāshya	Rāmānuja Bhāshya	Madhva Bhāshya	Śrīkara Bhāshya
I	1	1	1	1	1	1
		2	2	2	2	2
		3	3	3	3	3
		4	4	4	4	4
		5	5-11	5-12	5-11	5-12
		6	12-19	13-20	12-19	13-20
		7	20-21	21-22	20-21	21-22
		8	22	23	22	23-24
		9	23	24	23	25-28
		10	24-27	25-28	24	29-31
		11	28-31	29-32	25-27	32
		12	..	..	28-31	..
	2	1	1-8	1-8	1-8	1-8
		2	9-10	9-12	9-10	9-10
		3	11-12	13-18	11-12	11-12
		4	13-17	19-21	13-17	13-17
		5	18-20	22-24	18-20	18-20
		6	21-23	25-33	21-23	21-23
		7	24-32	..	24-32	24-32
	3	1	1-7	1-6	1-7	1-7
		2	8-9	7-8	8-9	8-9
		3	10-12	9-11	10-12	10-12
		4	13	12	13	13
		5	14-21	13-22	14-21	14-21
		6	22-23	23-24	22-23	22-23
		7	24-25	25-29	24-25	24-25
		8	26-30	30-32	26-33	26-33
		9	31-33	33-41	34-38	34-38
		10	34-38	42-44	39	39
		11	39	..	40	40
		12	40	..	41	41
		13	41	..	42	42-43
		14	42-43	..	43	..
	4	1	1-7	1-7	1-9	1-7
		2	8-10	8-10	10-11	8-10
		3	11-13	11-13	12-14	11-13
		4	14-15	14-15	15	14-15
		5	16-18	16-18	16-23	16-18
		6	19-22	19-22	24-28	19-22
		7	23-27	23-28	29	23-27
		8	28	29	..	28
II	1	1	1-2	1-2	1-3	1-2
		2	3	3	4-5	3
		3	4-11	4-12	6-7	4-11
		4	12	13	8-13	12
		5	13	14	14	13
		6	14-20	15-20	15-21	14-20
		7	21-23	21-23	22-27	21-23
		8	24-25	24-25	28-32	24-25
		9	26-29	26-31	33-34	26-33
		10	30-31	32-36	35-37	34-35
		11	32-33	..	38	36
		12	34-36	..	..	..
		13	37	..	..	..
	2	1	1-10	1-9	1-4	1-9
		2	11	10-16	5	10
		3	12-17	17-26	6	11-16
		4	18-27	27-29	7-8	17-26
		5	28-32	30	9-10	27-29
		6	33-36	31-34	11-17	30-31
		7	37-41	35-38	18-25	32-36
		8	42-45	39-42	26-29	37-41
		9	..	..	30-32	42-45
		10	..	..	33-36	..
		11	..	..	37-41	..
		12	..	..	42-45	..
	3	1	1-7	1-9	1-7	1-6
		2	8	10-17	8	7-8
		3	9	18	9	9
		4	10	19-32	10	10
		5	11	33-39	11	11
		6	12	40-41	12	12
		7	13	42-52	13	13
		8	14	..	14	14
		9	15	..	15-16	15
		10	16	..	17	16
		11	17	..	18-19	17
		12	18	..	20-26	18-30
		13	19-32	..	27	31-37
		14	33-39	..	28-29	38-39
		15	40	..	30	40-50
		16	41-42	..	31-32	..
		17	43-57	..	33-42	..
		18	..	..	43-50	..
		19	..	..	51-53	..

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APPENDIX C.—(*Contd.*)

Adhyāya	Pāda	Adhikaraṇa	Śhankara Bhāshya	Rāmānuja Bhāshya	Madhva Bhāshya	Śrīkara Bhāshya
II	4	1	1-4	1-3	1-3	1-3
		2	5-6	4-5	4	4
		3	7	6-7	5	5-6
		4	8	8-11	6-7	7-11
		5	9-12	12	8	12-13
		6	13	13-14	9-10	14-15
		7	14-16	15-16	11-12	16-18
		8	17-19	17-19	13	..
		9	20-22	..	14	..
		10	..	..	15-17	..
		11	..	..	18-20	..
		12	..	..	21	..
		13	..	..	22-23	..
III	1	1	1-7	1-7	1	1-7
		2	8-11	8-11	2	8-11
		3	12-21	12-21	3	12-21
		4	22	22	4	22
		5	23	23	5	23
		6	24-27	24-27	6	24-27
		7	..	..	7	..
		8	..	..	8	..
		9	..	..	9	..
		10	..	..	10-12	..
		11	..	..	13-15	..
		12	..	..	16	..
		13	..	..	17	..
		14	..	..	18	..
		15	..	..	19-23	..
		16	..	..	24	..
		17	..	..	25	..
		18	..	..	26-27	..
		19	..	..	28	..
		20	..	..	29	..
	2	1	1-6	1-6	1-4	1-6
		2	7-8	7-8	5	7-8
		3	9	9	6	9
		4	10	10	7	10
		5	11-21	11-25	8	11-20
		6	22-30	26-29	9	21-25
		7	31-37	30-36	10	26-34
		8	38-41	37-40	11-13	35-36
		9	..	..	14-17	37-40
		10	..	..	18	..
		11	..	..	19	..
		12	..	..	20-21	..
		13	..	..	22	..
		14	..	..	23-27	..
		15	..	..	28-31	..
		16	..	..	32-34	..
		17	..	..	35-36	..
		18	..	..	37	..
		19	..	..	38	..
		20	..	..	39-42	..

Adhyāya	Pāda	Adhikaraṇa	Śankara Bhāshya	Rāmānuja Bhāshya	Madhva Bhāshya	Śrīkara Bhāshya
III	3	1	1-4	1-5	1-5	1-5
		2	5	6-9	6-9	6-9
		3	6-8	10	10	10
		4	9	11-17	11	11-17
		5	10	18	12	18
		6	11-13	19	13	19
		7	14-15	20-22	14	20-22
		8	16-17	23	15-16	23
		9	18	24	17	24
		10	19	25	18	25
		11	20-22	26	19	26
		12	23	27-31	20-21	27-31
		13	24	32	22-23	32
		14	25	33-34	24	33-34
		15	26	35-37	25	35-37
		16	27-28	38-40	26	38-40
		17	29-30	41	27-28	41
		18	31	42	29-30	42
		19	32	43	31-32	43
		20	33	44-50	33-34	44-50
		21	34	51-52	35-37	51-52
		22	35-36	53-54	38	53-54
		23	37	55	39	55
		24	38	56	40-42	56
		25	39	57-58	43	57-58
		26	40-41	59-64	44	59-60
		27	42	..	45	61-64
		28	43	..	46-47	63-62
		29	44-52	..	48-49	..
		30	53	..	50	..
		31	54-56	..	51	..
		32	57-58	..	52	..
		33	59	..	53	..
		34	60	..	54	..
		35	61	..	55-56	..
		36	62	..	57-58	..
		37	63-66	..	59	..
		38	67-68	..	60	..
		39	..	..	61	..
		40	..	..	62	..
		41	..	..	63-66	..
		42	..	..	67-68	..
		43	..	..	..	..
	4	1	1-17	1-20	1-9	1-16
		2	18-20	21-22	10-12	17-20
		3	21-22	23-24	13	21-22
		4	23-24	25	14-33	23-24
		5	25	26	34-40	25
		6	26-27	27	41-43	26
		7	28-31	28-31	44-46	27
		8	32-35	32-35	47-48	28-31
		9	36-39	36-39	49	32-35

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APPENDIX C.—(*Contd.*)

Adhyāya	Pāda	Adhikaraṇa	Śankara Bhāshya	Rāmānuja Bhāshya	Madhva Bhāshya	Śrīkara Bhāshya
III	4	10	40	40-43	50	36-39
		11	41-42	44-45	51	40-43
		12	43	46-48	..	44-46
		13	44-46	49	..	47-48
		14	47-49	50	..	49
		15	50	51	..	50
		16	51	..	..	51
		17	52	..	..	52
IV	1	1	1-2	1-2	1-2	1-2
		2	3	3	3	3
		3	4	4-5	4	4-5
		4	5	6	5	6
		5	6	7-11	6	7-12
		6	7-10	12	7-11	13
		7	11	13	12	14
		8	12	14	13-19	15
		9	13	15	..	16-18
		10	14	16-18	..	19
		11	15	19	..	..
		12	16-17	..	..	..
		13	18	..	..	..
		14	19	..	..	..
	2	1	1-2	1-2	1-2	1-2
		2	3	3	3	3
		3	4-6	4	4	4
IV	2	4	7	5-6	5	5-6
		5	8-11	7-13	6	7-13
		6	12-14	14	7-14	14
		7	15	15	15	15
		8	16	16	16	16
		9	17	17	17-21	17
		10	18-19	18	22	18
		11	20-21	19-20	..	19-20
	3	1	1	1	1	1
		2	2	2	2	2
		3	3	3	3	3
		4	4-6	4-5	4-5	4-6
		5	7-14	6-15	6	7-16
		6	15-16	..	7-16	..
	4	1	1-3	1-3	1	1-3
		2	4	4	2	4-7
		3	5-7	5-7	3	8-12
		4	8-9	8-9	4	13-16
		5	10-14	10-16	5-7	17-21
		6	15-16	17-22	8	22
		7	17-22	..	9	..
		8	..	..	10-16	..
		9	..	..	17-20	..
		10	..	..	21-22	..
		11	..	..	23	..

APPENDIX D.

Total Sutras in each Pada of each Adhikarana as appearing in the four principal Bhashyas.

Adhyāya	Pāda	Śankara Bhāshya	Rāmānuja Bhāshya	Madhva Bhāshya	Srīkara Bhāshya
I	1	31	32	31	32
	2	32	33	32	32
	3	43	44	43	43
	4	28	29	29	28
	Total	134	138	135	135
II	1	37	36	38	36
	2	45	42	45	45
	3	57	52	53	50
	4	22	19	23	18
	Total	161	149	159	149
III	1	27	27	29	27
	2	41	40	42	40
	3	68	64	68	64
	4	52	51	51	52
	Total	188	182	190	183
IV	1	19	19	19	18
	2	21	20	22	20
	3	16	15	16	16
	4	22	22	23	22
	Total	78	76	80	76
Grand	Total	561	545	564	543

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APPENDIX E.

The Use and Significance of Om.

In connection with what is stated on pages 84 and 246 of the Introduction in regard to *Praṇava*, the following note on its use and significance may prove interesting :—Considerable discussion has centered round the point whether *Aum* (or *Ōm* to use the modern spelling) forms an essential part (*avayava*) of the first *Sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa or not. The followers of Ānandatīrtha hold that it forms an essential part, while those of Rāmānuja hold that it does not. Ānandatīrtha, in commenting on I. 1. 1, quotes the *Garuḍa Purāṇa* for the view that from Vishṇu Parabrahman proceeded *two śabdas* at the time of creation, *viz.*, "*Ōmkāra*" and "*Atha*". Therefore the two form the first in order. *Ōmkāra* includes *Akāra*, *Ukāra* and *Makāra*, *nāda*, *bindu*, *ghōsha*, *śānta* and *atiśānta*. All these possess the name of Parabrahman and indicate in sound, symbol and expression the reason why it should be used as part of the text. This is accepted by all previous writers and therefore the term *Ōm* should be used with every *Sūtra*. The following passage taken from Ānandatīrtha's comments on I. 1. 1, explains his view :—

॥ ॐ अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ॐ ॥

अथशब्दो मङ्गळार्थोऽधिकारानंतर्यार्थश्च ॥ अतःशब्दो हेत्वर्थः ॥ उक्तं च गारुडे ॥

अथातःशब्दपूर्वाणि सूत्राणि निखिलान्यपि ।
प्रारभंते नियत्यैव तात्किमत्र नियामकम् ॥
कश्चार्थश्च तयोर्विद्वन् कथमुत्तमता तयोः ।
एतदाख्याहि मे ब्रह्मन्यथा ज्ञास्यामि तत्त्वतः ॥
एवमुक्तो नारदेन ब्रह्मा प्रोवाच सत्तमः ।
आनंतर्येऽधिकारस्य मंगळार्थे तथैव च ॥
अथशब्दस्त्वतःशब्दो हेत्वर्थे समुदीरितः ।
परस्य ब्रह्मणो विष्णोः प्रसादादिति वा भवेत् ॥
स हि सर्वमनोवृत्तिप्रेरकः समुदाहृतः ।
सिसृक्षोः परमाद्विष्णोः प्रथमं द्वौ विनिःसृतौ ॥
ओंकारश्चाथशब्दश्च तस्मात्प्राथमिकौ क्रमात् ।
तद्धेतुत्वं वदंश्चापि तृतीयोऽन उदाहृतः ॥
अकारः सर्ववागात्मा परब्रह्माभिधायकः ।
तथौ प्राणात्मकौ प्रोक्तौ व्याप्तिस्थितिविधायकौः ॥
अतश्च पूर्वमुच्चार्याः सर्व एते सतां मताः ।
अथातःशब्दयोरेवं वीर्यमाज्ञाय तत्त्वतः ॥
सूत्रेषु तु महाप्राज्ञा स्तावेवादौ प्रयुञ्जते ॥ इति, etc.

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Ōm thus indicates Parabrahman. Jayatīrtha in his *Nyāya Sudhā* (I. 1. 1) writes :—*Jīva jaḍātiriktasya jignāsyasya siddhiḥ.* Elucidating its meaning, he observes :—*Ōmkārasya tasya jignāsyasya guṇaiḥ ānandādi ananta kalyāṇa guṇairguṇān ōtatām vakti । pakshadvayēpi anantānavadya kalyāṇaguṇa pūrṇatā ōnkārasya arthaḥ ॥* (*Ibid.*) As *Ōmkāra* indicates Parabrahman, it is beyond the *jīva*. *Brahmatva* is within the reach of the *jīva*, but not the *Ōmkāra*. Consequently *Ōm* is discarded by commentators who do not adopt the *Dvaita* viewpoint.

That *Ōm* forms an essential part of the first *Sūtra* in the *Vēdānta Sūtras* is accordingly the view of Ānandatīrtha and his school. This view was opposed by one Srīnivāsāchārya in his *Praṇavadarpaṇā* (Madras *D.C.* X, Nos. 4932 and 4933). This work, however, was, in its turn, severely criticized by Vijayīndratīrtha, a *guru* of the Sumatīndramaṭha, in his *Praṇavadarpaṇa khaṇḍanam* (Madras *D.C.* X, No. 4798). The work above referred to—*Praṇavadarpaṇa*—should be distinguished from *Ōmkāravādārtha* by Srīnivāsa, son of Srīnivāsāchārya and Lakshmāmba and disciple of Kauṇḍinya Srīnivāsadīkshita (Madras *D.C.* X, Nos. 4871 and 4872). This Srīnivāsa, son of Srīnivāsatātāchārya (not Srīnivāsāchārya) and Lakshmāmba and disciple of Kauṇḍinya *gōtra*, was the author of *Jignāsādarpaṇa*, which is an elaborate investigation into the meaning of the word *Jignāsā* in the first aphorism of the *Vedānta Sūtras* (Madras *D.C.* X, No. 4883). *Praṇavadarpaṇa* is a separate work written by Srīnivāsāchārya, son of Srīsailatātāchārya and Lakshmi and pupil of Srīnivāsādhvarin of Kauṇḍinya *gōtra* (Madras *D.C.* X, Nos. 4932 and 4933).

The *Dhyānabindōpanishad* explains how the Praṇava, *Ōm*, is to be used in *yōgic* meditation (Madras *D.C.* I. 3, No. 550). Similarly the *Panchabrahmōpanishad* describes the five manifestations of Śiva conceived as God and teaches that the five-syllabled *mantra—Namaśśivāya*—is the means of worshipping him and of thereby attaining salvation (Madras *D.C.* I. 3, No. 590). (*Cf. Nārāyaṇōpanishad* which states that eight-syllabled *mantra—Ōm namō Nārāyaṇāya*—is the means of worshipping Nārāyaṇa and thus winning salvation.)

Though Srīpati condemns *Pāncharātra Āgama*, for establishing the supremacy of *Ōmkāra*, he prefers to seek support from it (see his comment under II. 3. 42).

In the *Vishṇu Purāṇa*, which goes back to at least the 5th century A.D., Vishṇu is described to be in all things. "Within *Pradhāna* resides Soul, diffusive, conscious and self-irradiating, as fire (is inherent) in flint or sesamum oil in seed" (Wilson, *Vishṇu*

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Purāṇa, II. 233), while both *Pradhāna* and spirit are encompassed by the energy of Vishṇu. It is the energy of Vishṇu which causes *Pradhāna* and spirit to come together in creation, which keeps them in union, and which separates them at dissolution. It is Vishṇu who causes all things to evolve. And Vishṇu is Brahma, the Supreme Spirit, from whom the world proceeds, by whom it subsists, to whom it will return. "He is the Supreme abode of the existent and the non-existent. He it is by whose non-difference *from Brahma*, this entire universe, moveable and immoveable, *has its being*" (*Ibid.*, 236). The Sun is represented as part of Vishṇu. Light is his essence, and the light is called forth by reciting the syllable *Ōm*, a syllable which itself is Vishṇu, the substance of the three *Vēdas*. The Sun is, according to the *Purāṇa*, daily attacked by crowds of Vālakhilyas, demons no bigger than one's thumb, and it is the imperative duty of all the twice-born to sprinkle water that has been purified by the recital of the sacred letters *Ōm* and the Gāyatri verse. This sprinkling of the consecrated water causes the demons to disappear and the Sun is delivered from their attacks. Accordingly none should fail to observe this daily morning ritual.

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APPENDIX F.

Neo-Platonism and Christianity.

In connection with the views expressed on p. 716 of the Introduction of the influence of Neo-Platonism on Christianity, it is needful to refer to recent opinions expressed on the subject. The question is a complicated one and as remarked by Mr. J. M. Mitchell, who has ably brought up the literature on the subject as outlined by Adolph Harnack, "it is scarcely possible to get a complete view of their mutual relations". If Neo-Platonism is understood in the widest sense, as the highest and fittest expression of the religious movements at work in the Græco-Roman empire from the second to the fifth century, then it may be regarded as the twin sister of the Church dogmatic which grew up during the same period ; the younger sister was brought up by the elder, then rebelled against her and at last tyrranised over her. The Neo-Platonists themselves characterised the theologians of the Church as intruders, who had appropriated the Greek philosophy and spoiled it by the admixture of strange fables. Thus Porphyry says of Origen (Euseb., *H.E.*, VI. 19) : "The outer life of Origen was that of a Christian and contrary to law ; but as far as his views of things and of God are concerned, he thought like the Greeks, whose conceptions he overlaid with foreign myths." Where did he get these "myths" from? This verdict of Porphyry's has been characterised as "more just and apt" than of the theologians or the Greek philosophers, when they accused them of having borrowed all their really valuable doctrines from the ancient Christian books. But the important point is that the relationship has been acknowledged on both sides. In so far as Neo-Platonism and the Church dogmatic both set out from the felt need of redemption ; both sought to deliver the soul from sensuality and recognized men's inability without divine aid—without a revelation—to attain salvation and a sure knowledge of the truth, "they are", it is added, "at once most intimately related and at the same time mutually independent". It is suggested that during the third century A.D., Neo-Platonism exercised little influence on Christianity. During the fourth century A.D., however, the influence of Neo-Platonism on Oriental theologians proved of the utmost importance. Apart from certain doctrines, Neo-Platonists and Church theologians, indeed, drew so closely together that "many of them are completely at one". In ethical precepts, in directions of right living (that is, asceticism), the two systems more and more approximated each other. But it was here that Neo-Platonism finally celebrated its greatest triumph. "It indoctrinated the Church with all its mysticism, its mystic exercises and even its magical cultus as

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taught by Iamblichus. The works of the pseudo-Dionysius contain a Gnosis in which, by means of the teaching of Iamblichus and Proclus, the Church's theology is turned into a scholastic mysticism, with directions on matters of practice and ritual.....The influence of these writings, first on the East, and then—after 9th (or 12th) century—on the West, cannot be over-estimated." Augustine came fully under the influence of Neo-Platonism. Through it, he got rid of scepticism and the last remnants of Manichæism. In his *Confessions* (Book VII), he has recorded how much he owed to the perusal of Neo-Platonic works. On all the cardinal doctrines—God, matter, the relation of God to the world, freedom and evil—Augustine retained the impress of Neo-Platonism. But at the same time, he is the one early Christian writer who states the differences between Christianity and Neo-Platonism distinctly. (See Book VII, Chapters ix-xxi.) Why did Neo-Platonism succumb to Christianity? Catholic Christianity and Catholic Theology, it is said, conquered it "after assimilating nearly everything that it contained". This conquest of Neo-Platonism took place in the Empire of Constantine and Theodosius. And when we remember the attendant circumstances in which this "conquest" came about, we can rightly enquire "how much the essential doctrines of Christianity contributed to the victory, and what share must be assigned to the organization of the Church." It has been held on high authority that the empirical science of the Renaissance and the two following centuries was "itself a new development of Platonism and Neo-Platonism, as opposed to rationalistic dogmatism with its contempt for experience". Magic, astrology and alchemy—all the outgrowth of Neo-Platonism—gave the first effectual stimulus to the observation of nature, and consequently to natural science and in this way finally extinguished barren rationalism. Thus, in the history of science Neo-Platonism has played a part and rendered services which Plotinus, or Iamblichus or Proclus never dreamt. (See J. M. Mitchell in the *Ency. Brit.*, Eleventh Edition, XIX, 377-378.)

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED.

Ait. Upa. : Aitareyōpanishad.

Atharv. Upa. : Atharvasikhōpanishad.

Atharvasiras or Atharva. Upa. : Atharvasiras Upanishad.

Athar. Upa. : Atharvōpanishad.

Brihad. Upa. : Brihadāraṇyakōpanishad.

Chch. Upa. : Chchāndōgyōpanishad.

E.C. : Epigraphia Carnatika.

E.I. : Epigraphia Indica.

I.A. : Indian Antiquary.

Is. Upa. : Isāvāsyōpanishad.

Kaiv. Upa. : Kaivalyōpanishad.

Katha Upa. : Kathōpanishad.

Mādhy. Upa. : Mādhyadinayōpanishad.

Madras D.C. of MSS. : Madras Descriptive Catalogue of MSS.

Madras T.C. of MSS. : Madras Triennial Catalogue of MSS.

M.E.R. Madras Epigraphy Report.

Mahōpa. : Mahōpanishad.

Mand. Upa. : Māndūkyōpanishad.

Mund. Upa. : Mundakōpanishad.

Muk. Upa. : Muktōpanishad.

S.B.E. : Sacred Books of the East.

Svēt. Upa. : Svētāsvatarōpanishad.

Taitt. Upa. : Taittirīya Upanishad.

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ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA.

Page 7, Line 5, add the following :—

In a private communication addressed to me, Mr. Ramakrishna Kavi, M.A., Tirupati, writes that Srīkara is mentioned as the writer of a *Vritti* on the *Pūrva Mīmāmsa* by Srīdhara, assigned to 935 A.D. Murāri Misra, a writer on the *Mīmāmsa*, is, according to Mr. Ramakrishna Kavi, known to have mentioned Srīkara in his *Tripādinītinayana*. This Murāri Misra was, he adds, an younger contemporary of Mandana and Prabhākara. Srīkara, he further states, is mentioned by Chandra about (850 A.D.) and, "seems to have written a *Bhāshya* on the *Uttara Mīmāmsa*, *i.e.*, the *Brahma Sūtra*, also." It is known that Srīdhara is saluted by Bālakrishnānanda Saraswati in the introductory stanzas of his commentary on Jaimini (*Jaimini Sūtravrittiḥ*) along with Gōpālānanda and Svayamprakāsa [*Madras Tri. Cat. of MSS.*, Vol. I, Part i, Skt. B, p. 55, R. No. 383 (*b*)]. The works of Murāri and Srīdhara are so far unknown in the MS. collections of South India. So far as I know, neither the Madras nor the Tanjore MS. libraries possess any works of theirs. Ramakrishna Kavi adds: "Srīpati is indeed a later writer. They are two different writers. Their *Bhāshyas* are also different. They are called *Srīkara Bhāshya* and *Srīpati Bhāshya*. Srīpati is probably later than Pālkuriki Sōmanātha. A close examination of the *Bhāshyas* of Srīpati and Srīkara will reveal the priority of one of them. Srīpati is clearly an Ārādhya, while Srīkara, as understood from his quotations, was only a profounder of Sivādvaita like Srīkantha." I have been unable to trace the *Vritti* of Srīkara on the *Pūrva Mīmāmsa* referred to by Mr. Ramakrishna Kavi. Nor have I been so fortunate as to trace the reference to Srīkara referred to by him in Murāri's work, which also I have been unable to get at so far. As regards Srīkara's *Bhāshya* on the *Uttara Mīmāmsa*, I have been equally unsuccessful in tracing it. As to Srīkara and Srīpati being different writers on the *Uttara Mīmāmsa*, I am unable to say anything more useful at present; nor am I able to add to what I have said already in regard to the date of Srīpati. Until Srīkara's *Bhāshya*, referred to by Mr. Ramakrishna Kavi, is available, we are obviously not in a position to say anything about his standpoint—whether he was an exponent of Sivādvaita or any other system of philosophy. Srīpati, as will be seen from what has been stated above, was a Vīrasaiva and professedly a Bhēdābhēdavādin. As to his being later in date than Pālkuriki Sōmanātha, there can be no doubt whatever. Piduparti Basavaṇṇa who lived

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later than 1480 A.D., says in his *Basava Purāṇa* that King Pratāpa Rudra was king during Pālkuriki Sōmanātha's time. There has been some discussion as to the identity of this Pratāpa Rudra: is he Pratāpa Rudra I, who ruled between 1132–1198 A.D., or Pratāpa Rudra II, who was king between 1292–1325 A.D.? The real name of the former was Rudra, though modern writers have described him as Pratāpa Rudra I. That the Pratāpa Rudra mentioned by Piduparti Basavaṇṇa was Pratāpa Rudra II, seems to follow from the fact that Pālkuriki Sōmanātha is to have foretold the overthrow of the Kākatīya Kingdom shortly after his visit to Warrangal. And we know that Pratāpa Rudra II proved the last great Kākatīya King. Malik Kafur, General of Alauddin Khilji, twice invaded Warrangal and on the second occasion, took Pratāpa Rudra prisoner to Delhi. He returned to his capital as a vassal of the Sultan of Delhi and died in 1325 A.D. The prophesy of Sōmanātha that the Kākatīya Kingdom would fall, reported by Basavaṇṇa, could thus only refer to the final overthrow and not to any other event, *i.e.*, to any event in the reign of King Rudra, the earlier king, referred to as Pratāpa Rudra I. Accordingly, we have to assign Pālkuriki Sōmanātha to the reign of Pratāpa Rudra II, who reigned between 1292–1325 A.D. But if, as is suggested in some quarters, Pālkuriki Sōmanātha was a contemporary of Basava himself, he would have to be set down to the time of King Rudra and assigned to a period between 1132–1198 A.D. If so, the prophesy alleged to have been uttered by him in regard to the destruction of the Kākatīya Kingdom should be taken to be a later embellishment invented by ardent followers of his to augment his greatness in the public eye. However this may be, Pālkuruki Sōmanātha should have lived before *circa* 1400 A.D., the approximate time about which Srīpati, the commentator, lived.

Page 46, Line 26. For "12th" *read* "10th".

Page 47, Line 3, add at the end :—

Mr. Rangacharya, in his *Inscriptions of the Madras Presidency*, II, 893, notes under *Duggirala* 209 A :—"Records that in the reign of Kākatīya Gaṇapatidēva, his brother Bhatta Bhāskara gave in *Sakha* 1056 (= A.D. 1134) the village of Duggirala (present Ellore Taluk, Krishna District) in Khandavāti in 22 parts to Brahmans of 12 *gotrās* and similarly 43 other villages (*Mackenzie MSS., Book* XX., 67-70)". There is some mistake here, as we see Bhatta Bhāskara is described here as the "brother" of "Kākatīya Gaṇapatidēva".

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